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Preface 
Abbas Amanat 
Yale University 
This volume of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental 
Studies Bulletin Series, entitled Transformations of Middle Eastern 
Natural Environments: Legacies and Lessons, is based on an interna­
tional interdisciplinary conference by the same name organized 
by Yale’s Council on Middle East Studies. The conference, which 
was held October 30-November 1, 1997 at the Yale Center for 
International and Area Studies, brought together an array of 
scholars, practitioners, and journalists interested in and concerned 
with the natural environments of the Middle East. 
The interdisciplinary nature of the conference and this volume 
are significant. It is our belief that just as environmental problems 
transcend national boundaries and present widespread concerns 
throughout society, issues of the environment should not be dis­
cussed solely by people of the same discipline or profession. Given 
the complexity and diversity of environmental degradation in the 
Middle East, a comprehensive approach which takes into account 
historical and societal, as well as ecological and technical aspects, is 
the most congenial approach to a broad understanding of the prob­
lems in question. This present undertaking is but one step toward 
such an understanding. It is our hope that the following essays will 
represent the state of today’s scholarship, illuminate what we can 
learn about the past, and suggest what the future may entail. We 
hope furthermore that this volume may not only be useful for those 
scholars and practitioners currently working in the field, but also to 
students and others who wish to know more about the Middle East 
and its environments. 
The conference and this publication would not have been 
possible without generous financial support from Yale’s Kempf 
Memorial Fund at the Provost’s Office, the Yale Center for Interna­
tional and Area Studies, and Yale’s School of Forestry and Environ­
mental Studies. My thanks are due to Arline McCord, Associate 
Provost, Professor Gustav Ranis, Director of the Yale Center for 
International and Area Studies, and Jared Cohon, the former Dean 
of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. My 
special gratitude is also due to three Ph.D candidates, Jeff Albert, 
Magnus Bernhardsson and Roger Kenna, whose contributions were 
crucial to the organization of the conference and the editing of this 
stimulating volume. The quality of the papers presented and the 
overall format of the conference and of this volume testify to their 
  
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dedication and diligence. Professors Frank Hole, J. A. Allan, and 
Harvey Weiss provided sound advice and helped with identifying 
which key areas should be covered. They also helped organize three 
significant panels in their area of interest. Furthermore, Jane 
Coppock, Bulletin Series Co-editor and Assistant Dean at Yale’s 
School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, was critical in the 
publication process. Without her energy and enthusiasm this vol­
ume would never have reached its present shape. I would also like to 
express my appreciation for the work Bulletin Series Co-editor 
Joseph Miller was able to contribute to this project before his death 
in July of this year after a long illness. 
I would also like to thank all the participants in the conference, 
many of whom traveled great distances to come to New Haven. A 
conference is only as good as the quality of its participants. And in 
our case, we were especially fortunate, as the conference was charac­
terized by high academic and professional standards, reflected both 
in the following essays and in presentations, observations, and con­
versations which enriched the conference but by their ephemeral 
nature cannot be incorporated into a written volume. 
I hope that the dialogue initiated at our conference and contin­
ued in this volume will bring the issue of Middle Eastern environ­
ments the attention it deserves. 
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Introduction 
Jeff Albert, Magnus Bernhardsson, and Roger Kenna 
Yale University 
Scholars recognize at least two profoundly important characteristics 
that have combined to give the Middle East its enduring importance in 
world history. First, the region has been a wellspring of major civiliza­
tions and religions, and second, it is located at the junction of Asia, 
Europe and Africa, and has long contributed to important exchanges of 
goods and ideas. A less discussed, but crucial thread woven into the 
tapestry of Middle Eastern history is the long and complex relationship 
between the region’s natural environments and its human inhabitants. 
If one conceives of “the environment” as the physical, chemical, 
and biological integrity of natural ecosystems, the contemporary 
Middle East can certainly be thought of as a place in crisis. Burgeoning 
human populations and rising standards of living are testing the limits 
of plant, water, and air resources, while sensitive territories are 
placed increasingly at risk. At the same time, pastoral lifestyles which 
have survived for centuries are now threatened, and international 
tensions are compounded by pressing environmental issues such as 
water scarcity and pollution. 
Notwithstanding the serious environmental threats currently 
facing the region, however, it can be argued that Middle Eastern 
peoples, in fact, were among the first to become privy to the sensitivity 
of natural environments. 
There are clear historical examples of the consideration paid by 
the region’s pre-modern residents to the fragility of nature, and the 
lessons that that fragility has taught. The Fertile Crescent was home to 
one of the original departures from hunting and gathering to seden­
tary cultivation, and it has been posited that soil salinization from 
irrigation played a central role in the demise of Sumer in the second 
millenium BCE (Jacobsen and Adams 1958). But as Paul Ward En­
glish points out in these pages, groundwater has also been sustainably 
extracted for centuries with the use of self-regulating chain wells, 
known as qanats. Indeed, the venerable age of the civilizations of the 
Middle East requires that the notion of “environment” be defined 
in ways very different from how it has been presented in the modern 
West. Sharif Elmusa, a contributor to this volume who grew up in the 
region, once remarked that the first thing that comes to mind when he 
thinks of “nature” is a plowed field, not a tract of wilderness. 
Early 20th century scientific models of human-environment 
interactions focused on disturbance and recovery, as though the envi­
ronment were a passive receiver of human action. Later formulations 
 
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conceived of an interface of natural systems and social systems, a partial 
intersection of two sets (Bormann et al. 1993). Others have gone farther 
still, disputing that any portion of the natural system is isolated from 
human influences, asserting that even apparently “virgin” environments 
show evidence of human impact (Vogt et al. 1997). They place empha­
sis on ecosystem “legacies,” signs of the momentum of a natural system, 
which have been imparted to it by the history of its interaction with 
humans. Middle Eastern history, many would claim, supports this view. 
Despite such a long history of human-environment interaction, 
the Middle East is an area of surprising biological diversity. Al­
though the stereotype of the Middle East as a barren landscape is 
predominant, the reality is quite different. The area that was Man­
date Palestine, for example, is host to nearly 90 plant species/1000 
km2 (more than double that of the United States). Located at the 
juncture of several major terrestrial ecosystems (including the tem­
perate grasslands of Mesopotamia, the Mediterranean semi-desert 
and arid grasslands, the schlerophyllous woodlands and shrublands 
of the Lebanese and Turkish coasts, and the deserts of Sinai and 
Arabia), the region hosts over 500 species of migrating, wintering 
and resident birds (well above 15 species/1000 km2, an order of 
magnitude greater than most of Europe) (Leshem 1996). 
A desire to better understand the relationship between humans and 
nature in an area which has been continuously settled for millenia 
inspired us to convene “Transformations of Middle Eastern Natural 
Environments: Legacies and Lessons,” a conference which took place 
between October 30 and November 1, 1997, at Yale University, spon­
sored by the Council on Middle East Studies at the Yale Center for 
International and Area Studies. The event included well over 70 partici­
pants from the Middle East, Europe, and North America (a list of pan­
els and participants can be found at the end of the volume). In 
organizing this conference, we sought to focus attention on 
the following questions: 
•	 What are the key elements that define Middle Eastern 
natural environments? 
•	 What are the core issues of environmental change in the 
Middle East as the 21st century approaches? 
•	 How have the human inhabitants of the Middle East inter­
acted with these environments and how have both sides 
changed in the process? 
•	 How can perceptions of the value of natural resources, as well 
as the belief systems reflecting these values, be characterized? 
•	 Do our assessments of environmental legacies enable us to 
propose lessons to guide future policies? If so, what lessons 
can we offer? 
  
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The event’s earnest attempt to answer these questions spawned 
the volume you hold in your hands. 
Our endeavor first required a definition of the region in ques­
tion. What is the “Middle East?” We opted for an exceedingly broad 
and inclusive operational definition of the term. The geographic 
bounds, which are indicated in Figure 1, encompasses peoples who 
are linked by physiography, climate and culture. 
The breadth of the central questions articulated above was such 
that only an extremely diverse collection of scholars and practitio­
ners could be hoped to make progress toward answers. By conse­
quence, the conference and the volume drew from a wide spectrum 
of disciplines, ranging from climatology and marine ecology on the 
one end to cultural studies and art history on the other, with plant 
genetics, agronomy, fisheries management, regional planning, geog­
raphy, climate change, remote sensing technology, international 
Figure 1 
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relations, political science, human ecology, history, demography, 
and anthropology all falling somewhere between.1 
In this volume, to answer the first question about what key 
elements define the environment of the Middle East, Michael Mann 
and Raymond Bradley, co-authors of an important recent study 
performing historic global climate reconstructions (Mann et al. 
1998), provide an assessment of the global climate patterns which 
are best correlated with mesoscale variations in the Middle East. 
They emphasize (implicitly) that one major element of the environ­
ment of the Middle East is the variability of temperature and rainfall. 
Variability of the biotic factors (as opposed to abiotic climate 
factors) is also investigated in these pages. Keith Cressman, in his 
essay, considers modern efforts to understand and defend against 
one biotic factor in particular, the plague of biblical antiquity, the 
desert locust. Amir Afkhami evaluates a different plague—cholera in 
Iran—and demonstrates how its transmission was facilitated, ironi­
cally, by the qanat system, an otherwise efficient and environmen­
tally benign hydraulic technology. 
Additional important elements of the Middle Eastern environ­
ment are water scarcity, and as a partial result, conflict. John Water­
bury and Dale Whittington investigate both questions in their 
assessment of a resource once deemed so vast as to be infinite: the 
River Nile. Growing populations make the status quo arrangement, 
Egyptian dominance, a far less certain question than in decades past. 
Another river basin, the Jordan, is the subject of another set of 
studies which focus on the elements of scarcity and conflict. Uri 
Shamir provides reflections on recent water agreements between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians and Jordanians, respectively, while 
Aaron Wolf presents the historical context for Arab and Israeli 
hydrostrategies, as well as a proposed refutation of the “hydraulic 
imperative” hypothesis. Sharif Elmusa targets his essay on a specific 
proposal for regional accommodation, the fabled “Johnston Plan,” 
and in investigating its evolution, makes an argument for its 
modern application. 
Several core issues of environmental change—our second 
central question—emerge from the papers in the volume. Onn 
Winckler surveys population trends and government responses, with 
a focus on the Arab countries of the region. His assessment is a 
sobering one. Prominent among the core issues in the region are 
food production and the ability to meet the demands of rising popu­
lations. A. A. Jaradat, on the other hand, offers an overview of the 
historic role the Fertile Crescent has played in modern agriculture 
worldwide, as well as the opportunities associated with agricultural 
transformations and the reduction of genetic biodiversity. 
1	 Due to the multiple disciplines represented 
and their often distinct jargons, we decided 
to allow for a variety of terms in describing 
the area we define as the Middle East. The 
reader will therefore encounter several 
terms, such as Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), Near East, or West Asia 
North Africa (WANA). Those terms were 
the choice of the authors. 
  
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Kouchoukos et al., in describing the tools available for monitoring 
land use and land cover change, provide additional insights into agri­
cultural  change—principally irrigation and the expansion of cultiva­
tion into marginal areas. These changes are sufficiently widespread 
and dramatic that they can be understood using images resolved from 
satellite platforms. J. A. Allan, in his work on the political economy of 
water, considers the water/food nexus and the role of international 
trade in the avoidance of violent conflict over water. 
Also noteworthy among the core issues in the region is the integ­
rity of the marine environment. Pearson et al. present a case study of 
oil pollution in the Gulf of Oman, highlighting the sensitivity of 
marine resources and the ease with which they can be impaired. 
Menakhem Ben-Yami and Izzat Feidi offer discussions of a particu­
lar marine resource, the fishery, Ben-Yami focusing on the eastern 
Mediterranean and Feidi on the development challenges fisheries 
pose to communities throughout the Arab world. 
The interaction of humans and nature is the central theme of 
many of the papers presented in the volume. Peter Christensen 
investigates the history of irrigated agriculture with a critical eye on 
its limitations and the damages it wreaks on both human and natu­
ral systems. Peter Beaumont considers the massive hydrologic and 
agricultural implications of the Turkish Southeast Anatolia Project 
(GAP) for Syria and Iraq, the downstream riparians on the Tigris 
and Euphrates Rivers. Lois Beck and Susanne Steinmann provide 
case studies of nomadic peoples. Beck offers an overview of her 
extensive anthropological research among the Qashqa’i in Iran 
and their changing relation with the natural environment during 
momentous political changes in recent decades. Her discussion 
reminds us not to overlook people in any environmental analysis. 
Steinmann presents a critical analysis of gender-specific behaviors 
among the Beni Guil pastoralists in Morocco and shows how 
gendered resource exploitation is changed through sedentariza­
tion and urbanization. Behrooz Morvaridi considers the case of 
contract farming in Turkey to examine the disconnect between 
centralized agricultural planning and local conditions, hypothesizing 
that damage to land resources is attributable to the nature of the 
relationship between farmers and their government clients. Finally, 
in an examination of a profound human interference with a natural 
system, Daniel Golani surveys the impacts of the creation of the Suez 
Canal, and the subsequent interlinking of the Mediterranean and 
Red Seas, on fish population dynamics. 
Four contributions on nature and culture offer insights into the 
interplay between cultural norms and the environment, with par­
ticular emphasis on the idea of the garden. Karen Polinger Foster 
 
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focuses on exotic flora and fauna in ancient times and how they 
served as integral components of the idea of the garden. Attilio 
Petruccioli examines the idea of the Islamic garden and raises im­
portant theoretical and methodological issues which will serve 
as useful paradigms in future research. Heidi Walcher’s contribution 
is a useful companion to Petruciolli’s, since her work explores sev­
eral of his themes within the context of the city of Isfahan in Iran. 
Finally, environmental scientist Daniel Hillel utilizes his extensive 
knowledge of the natural environments of the Middle East to hy­
pothesize about the advent of monotheism in the ancient Middle 
East. His hypothesis is one intriguing answer to our question about 
how perceptions of nature, and belief systems reflecting those values, 
can be characterized. 
Finally, there is the question of legacies and lessons. Perhaps 
the strongest belief guiding both the conference and the volume is 
that good information and good communication, even across en­
duringly difficult political and cultural boundaries, will do more to 
focus attention on, and move toward solution of, environmental 
issues of critical importance to all inhabitants of the region than any 
other factors. It is toward that end, and in that spirit, that our en­
deavors are undertaken. 
We ended our conference after three days of lectures and pre­
sentations with an open discussion, from which two wonderful 
memories emerged. First, Youssef Barkoudah elected not to deliver 
an academic address, but instead to present a heartfelt account of 
the landscape changes he has witnessed in the Syrian village of his 
childhood. His description of “the day the qanat dried up” as a 
result of the construction of mechanized deep wells miles away was 
both powerful and moving, and placed much of what was discussed 
during the prior three days in a very human context. Second, Daniel 
Hillel ended the conference with an inspiring etymological discourse 
on the expressions describing the natural world, inspiring shouts in 
Arabic, Persian, Hebrew, and English from participants in the 
audience. Although Yale anthropologist Frank Hole pronounced 
Professor Hillel’s address to have provided “closure” to our event, 
we are hopeful that this volume instead will open readers’ minds to 
the complex and varied environmental changes which have charac­
terized the Middle East since antiquity and the importance of con­
tinuing to work in cooperation toward successfully functioning 
human and natural environments in the region. 
  
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Section I: Agriculture and Pastoralism 
Middle Eastern Irrigation: Legacies and Lessons 
Peter Christensen 
University of Copenhagen 
ABSTRACT 
This article argues that the pre-modern Middle East suffered a long period of political and economic decline after 
achieving a remarkable fluorescence centered on the Sassanian Empire (ca. 500 CE). Building on the works of various 
predecessors, the Sassanians managed to construct irrigation works on the Mesopotamian floodplain which provided 
them with an immensely wealthy material base. This base, however, had been built in a natural environment that was 
relatively fragile and susceptible to disruption. When new and properly maintained, Sassanian dams and canals enabled 
their owners to attain great riches. With time, however, thorough upkeep of these systems exceeded the ability of the 
Sassanians and their Muslim successors. Canals silted up and agricultural lands without adequate drainage suffered from 
salination. By themselves, these problems contributed to the decline of the region’s agro-ecological productivity. Other 
factors, however, exacerbated the decline. Epidemic disease, especially plague, and wars prevented the region’s inhabit­
ants from remedying problems such as siltation and salination. The result of this combination of systemic fragility and 
regular visitations by war and disease was the decline that had become so evident by the early nineteenth century. 
Beginning in the nineteenth century, under the influence of European technological advances, a movement began which 
proposed to reverse the environmental (and therefore political-economic) decline of the Middle East through the 
application of modern irrigation technologies. Although the final outcome of this attempted revitalization remains to be 
determined, the author argues that preliminary indications thus far do not provide much hope for long-term productivity 
and sustainability. 
In 1471, the Venetian merchant Josafat Barbaro, traveling with 
his companions along the road to Isfahan, marveled at how people 
had managed to cultivate this arid and stony land by means of 
underground canals, i.e., qanats. Without these, he said, “there 
could be no dwelling there” (Barbaro 1873). Almost two thousand 
years earlier, Greek invaders of the Iranian plateau had admired 
these same ingenious devices (Polybios 1922 edition). Indeed, qanats 
have played a crucial role over the millennia in the resilience of the 
small oases of the Iranian plateau. 
Of course, some settlements on the plateau declined or were 
even abandoned. The famous cities of Ray and Nishapur are perhaps 
the most striking examples of decline. The small Parthian and 
Sassanian-era towns of southern Fars had comparable histories. 
Nevertheless, in most cases, derelict and abandoned settlements 
were replaced by successor settlements (e.g., Mashhad took the place 
of Nishapur). In the long-term perspective, the resiliency of human 
habitation on the plateau, linked to the use of qanats, is remarkable. 
Other irrigated settlements in the Middle East have, however, 
proven to be less stable. At the beginning of the early modern 
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period, when Barbaro visited Isfahan, desertification and recession 
had already occurred on a large scale, perhaps most notably in the 
alluvial plains of Mesopotamia (including Khuzistan), which in 
antiquity and the early Middle Ages had held the largest population 
cluster in Southwest Asia, and had formed the basis of successive 
empires. In this region settled agriculture and urbanization had 
declined steeply after the early Middle Ages. A comparable decline 
had overtaken the Sistan Basin and the delta of the Murghab, where 
the great Marv oasis was largely abandoned by 1400. Further east, 
in the country of the Yeti-su, “The Land of the Seven Streams” (or 
Semirechie), a marked contraction of settlement and urban life had also 
occurred by the 14th and 15th centuries. Even Egypt, where irrigation 
was practiced under more favourable conditions than in most other 
places, suffered decline, though certainly on a less severe scale.1
1  It would seem that in 1800 the population 
Long-term fluctuations in population size, settlement numbers, was between 3 and 3.5 million. Before that 
cultivated area, economic diversity, and trade volume, can, of we have no reliable figures, so the decline 
cannot be quantified in any way. Sugges­course, be seen in all societies, including Europe. Moreover, many 
tions that the population at the time of the
irrigated settlements in the Middle East and Central Asia have Persian conquest, i.e., 525 B.C., had been 
proved remarkably resilient, in particular the oases of the Iranian above 20 million and had reached more 
than 30 million by late Roman times, theplateau and of Transoxania (the Zarafshan Valley). But even allow-
same as in 1966, may be dismissed as 
ing for these fluctuations, and for the fact that ruins sometimes wildly inflated: (Issawi 1970) and 
represent successive settlements, and thus may not be evidence of (Hollingsworth 1969). The first reliable 
census recorded a population of almost 10decline, and allowing finally for the fact that our image of vanished 
million in 1897. 
centers of civilization may be unduly exaggerated, it remains indis­
putable that the Middle East as a whole suffered marked, cumulative The rise of the Ottoman Empire as a great2
decline in pre-industrial times.2	 power in the 14th and 15th centuries 
would seem to go against this view, but
Western scholars have suggested a number of explanations for the resource base of this empire lay 
this decline. Some argue that the need for irrigation and flood con- primarily outside the irrigated enclaves of 
the Middle East.trol caused the rise of Oriental Despotism, regarded as a particularly 
nasty form of centralized government that eventually stifled society 
(Wittfogel 1960). Others point to the wartime destruction caused by 
the barbarian invasions of the Middle Ages, in particular the 
Mongols (13th century) and Timur-é Lenk/Tamerlane (14th cen­
tury). This explanation largely paraphrases medieval chroniclers’ 
horror stories and rests more or less explicitly on the assumption 
that the nomadism of the invaders and the settled agriculture of the 
invaded were antagonistic methods of subsistence.
 For a variety of reasons, these two explanations are unsatisfac­
tory. The concept of Oriental Despotism was more or less discredited 
in the course of the debate on Karl Wittfogel’s thesis; today “the 
Oriental Despot reigns with foremost authority in the realms of 
fiction” (Steadman 1969). The chronology of the barbarian inva­
sions, on the other hand, does not correspond to the process of 
decline. There are, fortunately, more creditable explanations. 
 
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More recently, scholars have begun to investigate the inherent 
environmental constraints, such as salination, destructive flooding, 
and drifting sands, that typify the Middle East. According to the 
hypothesis suggested by Thorkild Jacobsen and other participants in 
the Diyala Basin Project, Mesopotamia in particular was predisposed 
to these dangers owing to high water-tables and poor natural drain­
age: the salination of once-fertile soils and siltation of crucial water­
courses made irrigation unsustainable over the long run.3 
Although the idea of environmental limits, with its obvious links 
to present-day concerns (i.e., modern environmentalism), is in 
many ways a convincing explanation for the decline of the Middle 
East, it nevertheless has inherent problems. Based as it is on such 
concepts and models as the ecosystem, the idea tends to become 
overly functionalist and reductionist: in the final analysis, Middle 
Eastern decline is simply the outcome of humankind’s misreading of 
the environment’s limits. Although the notion of environmental 
limits offers a powerful tool for understanding Middle Eastern de­
cline, it does not tell the whole story. Indeed, it conveys a false sense 
of inevitability. The idea of environmental limits may suggest a way 
of looking at the larger patterns in history, but historical explanation 
is also about contingency: no universal agent or condition can give 
an adequate causal explanation of historical change in the oases and 
irrigated regions of the Middle East. 
MESOPOTAMIA 
Irrigation in the Mesopotamian floodplain goes back at least to 
5,000 BCE.4 For the first several thousand years, the region’s inhabit­
ants diverted irrigation waters via canals that roughly paralleled 
the course of the Euphrates. Settlement and cultivation was there­
fore concentrated in narrow strips along the river and canals. Begin­
ning around the middle of the first millennium BCE, new irrigation 
practices were adopted in Mesopotamia that drastically manipulated 
and coerced the floodplain’s environment. Key elements in the new 
large-scale irrigation system included, first, the construction of five 
huge feeder canals diverting the waters of the Euphrates across the 
central floodplain into the Tigris; and second, the tapping of the 
Tigris as a major source of irrigation water by the construction of 
two huge, interconnected parallel diversions known as the Katul al-
Kisrawi and the Nahrawan Canal. In the process, the political and 
economic center of the floodplain moved from ancient Babylon on 
the Euphrates to successive metropolitan complexes on the Tigris: 
Seleucia, Ctesiphon, and Baghdad. 
Precisely when the various components of the new system were 
constructed is difficult to say. It is fairly certain, however, that a 
The idea of environmental limits may 
suggest a way of looking at the larger 
patterns in history, but historical 
explanation is also about contingency: 
no universal agent or condition can give 
an adequate causal explanation of 
historical change in the oases and 
irrigated regions of the Middle East. 
3 	 This explanation has gained wide accep­
tance, cf. C. Ponting, A green history of the 
world (London 1991). 
4  The sections that follow are based on 
research by the author. See Christensen 
1993. 
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major reshaping of the floodplain occurred under Persian rule, 
especially in Parthian and Sassanian times (2nd century BCE to CE 
651). According to the traditions recorded by Muslim historians of 
the ninth and tenth centuries, the Sassanian kings in particular made 
a spectacular effort to extend settlement and cultivation between 226 
and 651 CE. Although the Muslim historians were paraphrasing 
official and highly tendentious histories composed by the Sassanians 
themselves for legitimating purposes, the account of the great colo­
nizing drive is essentially credible. Independent sources confirm 
this. The Sassanian kings established numerous cities and settle­
ments, forcibly transplanted thousands of prisoners from Roman 
territory to Mesopotamia (and other places), and constructed great 
irrigation and flood control works such as the Nahrawan complex. 
Moreover, their efforts were not confined to Mesopotamia. In the 
adjacent plain of Khuzistan, watered by the Karun River and its 
tributaries, the Sassanians constructed similar works, including five 
large dams combined with canal systems. Their settlements and 
irrigation works also spread out over large parts of the Iranian 
plateau. It would seem that by the late Sassanian times irrigation, 
settlement, and cultivation in the Mesopotamian floodplain and 
Khuzistan had reached their pre-industrial maximum extent. All 
available water resources had been exploited in an effort to extend as 
well as to intensify agricultural production. Thus summer cultiva­
tion involving various exotic plants (rice, sugar, cotton) had prob­
ably become widespread by this time. 
We know few details about how this impressive reshaping of the 
Mesopotamian landscape was achieved. The kings employed corps 
of engineers as well as groups of specialist workers. Later in the 
Muslim period the army was occasionally used for emergency re­
pairs. But, as very scattered references indicate, the hard and ex­
hausting work involved in the construction and maintenance of the 
great feeder canals must largely have been performed by corvée 
labour. But how the work force was mobilized and organized is not 
known. It seems that the digging and upkeep of the smaller canals 
that actually brought water to the fields was often done on a local, 
communal basis. In any case, the purpose of the whole enterprise 
seems clear enough: it was to enlarge the tax base. As the Mesopo­
tamian floodplain constituted the largest potentially irrigable spot in 
southwest Asia, it was of crucial importance to the successive em­
pires of that region; consequently, the kings determinedly attempted 
to maximize its agricultural and fiscal potential. There is no reason 
to believe that some sort of population pressure constituted the real 
“prime mover.” Population certainly increased in the process, but 
that was more likely a consequence than a cause of the expansion. 
It would seem that by the late Sassanian 
times irrigation, settlement, and cultiva­
tion in the Mesopotamian floodplain 
and Khuzistan had reached their pre­
industrial maximum extent. All available 
water resources had been exploited in 
an effort to extend as well as to intensify 
agricultural production….We know few 
details about how this impressive re­
shaping of the Mesopotamian land­
scape was achieved. 
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By the late Sassanian period (sixth century CE), when the 
Mesopotamia-centered empire really was a great power, the flood­
plain contributed more than half of the imperial income from the 
land tax (which was by far the most important source of revenue). 
Understandably, the Sassanian kings used to refer to the floodplain 
as “the heart” of their dominions (Dil-Iranshahr). 
For all its great size and impressive engineering, however, the 
system created by the Sassanians and their predecessors proved 
short-lived. As early as the sixth and seventh centuries, the low-lying 
south was ravaged by recurrent flooding and hydrological changes. 
By the end of the ninth century the whole system was clearly in 
decay. By mid-twelfth century the great Nahrawan complex had 
definitively broken down, and sometime between 1350 and 1550 the 
last of the transverse canals stopped working. In part, this was a 
result of coercing a fragile environment: the cutting of the natural 
drainage pattern and the introduction of summer cultivation must 
have increased soil salinity (this we may confidently infer from 
modern attempts to intensify agricultural production); and the 
increasing diversions from the rivers certainly caused an increase in 
the rate of siltation. In the south the riverbeds became unstable until 
the Tigris in the early seventh century broke through all embank­
ments, seeking a new channel. In the process some agricultural lands 
were literally drowned while others were left without adequate water 
supplies. Further north, siltation threatened to choke the canals, weirs, 
and floodgates unless these were regularly cleaned and dredged. 
Changes in the micro-environment were equally important. For 
two hundred years, from 542 CE to the late eighth century, the 
floodplain was ravaged by recurrent outbreaks of plague. By all 
accounts the mortality was staggering (as it was in the Mediterra­
nean Basin), and a conservative estimate would be that 
Mesopotamia cumulatively lost 40 to 50% of its population. An 
inevitable consequence of this demographic crash was that irrigation 
works fell into disrepair and agriculture contracted. The labour 
force necessary for maintaining and operating the system no longer 
existed.The successors of the Sassanians made only limited attempts 
at repairing the damage and were quite unable to restore the system. 
Plague can be seen, therefore, as a key factor in the decline of the 
early Middle Ages. But it cannot be an exhaustive explanation for 
the entire period up to the 19th century. As already stated, the great 
Nahrawan system that supplied the east bank of the Tigris defini­
tively stopped working around 1150 CE when there was no plague. 
In this case, political impotence, continuous internal fighting, and 
excessive taxation may have been the direct causes. The last element 
of the large-scale system, the transverse canals of the central plain, 
For all its great size and impressive 
engineering, however, the system 
created by the Sassanians and their 
predecessors proved short-lived…in this 
case, political impotence, continuous 
internal fighting , and excessive taxation 
may have been the direct causes…. 
Factors such as plague (and epidemic 
disease in general) and political unrest 
are, I also believe, the direct causes of 
the destruction of Mesopotamian 
irrigation. Yet their impact can only be 
understood in the context of environ­
mental instability. 
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stopped operating between 1350 and 1550, the chronology suggest­
ing that plague may again have been decisive (the Black Death 
struck Baghdad in 1347, and plague kept recurring until 1840). 
Factors such as plague (and epidemic disease in general) and 
political unrest are, I also believe, the direct causes of the destruction 
of Mesopotamian irrigation. Yet their impact can only be under­
stood in the context of environmental instability: expansion under 
Persian rule had created an irrigation system that was, if not self-
destructive, then at least extremely vulnerable to even small distur­
bances. In Europe the consequences of the plague epidemics were 
very different, partly owing to the resiliency of the European cultural 
landscape. Economic activity in Europe rebounded (and, of course, 
grew) in a way that the economy of the Middle East could not. 
SISTAN 
A similar cycle of expansion and recession occurred in the Sistan 
basin on the far eastern fringe of the Middle East. Sistan, which is 
today divided between Iran and Afghanistan, comprised the land 
bordering the lower course of the Hilmand River and the inland 
delta of the river. The Hilmand drains the Western Hindu Kush 
range. Running for a thousand kilometers across the arid steppes of 
Western Afghanistan, it finally empties into a closed basin identical 
to the barren kavirs of Iran. However, owing to the large quantities 
of water carried by the river, the center of the Sistan basin is covered 
by extensive, shallow sweet water lakes (the Hamun-i Hilmand) for 
most of the year. The extent of the lakes, of course, fluctuates with 
the variability of precipitation in the Hindu Kush. 
Written sources and archaeological material show that Sistan was 
populous and intensively irrigated and cultivated. The medieval 
Muslim geographers and travellers extolled the fertility of the land 
and the prosperity of the inhabitants. The local urban center, 
Zarandj, was regarded as one of the great cities of the East, famous 
for its textiles and centers of learning. By the 19th century, Sistan 
had been reduced to a sparsely settled maze of ruins and windblown 
dunes. According to conventional wisdom—which bases itself on 
the horror stories of the medieval chroniclers—this transformation 
was precipitated by the invasion of Timur in 1383. Not satisfied with 
razing Zarandj and massacring the inhabitants, the conqueror is said 
to have destroyed a vital dam on the Hilmand, thus willfully ruining 
the elaborate irrigation system. Other sources point to Shah Rukh, 
the son and successor of Timur, as destroyer of the dam. Who did it, 
however, is not important for the present argument. 
There can be little doubt that Sistan suffered much destruction 
in the course of the protracted Timurid wars. A careful analysis of 
Historical inquiry clearly shows that the 
belief that Third World societies 
formerly operated sustainable agricul­
tural systems (until disturbed by 
imperialism and excessive population 
growth) is quite unwarranted. Techno­
logical pessimism should not make us 
romanticize ancient practices. 
 
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the available data shows, however, that the recession of cultivation 
and settlement was a much more complex process. In the first place, 
it is clear that recession had started long before the advent of the 
Timurid armies. Irrigated agriculture, based on diversions from the 
Hilmand, had been practiced in the Sistan Basin at least since the 
beginning of the third millennium BCE. We need not follow the 
early settlements and the fluctuations caused by siltation and 
changes in the course of the river. Many phases of Sistani history 
remain obscure in any case. 
A remarkable expansion of settlement and cultivation began in 
Parthian and Sassanian times, however, culminating in the early 
Muslim epoch (i.e., in the 9th and 10th centuries). It is evident that 
the expansion was based on a vast extension of the diversions from 
the Hilmand River. On the east bank the cornerstone was a great 
Constraints, however, only become dam across the Hilmand located one day’s march south of the capi­
constraints in specific historical contexts tal city of Zarandj. This is the dam supposedly destroyed by Timur. 
(which, of course, is true of assets as 
The dam diverted water into a huge system of feeder canals reaching well). Low gradients, high groundwater 
almost 150 kilometers northwards. The system was completed in the tables and soil salinity are not major 
early eighth century, but, as stated above, had been partially con- constraints unless large-scale (and fairly 
structed in the preceding centuries. intensive) irrigation is practiced. Extra-
As was the case in Mesopotamia, the construction and mainte- neous events, such as recurrent civil 
wars, invasions, and, possibly, the nance of the irrigation system required large expense and a huge 
outbreaks of epidemic disease are key labour effort. Moreover, the shifting sands, perpetually kept in 
catalysts for the onset of marked decline. motion by the “wind of a 120 days”(a strong northwester blowing 
So are the actual means available for 
constantly from May to October), constituted a particular danger coercing and manipulating the physical 
that had to be kept under control by groups of expert sandfighters. world, i.e. technology and energy 
Also, the elaborate network of canals was frequently damaged by the resources. In the last 100 to 150 years, 
unpredictable floods of the Hilmand. The cleaning of canals added these variables in particular have been 
to the windblown material and, finally, there are fairly clear indica- seen by many as the key elements in 
reversing the decline of the Middle East. tions that the increased irrigation caused salinity problems. For all 
the efforts expended in maintenance, the first signs of deterioration 
followed immediately upon the maximum extent of cultivation. By 
the late tenth century, the shifting sands had even temporarily bro­
ken into Zarandj itself and declining productivity was observed in 
several places. A century later, areas in the northern end of the great 
feeder system had been abandoned. Although attempts at repair and 
recolonization are recorded, chiefly at the end of the 13th century, 
the overall picture is one of irreversible recession. By the early nine­
teenth century, settled and irrigated agriculture had contracted to a 
small area in the northwestern part of the delta. Yet the Sistanis, 
despite demographic decline and political decentralization, still 
commanded the technology to construct quite serviceable weirs 
across the Hilmand. The British border commission, in 1870, saw 
how this was done: 
  
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The dimensions of the ‘Band’ are as follows: 
entire length, 720 feet; length across original bed of river, 
520 feet; breadth at broadest part, 110 feet; depth 18 feet on 
the river side. It is formed of fascines of tamarisk branches 
closely interwoven together with stakes driven into them at 
intervals: the branches used for this purposes are green and 
fresh, but of no great size, while the interlacing of them is 
very close. The present ‘Band’ was constructed by 2000 men 
in three months, all classes in Sistan giving their aid to a 
work on which their own prosperity was so much depen­
dent. The great part of the labour was in bringing from a 
distance the enormous quantity of tamarisk required; but it 
is said that once the branches were collected, the actual 
construction was performed in a short time by one man, a 
native of Banjár, the sole possessor of this art, and who 
refuses to impart his knowledge to any one but his own son. 
The ‘Band’ still requires a small yearly repair when the 
spring floods are over, and its face towards the river is an­
nually increased by a yard or more, but these repairs are 
now easily accomplished by fifty or sixty men.5 
Tate, who witnessed the rebuilding of the weir in 1904, says that 
the work began in the middle of August (i.e., between harvest and 
sowing), lasted a month and involved 40,000 people in all. For the 
construction itself, no less than 450,000 fascines of tamarisk 
branches were used (Tate 1909). But the cultivated area had con­
tracted drastically and instead extensive subsistence—herding and 
shifting slash-and-burn agriculture—had become widespread. 
In Sistan, as in Mesopotamia, the decline of large-scale irrigation 
clearly was conditioned by environmental constraints such as cli­
mate, topography, soil composition, and hydrology. Constraints, 
however, only become constraints in specific historical contexts 
(which, of course, is true of assets as well). Low gradients, high 
groundwater tables and soil salinity are not major constraints unless 
large-scale (and fairly intensive) irrigation is practiced. Extraneous 
events, such as recurrent civil wars, invasions, and, possibly, the 
outbreaks of epidemic disease are key catalysts for the onset of 
marked decline.6 So are the actual means available for coercing and 
manipulating the physical world, i.e. technology and energy re­
sources. In the last 100 to 150 years, these variables in particular 
have been seen by many as the key elements in reversing the decline 
of the Middle East. 
[In India] The British eventually 
developed the basic hydraulic technolo­
gies of modern large-scale irrigation and 
water management. Among the 
important technological innovations 
were masonry headworks, drainage 
networks, the elimination of erosion and 
silting by calculating optimal gradients, 
and, of course, barrages or weirs 
making perennial irrigation possible. 
In the process, the British, persistent 
critics of the kind of oriental despotism 
and Eastern centralization that 
supposedly accompanied hydraulic 
societies, ended up as the greatest 
irrigation system builders of all. 
5  Goldsmid 1876: 281f. Bandjar was a village 
situated a few kilometers northeast of 
Zabul. See also Christensen 1993: 52–56, 
107–112, 166–168. 
6 	 In Sistan (and on most of the Iranian 
Plateau) the course of the second plague 
pandemic, beginning in the mid-14th 
century, remains an enigma. Nearby Herat 
suffered several outbreaks, but there is no 
evidence of the disease ever reaching 
Sistan. Very likely, this simply reflects the 
dearth of sources. It is, after all, hard to 
believe that the highly contagious infection 
simply bypassed Sistan. In the early 20th 
century plague did in fact reach the 
country. But plague was erratic, and 
positive evidence is necessary if massive 
supermortality is to be considered a factor 
in the decline of Sistan. 
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 THE MAGIC WAND 
European engineers arriving in the Middle East in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries suggested that technological limitations lay at 
the root of the region’s decline: in the past, in their view, irrigation 
had failed because of restricted engineering capabilities and un­
sound agricultural practices; the engineers of the past had been 
unable to construct permanent headworks and, lacking mathemati­
cal skills, had not calculated gradients properly. This view was 
largely based on observations made by British engineers surveying 
remnants of Mughul canals in northern India in the early 19th cen­
tury. These canals had served only for limited time partly owing to 
technological deficiencies of the sort just mentioned: little use had 
been made of masonry structures, and the canals were just contour 
canals, i.e., they tended to avoid high ground and follow the river 
courses. Thus they were vulnerable to floods and silt deposits. 
(Stone 1984; CEHI 1 1982) 
The British then proceeded to repair and improve the old canals 
and construct new ones all over the Punjab and in the Gangetic 
Plains. Gathering experience by trial and error, they eventually 
developed the basic hydraulic technologies of modern large-scale 
irrigation and water management. Among the important techno­
logical innovations were masonry headworks, drainage networks, 
the elimination of erosion and silting by calculating optimal gradi­
ents, and, of course, barrages or weirs making perennial irrigation 
possible.7 In the process, the British, persistent critics of the kind of 
oriental despotism and Eastern centralization that supposedly ac­
companied hydraulic societies, ended up as the greatest irrigation 
system builders of all. 
Together with a robust technological optimism, the British later 
brought their hydraulic skills to the Middle East. Thus William 
Willcocks, in 1894, suggested the construction of a storage dam 
across the main channel of the Nile at Aswan. A dam this far up the 
river would prove a much more efficient way of raising water and 
extending perennial irrigation in Upper Egypt.8  A few years later, 
Willcocks, along with other British engineers serving as advisers to 
the Ottoman Empire, surveyed the dreary plains of ancient 
Mesopotamia, and confidently predicted the reclamation of the 
whole country through British efforts: “Modern science,” he wrote, 
“will touch this region with her magic wand, and the waste places 
shall again become inhabited, and the desert shall blossom as a rose.”9 
When the Russians conquered the ancient irrigated enclaves of 
Turkestan in Central Asia, they viewed local technology with great 
disdain. In 1819, Captain Nicolai Muraviev, the Russian spy, arrived 
in Khiva and reported that the inhabitants were cruel, backward, 
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7 Weir-control was first developed during 
repairs of an ancient, silted weir, the Grand 
Anicut, on the Cauvery River in the south. 
Reinforced concrete and labour-saving 
machinery were not widely used until 
the1920s, however (Headrick 1988). 
8 	 In fact, a storage dam at Aswan had already 
been suggested by British engineers in 
1876 (Collins 1990). 
9 Willcocks (1903). Willcocks was fond of 
this metaphor, cf. his plans for develop­
ment of the Sudd regions on the White 
Nile (cited in Collins 1990). 
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and superstitious. He grudgingly admired the flourishing agricul­
ture, but added disparagingly that their irrigation was “unscien­
tific.”10 Later official Russian reports convey the same picture: 
The construction of canals in the Zerafshan province, 
though not without some boldness both in design and 
execution, is generally defective; the canals are tortuous, too 
numerous, and liable to burst and overflow. The intakes of 
the canals are simply cuttings in the banks, dammed up 
occasionally by very unsubstantial weirs of any fragile mate­
rial near at hand. The cleaning and the general maintenance 
of the canals is most unsatisfactory, as they are allowed to 
be obstructed by rubbish of every kind. The whole system of 
irrigation is a very primitive one; all the constructions to 
raise, dam, let out, carry, distribute, and gauge the water are 
of the most simple description, and are built of materials 
close at hand, such as earth, fascines, stakes, branches, sand, 
gravel, and sometimes rough stones (Curzon 1889). 
A few Russians were genuinely impressed by the sophisticated 
irrigation networks around Samarkand in 1870 and thought that 
these could not be much improved upon by Russian engineers in 
spite of their superior scientific skills (Radlov 1868). Generally, 
however, Russians, whether Czarist or later Soviet, believed that they 
had a great civilizing task to perform in Turkestan, where they be­
lieved that chronic raiding, slavery, and religious fanaticism marked 
a society long sunk in decay and barbarism. The Russians believed 
that the chief means to achieve progress in Central Asia would be 
scientific irrigation and enlightened rule. The Russians managed to 
combine this outlook with an unabashedly predatory approach that 
sprang from historically conditioned attitudes to Islam; they conse­
quently treated Turkestanis as third-rate citizens. 
Following the conquest, Russian engineers and officials regularly 
advanced more or less fantastic schemes for extending the area 
under irrigation. Among the more spectacular ideas were schemes 
for diverting the waters of the Amu Darya into the Karakum Desert. 
Even the transfer of extra water from the Siberian rivers was 
suggested (Micklin 1986). Yet under Czarist rule little was actually 
achieved as the Russians lacked both capital and, equally important, 
the engineering skills (Pahlen 1908). In fact, Russians in Turkestan 
were painfully aware of how much more successful were their Brit­
ish adversaries in India in this respect.11 
Yet to many Europeans sharing the Russian view of moribund 
Turkestan, even the modest efforts of Czarist Russia seemed a great 
10 	Murav’yov (1820). Incidentally, Muraviev 
realized that the numerous ruins around 
Khiva were in fact the remains of 
successive settlements that had shifted with 
hydrological changes. 
11 Pierce (1960). In consequence, engineers 
were sent abroad to study Western 
irrigation technology (Pahlen 1908). 
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step forward on the path of civilization. Curzon, who had travelled 
through Transcaspia in 1888, admitted that “Russia has conferred 
great and substantial advantages upon the Central Asian regions,” 
although drunkenness, gambling and prostitution as always fol­
lowed the Russians.12 Some modest irrigation works were under­
taken, for instance around Tashkent where the Romanov Canal was 
dug (until construction was stopped by the first World War). Some 
new concrete dams with iron sluice gates were constructed on the 
Zarafshan River (Pahlen 1908). On the whole, however, results were 
disappointing. A sustained attempt at transforming Turkestan 
through modern irrigation technology had to await the establish­
ment of Soviet rule. What the Soviet engineers brought to 
Turkestani irrigation was, above all, an increase in scale. Command 
of energy, of earth-moving machinery and reinforced concrete, 
combined with political command of entire drainage basins led to 
gigantic (and destructive) projects such as the Karakum Canal. 
LESSONS? 
The idea that poverty and other characteristics of “underdevel­
opment” can eventually be overcome, in part at least, by education 
and transfer of western science and technology remains a key ele­
ment in all developmental theorizing. To promote agricultural 
production in the arid zone, FAO and UNESCO in the 1950s and 
1960s organized several international symposia and conferences and 
published papers analyzing the water resources of the arid zone and 
their development potential.13 Reading through these papers as well 
as the conference reports, one is struck by the pervading optimism. 
Of course, the experts were aware that in the past, irrigation societies 
had faced severe environmental problems and that present condi­
tions were somehow rooted in these problems. But their under­
standing of what had occurred in the past was incomplete and 
colored by stereotyped ideas about the rise and decline of civiliza­
tions. Indeed, little factual knowledge was readily available.14 
Because of the obvious and well-known hazards of large-scale 
irrigation, chiefly in the shape of salinity build-up, one would think 
that irrigation experts had to consider their schemes in an environ­
mental context, perhaps even in terms of sustainability (however 
this may be defined). Yet most experts firmly believed that whatever 
problems might arise from expanding irrigation could be solved by 
improved technology including fertilizers, mechanization, new crop 
rotating patterns and new crop varieties, i.e., by transfer of advanced 
western technologies. More economical approaches and equitable 
social arrangements would further advance productivity and thus 
living conditions in the arid lands. Similar attitudes may be found 
12 Curzon (1889). Of course, Curzon would 
not accept Russia as a true representative 
of European civilization, but rather as a 
backward nation that appeared advanced 
in even more backward Turkestan. 
13 E.g., in Tehran (1961), Heraklion (1962), 
Paris (1962). 
14 Iraq was an exception. The preliminary 
results and hypotheses of the Diyala Basin 
archaeological project had just been 
published. 
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later in The Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED, the so-called Brundtland Report) and diverse 
FAO and World Bank reports. 
Soviet experts in particular showed great faith in their ability to 
overcome salinity and other environmental problems. Thanks to 
modern technology, the deserts and steppes of stagnant Turkestan 
would be conquered and millions of square kilometers brought 
under irrigated cultivation. At the Arid Zone Conferences they even 
presented a scheme for turning to the great Siberian rivers to pro­
vide extra water for arid Turkestan as if no environmental risks were 
involved (Korda 1961). In retrospect this seems extremely naive, 
considering how Soviet development projects have brought ecologi­
cal disaster to Turkestan. 
At the time of these United Nations conferences (in the early 
1960s) the transfer of advanced western technologies, including 
irrigation technology, to the underdeveloped regions of the world 
had in fact been going on for a long time, and modern development 
experts and engineers might have drawn some basic lessons from 
this process. But they didn’t. And they still don’t. Although debates 
about appropriate technologies have been underway since the 1970s, as 
the environmental constraints become ever more obvious,15  the pre­
vailing attitude remains that modern technologies offer a wider range of 
options which, combined with effective policies and institutions, can 
make economic growth compatible with improved environment. 
Therefore, the World Bank and the WCED can confidently claim 
that development is not antithetical to the environment. “Economic 
development and sound environmental management are comple­
mentary aspects of the same agenda” (World Development Report 
1992). Technological optimism, so deeply rooted in the European 
world view, has always overruled historical evidence. 
Over the last 150 years or so, systematic attempts have been 
made to increase productivity and material welfare in the Middle 
East by introducing western hydraulic technologies. This transfer 
has achieved an impressive expansion of irrigated agriculture: an­
cient oases have been expanded, water has been brought to new 
areas, and productivity as well as safety have been increased by 
extending perennial irrigation. At the same time, production has 
been restructured: the traditional subsistence agriculture of the 
ancient enclaves and oases has been largely replaced by market-
oriented cash crops. In quantitative terms, the decades following World 
War II saw the maximum extent of expansion, when mechanization, 
chemical fertilizers, pesticides, high-yielding crop varieties, and addi­
tional sources of energy were applied on an ever-increasing scale. 
Technological optimism, so deeply 
rooted in the European world-view, has 
always overruled historical evidence. 
15 Cf. M. Taghi Farvar and J. P. Milton, eds.: 
The careless technology: ecology and 
international development (Garden City 
1972). 
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Yet, in the broader perspective, results are disappointing. West­
ern technology has brought neither economic nor environmental 
stability. On the contrary, per capita availability of water has de­
creased, while environmental degradation has escalated. It is not 
that modern irrigation should bear the blame exclusively. After all, 
western technologies were imported into areas already severely 
degraded by centuries of indigenous large-scale irrigation. Surveyed 
in the long term, large-scale irrigation systems appear to have lim­
ited life-expectancy, i.e. they have not been sustainable. There are 
exceptions, of course, but they are few.16  No single reason will ac­
count for this. The rise and fall of irrigation systems are historical 
processes that involve many specific variables, ranging from political 
upheaval to climatic fluctuations. Yet in the arid lands, limiting 
environmental conditions have been a decisive obstacle. However 
defined, the concept of sustainability essentially refers to mainte­
nance, durability, and resiliency in the long term. Western hydraulic 
technologies have brought short-term increases, but at the price of 
long-term degradation. The Soviet destruction of Turkestan may be 
an extreme example, but at present most arid lands are operating 
unsustainable agricultural systems which cause rapid resource 
depletion and environmental destruction. 
If present technologies are inappropriate, what are the alterna­
tives? If the results of technology transfer have been disappointing, 
could it be that it was not the right kind of technology? Or, as in the 
case of the “Green Revolution,” that the implications have not been 
thought out properly? It is widely argued, e.g., in the report of the 
WCED and by FAO, the World Bank, and other such agencies, that, 
given the proper technology, conditions may still be improved. This 
view cannot be dismissed by saying that western technology is inher­
ently self-destructive. Throughout history humans (and extinct 
hominids as well) have relied on technology for survival and we 
certainly must go on doing so. The question is: what are the appro­
priate technologies in the fragile environments of the arid lands? 
In the past, knowledge of the physical processes causing 
salination, desertification, etc., was limited if not completely absent, 
making the negative consequences of human manipulation of na­
ture inevitable for all practical purposes. Today we have greater 
insight into the way natural forces work and on this basis we should 
be able to take more sustainable courses of action. No doubt there is 
room, for instance, for considerable improvement of existing irriga­
tion systems by tranferring of super-modern technologies. The 
predominant gravity-flow canal irrigation loses at least 50% of the 
water through evaporation and seepage. These losses may be drasti­
cally cut by lining canals with plastics, concrete or tile or by adopt­
16 In parts of India the expansion of large-
scale irrigation has achieved impressive and 
apparently sustainable increases, although 
the wider environmental consequences 
remain to be assessed. 
Yet, in the broader perspective, results 
are disappointing. Western technology 
has brought neither economic nor 
environmental stability. On the contrary, 
per capita availability of water has 
decreased, while environmental 
degradation has escalated. It is not that 
modern irrigation should bear the blame 
exclusively. After all, western technolo­
gies were imported into areas already 
severely degraded by centuries of 
indigenous large-scale irrigation. 
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ing new technologies such as sprinkler-, drip-, or trickle irrigation, 
and even have these computer-controlled so that water is only 
released when necessary. Such highly mechanized and highly 
specialized irrigation technologies are employed on a large scale in 
the arid southwest of the United States, especially in California, and 
have served as models for creating modern, efficient irrigation in, 
for instance, Israel and Australia.17 But for most Third World coun­
tries these technologies do not present a realistic option. Their de­
mand for expertise, energy, and capital place them beyond the reach 
of ordinary peasants. Moreover, they are only feasible for high-
profit cash crops and can hardly solve the problem of providing 
basic crops. For political reasons, moving away from cereal produc­
tion seems unacceptable, anyway. Also, the historical record of 
irrigated agriculture in developed, industrialized societies is not 
altogether comforting: sophisticated, advanced technologies have 
brought serious (and steadily increasing) environmental degrada­
tion in the United States, Australia and Israel.18 
In current debates on development strategies it is frequently 
asserted that traditional technologies—displaced by modern western 
technology—were in fact much more sustainable and that we should 
rediscover these, e.g., the terracing techniques of the ancient Andean 
farmers. The failure or, at least, dubious benefits of modern irriga­
tion technology is not an argument in favour of “indigenious” (or 
“traditional”) technologies, however. Historical inquiry clearly 
shows that the belief that Third World societies formerly operated 
sustainable agricultural systems (until disturbed by imperialism and 
excessive population growth) is quite unwarranted. Technological 
pessimism should not make us romanticize ancient practices. The 
small-scale qanat of the Iranian highlands was an ingenious and 
environmentally fairly neutral device, but large-scale systems, repre­
sented by engineering feats such as the Nahrawan Canal in pre-
Islamic Iraq, were usually harmful to the environment and 
unsustainable (Christensen 1993). So were the formerly much-
admired agricultural systems of China. 
The realization that large-scale irrigation, even when involving 
modern technology and massive inputs of energy, is a hazardous 
undertaking has brought small-scale, low-cost irrigation technolo­
gies in focus (Stern 1982). No doubt these have longer life expectan­
cies and are more easily available to ordinary farmers, but it is hard 
to see what kind of small-scale technology will help solve the prob­
lems of Egypt, for instance. The fact remains that the societies living 
in arid lands are, for historical reasons, dependent on large-scale 
irrigation systems and these constitute a key factor in the processes 
of land degradation. At present no readily available technology can 
17 Irrigation was brought to California by 
Spanish settlers (no indigenous irrigation 
agriculture existed), but remained of little 
importance until the late 19th century 
when growing markets in the east 
promoted heavily irrigated and very 
efficient garden agriculture. 
18 E.g., Hays (1982); Worster (1985); D. 
Worster, “Thinking like a river,” in W. 
Jackson, et al. (eds.): Meeting the expecta­
tions of the land : 56-67 (San Francisco, 
1984). 
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overcome this fact and the systems, therefore, have an inherently 
limited life expectancy. Thus the prospect of achieving further agri­
cultural growth without very serious environmental degradation 
appears so slim as to be nonexistent. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Fertile Crescent is a high biodiversity region where most temperate-zone agricultural species originated and were 
first domesticated. A favorable environment, a special plant community, and an adaptive population combined to initiate 
the Neolithic—the New Stone Age—in the Fertile Crescent. However, over time, valuable plant genetic resources of 
the region are being eroded through degradation of natural habitats, intensification of the cultivation of arable lands, 
expansion of cultivation into marginal areas, replacement of diverse and widely adapted landraces by new cultivars based 
on a narrow genetic base, and over-exploitation of natural pastures and grazing lands. There is a grave risk that much of 
the inherent biodiversity of the Fertile Crescent will be lost unless a holistic approach to the management of ecosys­
tems, based on sustainable agriculture and sustainable development, is implemented. Components of the holistic 
approach are presented and discussed under the following five themes: (i) assessment of problems, obstacles and needs 
(ii) land use management, including soils, water and vegetation (iii) the conservation of agricultural biodiversity and its 
utilization in agricultural production systems (iv) social, political and economic factors, including indigenous knowledge 
and (v) human resources. It is hypothesized that food security for future generations in the Fertile Crescent will be 
strengthened by the conservation and utilization of agricultural biodiversity. This can be achieved through the develop­
ment of productive and sustainable resource management strategies in the agroecosystems of the region. 
INTRODUCTION 
The modern territories Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, 
Syria, western Iran, and southeast Turkey encompass the region 
often referred to as the Fertile Crescent. Here, many of the species of 
temperate-zone agriculture originated and were first domesticated. 
Their wild relatives and landraces are still found in the region 
(Harlan 1992; Zohary and Hopf 1993). It is an area of megadiversity 
of important food, feed, medicinal, horticultural crops, spices, pas­
ture and rangeland species. However, the area under arable, annual 
and perennial crops and forests is small, leaving the bulk of the land 
as steppe, desert, or semi-desert. Much of the land has steep slopes 
and/or shallow, or saline, soils that are unsuitable for cultivation 
without extensive and expensive reclamation work. The land resource 
is fragile and the conservation and maintenance of its biodiversity and 
productivity are of crucial concern (Held 1994). 
THE FERTILE CRESCENT: CENTER OF ORIGIN AND 
CENTER OF DIVERSITY 
The Fertile Crescent is at the core of the West Asia and North 
Africa (WANA) region (see Kouchoukos et al., this volume). The 
WANA region straddles three important centers of biological diver­
sity: the Near Eastern, the Mediterranean and the Central Asian. 
Many major crops, including cereals, pulses, spices, oil crops, fiber 
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plants, pasture and forage species, and fruit and nut trees trace their 
origins to different parts of WANA (Harlan 1975, 1992). 
The region is characterized by several major land forms (Zohary 
1973). The Afro-Arabian tableland borders the area to the south and 
is today largely desert. The Irano-Anatolian folded zone, which 
includes the Zagros, Taurus, and Syro-Palestine ranges, forms a 
mountainous arc where most of the arboreal vegetation now grows. 
Between these two zones is a region of rolling terrain and alluvial 
plains. The tremendous variability in topography has a strong influ­
ence on climate and vegetation. The coastal regions in the west are 
characterized by a Mediterranean regime of hot, dry summers and 
cool, wet winters. A lowland area known as the “Syrian Saddle,” 
which separates the Anti-Taurus from the Syro-Palestine ranges, 
allows the Mediterranean influence to extend inland. The inland 
regions, however, have a more continental climate. 
Despite a scarcity of water and cultivable land, the Fertile Cres­
cent was one of the major food-producing regions of the old world 
for many centuries (Harlan 1992; Zohary and Hopf 1993), having 
once been termed the granary of the Roman Empire (Held 1994). 
Today, it supports a rapidly growing (3-3.6% per annum) popula­
tion of some 70 million people. It has become the largest food-
importing region in the developing world due to this rapidly 
growing population (and, in some countries, rising income) at a 
time of sluggish growth in its agricultural production (FAO 1996a). 
THE FIRST GREEN REVOLUTION 
Favorable climatic conditions after 9,000 BCE brought steady 
improvements in the Fertile Crescent environment, which encour­
aged the growth and spread of wild plants and animals that consti­
tuted food supply for an increasing human population (Miller 
1992). Grasslands with scattered trees became the native habitat of 
early wild forms of wheat and barley, which still grow in many loca­
tions throughout the Fertile Crescent today. 
For many centuries, these wild cereals were harvested by hunt­
ers/gatherers but were gradually domesticated and cultivated along 
with other major food plants, including vegetables, oil crops, fiber 
crops, spices, fruit and nut trees. At about the same time, animals 
that still dominate the farm scene were domesticated—sheep, goats, 
cattle, pigs, and dogs (Miller 1992; Nesbitt 1995). Thus, a particular 
environment, a special plant community and an adaptive popula­
tion combined to initiate the Neolithic—the New Stone Age—in the 
Fertile Crescent about 10,000 years ago in which the systematic 
development of organized settlements occurred. This development 
led to a further complex of cultural processes: politics, administra-
Despite a scarcity of water and cultivable 
land, the Fertile Crescent was one of the 
major food-producing regions of the old 
world for many centuries, having once 
been termed the granary of the Roman 
Empire. Today, it supports a rapidly 
growing (3–3.6% per annum) population 
of some 70 million people. It has become 
the largest food-importing region in the 
developing world. (See Winckler, Allan, 
this volume) 
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tion, organized religion, trade and writing. It is said that “man was 
domesticated by plants” (Willcox 1995). 
Around 5,500 BCE the dryland farmers in the Fertile Crescent 
took a major step forward by minimizing their dependence on rain­
fall: they extended and then gradually shifted farming from dryland 
areas to the plains watered by the Tigris and Euphrates. This devel­
opment in food production led to cooperative planning, organized 
engineering, expanded storage facilities for harvest surpluses, trade 
relations, defenses for the protection of food supplies, centralized 
administration to apportion water and coordinate activities, the 
establishment of the first city-states, and the appearance of great 
empires and civilizations (Miller 1992). 
The area from the Levantine to Mesopotamia was the most 
fitting place for agriculture to begin, not simply because of its soil 
The Mediterreanean region was fertility (which waned considerably over the millennia) but also 
magnificently well-stocked with cereals because of its landscape, its climate, its plants, and its animals. The 
that lended themselves to domestica-
Mediterranean climate is ideal for early cultivation and the Mediter­ tion. Of the world’s 56 species of large 
ranean region was magnificently well-stocked with cereals that seeded grasses, 32 are found wild in the 
lended themselves to domestication. Of the world’s 56 species of Mediterranean area. By contrast, North 
large seeded grasses, 32 are found wild in the Mediterranean area. By America and sub-Saharan Africa boast 
contrast, North America and sub-Saharan Africa boast only four only four each; East Asia has six. 
each; East Asia has six. These proto-cereals were abundant enough 
to allow hunter-gatherers emphasizing the second of their compe­
tencies to settle down, even before they started cultivation (Nesbitt 
1995; Wilcox 1995). 
The “Fertile Crescent” draws its name from the achievement of a 
balance between humans and the natural ecosystems (including 
soils, water, crops selected from a rich flora, natural pastures in well-
managed, productive agricultural systems and livestock). Unfortu­
nately, this balance has now largely broken down and is expected to 
be further disrupted by increasing population pressures on a dimin­
ishing resource base. The solution cannot be simply a rescue mission 
for the remains of the flora (i.e., collection and conservation of 
germplasm in gene banks) but rather must be grounded in a holistic 
approach to the major agroecosystems (and farming systems there­
in) in the region. If sustainable land management, in equilibrium 
with human societies, can be reinstated in the different farming 
systems of the Fertile Crescent, much of what is required for the con­
servation of biodiversity will also have been achieved (ICARDA 1995). 
INDIGENOUS PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 
It is estimated that the WANA region has a flora of 32,000 spe­
cies of higher plants, a high proportion of which are endemic (Table 
1) and 10% of which are deemed threatened. The highest plant 
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diversity occurs in Turkey (with 163 plant families, 1,225 genera, 
9,000 species and 3,000 plant taxa as endemic) and Morocco (with 
135 plant families, 940 genera, 4,500 species and 600 plant taxa as 
endemic). Oak (Quercus calliprinos Webb, among others) and 
Aleppo pine (Pinus halepensis Mill.) predominate the Mediterranean 
coastal forest west of the great bend in the Euphrates. In addition to 
oak, pistachio (Pistacia spp.) and carob (Ceratonia siliqua L.) are 
important trees that have edible fruit and nuts. Lebanon cedar 
(Cedrus libani A. Rich.) is found only at higher elevations. The drier 
inland regions of the folded zone are dominated by oak (Quercus 
brantii Lindl) but pistachio continues to be an important compo­
nent. In the more arid regions of southern Iran where it is too dry 
for oak, pistachio-almond steppe forest predominates. The forest 
grades successively into steppe forest, steppe, and desert in northern 
Syria and Iraq. Riverine associations characterized by willow (Salix 
sp.), poplar (Populus sp.), and tamarisk (Tamarix sp.) cut across 
environmental zones. The wild grasses and legumes are at home in 
the open oak forest and steppe forest regions (Harlan 1992; 1995; 
Zohary and Hopf 1993). 
CROPS ORIGINATING IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT 
Table 1 Native, endemic, and % endemic
The majority of crops domesticated in this region as well as their vascular plant species in countries of 
wild ancestors are of worldwide importance (Harlan 1992). The the WANA region (with Fertile 
Crescent countries in italics).following is a short list of those crops having their center of origin 
and center of diversity in one or more of the three recognized cen-
Country Native Plant Endemic % Species
ters in the WANA region (Harlan 1992). Species Species Endemism 
Afghanistan 4000 800 20 
•	 Cereals: Avena spp. (wild oats); Hordeum spp. (Wild and Algeria 3160 250 5 
Bahrain 250 0 0cultivated barley); Secale cereale (wild rye); 
Cyprus 1650 90 5 
•	 Triticum species (wild and cultivated wheat); Aegilops spp. 
Egypt 2080 70 3 
(Goat grass);	 Iran 8000 1400 18 
•	 pulses: Cicer spp. (wild and cultivated chickpea); Lens spp. Iraq 3000 190 6 
Israel 2200 170 7(wild and cultivated lentils); Pisum spp. (wild and cultivated 
Jordan 2100 150 7
peas); Vicia faba (cultivated faba beans); 
Kuwait 282 0 0 
•	 vegetables: Lactuca sativa (lettuce); Brassica spp. (turnip, Lebanon 2600 300 6 
cabbage and their wild relatives); Raphanus sativus (radish);	 Libya 1800 130 7 
Morocco 3800 630 17Allium spp. (wild and cultivated onions and garlic); Daucus 
Oman 1200 70 6spp. (carrot and wild relatives); Cynara scolymus (arti-
Pakistan 5100 400 8 
choke); Sinapis alba (mustards); Qatar 300 0 0 
•	 spices: Cumminum cyminum (cumin); Mentha piperita Saudi Arabia 2000 30 2 
(peppermint); Foeniculum vulgare (fennel); Fiber/jute Syria 3100 400 13 
Tunisia 2200 ? ?crops; Linum usitatissimum (flax, linseed); Sesamum 
Turkey 8700 2700 31 
indicum (Sesame); 
Yemen >2000 >100 >6 
Yemen-Socotra Island 800 >230 >28 
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•	 forages: Medicago spp. (medics and wild relatives); Vicia 
sativa (vetch and wild relatives); Fruit and nut trees; Olea 
europea (olives and wild relatives); Ficus carica (figs and 
wild relatives); Phoenix dactylifera (date palm); Vitis vinifera 
(grapes); Punica granatum (pomegranates); Pistacia spp. 
(pistachio and wild relatives); Prunus spp. (plum, pear, 
apricot, etc); Amygdalus spp. (almonds and wild relatives); 
•	 timber trees: Abies spp., Acacia spp., Castanea sativa, Cedrus 
spp., Fagus orientalis, Juglans regia, Pinus spp.; 
•	 dyes: Alkanna tinctoria, Anchus italica, Indegofera spp., 
Rubia tinctoria; 
•	 essential oils and herbs: Achillea spp., Artemisia spp., Orig­
anum spp., Thymus spp.; and 
•	 plants of horticultural value: Allium spp., Asparagus spp., 
Colchicum spp., Crocus spp., Lilium spp., Rosa persica, 
Tulipa spp. 
GLOBAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BIODIVERSITY OF THE 
FERTILE CRESCENT 
The Fertile Crescent is also an area of crop species megadiversity. 
Several of the significant species (wheat, barley, lentil, pea and vetch) 
of temperate-zone agriculture originated there 10,000 years ago. These 
crops’ wild relatives and landraces of enormous genetic diversity are 
still found in the region. Almond, olive, figs, pomegranates, grapes, 
and pistachio also originated there and have dominated its traditional 
agricultural systems (Harlan 1992; Jaradat 1995). These crops are 
present as a diverse range of wild relatives, weedy forms and local 
varieties. Olives and almonds, two of the most widely cultivated fruit 
trees in the Mediterranean, exist as numerous local clones with dis­
tinct variations in fruit and tree characteristics. 
Wheat and barley have become two major staple crops upon 
which a large proportion (30%) of the world’s population depends. 
Wheat currently occupies 16% of the world’s arable land. World 
production of wheat averaged 550 million metric tons () between 
1992 and 1994, approximately 30% of the global production of all 
cereals, exceeding that of both rice and maize. The production of 
barley, averaged at 165 million  from over 70 million hectares 
(ha) of land, contributes to 20% of the global production of coarse 
grains (Dalrymple 1986; Khaldi 1984). 
An excellent example of the benefits derived from genetic pas­
ture species of the Fertile Crescent is the Australian ley farming 
system, developed in the 1930s, using medics and clovers collected 
from the Mediterranean basin and introduced into rotation with 
The solution cannot be simply a rescue 
mission for the remains of the flora (i.e., 
collection and conservation of 
germplasm in gene banks) but rather 
must be grounded in a holistic approach 
to the major agroecosystems (and 
farming systems therein) in the region. 
If sustainable land management, in 
equilibrium with human societies, can 
be reinstated in the different farming 
systems of the Fertile Crescent, much of 
what is required for the conservation of 
biodiversity will also have been achieved 
(ICARDA 1995). 
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cereals (Carter 1987; Cocks 1995). This system generates harvests 
worth hundreds of millions of dollars in terms of meat, milk, wool, 
added nitrogen fertility and cereal yield sustainability. 
LANDRACES AND PRIMITIVE VARIETIES 
Primitive landraces, wild crop relatives and other wild plant 
species from the Fertile Crescent continue to provide new sources of 
important genetic traits and to improve agricultural production 
worldwide as new techniques allow for the use of wider gene pools 
(Jana 1995). Primitive landraces have persisted in situ because the 
nature of the farming systems in the region has been dynamically 
conserved by farmers. By growing mixtures of diversified local 
germplasm of crops, farmers have been able to select varieties 
adapted to local farming systems and environmental conditions. 
However, most of this diversity is threatened by the adoption of 
uniform new crop varieties, nitrogenous fertilizers, increased agri­
cultural mechanization, urbanization, and habitat destruction by 
overgrazing and forest clearing (Dalrymple 1986; Fowler and 
Mooney 1990). This has led to the disappearance of traditional 
diversity based on local farming systems. The region that gave sed­
entary agriculture to the world now experiences deficits in food 
production (Khaldi 1984); its population has simply outstripped its 
agricultural resources. 
Landraces which have been developed over many generations by 
farmers’ selection for desirable traits tend to be genetically more 
heterogenous and more highly adapted to their specific agro­
ecological environment. Conservation of the valuable and highly 
diverse genetic resources harbored by these landraces can be 
achieved through on-farm conservation and continuous use of these 
landraces in traditional farming systems (McNeely 1989; Brush 
1995) as well as in-situ strategies, the success of which largely de­
pends on community-based management (Brush 1986, 1991; Friis-
Hansen 1994). 
AGRICULTURAL BIODIVERSITY AND SUSTAINABILITY 
Plant resources contain the genetic material which is the key to 
food security and sustainable agricultural production to meet both 
biotic and abiotic changes and challenges. Over time, agricultural 
production has become dependent on a narrow genetic base, both 
among and within species and crops (Harlan 1975). While tradi­
tional low-input farming systems in the Fertile Crescent maintain 
their diversity in order to preserve stability of production under 
climatic, disease and pest risks, they also tend to be less productive 
(Cooper et al. 1987; Jaradat 1991). 
By growing mixtures of diversified local 
germplasm of crops, farmers have been 
able to select varieties adapted to local 
farming systems and environmental 
conditions. However, most of this 
diversity is threatened by the adoption 
of uniform new crop varieties, nitrog­
enous fertilizers, increased agricultural 
mechanization, urbanization, and 
habitat destruction by overgrazing and 
forest clearing.…The region that gave 
sedentary agriculture to the world now 
experiences deficits in food production; 
its population has simply outstripped its 
agricultural resources. 
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National, regional, and international research centers have 
already collected and evaluated the genetic makeup of agricultur­
ally important species such as wheat, barley, and lentil (ICARDA 
1995; Jaradat 1997). Characterization of these genetic resources 
was carried out for traits such as temperature and moisture 
stresses, resistance to disease pathogens, insect pests, and yield 
improvement potential. Although still far from completion, sub­
stantial gene banks have been established as a means of ex-situ 
conservation (FAO 1996a). Gene banks are especially important 
for those species with only scattered and small wild populations 
(e.g., wild lentil populations in Syria and Jordan), which can be 
more effectively conserved through ex-situ conservation. However, 
the richness of many field crops, fruit trees, vegetable crops, pas­
ture and forage legume species and their weedy and wild relatives 
in the Fertile Crescent is now under threat due to one or more 
factors delineated below. 
Gene banks are only part of the process of maintaining 
biodiversity. For spatially and temporally diverse populations, 
obtaining a representative sample is a formidable task (Jaradat 
1997). It is increasingly recognized that ex-situ conservation is 
limited by the fact that only a small proportion of existing genetic 
resources may be sampled. Due to the dynamic nature of plant 
populations and their interaction with the environment, collec­
tions may not represent the total variation present at a given time. 
As a result, naturally occurring and evolving populations (e.g., 
wild emmer wheat in its centre of origin, wild almond, and pista­
chio species) must be maintained in-situ within their environ­
ments; this aspect of conservation is now receiving more attention 
than collection and ex-situ storage (see Engels 1995, for a review). 
Comprehensive information about the characteristics and 
status of agricultural biodiversity in the ecosystems of the region is 
lacking. The diversity of some agriculturally important species has 
been covered in detail (e.g., wheat, barley, lentils); for other species 
(e.g., horticultural crops, medicinal crops, spices) information is 
virtually non-existent (Jaradat 1995). 
Sustainable agriculture is defined as the appropriate manage­
ment of resources in agricultural production in order to satisfy 
current and future human needs while maintaining or enhancing 
the productive capacity of the natural resources (Univ. of Califor­
nia 1997). Sustainable agriculture depends upon the conservation 
of resources (land, water, and genetic resources) upon which 
agricultural production is based. Any strategy for the conservation 
of natural resources must include efforts at achieving sustainable 
agricultural production (Francis et al. 1986). 
Comprehensive information about the 
characteristics and status of agricultural 
biodiversity in the ecosystems of the 
region is lacking. The diversity of some 
agriculturally important species has 
been covered in detail (e.g., wheat, 
barley, lentils); for other species (e.g., 
horticultural crops, medicinal crops, 
spices) information is virtually 
non-existent. 
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Destruction of natural habitats and over-exploitation of native 
vegetation inevitably lead to the degradation of biodiversity. How­
ever, in the Fertile Crescent, those habitats represent the resource 
base for productive agriculture and are often the only livelihood of 
farmers and herders (Barham and Mensching 1988; Tully 1989). 
Indigenous knowledge about cultivated species and their wild and 
weedy relatives, native vegetation, and traditional agricultural prac­
tices in land and water management is an invaluable resource in the 
search for new and appropriate methods of conserving and using 
biodiversity, in general, and plant genetic resources, in particular 
(Brush 1992; Daes 1993). Landraces which have been developed 
over many generations by farmers in the Fertile Crescent are usually 
genetically more heterogeneous and highly adapted to their specific 
agroecological environment. Little is known about farmers’ criteria 
for selection, and the value of their knowledge has only recently been 
recognized for use in breeding programs (Crucible Group 1994). 
Indigenous knowledge is critical to retaining the benefits of 
centuries of keen human observation, applied in different areas of 
the Fertile Crescent, on how agroecosystems function, on the char­
acteristics of cultivated crops, and on their multiple uses. These 
knowledge systems were the only means to integrate the impact of 
long-term climatic and biological changes over many generations 
(Brush 1986), and they are quite necessary for developing new 
methods of adding value to agricultural products (Hodgkin 1995). 
This is particularly true in a region where farming is not only a 
marginal economic activity but also a vital social and environmental 
enterprise (Cooper et al. 1987; Jaradat 1990). 
Still, for many species, especially domesticates and weedy forms, 
active management may be required to preserve their diversity. 
Here, traditional knowledge must be complemented by methods to 
build niches for the maintenance of biodiversity (FAO 1996a, b). 
CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY 
The loss of the region’s biological diversity from habitat destruc­
tion, overgrazing, and pollution has continued despite mounting 
national and international efforts to conserve it (ICARDA 1995). 
Biological resources constitute a capital asset with great potential for 
yielding sustainable benefits. Urgent and decisive action is needed to 
conserve and maintain biodiversity at the genes, species, landraces, 
and ecosystems levels in the Fertile Crescent, with a view to the 
sustainable management and use of biological resources. Capacities 
for the assessment, study and systematic observation and evaluation 
of biodiversity need to be reinforced at national and regional levels 
in the region. Effective national action and regional cooperation are 
Comprehensive information about the 
characteristics and status of agricultural 
biodiversity in the ecosystems of the 
region is lacking…indigenous knowledge 
is critical to retaining the benefits of 
centuries of keen human observation, 
applied in different areas of the Fertile 
Crescent, on how agroecosystems function, 
on the characteristics of cultivated crops, 
and on their multiple uses. 
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required for the in situ conservation and protection of ecosystems, 
for the ex situ conservation of biological and genetic resources and 
for the enhancement of ecosystem functions. The active participa­
tion and support of local communities are essential to the success of 
such an approach (Wood 1994; Porceddu 1995). 
BACKGROUND: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO 
BIODIVERSITY IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT 
Several factors (Jana 1995), both anthropogenic and natural, 
have contributed to the rich diversity of crops and wild species in 
the Fertile Crescent. 
Socio-political Factors 
The political climate and interests in agricultural innovation 
were important influences throughout most of the agricultural 
history in the Fertile Crescent. Each political administration, from 
Roman to Byzantine to Islamic rule, enabled agricultural progress 
and associated crop evolution (Held 1994). During the medieval 
Islamic period, this evolution was facilitated by favorable land ten­
ure and taxation systems. There were also considerable royal inter­
ests in botanical gardens and other forms of aesthetic activities 
which promoted the conservation of plant diversity. The region’s 
long history of human movement, for commercial and political 
purposes, contributed to the migration and diffusion of crop species 
in and out of the region (Harlan 1992). 
Agro-climatic Factors 
Environmental stresses, especially high temperatures and low 
soil moistures, are common during crop growth and development 
(Cooper et al. 1987). Crops and wild plant populations evolving 
under such stressful environments accumulated higher frequencies 
of resistant alleles at individual loci, and also enhanced the assem­
blage of desirable allelic combinations at both linked and unlinked loci. 
Ecological Factors 
Ecological diversity often correlates with genetic diversity. In their 
natural habitats in this region, indigenous crops and their wild rela­
tives encounter diverse ecological habitats that contribute to adaptive 
diversity among populations in different ecological niches. This has 
been demonstrated by numerous studies (Jaradat 1996); subjected to 
heterogenous biotic pressures, intergenotypic, and interspecific inter­
actions, diverse ecosystems were produced which promoted spatial 
divergence among local populations of crops and their pests. 
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Genetic Factors 
Dynamic interaction between natural and human factors have 
maintained crop genetic diversity in traditional agroecosystems in 
this region for millennia. Evolutionary processes such as geographic 
isolation, limited gene migration through germplasm exchange, 
occasional introgression between cultivated varieties and their wild 
relatives, and natural selection in local populations caused adaptive 
divergence and geographical differentiation among primitive variet­
ies and landrace populations of crop species (Harlan 1975). 
THREATS TO BIODIVERSITY IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT 
The major causes of plant genetic erosion and loss of biodiversity 
have been summarized in the Report on the State of the World’s Plant 
Genetic Resources (FAO 1996a) as follows: 
• replacement of local varieties; 
• land clearing;
 
• over-exploitation of species;
 
• population pressure; 
• environmental degradation;
 
• overgrazing;
 
• legislation/policy; 
• changing agricultural systems; 
• pests/weeds/diseases, and 
• reduced fallow land 
In an effort to achieve national food self-security, some countries 
in the Fertile Crescent have intensified and expanded agricultural 
land use, leading to degradation of the limited vegetation, soil, and 
water resources (Jaradat 1990). As a result, genetic diversity is being 
seriously eroded through the degradation of their natural habitats, 
the intensification and expansion of cultivation, and overgrazing in 
natural rangelands (ICARDA 1995). Overgrazing is especially threat­
ening to annual crops such as wheat, barley and lentils (and their 
wild relatives), particularly in marginal areas and where cereal-
livestock farming systems are practiced (Cocks 1995). Regeneration 
of horticultural crops and their wild relatives can be seriously im­
paired as a result of overgrazing, uprooting and cutting for fuel 
purposes (Barham and Mensching 1984; Cooper et al. 1987). As a 
result, wild relatives of crop species grow only in marginal land areas 
such as field borders, abandoned fields, and areas with shallow soil 
and remnants of natural vegetation. The habitats supporting these 
valuable genetic resources are already either patchy or degraded. 
During the last four decades, forest cover has continued to decrease 
in most countries in the Fertile Crescent despite substantial affores­
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tation efforts (AOAD 1994). Intensive agricultural practices, such as 
removing rocks and terracing land to plant horticultural crops, also 
lead to serious habitat destruction and fragmentation which are 
seriously threatening the populations of wild and weedy relatives of 
major crops in the region (ICARDA 1995). 
FARMING SYSTEMS IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT 
The drylands of the Fertile Crescent are a major source of food 
and fiber for millions of people. However, current yields are very 
low as compared to yields of the same crops in developed countries. 
The main reasons for this are: 
•	 traditional production practices used by most farmers
 
(yields are low, as is the rate of adoption of new technology,
 
for economic reasons, generally);
 
•	 non-implementation of improved soil and water conserva­
tion methods;
 
•	 soil erosion, which leads to loss of productivity; 
•	 low soil fertility and inadequate and improper use of fertilizers; 
•	 low and erratic rainfall; and 
•	 loss of biodiversity and valuable plant genetic resources. 
The high and growing population pressures on the limited natu­
ral resource base in most parts of the Fertile Crescent and the misuse 
of the limited land resources has resulted in the expansion of culti­
vated agriculture to the marginal areas, overstocking of rangelands, 
and destruction of forests. Firmly rooted in the physical environ­
ment, these traditional systems are the outcome of centuries of 
ecological experimentation and adaptation, and represent the best 
efforts of farmers to manage the resources of the arid and semi-arid 
environments of the Fertile Crescent (Oram 1979; Gibbon 1981). 
Unfortunately, they have encouraged neither tree crops and pasture 
planting nor the adoption of soil conservation and range manage­
ment practices required in arid and semi-arid parts of this region 
(Cocks 1995; FAO 1996b). 
Dryland agriculture in this region is characterized by small-to­
medium traditional subsistence farms in the hills, mountains, plains 
and the drier parts of the region. Farm size, number of parcels, and 
ownership are among the important factors in understanding farm­
ers’ practices (Tully 1989). 
Subsistence agricultural production in the region is significant 
due to large family size and small land holdings. Cereal consump­
tion, mostly wheat, is approximately 200 kg/person/year, generally 
providing over 50% of dietary intake in terms of both protein and 
calories (FAO 1996a). 
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In traditional village settings over the past 10,000 years, farmers 
have been (1) growing wheat and/or barley in the plains and grazing 
their sheep and goats on the stubble, (2) growing olives, grapes and 
almonds on the lower hills and (3) raising vegetables in small land 
holdings around the village (Jaradat 1990). These practices have 
sustained plant genetic diversity over the millenia. 
By its very nature, agriculture is highly interactive with ecological 
factors and cultural traditions, so it differs from one region to an­
other, as well as within a particular region. The Fertile Crescent is no 
exception. Outside of the intensively irrigated lands, parts of Israel, 
and a few other scattered areas, low crop yields still typify regional 
agriculture, although yields have increased notably since the 1950s. 
Until the 1960s, mechanization was uncommon, but coordinated 
programs are increasing the number of machines, especially tractors 
(Held 1994). 
Improvement in agriculture has been hindered by the persistence 
of traditional practices that are inimical to better farming and mar­
keting. Agricultural land use has been intensified and expanded in 
efforts to meet national aims of food self-sufficiency, placing huge 
demands on the natural resources base, and leading to severe degra­
dation of vegetation, land and water resources. Despite increases in 
the production of crops, in general, and horticultural crops, in 
particular, agricultural imports have been rising steadily. They now 
account for 25% of the region’s total import bill and more than 40% 
of food imports by all developing countries. If current trends con­
tinue, the region will experience, by the year 2000, a six-fold increase 
in the cost of its food imports (Held 1994). 
Agricultural lands in the Fertile Crescent fall into three broad 
domains, according to the availability of rainfall: 
•	 Sub-humid and moister semiarid areas suitable for dryland 
farming of fruit trees in areas of higher rainfall and wheat, 
barley, lentils, chickpeas and other minor crops in the drier 
parts; 
•	 irrigated areas suitable for intensive farming and the pro­
duction of crops such as rice, cotton, sugar beets, etc.; and 
•	 arid and semiarid lands suitable for grazing by sheep, goats 
and camels. 
Farming systems in the Fertile Crescent include irrigated systems, 
wheat-based systems, barley-based systems, the Ley farming system, 
native pasture-based systems, and fallow systems (Jaradat 1990). 
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Irrigated Farming Systems
 
Irrigated agriculture originated in Mesopotamia (Zohary and 
Hopf 1993). Irrigation farming is situated in those areas where 
annual rainfall is less than 150-200 mm but which are characterized 
by high interannual variability (Gibbon 1981). Improved produc­
tion practices are widely adopted in irrigated farming along the 
Euphrates, Tigris and Jordan rivers in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Jordan 
and Israel (Held 1994), resulting in high and stable crop yields. 
However, sustainability of these high yields can only be maintained 
by proper management, irrigation scheduling and drainage (Steiner 
et al. 1988). Pesticide and fertilizer pollution of soil and water is also 
of concern. 
Wheat-Based Farming Systems 
These systems are largely crop-focused, and many other crops 
are grown besides wheat. Additional crops include barley, lentils, 
chickpeas, melon, sorghum, cotton, and vegetables (Tully 1988). 
Food and feed legumes play an important role in sustaining the 
productivity of cereals and livestock in the wheat-based system. The 
ability of legumes to fix atmospheric nitrogen and improve soil 
structure are key to the systems’ sustainability (Osman et al. 1988; 
Cocks 1995). Fruit trees are also a central component of the wheat-
based system and play a major role in the economy of most coun­
tries of the Fertile Crescent, covering extensive areas in southern 
Turkey, northern Iraq, northwestern Iran, western Syria, Lebanon, 
northern and central Jordan and Israel (Jaradat 1995). The most 
common fruit trees grown under rainfed conditions are grapes, 
olives, almonds, pistachios, figs and pomegranates. Apples, pears, 
cherries, peaches and plums are found at higher elevations where 
rainfall exceeds 400 mm. 
Barley-Based Farming Systems 
The barley-based system exists in wide areas along the dry 
margins (200-300 mm of annual rainfall) of cultivation in most 
countries of the Fertile Crescent. Barley is grown mainly as feed for 
livestock (Tully 1989). These systems support large numbers of 
resource-poor farmers; although they are of subsistence nature, 
they have become suppliers of livestock products to expanding urban 
centers (Jaradat 1990). However, these systems have contributed to 
the degradation of the marginal and fragile environments they occupy 
and the sustainability of the system as it is practiced is questionable. 
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The Ley Farming System 
The Ley farming system involves planting annual forage legumes 
in rotation with wheat as a substitute for fallowing, and is being 
practiced on a small scale in parts of the Fertile Crescent (Carter 
1987; Cocks 1995). Its benefits include (1) improvement of soil struc­
ture and fertility, (2) reduced soil erosion, (3) weed control without 
chemicals and (4) sustainable livestock and wheat production. 
Native Pasture-Based System 
This system is integrated with the wheat- and barley-based sys­
tems and is based in the steppe and other locations where rainfall 
exceeds 250 mm. It utilizes lands that are too steep or stony, or areas 
where the soil is too shallow for cultivation (Cooper et al. 1987). 
These pasture lands are usually found in foothills and slopes of 
mountain ranges in the eastern Mediterranean (Gibbon 1981). The 
pastures tend to have a low carrying capacity (1 ewe/ha) and over­
grazing and high stocking rates have severely degraded the natural 
vegetation in these areas (Oram 1979). 
The Fallow System 
Fallowing is a common practice in the dryland farming systems 
of the Fertile Crescent. It involves leaving the land without a crop 
for one or more growing seasons. The benefits of fallow vary with 
different soils and climates, but include improved moisture storage, 
increased mineralization of soil nitrogen, weed control and better 
seedbed conditions (Papendick and Campbell 1974). 
A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO SUSTAINABLE 
AGRICULTURE AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION 
IN THE FERTILE CRESCENT 
In order to sustainably conserve the remaining biodiversity in 
the Fertile Crescent, and in order for biodiversity to positively 
contribute to the establishment of sustainable farming systems in 
the region, activities leading to the in-situ, or on-farm conservation 
of biodiversity should include (Lowerance et al. 1986): 
•	 identification of sites with large biodiversity of target 
cultivated, wild and weedy species; 
•	 assessment of the threats to biodiversity of each of culti­
vated, wild and weedy species; 
•	 documentation of the extent of cultivation of landraces and 
primitive or old varieties of field crops and horticultural 
crops in the region; and 
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•	 characterization of wild and weedy species and landraces
 
and the documentation of the status of landraces and wild
 
relatives in ex-situ collections, in an effort to fill gaps and
 
capture maximum diversity in collections.
 
COMMUNITY-BASED BIODIVERSITY MANAGEMENT 
The biodiversity which has been evolving as a part of the Fertile 
Crescent landscape over the centuries is of global importance (Table 
2; Kloppenberg and Kleiman 1988). Maintaining sufficient heteroge­
neity in farming systems and providing the necessary habitats to 
sustain this biodiversity is a regional and international responsibility 
(IPGRI 1995). Although technology plays a major role in improving 
sedentary farming, the role of management is also crucial (McNeely 
1988; 1989). The widely-practiced top-down approaches have proved 
to be ineffective in regulating land use and allowing sustainable 
biodiversity management and conservation within ecosystems 
(Lowerance et al. 1986), especially in the WANA region (FAO 1996a). 
Community-based management, on the other hand, is expected to 
result in a more effective and sustainable management of biodiversity. 
The agricultural community should be seen as part of a larger and 
more comprehensive ecosystem which provides both goods and 
services from nature through well-managed protected systems. 
Diversity of crop species and the diversity of varieties within 
species have traditionally strengthened the resilience of agriculture 
(Harlan 1975). Protected areas can contribute to this effort through 
maintaining wild relatives of crops. Agriculture and protected areas 
are sometimes seen as opposite ends of a spectrum (McNeely 1995). 
However, they can play important complementary roles, especially 
when the protected areas are managed in ways explicitly designed to 
support agricultural development. Nonetheless, exclusion by means 
of protected areas is not necessarily the best means of all species or 
Table 2 Examples of important indigenous economic plants in countries of The Fertile Crescent. 
Category	 Examples 
Food plants	 Almonds, apricot, barley, beets, carob, chestnut, sweet chestnut, chickpea, cherry, date palm, fig, 
sycamore fig, lentil, olive, pistachio, pomegranate, quince, rye, wheat 
Fiber plants	 Flax 
Oil plants	 Safflower, flax, olive 
Timber trees	 Abies spp., Acacia spp., Castanea sativa, Cedrus spp., Fagus orientalis, Juglans, regia, Pinus spp. 
Dyes	 Alkanna tinctoria, Anchus italica, Indegofera spp., Rubia tinctoria 
Essential oils, perfumes, herbs	 Achillea spp., Artemisia spp., Origanum spp., Thymus spp. 
Plants of horticultural value	 Allium spp., Asparagus spp., Colchicum spp., Crocus spp., Lilium spp., Rosa persica, Tulipa spp. 
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genetic resource conservation (ICARDA 1995). For many species 
and environments, active management is required to conserve their 
genetic diversity. This can be achieved through: 
•	 restoration (or creation), within the farming system, of 
special niches or habitats for certain crops and their wild 
and weedy relatives; 
•	 promotion of traditional land management practices, 
including the use of traditional land preparation, sowing, 
and harvesting of certain crops; 
•	 promotion of active participation of farmers in surveys, 
selection and breeding, and utilization of their indigenous 
knowledge (Daes 1993); 
•	 providing farmers with a broader genetic base (among and 
within crops and genotypes) to enhance sustainability; and 
•	 reform of social and economic policies to encourage adoption, 
by farmers, of in situ and on-farm conservation measures. 
The Role of Farmers in Maintaining Biodiversity 
Farmers, under traditional farming systems, have maintained 
biodiversity through the creative handling (use, conservation and im­
provement) of landrace and old crop varieties. Farmers’ choices are 
usually based on the continued suitability of the traditional varieties 
under their prevailing farming systems (Brush 1991; 1995). 
Traditional farming has been in long and close contact with a great 
range of different ecosystems (Wood 1994); characteristically, tradi­
tional farming taps and manages a range of natural resources beyond 
the limit of the farm. Farm communities should be recognized as stew­
ards in the continued management of biodiversity. 
Throughout their history, farmers have maintained diversity in 
order to preserve stability of production under biotic and abiotic 
stresses. Wild and weedy relatives of many crops (e.g., fruit trees, leafy 
vegetables) used to be left growing on field borders to supply food, feed, 
seeds or root stocks for grafting. The replacement of the traditional 
farming system by modern agricultural practices is endangering these 
wild relatives. Food demands and market forces have encouraged the 
replacement of adapted landraces and local varieties of field crops, 
vegetables and fruit and nut trees with higher-yielding, more uniform 
cultivars, thus hampering the gene pools of these crops (Fowler and 
Mooney 1990). 
Demand, by consumers and farmers alike, for higher-yielding and 
more uniform food crops which must also be adapted to ever-changing 
biotic and abiotic stresses requires continuous and reliable access to 
genetic resources that can be used to impart such qualities. The loss of 
traditional agriculture to modern monocultures eliminates associated 
Farm communities should be recog­
nized as stewards in the continued 
management of biodiversity. 
Throughout their history, farmers have 
maintained diversity in order to 
preserve stability of production under 
biotic and abiotic stresses. 
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and potentially beneficial biological elements (Waage 1991) as well as 
the invaluable traditional knowledge of the distinct qualities, uses, and 
growth requirements of wild and weedy relatives of crop plants and 
landraces of these crops (Brush 1986; Crucible Group 1994). 
There is a need for research strategies that will both increase the 
quantity and improve the quality of the genetic diversity being con­
served by farmers (Voss 1992). Research objectives should include (1) 
the provision of usable variation for farmers to evaluate and incorporate 
into their cropping systems, (2) the dynamic on-farm conservation of 
germplasm as resources for farmers throughout the region, and (3) the 
protection of the environment by continued traditional management of 
proven sustainability. 
Supporting On-farm Conservation of Biodiversity 
Farmers choose to grow new cultivars for many reasons, includ­
ing market conditions, family food security and environmental 
sustainability. Unfortunately, these choices often result in significant 
on-farm genetic erosion. Still, in some countries of the Middle East, 
including those in the Fertile Crescent, the overwhelming majority 
of farmers, as a matter of choice or necessity, engage in conservation 
and development of plant genetic resources as they select and save 
seed for the next planting season. These farmers typically practice 
low-input farming. Such farmers often lack access to new and di­
verse genetic materials which could be integrated into existing crops 
to improve production (ICARDA 1995). 
Prospects of markedly increasing the productivity of low-input 
and low-potential farms through genetic improvement alone, and 
without appropriate and creative approaches, would appear limited. 
Yet increased productivity is invaluable for food security and the 
reduction of pressure on fragile environments (Sobral 1997). Initia­
tives focusing on participatory, on-farm management and improve­
ment of plant genetic resources may offer the potential to reach large 
numbers of farmers and promote further agricultural development 
(ICARDA 1995). Rigorous multidisciplinary scientific research is 
needed in relation to on farm conservation of biodiversity, including 
•	 ethnobotanical and socio-economic research to understand 
and analyze farmer knowledge, selection/breeding, utiliza­
tion, and management of plant genetic resources; 
•	 population and conservation biology to understand the 
structure and dynamics of genetic diversity in local 
landraces and farmers’ varieties; 
•	 crop improvement research, including research on mass 
selection and simple breeding as a means of increasing crop 
Farmers choose to grow new cultivars 
for many reasons, including market 
conditions, family food security and 
environmental sustainability. Unfortu­
nately, these choices often result in 
significant on-farm genetic erosion. 
Still, in some countries of the Middle 
East, including those in the Fertile 
Crescent, the overwhelming majority of 
farmers, as a matter of choice or 
necessity, engage in conservation and 
development of plant genetic resources 
as they select and save seed for the 
next planting season. 
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yields and reliability without significant losses of local 
biodiversity; and 
•	 extension studies of little known crops, including seed 
production, marketing and distribution. 
In this context, two major issues must be considered. The first 
concerns large gaps in knowledge about conservation requirements 
and crop diversity loss in traditional farming systems, farmers’ 
attitudes concerning diversity, and the habitats supporting diversity. 
The second concerns yield limitations of traditional plant breeding 
systems by local farmers (which are constrained by the limited avail­
ability of germplasm) (Henne 1995). 
Promoting in situ Conservation 
Natural ecosystems hold important plant genetic resources, 
including endemic and threatened wild and weedy relatives of crop 
plants. This genetic diversity is an economically important compo­
nent of natural ecosystems and cannot be maintained ex situ 
(Shands 1991). Unique and particularly diverse populations of these 
genetic resources must be protected in situ when they are under 
threat. Two reasons can be cited (ICARDA 1995) in favor of in situ 
and on-farm conservation of biodiversity. First, it promotes the 
evolutionary process, allowing germplasm to be kept in tune with 
the changing environment (biotic and abiotic elements). Second, it 
assures greater genetic diversity conservation than ex situ systems. 
Underutilized Species 
Many species typically regarded as marginal contribute substan­
tially to household food and livelihood security (IPGRI 1995). They 
are often managed or harvested by women. Many medicinal plants, 
herbs (Oran 1996; Steinmann, this volume), and even fruit trees and 
some field crops in the Fertile Crescent can be considered as un­
derutilized. Knowledge concerning the uses and management of 
these species is often localized and specialized. Many of these species 
have the potential for more widespread use, and their promotion 
could contribute to food security, agricultural diversification, and 
income generation, particularly in areas where the cultivation of 
major crops is economically constrained. 
Seed Production and Distribution 
Farmers benefit from having a wide range of seed varieties and 
other planting materials (Kloppenburg and Kleiman 1988). Avail­
ability can be constrained by (1) poor harvests, inadequate on-farm 
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storage facilities, and insufficient means to multiply quality seed, 
and (2) poor seed distribution systems. 
There is a need to strengthen local capacity to produce and 
distribute seed of many crops and local varieties, especially landraces 
and minor crops with specific adaptations, which can promote 
diverse and resilient farming systems. 
NEW MARKETS FOR LOCAL VARIETIES 
Increasingly, diversity is being replaced by uniformity in the 
agricultural market place. Changes in traditional cultures and in 
consumer preferences are one explanation. Concentration on pro­
ductivity, the effects of advertising, the rise of global consumer 
markets leading to stringent requirements being imposed on farm­
ers, and the often inadvertent disincentives arising from legislation, 
policies, programs and other institutional activities offer additional 
explanations (Fowler and Mooney 1990). Economic and social 
incentives could be offered to encourage farmers who continue to 
grow distinct, local varieties and produce “diversity-rich” agricul­
tural products. 
LAND USE MANAGEMENT 
Land use management and planning of areas to be used for on-
farm and in situ conservation is essential to: 
•	 provide buffers, corridors or habitat strips for the target species; 
•	 provide both water catchment and habitat for wild and 
weedy relatives of crop species; 
•	 provide niches for diversified plant production and alterna­
tive income generation (weedy vegetables, spices and herbs); 
•	 develop community-level water harvesting techniques 
where necessary; 
•	 help protect target tree species as a genetic resource along 
with their use as rootstocks for grafting (e.g., wild Olea 
species in parts of southern Turkey, and wild Pistachia in 
Syria, Lebanon and Jordan); 
•	 promote biodiversity-maintaining agronomic practices 
(e.g., sowing mixtures of cereal landraces in rotation with 
forage legumes to maintain soil fertility and production in 
rainfed cropping areas to avoid poor management); 
•	 provide seed of locally-adapted pasture legumes for rejuve­
nation of degraded common grazing lands; and 
•	 establish sustainable grazing management and monitor 
pasture and range condition and animal nutrition and 
health with the objective of preserving germplasm while 
maintaining animal production. 
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SPECIES MANAGEMENT 
Species management can be achieved through in situ conserva­
tion to protect wild species of a particular crop gene pool in their 
original habitats. These habitats may be modified when necessary to 
ensure sufficient population size and gene flow. Different target 
species will require different management. For example, populations 
of wild progenitors of wheat, barley and lentils, growing on field 
borders of the respective crops, constitute a special case of in situ 
conservation. These three crops and their wild progenitors develop 
hybridizing complexes, allowing introgression and gene flow be­
tween the wild and domesticated species (ICARDA 1995). The hy­
bridizing complexes may be enhanced by frequent planting of 
cultivated species in fields adjacent to the wild populations. A simi­
lar situation can be envisaged for vegetables, fruit trees and their 
wild relatives throughout the Fertile Crescent (Bromberg 1995). 
On the other hand, farmers can be encouraged to practice on-
farm conservation of landraces and old varieties through awareness 
building and incentives in the form of alternative livelihood. The 
latter may include (1) introducing apiculture into farming systems, 
especially where mixed farming is being practiced, (2) supply of 
locally adapted rootstocks and seeds, and (3) technical assistance in 
soil management and water harvesting. 
Establishment of field gene banks to grow vulnerable crop spe­
cies for replanting in field margins and improved habitats as native 
trees or as adapted rootstocks will promote on-farm conservation. 
These field gene banks can be utilized to promote public awareness 
as well (Du Puy and Jackson 1995). 
Finally, wild relatives and landraces, capable of withstanding 
particular biotic and abiotic stresses, can be utilized in breeding 
programs to make use of specific adaptation and thereby maintain 
genetic diversity within a crop (ICARDA 1995). Farmers’ active 
participation is essential (McNeely 1989; ICARDA 1995) in the 
selection of lines in breeding programs to ensure that new genotypes 
are specifically adapted not only to the ecological conditions but also 
to the intended end-use and farmers’ preferences. 
SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Governments in the Fertile Crescent are preoccupied with sup­
porting and improving agricultural production, since the region has 
some of the highest population growth rates in the world and a 
widening trade gap in food and agricultural products (Held 1994). 
Unfortunately, those policies directed at enhancing agricultural 
productivity also tend to negatively impact genetic biodiversity. 
Although there are limited biodiversity conservation policies in a 
On the other hand, farmers can be 
encouraged to practice on-farm 
conservation of landraces and old 
varieties through awareness building 
and incentives in the form of alternative 
livelihood. The latter may include (1) 
introducing apiculture into farming 
systems, especially where mixed 
farming is being practiced, (2) supply of 
locally adapted rootstocks and seeds, 
and (3) technical assistance in soil 
management and water harvesting. 
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 few of these countries, there is no holistic plan for their implementa­
tion (ICARDA 1995). 
Technologies appropriate for better management of biodiversity, 
water, soil, land and cropping systems are available but their adop­
tion has been inhibited by disincentives to sustainable use of these 
natural resources (Altieri and Merrick 1987; Voss 1992; Sobral 
1997). Also, uncertainties over property rights among users of the 
natural grazing and water catchments can become obstacles to 
proper management of land and other natural resources. Some 
tribal institutions which once regulated grazing or water rights have 
broken down (e.g., in Jordan) or been undermined by government 
nationalization of land (e.g., Syria). Some rangelands are being 
privately appropriated through new settlement and conversion to 
cropping (e.g., Jordan) while many (including the Hammad region 
bordering Syria, Jordan and Iraq) are open access areas where users 
have incentive neither to improve productivity nor to conserve 
biodiversity. 
In the barley-based, and to some extent the wheat-based, farm­
ing systems, livestock is becoming increasingly dependent on 
supplementary feed, forage supplies and crop residues from 
biodiversity-rich areas in Syria, Jordan and Iraq (Jaradat and 
Haddad 1994). This is causing significant competition over re­
sources which must be taken into account in any policy changes. 
Although planners and policymakers are convinced that changes 
are needed, they posit that they will take time to implement. A 
strong emphasis on the communities and local land managers as 
well as the modification of current government incentives for the 
benefit of biodiversity conservation can bring about these changes in 
a relatively short time (ICARDA 1995). 
In Syria, Jordan and Iraq, governments buy strategic crops (wheat, 
barley, cotton, sugar beet) at attractive prices; feed concentrates are 
distributed at cost through farmers’ cooperatives, and governments 
control the price of many agricultural products (e.g., meat). Some of 
these policies may be modified after the demonstration of feasible 
policy alternatives conducive to biodiversity conservation. 
Agricultural and land use policies, legislation related to bio­
diversity, and resource management which include indigenous 
knowledge and property rights are well-acknowledged policy areas 
(Kloppenburg and Kleiman 1988; Doren-Adzobu 1997). It is vital to 
promote policies which favor biodiversity conservation without 
jeopardizing agricultural production. Such initiatives can be defined 
and tested and can be country- or region-specific. They must ad­
dress current incentive practices of land clearing for fruit tree 
plantations in hilly areas, herbicide and pesticide use in intensive 
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Although planners and policymakers are 
convinced that changes are needed, they 
posit that they will take time to imple­
ment. A strong emphasis on the 
communities and local land managers 
as well as the modification of current 
government incentives for the benefit of 
biodiversity conservation can bring about 
these changes in a relatively short time 
(ICARDA 1995).…In Syria, Jordan and 
Iraq, governments buy strategic crops 
(wheat, barley, cotton, sugar beet) at 
attractive prices; feed concentrates are 
distributed at cost through farmers’ 
cooperatives, and governments control 
the price of many agricultural products 
(e.g., meat). Some of these policies may 
be modified after the demonstration of 
feasible policy alternatives conducive to 
biodiversity conservation. 
  

     
farming (e.g., the Jordan, the Beqa’a and the Ghab valleys, in Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria, respectively), and land ownership and agricul­
tural expansion in marginal and government-owned lands. 
HUMAN RESOURCES 
Human and institutional resources play a decisive role in the 
sustainability of agricultural production and biodiversity conserva­
tion. Long-term national plant genetic resources programs, comple­
mented by coordinated regional activities, will provide the frame­
work for sustainable biodiversity conservation (ICARDA 1995; 
IPGRI 1995). However, skilled personnel educated in biodiversity 
conservation and plant genetic resources are lacking in the region 
(Adham et al. 1995). Training needs of most countries range over a 
number of disciplines and involve both short and long term training 
(IPGRI 1995). They include specialized training in plant identifica­
tion of wild relatives and landraces, in situ and on-farm conserva­
tion, agro-ecosystem ecology, population genetics, and agricultural 
socio-economics. Administrators and technicians in this field re­
quire specially adapted in-country training courses. 
OPERATIONAL NEEDS TO PROMOTE ON-FARM 
MANAGEMENT OF BIODIVERSITY 
The range of options for intervention in on-farm germplasm 
conservation and management (Henne 1995) in the Fertile Crescent 
is great. The often conflicting objectives of conservation, agricultural 
development, social equity, appropriate seed production and deliv­
ery systems, and the provision of samples for breeding work, all 
overlain with donors’ changing interests, has in the past led to much 
confusion. In this context, it is important to address a variety of 
needs and priorities. More technical investigation is needed on 
genetic and agronomic aspects of on-farm conservation in order to 
quantify, improve and transfer both the genetic resources and tradi­
tional management technology, so as to supplement information 
generated by sociological and anthropological studies. Priority at­
tention should be given to farming (and cropping) systems rich in 
species and varietal diversity. Information on farming communities 
with a history of crop and varietal experimentation should be used 
in planning on-farm conservation. Information on varietal move­
ment in and out of cropping systems is vital to understanding the 
dynamic nature of on-farm management of germplasm. It is highly 
recommended that intervention start with farming systems with a 
history of traditional management, in regions of varietal diversifica­
tion which are not yet targeted for agricultural development. 
The often conflicting objectives of 
conservation, agricultural development, 
social equity, appropriate seed produc­
tion and delivery systems, and the 
provision of samples for breeding work, 
all overlain with donors’ changing 
interests, has in the past led to much 
confusion. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The holistic approach to sustainable agricultural development 
and biodiversity conservation in the Fertile Crescent is hypothesized to: 
•	 reduce risks to productivity under highly variable environ­
ments by utilizing the specific adaptation of landraces, the
 
highly diverse wild relatives and other biodiversity assets in
 
different farming systems in the region;
 
•	 allow for sound management of natural resources, includ­
ing biological, water, and soil resources, for present and
 
future agricultural development;
 
•	 build and strengthen human resources to cope with agricul­
tural and environmental challenges, and
 
•	 create public awareness in environmental and biodiversity
 
issues, especially those influencing agricultural production
 
and its sustainability.
 
Promoting sustainable agriculture through diversification of 
crop production and broader diversity in crops in the Fertile Cres­
cent calls for (Francis et al. 1988; Henne 1995): 
•	 incorporation of a broader range of crops including inter alia
 
crops which produce raw material or are sources of energy;
 
•	 use of more diversity in breeding programs and in varieties
 
and species used on farms;
 
•	 implementation of innovative approaches in plant breeding
 
for the purposes of domesticating new crops; the develop­
ment of new plant varieties and the promotion of higher
 
levels of genetic diversity in crops and on farms, such as
 
planting mixtures of adapted varieties, are recognized as
 
means for adding stability in agricultural systems and pro­
moting agricultural production and food security; and
 
•	 support of efforts to identify those activities used in plant
 
breeding, plant research and farming systems that foster on-

farm diversity. Such research might include a review of
 
non-homogenous farming systems, such as those based on
 
intercropping, polycropping, integrated pest management
 
and integrated nutrient management, for their possible
 
wider applicability.
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Use of Land by Nomadic Pastoralists in Iran: 1970–1998 
Lois Beck 
Washington University, St. Louis 
ABSTRACT 
This paper describes and analyzes changes in natural resource use by the Qashqa’i nomadic pastoralists of southwestern 
Iran between the early 1970s and the present. Drawing upon the author’s anthropological fieldwork, including eight visits 
since the overthrow of the shah in 1979, the paper demonstrates how Qashqa’i land use strategies, which evolved over 
centuries as a means for survival in often marginal natural environments, have adapted to the pressures of an increasingly 
intrusive society with urban and technological biases. Despite these pressures, the Qashqa’i have used customary and 
new means to wrest a living from their remaining lands and have thereby preserved a measure of autonomy. 
In this paper, I examine how some nomadic pastoralists in Iran 
changed their use of the physical environment over the past thirty 
years and how these changes related to their economic practices. I 
base this paper on my anthropological research among Qashqa’i 
nomadic pastoralists in southwestern Iran in the 1970s and 1990s, 
including eight visits since the revolution in 1978-1979 and the 
Islamic Republic’s formation. I draw on my observations of the 
varying ecological adaptations and diversifying economic strategies 
of these tribal people as they exploited a vast section of the southern 
Zagros Mountains. Their practices included use and protection of 
pastureland, investment in arable land and agricultural techniques, 
construction of water-control systems, hunting, gathering, construc­
tion of shelters for people and animals, increased reliance on roads 
and motorized transportation, and closer ties with the national 
government and the market. Although much of the land these no­
madic pastoralists used was not suitable for productive activities 
other than seasonal pastoralism, hunting, and gathering, they were 
increasingly forced to compete with settled agrarian communities for 
the available cultivable land and for access to water and rights of 
passage. They, did enjoy, however, the competitive advantage of a 
continuing reliance on migration, and the primary products of pasto­
ralism (meat, dairy goods, wool, weavings) were in market demand. 
This paper may inspire other scholars to take fuller consider­
ation of the people actually making use of a specific territory. How­
ever land is used, it is obviously more than just physical features. 
Studies of the environment too often ignore or neglect the people 
who make a livelihood there and whose use of land is a major part of 
their vital social and cultural systems. People have developed strategies 
of land use through a process of trial and error over long periods— 
decades, centuries, and even millennia. Such strategies and the 
people who devise them deserve at least our respect and at most our 
support and possible protection. 
However land is used, it is obviously 
more than just physical features. Studies 
of the environment too often ignore or 
neglect the people who make a 
livelihood there and whose use of land is 
a major part of their vital social and 
cultural systems. 
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Mobile residents of the plateaus and valleys of the Zagros Moun­
tains of southwestern Iran, the Qashqa’i are members of a tribal 
confederacy of some 800,000 individuals. They speak a Central-
Asian-derived Turkish and constitute one of Iran’s many ethnic and 
national minorities. Until the 1960s most Qashqa’i were nomadic 
pastoralists who migrated semiannually hundreds of kilometers 
between winter pastures at low altitudes near the Persian Gulf and 
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Figure 1 Qashqa’i territory (Beck 1991). 
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Figure 2 Qashqa’i winter pastures, summer pastures, and migration routes (Beck 1991). 
summer pastures high in the mountains to the north and east 
(Figures 1 and 2). 
Since the 1960s many Qashqa’i have settled in villages and 
towns, although often retaining pastoralism as one of several means 
of livelihood. Despite the new places and patterns of residence for 
many of these settlers, most remained attached to their customary 
seasonal pastures, visited their kin there, and continued to exploit 
the resources, often in cooperation with these kin. 
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      
This paper focuses on the contemporary ecological, economic, 
and social conditions in southwestern Iran as I have directly ob­
served them during eight periods since the revolution in 1978-1979 
and the Islamic Republic’s formation, most recently in 1998. 
Because of research I also conducted there in the 1970s, I am able to 
follow precisely the changes that individuals, families, and tribal 
groups have made over the past thirty years.1  My publications draw­
ing on this earlier research provide comparative information about 
previous periods (e.g., Beck 1980, 1981a, 1981b, 1991). Other 
aspects of post-revolutionary conditions are covered in existing 
and forthcoming work (Beck 1992). 
I ask the following key questions: 
•	 How have the Qashqa’i people made the best of the inher­
ent environmental constraints of these rugged, mountain- I conducted anthropological research1
among Qashqa’i nomadic pastoralists inous, and semi-arid lands? 
Iran in 1969-1971, 1977 (two visits), 1979,
•	 How and why do many of them continue with pastoralism 1991, 1992, 1995 (two visits), 1996,1997 
and nomadism, despite pressures to change their liveli- and 1998. Research in the 1990s was 
supported in part by grants from thehoods and lifestyles? 
National Endowment for the Humanities,
•	 How have these pressures changed over the years? the Social Science Research Council, the 
•	 Why does the current Islamic government, unlike previous American Philosophical Society, and 
Washington University.Iranian governments in this century, support nomads and
 
their livelihoods?
 
Despite the many changes that all Qashqa’i have undergone in the 
past thirty years, I am still impressed by the remarkable continuities in 
their society and culture. In examining my photographs to find details 
to add to this paper, I was struck by how many of them could have 
been taken at any time during the past three decades, as long ago as 
1969 or as recently as 1998. 
A TYPICAL CAMP: 1970 AND 1998 
Several brief descriptions will help to demonstrate the kinds of 
changes that have occurred for Qashqa’i nomadic pastoralists and to 
establish a context for this paper’s discussion. Their winter and 
summer pastures are located in the valleys and on the slopes and 
plateaus of the southern Zagros Mountains. Mountain peaks rise 
above nomads’ camps, each of which is usually secluded by the 
rugged terrain. The ecological differences between winter and sum­
mer pastures will be apparent here and in the rest of the paper. 
A typical campsite in winter pastures in 1970 contained three 
woven goat-hair tents with slanted roofs to deflect rain and snow. 
Each dwelling held an extended family of seven or so people. The 
black tents were pitched on flat areas on the slopes of gullies to 
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protect the occupants and their possessions from flash floods while 
also still providing some shelter from wind. Several nearby huts built 
of stones, tree branches, and bundled reeds were used for cooking, 
storage, and refuge in inclement weather. A simple, roughly circular, 
open-air enclosure made of rocks heaped with dried thorny bushes 
protected the animals at night and helped to discourage predators. 
Each household owned its own sheep and goats, which were tended 
together in herds of from one hundred to three hundred animals. 
Small trees and shrubs and low-lying plants grew in the terrain 
surrounding the camp. Green leafy shoots appeared as the weather 
warmed after the winter’s rains. Several nearby shallow depressions, 
sometimes fortified along the sides with rocks and dried mud, held 
rainfall and runoff for the animals to drink. Accompanied by don­
keys to carry the load, the camp’s women and children spent many 
hours a day traveling to and from a well in the valley below, the 
nearest source of clean drinking water. Newborn lambs and kids 
were held in reed pens inside the tents and released several times a 
day to be reunited with their mothers for nursing. Before dawn 
shepherds took the herds to graze different parts of the surrounding 
hills and mountainsides, while a camel herder tended his animals and 
collected firewood for the camp’s use. Men and boys kept periodic 
watch over several small fields of sown barley protected by rock walls, 
the crop to be used as supplemental animal feed if sufficient rain 
germinated the seeds and grew the plants to maturity. Birds seemed to 
eat as much grain as was eventually harvested. 
By contrast, in terms of both time and space, a typical residential 
site in summer pastures in 1998 contained several simple one-room 
houses constructed from stones gathered nearby and mortared with 
cement and dirt. They stood on the very spots where tents used to be 
erected only a few years previously. A small kitchen area walled in by 
cement blocks and roofed with old tent fabric stood to the side of 
each house, and just beyond that lay heaps of firewood and 
miscellaneous equipment that had not found a place in these new 
dwellings. Gunny sacks filled with barley, dried alfalfa, and straw 
leaned against the houses’ outer walls. A black goat-hair tent was 
pitched by one house, where a newly married son and his bride 
resided and where guests were entertained, as if to celebrate the past 
nostalgically. Holding the herds at night, pens made of metal mesh 
supported by wooden stakes stood behind the houses at the edge of 
the mountain slope. The mouth of the nearest spring had been 
cemented to form a small pool from which people drew water, and a 
cement channel led water to another pool where the animals drank. 
A decrepit Land Rover was parked beside one of the houses. The dirt 
track used by the vehicle’s owner to reach the camp was also traveled 
Photo: Lois Beck 
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by Persian and Lur cultivators in the area. The dust-raising traffic 
annoyed everyone, especially mothers trying to watch young chil­
dren. These trespassers demonstrated no concern for the campsite’s 
borders; they did not care that the camp was a defined territory to be 
used exclusively by its inhabitants. Down the hill near another water 
channel was a toilet, a small, open-air, cement-block structure con­
taining a ceramic platform precariously balanced over a pit. The 
stumps of shade trees, planted along the channel but cut down by 
irate Persian cultivators who resented the nomads’ presence, stood 
as stark evidence of the conflict. Their trunks lay on the ground, 
stripped of branches. The surrounding terrain was bare compared 
with winter pastures. No trees or large shrubs grew here naturally, 
only small bushes and low-lying vegetation. The valley below, its 
streams blocked against the pastoralists’ animals since the 1980s, was 
green with walled orchards and cultivated fields. Hostile encounters 
between the Persian and Lur cultivators there and the pastoralists 
occurred almost daily. 
Various topics mentioned in these two passages are discussed in 
the following eight sections. I focus on the post-revolutionary period 
(1979-1998) with comparative information provided for earlier 
periods. The wider context, in which many individuals and groups 
other than the Qashqa’i competed for the same resources, cannot be 
discussed in detail here. 
LAND 
Problems over land caused great uncertainty among Qashqa’i 
nomadic pastoralists and significantly affected the ongoing decisions 
they made concerning their livelihoods and lifestyles. No single 
government agency held all the information about land use and 
deeds for any given territory, and some offices possessed conflicting 
information. Such bureaucratic chaos offered the potential for great 
abuse. In part because the nomads were especially vulnerable due to 
their mobility and their only seasonal residence in winter and sum­
mer pastures, settled non-Qashqa’i individuals with influential 
government connections and sufficient wealth to bribe officials 
could determine their own land use. To support their own interests, 
Qashqa’i individuals held onto any documents pertaining to land. 
Even papers concerning disputes on other issues contained a record 
of people’s location at the time, necessary for proof of residence. 
School records also provided evidence for the presence of certain 
families in specific places. 
The status of nationalized pastureland, a broad policy intro­
duced by Mohammad Reza Shah in 1962 as part of his “bloodless” 
revolution, was unclear after his ouster in 1979 and still remained so 
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in 1998, in part because his programs, even exemplary ones, were 
tainted by their association with him. Since 1962, natural water­
courses, following the pull of gravity and the contours of the often 
hilly if not mountainous terrain, were generally recognized by gov­
ernment officials as the legal division between pasture and “culti­
vable” land. Land above the channels was nationalized to be used as 
pasture; land below was subject to land reform and opened up for 
cultivation if not already cultivated. Most nomads were not eligible 
then for distribution of cultivable land. By the 1990s the dividing 
line between these two types of land was increasingly unclear be­
cause of the expansion of irrigation systems and new land brought 
under cultivation. Some changes did occur in the mid-1990s, such as 
new legal rights to rent, transfer, and sell pasture leases to others. 
Rights over collectively used land were locally negotiated but not 
always formalized by legal documentation. The issue of land consid­
ered as privately owned with or without supporting legal documents 
was still under discussion in the national parliament in 1998, in part 
because of problems created by the many thousands of wealthy 
landowners who had fled into exile during or after the revolution 
and who later attempted to return and/or claim their (former) land. 
Although some influential members of the ruling Shi’i Muslim 
clergy supported a land reform that would give legal title to the 
cultivators who actually worked the land, others were themselves 
major landholders and resisted any new comprehensive reform that 
would jeopardize their own interests and those of their political and 
economic backers. 
NOMADISM AND PASTORALISM 
Qashqa’i nomadic pastoralists herded their sheep and goats 
seasonally between lowlands and highlands, distances as much as 
600 km each way, and exploited the pastoral resources along the 
routes. They spent approximately four months in lowland winter 
pastures, two months migrating in the spring to highland summer 
pastures, three to four months residing there, and two to three 
months migrating in the autumn back to lowland winter pastures. 
These migrations were not merely passages between two regions, for 
the vegetation along the way, especially in spring, was a vital part of 
the animals’ sustenance. Also, seasonal pastures did not provide 
sufficient natural grazing and water to support the nomads and their 
animals for long periods. Once arriving in winter or summer pas­
tures, the nomads did not stay in one location for the season. 
Rather, they moved periodically from place to place within these 
areas seeking fresh grazing, better access to water and other natural 
Rights over collectively used land were 
locally negotiated but not always 
formalized by legal documentation. The 
issue of land considered as privately 
owned with or without supporting legal 
documents was still under discussion in 
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resources, clean campsites, and new neighbors. 
Most Qashqa’i people spent the year traveling in these ways and 
residing in goat-hair tents wherever they set up camp. Diverse and 
flexible patterns had always emerged, however, as people made 
ongoing individual and group decisions to continue or to change 
their current modes of livelihood, residence, and lifestyle. For 
example, even by the 1970s some Qashqa’i lived in huts or small, 
rudimentary houses in winter or summer pastures and migrated in 
the spring and autumn. Some resided in tents and did not migrate at 
all. Others lived in villages in the winter and in tents at higher alti­
tudes in the summer. Some Qashqa’i resided in tents and practiced 
only agriculture, while others lived in houses and practiced only 
pastoralism. Some families were divided into nomadic and settled 
parts and into pastoral and agricultural parts. And some Qashqa’i 
migrated without having any sheep and goats. All these patterns and 
the more standard ones could change on a yearly and even a sea­
sonal basis. For any single local group, the specific patterns its mem­
bers created during a year were never to be replicated. 
By 1979 many nomads found the autumn’s trek lasting two to 
three months to be too strenuous and troublesome for their animals 
because of the increasing shortage of pasture and water along the 
route and the detours caused by expanding human settlements and 
agrarian activity. Most began to hire trucks and transport their 
animals in a single day, a change that put new stress on the pastoral 
resources of their summer and winter territories, on which they 
were now dependent for longer periods than before. Remaining in 
summer pastures longer than in the past, beyond the time when 
natural vegetation was nearly depleted, they became increasingly 
reliant on growing, buying, storing, and transporting supplemental 
animal feed. They also entered winter pastures well before they had 
gone there in the past, exploited natural vegetation that they had 
formerly conserved until later in the season, and grew, bought, and 
stored quantities of fodder there as well. 
The newly growing natural vegetation along the migratory route 
in the spring was too lush and beneficial to bypass, and so almost all 
pastoralists continued to send their animals by hoof during that 
season. As they traveled from one point on the route to the next, 
each new one usually at a slightly higher altitude, they found fresh 
vegetation. On a slightly accelerated schedule, they entered summer 
pastures several weeks sooner than in the past, but natural vegeta­
tion there was usually adequate for their herds then. Their early use 
of this vegetation did decrease the pasturage available later in the 
season, when they also needed it. They enhanced methods they had 
used in the past to protect specific areas and to conserve vegetation, 
By 1979 many nomads found the 
autumn’s trek lasting two to three months 
to be too strenuous and troublesome for 
their animals because of the increasing 
shortage of pasture and water along the 
route and the pressure of expanding 
human settlements and agrarian activity. 
Most began to hire trucks and transport 
their animals in a single day, a change 
that put new stress on the pastoral 
resources of their summer and winter 
territories, on which they were now 
dependent for longer periods than before. 
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by careful scheduling and rotation, removing rocks to encourage plant 
growth, creating physical barriers, and guarding against encroachers 
in protected areas. 
Before 1979 most nomads had relied on camels and other pack 
animals (mules, donkeys, horses) to carry their goat-hair tents and 
other household possessions between winter and summer pastures. 
Since then, many people have sold their camels and many of their 
pack animals because of their new reliance on motorized transporta­
tion. Although increasingly expensive, the use of such vehicles did 
offer many obvious benefits. Also, tending the camels during winter 
and summer, when the animals’ services were not in much demand, 
had become burdensome and expensive even for those able to hire 
specialized herders. Twice a year families contracted with truck 
owners from nearby towns and cities to carry their goods to the 
other seasonal pastures. Formerly, herds, pack animals, and house­
holds had followed the same schedules and routes, but now animals 
were usually separated from households for part of the spring. 
Changes in dairy production were one result, for the women and 
girls previously present to milk and process the products did not 
accompany the herds. To the detriment of people’s diets and needs 
for income, dairy production was delayed until people and animals 
were reunited in summer pastures. Care of lambs and kids during 
the spring migration was another problem, for they could not ac­
company the adult animals without special supervision. Now com­
mitted to formal education, the children who had formerly tended 
the young animals during the spring migration no longer migrated 
with the herds. 
The increasing availability of rapid transportation facilitated the 
nomads’ further economic diversification. A family could engage in 
a variety of activities simultaneously, as long as at least one person 
could travel from one location to another quickly. For example, a 
man could irrigate his newly planted apple orchard for the stipu­
lated twelve-hour period and then return to camp by motorcycle 
in time to select sheep to be driven to market by a hired truck. 
Another man could transport recently harvested fodder from sum­
mer pastures to winter ones, in anticipation of the herds’ early 
arrival, while his son managed the animals during his brief absence. 
Trips to town for errands and government business were no longer 
as onerous and time-consuming. 
The absence of camels and the decrease of other pack animals 
freed up some kinds of natural pasturage for sheep and goats, 
although camels had usually consumed plants that were too tall, 
thorny, or tough for the other animals, especially sheep. One single-
stemmed thorny plant in particular was no longer grazed by any 
Before 1979 most nomads had relied 
on camels and other pack animals 
(mules, donkeys, horses) to carry their 
goat-hair tents and other household 
possessions between winter and 
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reliance on motorized transportation. 
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animals, and it grew to apparently unprecedented heights, two or 
more meters, and appeared to be taking over some areas of summer 
pastures to the detriment of other vegetation. With no camels to 
graze them, thorny bushes also proliferated, but in this case they 
supported the opportunistic growth of the surrounding low-lying 
vegetation that the sheep and goats preferred. Their populations 
expanding, small animals such as birds, rodents, rabbits, weasels, 
lizards, toads, and snakes found shelter in and around these bushes. 
Slow-burning dried camel dung used to provide an important 
fuel for all pastoralists but was no longer available when they sold 
these animals. They eventually bought propane-gas cookers and 
lanterns and kerosene heaters when they saw that natural fuels (wood, 
charcoal, brush) were not nearly sufficient for their many needs 
(cooking, baking, milk processing, wool dyeing, lighting, heating). 
In the 1960s and 1970s the shah’s government had tried by 
various means to impede the nomads’ migrations. After 1979, by 
contrast, the new Islamic government adopted supportive policies. Its 
Ministries of Natural Resources and Rural Reconstruction seeded 
many areas along major migratory routes and posted signs explaining 
their intentions. Officials chose locations where many pastoralists 
camped overnight during the migration, so that herd and pack ani­
mals could fortify themselves for the next day’s journey without tres­
passing on anyone’s grazing lands. According to local reports, the 
apparently successful program resulted in decreased pressure on other 
pastoral resources and fewer conflicts along the routes. 
Also offered by the new government at low or no cost to the no­
mads, modern veterinary medicine played a major role in the 
pastoralists’ ability to keep their animals alive and healthy and less 
subject to the catastrophic diseases that used to wipe out entire herds. 
Regional veterinary clinics were established, and government-paid 
specialists toured seasonal pastures to dispense drugs and treatments. 
One apparent result of the increasingly widespread use of modern 
veterinary care was the pastoralists’ decreased use of ritual and symbolic 
acts to attain these same ends. Until the 1980s most people had con­
ducted rituals and prayers and employed amulets (always in combina­
tion with other, supposedly more practical efforts) to protect and care 
for their animals. In the 1990s many of these rituals were not practiced 
at all or only by a limited number of individuals who still believed in 
their efficacy. Many prized rams in 1998 were still outfitted with carved 
wooden talismans decorated by braided tassels, but the nomads some­
times stated that these charms simply reminded them of old Qashqa’i 
customs and did not offer any real protection to the animals. Almost all 
pastoralists continued to abide by their notions of auspicious and inaus­
picious days of the week in order to avoid jeopardizing acts central to 
In the 1960s and 1970s the shah’s 
government had tried by various means 
to impede the nomads’ migrations. 
After 1979, by contrast, the new 
Islamic government adopted supportive 
policies. Its Ministries of Natural 
Resources and Rural Reconstruction 
seeded many areas along major 
migratory routes and posted signs 
explaining their intentions. 
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their livelihood such as shearing the wool and transporting the sheep to 
market. People still talked about the rain ceremonies they used to per­
form and the rituals they conducted to mark and safeguard the critical 
stages of the seasonal round, but by 1998 most people did not actually 
engage in them, and children rarely knew anything about them.2 
Since 1979 the new government paid special attention to build­
ing new roads and improving existing ones in Qashqa’i territory— 
especially in remote places—and in surrounding areas. A mixed 
blessing for the pastoralists, these roads assisted them in their new 
or increased reliance on motorized transportation and their efforts 
to carry products to and from markets (including supplies for con­
struction—see below). But the roads also brought outsiders into 
their territories more frequently, thereby increasing the competition 
over pastoral and agricultural land and other resources. New and 
improved roads opened previously unexploited areas to outsiders 
wanting to plant orchards or engage in mechanized agriculture. 
Urban, middle-class, Persian tourists also took advantage of the new 
roads—and the greater security—to invade seasonal pastures for 
picnics and outings on Fridays and other holidays. Anxious to flee 
the city’s heat, dirt, and crowds, they presumed upon the customar­
ily offered hospitality of reluctant Qashqa’i hosts (Beck 1982). 
Commercial herds and animal contracts were a significant 
feature of pastoralism in southwestern Iran in the 1960s and 1970s. 
By the early 1980s many commercial herds, owned by non-Quashqa’i 
urban entrepreneurs and tended by hired and often non-tribal herd­
ers, had virtually disappeared from the landscape because of newly 
enforced government regulations about the illegal use of national­
ized pastures and because of changes in the economics of this kind 
of animal husbandry. Also, the Qashqa’i, disarmed by the shah but 
re-armed during the revolution, were now better able to guard and 
defend their own pastoral resources. Commercial animal contracts, 
under which urban moneylenders and merchants became part own­
ers of the nomads’ herds because of the nomads’ unpaid and deep­
ening debts, also decreased and by the 1990s were rare. This change 
resulted in part because new government regulations covering 
moneylending and interest-taking forced at least a temporary refig­
uring of debts according to what were said to be Islamic principles. 
The most abusive of the moneylenders were publicly flogged by the 
government’s revolutionary guards. Pastoralists were able to renego­
tiate their existing debts, and they took on new loans under 
revised terms. (They were now also eligible for loans for specific 
projects from government-run banks.) Interest rates declined, and 
debts did not escalate in the way they had done before the revolu­
tion. The absence of or significant decrease in herds belonging to 
2  In Nomad (Beck 1991) I discuss how these 
rites and practices fit within the seasonal 
round. 
By the early 1980s many commercial 
herds, owned by non-Qashqa’i urban 
entrepreneurs and tended by hired and 
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outsiders significantly improved the quantity and quality of pastoral 
resources for the Qashqa’i users.3  The numbers of herd animals 
owned by the Qashqa’i as a whole did not increase and in fact may 
have decreased as part of the process of settlement and the adoption 
of new livelihoods (see below). 
AGRICULTURE 
The legal status of land classified as “cultivable” was not yet 
settled in many areas of Qashqa’i territory and the periphery in 
1998. Disputes were common, and many pastoralists were insecure 
about their own and others’ rights and claims. 
Agricultural production in Qashqa’i territory had rapidly 
increased since the 1960s, both by outsiders able to appropriate 
land in the area and by the Qashqa’i themselves. Sections of winter 
and summer pastures and many areas along migratory routes 
became cultivated. In the uplands above water courses, crops de­
pended on moisture from seasonal rain and snow. Below water 
courses, crops were often irrigated. Pastoral land, never plowed 
before, was transformed into agricultural land and was off-limits 
during the growing and harvest seasons to the pastoralists’ herd and 
pack animals. Even where the pastoralists themselves added or en­
larged their own areas of cultivation, the land became lost or dimin­
ished as a viable pastoral resource. Villagers who expanded the land 
they cultivated in and near seasonal pastures and along migratory 
routes were often aided by mechanized equipment, such as tractors 
and combines, and they improved their own supply of water by 
digging wells, installing motorized pumps, and constructing irrigation 
works. As villages expanded in population size and land use, the sur­
rounding areas became denuded of viable pastoral resources. The 
nomads found that they increasingly had to travel circuitous or indi­
rect routes to avoid these growing settlements and to find adequate 
grazing and water.4 
The creation and expansion of fruit orchards was a major part of 
these changes. Trees planted in summer pastures were mostly apple, 
apricot, walnut, almond, and pistachio, while in winter pastures, an 
area of high summer heat and dryness, they were primarily date, 
lime, lemon, orange, and pomegranate. Many villagers also grew 
grapes and figs, especially in areas between winter and summer 
pastures. People with claims to land and access to sufficient water 
planted saplings and vines, constructed irrigation systems, erected 
containing walls, and committed themselves to a dependence on 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides. The sources of water they walled 
in, often natural springs or the mouths of qanats (man-made under­
ground water channels; see English, Afkhami, this volume), were 
3  Linda Schilcher notes that this pattern of 
government intervention to rescue rural 
people from urban entrepreneurial greed 
was also found elsewhere, such as in Syria 
under the Ottoman Empire in the 1880s 
and 1890s (personal communication, 
December 1997). She offered helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
4  Nick Kouchoukos et al. (this volume) note 
certain major trends in southwest Asia: the 
extension of cultivation into marginal 
steppe lands, expansion of irrigation, and 
degradation of the vegetation of the 
steppe. Unsustainable production systems, 
such as many forms of agriculture in arid 
and semi-arid lands, also cause the rapid 
depletion of resources and the destruction 
of the natural environment (Christensen, 
this volume). 
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thereby now off-limits to pastoralists, either traveling through the 
area or resident in nearby seasonal pastures. When I asked 
pastoralists in the 1990s to tell me the single most troubling diffi­
culty threatening their main livelihood, many answered, “orchards.” 
Most pastoralists tried to increase the production of fodder crops 
for their animals and wheat for household use—flat bread remained 
the people’s staple food. During times of inadequate rain and snow, 
naturally growing vegetation was insufficient for the herd and pack 
animals, and quantities of supplemental feed were needed. This feed 
included barley, straw, and fresh and dried alfalfa, clover, and hay. The 
prices of these commodities rose rapidly during times of low moisture, 
because crops grew poorly under such conditions and the regional 
demand for them was great, especially from settled people who also 
owned animals and did not have much if any natural pasturage. Hence 
pastoralists with available land, water, labor, and time tried to produce 
as much fodder as possible, to avoid high and often escalating market 
prices, without jeopardizing other aspects of their livelihood. In record­
ing household budgets, I noted that barley and alfalfa comprised the 
single largest annual expense for many pastoralists. Dried sugar-beet 
pulp, a by-product of sugar factories in the province and used widely in 
the area in the 1970s, was no longer much used by the 1980s because of 
its apparent lack of adequate nutrients. 
The main advantage for the pastoralists in the expansion of their 
own and others’ cultivation was their ability to graze animals on the 
stubble and other crop residues after the harvests were completed. 
Because of the mountainous terrain and the different altitudes 
where cultivation was practiced, the pastoralists herded their ani­
mals from one elevation to another in order to exploit sequential 
harvests. Remaining in their summer territories beyond the point 
when natural pasturage was depleted, the pastoralists came to rely 
heavily on the remnants in these fields. Mechanized combines, 
increasingly used in wide flat areas free of large stones, left the stalks 
of harvested crops standing as high as fifteen centimeters, which the 
pastoralists used for grazing. (By contrast, cultivators who harvested 
grain by hand sickles cut the crop close to the ground and left little 
for ruminants.) 
Another new advantageous factor—one related to expanded 
irrigation—was the lush, wild, and opportunistic vegetation growing 
at the edges of cultivated fields, between trees in orchards, and along 
water channels. Pastoralists grazed their animals on the live vegeta­
tion, cut armfuls and filled gunny sacks to bring to the animals, and 
dried and stored quantities for use later on. They competed for this 
resource with the cultivators, who also needed animal fodder or who 
wanted to sell it for a profit. Some crops, such as dry-farmed barley 
When I asked pastoralists in the 1990s 
to tell me the single most troubling 
difficulty threatening their main 
livelihood, many answered, “orchards.” 
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and irrigated pulses, had spaces between plants where pastoralists 
could gingerly walk to collect wild vegetation. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, some far-sighted pastoralists had 
planted poplar trees in summer pastures in order to use the trunks 
as roof beams and other supportive structures for the houses they 
expected they would ultimately build. During late autumn and 
early spring, unhampered by the heavy snows of winter, trespassers 
sometimes cut down these unguarded trees for their own use or just 
out of spite. 
MANAGEMENT OF WATER 
Many changes also occurred in the management of water. Until 
the 1960s and early 1970s most pastoralists in this large stretch of 
the southern Zagros Mountains had relied, without much human 
Until the 1960s and early 1970s most intervention, on the natural sources of water available. In winter 
pastoralists in this large stretch of the pastures they sometimes deepened or fortified naturally occurring 
southern Zagros Mountains had relied, shallow basins to collect seasonal rainfall and runoff for the ani­
without much human intervention, on 
mals, while in summer pastures they dug shallow trenches to direct the natural sources of water available.... 
the flow of water from natural springs to the small pools they Since the early 1980s, the management 
excavated. They always tried to find fresh spring or well water for of water has become more controlled 
drinking, food preparing, milk processing, and wool dyeing. and government-assisted. 
Women and children aided by pack animals and goat-skin bags 
spent time and effort traveling to and from the nearest sources. An 
area of seasonal and unpredictable water, winter pastures were more 
troublesome than summer pastures, an area of many natural springs. 
Since the early 1980s, the management of water has become 
more controlled and government-assisted. Through officials of the 
Organization for Nomadic Affairs, the Ministry of Rural Recon­
struction was instrumental in transforming water use for Qashqa’i 
pastoralists. With aid from the Ministry of Agriculture, these offi­
cials helped some people to secure low-interest bank loans and 
low-cost or subsidized construction supplies (such as cement) and 
assisted them in acquiring land-use permits from the Ministry of 
Natural Resources. In many areas, pastoralists together with hired 
professionals and workers dug wells, repaired or improved access 
to qanats, and constructed cement channels and catchment basins, 
all of which delivered clean, reliable water. In winter pastures, 
where springs are not common, the government dug many wells in 
convenient locations and also constructed or set up large, covered 
or enclosed, holding tanks and periodically filled them with clean 
water from tankers, at either low or no cost to the pastoralists. 
Some of these recent efforts to manage water caused at least a 
temporary and possibly a longer-term or even a permanent de­
crease in water in the vicinity. In some areas of summer pastures, 
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many natural springs dried up in the summer of 1997 following the 
winter’s sparse snow and rain. Whether winter snows and rains in 
1997-1998 will replenish the ground water and restore the flow of 
these springs is not yet known, although the seasonal residents in 
some areas did say that they expected the water to return, perhaps at 
decreased levels. More pessimistic, other residents blamed the 
nearby non-Qashqa’i cultivators and their over-exploitation of 
groundwater for the death of the springs. Where orchard owners 
and other large-scale cultivators, mostly non-Qashqa’i outsiders, 
dug deep wells and installed motorized pumps, a lowered water 
table resulted. According to residents and observers, once the pumps 
began to operate, water in the vicinity never returned to its previous 
levels and quantities. In the summer of 1997 many orchards held 
dead, dying, stunted, or fruitless trees due to insufficient irrigation 
water, although whether this condition came about primarily be­
cause of the year’s poor supply of rain and snow or from a more 
long-term lowering of the water table is not yet clear.5 
CONSTRUCTION OF SHELTERS 
Human dwellings, accompanying structures, and animal pens 
and shelters also altered the landscape of areas formerly inhabited 
only by the seasonal, mobile tents of nomads. These developments 
are explained by the processes of modernization and the nomads’ 
insecurity about their claims to land. 
The building of dwellings accompanied a general rise in the 
standard of living for most Qashqa’i, who also wanted to protect and 
shelter the new possessions they now owned. Many pastoralists, 
even those who were fully nomadic, chose to construct huts and 
houses for themselves and pens and shelters for their animals in 
winter and/or summer pastures. When they saw that these dwellings 
were likely to be vandalized during the seasons when they were 
absent, they cut back on their efforts and investments. For example, 
they bought previously used, inexpensive wooden and metal doors 
and window frames when the new ones they had purchased and 
installed were roughly pried away from the walls and stolen by tres­
passers. Even though they always stored miscellaneous equipment in 
these dwellings when they departed for their other seasonal pastures, 
they learned not to lock the doors, for the cost to repair the damage 
that thieves caused by breaking locks, doors, and windows was 
greater than the cost of replacing any stolen items. 
Using locally available rocks for the foundations and tree 
branches, long reeds, and woven-reed mats for the walls and roofs, 
many men built simple one-room huts for their families in winter 
pastures, which helped to protect them from the winter’s rain, snow, 
5  Many authors, including Paul English (this 
volume), note that deep wells in arid and 
semi-arid areas, which extract water 
beyond replacement levels, fail to increase 
agricultural production and are in fact an 
ecological threat. 
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mud, wind, and cold. Some men built more substantial huts by also 
using cement mixed with dirt for mortar and flooring, cement and 
plaster for the walls, and wooden beams for the roofs. They often talked 
about how miserable life had been in past winters when only goat-hair 
tents sheltered them. Their perception of the nomadic life’s rigors 
seemed to have changed, especially when they compared their physical 
comfort in the winter with that of their house-dwelling relatives. 
Many nomads also built more substantial one-room or two-
room houses in summer pastures. They did not need physical 
shelter as much in the summer, when the weather is dry and usually 
mild, but because they have recently chosen to arrive there earlier in 
the spring and to stay later in the summer, they did want more 
protective shelter during these two often cold and windy periods. 
People with increased agricultural activities, more prevalent in 
People who improved their access to summer pastures than in winter ones, occupied the land for a longer 
water also wanted to live nearby on a duration than in the past. Those owning trees or vines bearing fruit 
more permanent basis. Until the late 
needed to collect or oversee the autumn’s harvest. 1970s the nomads moved periodically 
People who improved their access to water also wanted to live from place to place in seasonal pastures 
nearby on a more permanent basis. Until the late 1970s the nomads to find fresh grazing and clean camp-
had moved periodically from place to place in seasonal pastures to sites, but more recently they have 
find fresh grazing and clean campsites, but more recently they have remained in specific locations, often to 
exploit the water over which they have remained in specific locations, often to exploit the water over which 
now claimed greater rights. they have now claimed greater rights. Needing to travel farther and 
farther away from camp every day to locate adequate grazing, 
shepherds and animals were burdened by these more stationary 
residential practices. 
The pastoralists’ decreased reliance on hired shepherds figured 
in their decisions to construct animal pens and shelters, where they 
could temporarily leave their animals unsupervised. Herd animals in 
summer pastures and sometimes in winter ones used to sleep or rest 
in the open and were subject to predator attacks and stampeding if 
the owners and shepherds were not vigilant enough. Since the late 
1970s, many households were forced to devise new ways of handling 
the actual herding and daily animal care, largely because of the 
scarcity of hired shepherds in the region. Reflecting the shortage, 
shepherds’ salaries rapidly escalated, making the hiring of herders 
even more problematic and forcing the nomads to rely on more 
protective pens and shelters. 
Use of animal pens facilitated the accumulation of dung, which 
all pastoralists periodically collected for use as fertilizer in their 
orchards or to sell to other orchard owners. Mounds of dung stood 
beside the pens to await transport. 
Many pastoralists also built huts, houses, and animal shelters in 
their seasonal pastures because of their insecurity about land rights. 
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By 1998 the government had still not passed the land-reform legisla­
tion that was promised soon after the revolution, and pastoralists 
claimed that the existence of permanent structures would help them 
to fortify their rights to the land in any eventuality. Dwellings 
offered “hard facts” to touring government agents assigned to 
handle disputes over land. 
HUNTING AND GATHERING 
Patterns of hunting and gathering continued in the 1990s in many 
of the same ways as in the 1960s and before. The major changes were in 
the use of firearms and the decreased exploitation of natural resources 
along the migratory routes. 
The shah had forcibly disarmed the Qashqa’i in the 1960s 
because of his fear about their military threat to him. With his 
ouster in 1979, many Qashqa’i men immediately rearmed them­
selves and resumed game hunting in their territories. The climate 
of freedom also affected other Iranians who were enthusiastic about 
hunting. Within a year or two of the revolution, the most prized 
game animals in southwestern Iran were said to be exterminated. 
The game included wild sheep and goats, ibex, gazelles and other 
antelopes, and deer—in fact, any animals with horns to be displayed 
as trophies. Several wildlife preserves created by the shah in the 
southern Zagros were rapidly decimated, the few game wardens still 
coming to work profiting from bribes and even partaking in the 
slaughter themselves. Many Qashqa’i men claimed to have practiced 
wildlife conservation in the past, but their efforts after the revolu­
tion were pointless, given the many outsiders eager to shoot any and 
all wildlife. Qashqa’i men had grown up learning the mountaineer­
ing skills necessary to collect the game after they had pursued and 
shot it, skills many urbanites and other outsiders lacked. These 
outsiders often shot animals that they left dead or dying where they 
fell, and hence the activity was simply sport and not, as in the 
Qashqa’i case, also an important source of food. Qashqa’i hunters 
continued to track wild boars, bears, mountain lions, wolves, hy­
enas, and other predators preying on their flocks, and, as before, 
they avidly sought wild game birds (partridges, quail) to consume as 
food. Those living near lakes and rivers hunted water fowl and 
fished. At least a few men found the use of dynamite to be an effec­
tive way to capture quantities of fish with little effort. 
Gathering of many natural resources was still a major part of the 
Qashqa’i subsistence and economy in 1998. In fact, reliance on these 
items allowed some families to continue with migratory pastoralism 
when they would not otherwise have had adequate food or income. 
Dairy products for home consumption were available only in the 
Within a year or two of the revolution, 
the most prized game animals in 
southwestern Iran were said to be 
exterminated….Several wildlife 
preserves created by the shah in the 
southern Zagros were rapidly deci­
mated, the few game wardens still 
coming to work profiting from bribes 
and even partaking in the slaughter 
themselves. 
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spring and part of the summer (except for limited quantities of 
dried milk solids saved for the winter), and hence all pastoralists 
enjoyed, if not depended on, the many foods they gathered through­
out the year. The seasonal residents of winter and summer pastures, 
and their settled kin who came to visit, continued to exploit their 
own and surrounding territories for many kinds of human foods 
(wild fruits, nuts, vegetables, herbs, mushrooms, truffles, bird eggs), 
animal fodder, medicines, salt, dyes, fuels, and raw materials (wood, 
reeds) for tools and other constructed objects. Most of the items 
were seasonal in nature, and the pastoralists sought them according 
to the schedules and techniques they knew in detail. 
Because most people now traveled by truck between winter and 
summer pastures, they were no longer able to gather resources along 
the migratory routes. The paved roads they followed bypassed the 
valleys and mountainsides where most resources were located. 
Those who had acquaintances in villages along the migratory routes 
were eventually able to barter for some items, and itinerant peddlers 
brought others. People who visited these areas always collected the 
resources that were unique or special there and later shared them 
with others. The men who accompanied the herds on the spring 
migration gathered what they could, but their time was occupied by 
herding and safeguarding the animals, and they lacked the means to 
process or to transport quantities of gathered resources.6 
The non-Qashqa’i people who used to gather natural resources 
before the 1970s in Qashqa’i territory, primarily for sale but also for 
their own consumption, came less frequently or not at all in the 
1990s. The resources included wood (for firewood, making charcoal, 
and construction), wild fruits and nuts, herbs and many other green 
plants including wild artichokes, mushrooms, truffles, garlic, and 
tree and shrub saps including the exported gum tragacanth. Guided 
by western-inspired notions of environmental protection, the Min­
istry of Natural Resources was supposed to control or eliminate 
these activities on what was usually nationalized pastureland, but it 
did not do so successfully under the shah’s regime. Under the Is­
lamic government, the ministry was more effective in preventing 
outsiders from exploiting Qashqa’i pastures in these ways or in 
limiting their numbers. Collectors of gum tragacanth, for example, 
could buy permits from the ministry enabling them to exploit cer­
tain territories if they also obtained the approval of the resident 
pastoralists. Qashqa’i people, many of whom relied on selling and 
consuming these same resources, collected them on their own lands, 
especially if they held title or usufructuary deeds. 
Because of the increasingly widespread use of electricity and 
propane and natural gas by many people in southwestern Iran, the 
Gathering of many natural resources 
was still a major part of the Qashqa’i 
subsistence and economy in 1998. In 
fact, reliance on these items allowed 
some families to continue with migra­
tory pastoralism when they would not 
otherwise have had adequate food or 
income. 
6  For a detailed discussion of gathering by 
pastoralists in Morocco, see the article by 
Susanne Steinmann (this volume). 
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demand for firewood and charcoal decreased. Agents of the Ministry 
of Natural Resources tried to protect the environment from further 
deforestation and depletion of other natural resources. Until the 
revolution, the ministry’s forest rangers used to patrol sections of 
Qashqa’i territory but were susceptible to bribery and appeared to 
cause little change in how people actually exploited the land. Since 
the early 1980s their activities have focused instead on pursuing the 
claims that residents brought against trespassers engaged in destruc­
tive acts. Aided now by motorized vehicles, many Qashqa’i pastor­
alists transported quantities of firewood from winter pastures to 
summer ones, where wood was scarce and where camel dung, for­
merly used as fuel, was no longer found. 
THE GOVERNMENT 
The government continued to play a major role in the 1990s in 
determining who resided on and worked which parcels of land, but in 
some different ways from the government in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
Islamic government supported people it classified as “nomads” 
(ashayer) and offered them services and support that the previous two 
shahs (1925-1979) had not. Short-term and long-term leases for land 
still classified as “pastures,” as well as leases and ownership deeds for 
land still considered as  “cultivable,” were obtained by many people 
through various government ministries. People who chose to settle in 
villages and especially in towns found it difficult to hold onto pastoral 
and agricultural land in their customary seasonal territories. Some 
families chose to divide their labor force in order to retain rights to 
land. As an example of an increasingly prevalent pattern found within 
extended families, one man migrated between winter and summer 
pastures with the sheep and goats and maintained the family’s pas­
ture-use deeds, while his brother lived in a village to cultivate grain 
and fodder crops on land he rented or purchased, and a third brother 
resided in a town to work for wages in a factory or government office. 
As previously indicated, governmental ministries and agencies 
also aided the pastoralists in many other aspects of their lives by 
building roads and bathhouses in remote areas and by offering 
veterinary care, pasture seeding, water management, bank loans, 
commodity pricing, economic cooperatives, and formal education. 
Some high-level officials of the Islamic government were fasci­
nated by people in Iran whom they considered to be exotic or pic­
turesque. While the last two shahs had feared many of these same 
people for the military and political threat they were believed to 
pose, the current government appeared to be less concerned. While 
providing such people with many services, the Islamic government 
also developed programs to use them for its own purposes and by 
Because of the increasingly widespread 
use of electricity and propane and 
natural gas by many people in south­
western Iran, the demand for firewood 
and charcoal decreased. 
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various means, including the media. For example, from the 1980s 
until 1995 a national, annual Day of the Nomad was officially cel­
ebrated in different regions by provincial dignitaries and spectators 
to mark the nomads’ many contributions to Iran’s history, econ­
omy, and cultural diversity. The Ayatollah Khomeini had declared 
that nomads were the “treasures of the revolution.” Government-
sponsored or-supported publications, films, and television programs 
about nomads were designed to provide appealing images for a 
national and sometimes international audience. 
Apparently unintentionally, and perhaps ironically, such official 
attention helped the Qashqa’i (and other similar groups) to pursue 
their chosen lifestyles, which for many remained a combination of 
pastoralism and nomadism, and to engage in customary practices 
that these officials considered colorful or quaint. For example, many 
Qashqa’i women were allowed to maintain their customary dress 
and head gear, despite the attire’s violating the requirements of 
modest “Islamic” dress imposed on almost all other Iranian women, 
especially in urban areas. 
Many agents of the Islamic government, especially in ministries 
having special interests in nomads and pastoralists, were of ethnic, 
tribal, pastoral, and nomadic backgrounds and had often been born 
and raised as nomadic pastoralists themselves. They had benefited 
from the government’s expansion of formal education into tribal 
areas and had continued their education in towns and cities. They 
tended to be supportive of and sympathetic to the needs of people 
who perpetuated nomadic and pastoral lifestyles despite difficulties. 
When I asked Qashqa’i people about the changes in their relationship 
with the government after the revolution, many responded by noting 
that people with identities similar to their own were now government 
officials who supported rather than hindered or oppressed them. 
THE MARKET ECONOMY 
The impact of the market economy is another important factor in 
understanding the ways the Qashqa’i used land. They had always 
directed their productive activities toward market demands and not 
just toward household consumption. When the price of sheep and 
goats was considered good, they placed more attention on animal 
husbandry. When regional needs for agricultural products were great, 
they tried to produce their own and relied on the market for the pur­
chase of more. Market demands for the pastoralists’ dairy products, 
other pastoral produce (woven goods, sheep wool, goat hair, skins), 
and gathered resources also played a role in determining the eco­
nomic decisions that households made on a seasonal and yearly basis. 
Since the revolution, especially during and since the Iraq-Iran 
Some high-level officials of the Islamic 
government were fascinated by people 
in Iran whom they considered to be 
exotic or picturesque….From the 
1980s until 1995 a national, annual 
Day of the Nomad was officially 
celebrated in different regions by 
provincial dignitaries and spectators to 
mark the nomads’ many contributions 
to Iran’s history, economy, and cultural 
diversity. The Ayatollah Khomeini had 
declared that nomads were the 
“treasures of the revolution.” 
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war (1980-1988), national inflation was high and rising, and all 
Iranians, not just Qashqa’i pastoralists, were forced to change their 
patterns of production and consumption. Qashqa’i and other pro­
ducers of essential market commodities were especially affected by 
volatile and unpredictable economic trends. The pastoralists com­
plained that the prices they received for live sheep and goats did not 
rise as rapidly as the costs of the goods they needed to buy. They 
were especially disturbed by the high mark-up in meat prices, from 
the amount they received per kilogram at government slaughter­
houses to the amount customers paid in urban butcher shops. The 
government and a series of middlemen, and not the actual produc­
ers, derived the most profit from the pastoralists’ enterprise. In 
some years the pastoralists incurred more expenses for tending the 
animals than they received for their sale. Because of rapidly escalat­
ing prices in general, by 1996 most Qashqa’i people were financially 
unable to make major changes in the ways they exploited the land, 
such as adopting new mechanized agricultural equipment and in­
stalling irrigation works. Even commonplace construction materials 
such as bricks and cement became prohibitively expensive. The 
election of a new, moderate president of Iran in 1997 brought hopes 
that the national economy would be brought under greater control. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have outlined a variety of factors that have influ­
enced the ways that many Qashqa’i nomadic pastoralists used land 
during the past thirty years and how and why these patterns have 
changed. Although the subject is beyond this paper’s discussion, I 
will mention that certain new patterns of local social organization 
were in large part explained by changes in the productive activities 
of people during this period. Groups of families could better exploit a 
larger territory, engage in diversifying economic activities, and interact 
with the market more successfully if they cooperated with one another. 
At a time when we see that some locally managed and controlled 
subsistence strategies appear to be more viable, sustainable, and 
protective of the environment than, for example, large-scale agro­
pastoral corporations, the case provided by the Qashqa’i may be 
informative. The Qashqa’i make the best of the inherent environ­
mental constraints of their rugged, mountainous, and semi-arid 
lands, in ways that have served them, their ancestors, and those who 
preceded them for hundreds if not thousands of years. They have 
also made frequent adjustments in the ways they related to the land. 
They do not blindly follow patterns that they had practiced in the 
past, nor do they ignore the consequences of the actions they do take. 
Outsiders can at least try not to impede them as they continue to find 
The Qashqa’i make the best of the 
inherent environmental constraints of 
their rugged, mountainous, and semi­
arid lands, in ways that have served 
them and their ancestors for hundreds 
if not thousands of years. They have 
also made frequent adjustments in the 
ways they related to the land. They do 
not blindly follow patterns that they had 
practiced in the past, nor do they ignore 
the consequences of the actions they 
do take. 
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solutions to the many constraints that confront them. One prevalent 
theme in the recent literature on the natural environment is the 
concern about depletion and destruction, and the solution often 
proposed is the removal of people. But when we compare, for ex­
ample, Qashqa’i land-use strategies with the whole-scale destruction 
wrecked upon the environment by multinational corporations, na­
tion-states eager for “development,” and warfare, it seems ridiculous 
to try to prevent people such as the Qashqa’i from living in the ways 
they have deemed productive for themselves and their society. 
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Gender, Pastoralism, and Intensification:
 
Changing Environmental Resource Use in Morocco
 
Susanne H. Steinmann 
Clark University 
ABSTRACT 
Through a study of the sedentarization of the Beni Guil pastoral nomads of eastern Morocco, this paper examines how 
gender interacts with environmental and socio-economic change. Based on extensive fieldwork with the Beni Guil, this 
paper demonstrates how gendered resource exploitation–in particular, the collection of mushrooms, medicinal plants, 
and fuelwood–is recast through sedentarization, urbanization, and commercialization. The case of the Beni Guil suggests 
that certain accepted theories of the consequences of settlement for nomad women and their local environments 
should be re-examined in order to understand better the past and present, and to plan for the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nomadic pastoralism was once a dominant feature on the North 
African landscape. Since the end of World War II, however, exten­
sive nomadic herding has steadily shifted toward more intensive 
agro-pastoral production on marginal grazing lands (Bencherifa and 
Johnson 1990). This trend raises concerns about the social conse­
quences of cumulative land-cover change, particularly land-use 
intensification, land degradation and declining species diversity, and 
challenges researchers and policy makers to address the complexities 
of local scale land-use systems (Turner et al. 1990). Studies that 
explore the interaction between cultural change, economic develop­
ment and environmental sustainability have generally recognized 
the importance of understanding the socio-political contexts within 
which land-users make resource decisions (Blaikie 1985). Yet, ques­
tions about how gender relations affect intra-household environ­
mental management remain unclear, particularly in the Middle East 
and North Africa.1 Identifying the constraints and opportunities 
that shape gendered land-use behavior assures a more accurate assess- 1 Despite the prolific literature on gender, 
resources and sustainable development, inment of environmental change at the scale where decisions are made. 
Asia, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa,
Understanding the human dynamics of environmental change is geographical literature on women and the 
important in semi-arid rangelands of North Africa, which cover environment still ignores these nature-
society questions in the Middle East andapproximately 385,000 square kilometers and represent 25% of the 
North Africa (e.g., Momsen and Townsend
region’s productive food raising area (Abbab 1994). More than 15 1987; Momsen and Kinnaird 1993; 
million people, or one quarter of the region’s population, derive	 Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter and Wangari, 
eds. 1996).their livelihoods directly from land-based activities of mixed farm­
ing and herding (Abbab 1994; Le Houerou 1993). Such an under­
standing is particularly important to Morocco, where 64% of the 
land area is classified as rangeland, pasture, woodland or forest and 
where almost half of the working population derives its livelihood 
from agriculture or livestock raising (UNEP 1993). 
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Central to the broad discourse on sustainable natural resource 
use in developing countries is whether change results in positive or 
negative social and ecological outcomes (Blaikie and Brookfield 
1987). In North Africa, as elsewhere, more intensive herding and 
farming practices help sustain a growing human population. But 
overgrazing, soil erosion, expansion of cultivation, and irrigated 
agriculture threaten the long-term productivity of these rangelands 
and the livelihoods that depend on them (Swearingen 1994). These 
problems persist in part because the perceptions and interests of 
land users are neglected in environmental change analysis and con­
servation planning (Blaikie 1985). 
In the Middle East, and in Morocco specifically, researchers have 
generally addressed the causes of nomadic sedentarization and 
associated environmental consequences at the community or re­
gional scales. Their literature generally approaches the problem of 
landscape change through an analysis of demographic, historical 
and political economic factors, or transformations of regulatory 
institutions and land tenure systems (Abbab 1994; Artz, Norton and 
O’Rourke 1986; Bencherifa 1996; Bencherifa andJohnson 1991; 
Mendes and Nargisse 1992; Tozy 1994; Trautmann 1989). However, 
these analyses obscure the changing production decisions at the 
household level where broader economic and environmental conse­
quences are felt. 
The paucity of intra-household environmental research in the 
region also results from cultural values that limit contact between 
male researchers and local women. With few exceptions, male re­
searchers have predominated field work in pastoral and agro-pasto­
ral communities in North Africa. Furthermore, conservation and 
development projects in Morocco are generally implemented and 
managed by men who work with male, but not female, land users. 
However, women are quite visible across the rural landscape collect­
ing water, fuelwood and other plant resources, herding animals and 
working in fields. 
Using gender as the entry point for understanding household 
natural resource management could lead to more accurate informa­
tion about how gender-specific tasks shift in response to ecological 
and socio-economic changes. The research and findings of this 
article are, therefore, gender-based. This article hopes to contribute 
to more effective range conservation projects that solicit input from 
the appropriate land-user groups while, at the same time, challeng­
ing assumptions and myths about who manages what resources. 
This article addresses these concerns by studying the settlement 
of the Beni Guil pastoral nomads in eastern Morocco. Two inter­
related questions will be raised: How do gender-specific natural 
Using gender as the entry point for 
understanding household natural 
resource management could lead to 
more accurate information about how 
gender-specific tasks shift in response to 
ecological and socio-economic changes. 
The research and findings of this article 
are, therefore, gender-based. This 
article hopes to contribute to more 
effective range conservation projects 
that solicit input from the appropriate 
land-user groups while, at the same 
time, challenging assumptions and 
myths about who manages what. 
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resource uses respond to ecological and socio-economic change? 
And, how do shifting gendered land-use patterns affect environmen­
tal change at the local scale? 
Based on data collected during 10 months of field research2 
among the Beni Guil pastoral nomads, findings suggest that: 
•	 in mobile tents, women and men operate with separate sets 
of resource management tasks, but these tasks are increas­
ingly shared as households become settled; 
•	 sedentarization and female seclusion reduce women’s op­
portunities to collect natural rangeland resources and is 
most acute in villages where (unlike larger towns) few alter­
native points of access exist; therefore, 
•	 the gender ratio for who collects wild mushrooms, truffles, 
medicinal plants and fuelwood is most equal in villages and 
suggests that control shifts from women to men; and truck 
transportation and the weekly market (souk) in towns pro­
vide alternative opportunities that women use to regain 
control over resources that contribute to their household 
responsibilities. 
GENDER THEORIES AND RELEVANCE TO THE BENI 
GUIL CASE 
The rationale for a gender analysis of land-use practices is that 
women and men have different, vested sets of interests in the natural 
resources they manage depending on their responsibilities in main­
taining the household (Fortmann 1996; Rocheleau 1991). Men and 
women, particularly in sex-segregated societies, face different con­
straints and opportunities in meeting rapidly changing livelihood 
responsibilities. In contrast to the scanty research on women and the 
environment in the Middle East and North Africa, a large literature 
exists in anthropology, sociology, and history analyzing how urban 
Muslim women’s status and political power change in response to 
development (e.g. Ahmed 1992; Keddie and Baron 1991; Lazreg 
1994; Saadawi 1986; Tucker 1993). The literature on “la condition 
Feminine” in rural Morocco is also dominated by anthropological 
(e.g. Hilse-Dwyer, Maher and Rosen, in Beck and Keddie 1978; 
Schaefer-Davis 1993) and sociological research (e.g. Belarbi 1995; 
Mernissi 1984; 1997). These studies attempt to understand how 
development affects womens’ economic, social or political gains and 
losses and provide useful insights for development projects that 
target women’s needs. But, their research agenda does not address 
the flexibility of household gender roles and the implication, if any, 
for environmental change if those roles shift. Although largely 
absent from the Muslim Arab regions, the importance of gender 
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2 	 Field research was conducted in eastern 
Morocco from September 1996 to June 
1997. The project was sponsored by the 
Social Science Research Council’s Near and 
Middle East Program and the National 
Science Foundation. The research 
contributes to the completion of a doctoral 
degree in geography at Clark University. 
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analysis in explaining environmental change is demonstrated in the 
case-study literature from rural communities in Asia (Agarwal 1994; 
Joekes 1995), Sub-Saharan Africa (Carney and Watts 1991; Fortmann 
1996; Jackson 1993; Schroeder 1997; Thomas-Slayter and Rocheleau 
1995), and Latin America (Rocheleau et al. 1996; Townsend 1993). 
The literature on gender, environment and sustainable develop­
ment is inspired to varying degrees by two dominant approaches: 
(1) gender and environment and, (2) ecofeminism. The first grew 
out of the WID (women in development) approach to project and 
development planning interventions. This perspective emphasized 
the importance of women as managers of environmental resources, 
their vulnerability to diminishing natural resources, and the need to 
direct conservation programs toward assisting women (parallel or 
separately from men).3 The practice of adding women on without 
considering fundamental inequities in class and gender relations 
eventually led some socialist-feminists to adopt alternative gender and 
development (GAD) or genger and environment (GED) approaches. 
The ecofeminist approach is ideologically driven. It rests on the 
philosophy that women have an inherent affinity with nature, as 
opposed to men’s desire to control and dominate nature through 
science, technology and development (see Merchant 1989; Mies and 
Shiva 1993; Plumwood 1993; Shiva 1987). Although both of these 
approaches draw attention to women’s interests in environmental 
resources they often have rigid conceptualizations of gender rela­
tions (Agarwal 1995; Jackson 1995; Joekes et al. 1994) I agree with 
those who propose an alternative approach that analyzes the flexibil­
ity of social, economic and ecological contexts that either maintain 
or transform traditionally male and female resource management 
tasks (Braidotti et al. 1994; Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter and Wangari 
1996; Jackson 1993). 
These theoretical advances in gender and environment studies 
have been supported primarily by case studies in agricultural com­
munities and still need to be examined within livestock-based liveli­
hood systems. To date, gender-based research among pastoral 
nomads has examined the links between economic development, 
commercialization, sedentarization, over-exploitation of nature and 
women’s poverty (see Horowitz and Jowkar 1992). 
One such study has assessed the role of technology in encourag­
ing settlement and the consequent gender-based resource losses or 
gains. Dawn Chatty’s work among nomads in Syria (1976) analyzed 
the gender-specific consequences of the introduction and rapid 
adoption of trucks. Chatty found that trucks deepened gender-based 
inequalities over household resources. More recent research in 
Oman showed that women utilized a variety of informal institutions 
3 	 The currently on-going range conservation 
project in eastern Morocco is an example 
of this approach. 
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and networks to reclaim their interests within the realm of male 
decisions, including adoption and use of new technologies (Chatty 
1996). Similarly, in her detailed ethnography of pastoral nomads in 
Iran, Lois Beck argues that women acknowledged the benefits of new 
technologies and encouraged their adoption (Beck 1991; 1997). These 
anthropological studies, however, do not address the environmental 
outcomes of gendered interests and control of new technologies. 
For example, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Moroc­
can government installed motor-driven deep wells in drought-prone 
rangelands. These technologies secured permanent water resources 
and encouraged more intensive land use (Bartel 1985). Greater 
availability of truck transportation today also facilitates access to 
commercial town markets where animal feed is sold. Beni Guil men 
use trucks to haul water and fodder to remote tent sites and villages, 
a practice that allows rural households to support more animals on 
smaller parcels of land. This practice has encouraged sedentarization 
and over-exploitation of rangeland resources. Moreover, since men 
spend more time in town securing feed resources, women increas­
ingly assume men’s herding responsibilities. But women herd only 
close to home, a practice that further denudes vegetation cover near 
fixed settlements (Steinmann, in press). 
Among the Beni Guil, trucks facilitate access to commercial oppor­
tunities in towns and increase women’s dependency on male income 
earners. Women, however, are not passive agents. Older women, par­
ticularly those in tents and villages, find ways to access truck transporta­
tion into town where they take advantage of commercial opportunities. 
The author often observed older women—who are less constrained by 
the cultural norm of seclusion— successfully negotiate rides with male 
truck drivers. This observation points to a weakness in feminist devel­
opment theories that ignore the diversity in women’s abilities to secure 
their interests within broader structural constraints. 
Throughout the Middle East and Africa, case studies from live­
stock-dependent households suggest that pastoral women lose eco­
nomic and political power as a consequence of economic develop­
ment and environmental degradation (Abu-Lughod 1993; Carr 
1977; Horowitz and Jowkar 1992). This literature argues that in 
geographically isolated mobile tents pastoral women’s roles as pro­
viders of subsistence foods, medical resources and fuelwood gave 
them status and power. But, as nomadic households become inte­
grated into a cash economy women lose control over those resources 
thereby becoming more dependent on male income earners 
(Horowitz and Jowkar 1992; Talle 1988). These approaches address 
the social implications of settlement and commercialization, 
but they do not consider the environmental consequences. 
Beni Guil men use trucks to haul water 
and fodder to remote tent sites and 
villages, a practice that allows rural 
households to support more animals on 
smaller parcels of land. This practice has 
encouraged sedentarization and over­
exploitation of rangeland resources. 
Moreover, since men spend more time 
in town securing feed resources, women 
increasingly assume men’s herding 
responsibilities. But women herd only 
close to home, a practice that further 
denudes vegetation cover near fixed 
settlements. 
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The Beni Guil case suggests that the effect of settlement on 
women’s access to natural rangeland resources is more nuanced. For 
example, with the exception of poor women in towns, Beni Guil 
women’s collection of natural resources declined linearly and sig­
nificantly from mobile tent to village to town households. Corre­
sponding to this change, men’s collection activities increased. 
However, access to rangeland products (such as wild mushrooms, 
truffles and medicinal plants) and knowledge about them declined 
only for women in villages and not among women living in town. 
Furthermore, many Beni Guil households divided their liveli­
hood activities between two locations: mobile tents and fixed homes. 
In this way they took advantage of diverse commercial and natural 
resources. This represents a strategy that alleviates pressure on those 
resources and requires flexible intra-household labor roles. The Beni 
Guil example therefore suggests that theories that do not question 
the simplistic dualism of nomadic versus settled households need 
reassessment. 
The differences in gendered resource management across loca­
tions from tent to village and larger commercial towns also demand 
moving beyond static gender analyses to more complex analysis of 
flexible gender roles. Both a ‘developmentalist’ view (see Joekes 
1994) and feminist political ecology (see Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter 
and Wangar 1996) provide alternative and corrective approaches. 
While acknowledging gender differentiated resource control and 
management tasks, these perspectives argue that gender roles are not 
ascribed but are “merely part of general entitlements and capabili­
ties” (Joekes 1994). They posit that understanding local-scale envi­
ronmental change requires attention to class, ethnic and gender 
relations among land managers (Carney and Watts 1991; Rocheleau 
1991; Schroeder 1993). These approaches address both the social 
and environmental consequences of changing livelihood systems. 
In an attempt to better understand the complexity of household 
land-use decision making, academics and development practitioners 
have also recognized the value of incorporating indigenous environ­
mental knowledge systems and gender analysis into conservation 
planning (Bebbington 1990; Carney and Watts 1991; Chambers 
1983; Davis 1995; McCorkle 1989; Richards 1985; Rocheleau 1991; 
Thrupp 1989). In eastern Morocco, growing concern about land 
degradation in the 1970s led to a series of studies, including one on 
traditional range management institutions and indigenous knowl­
edge systems. 
These land-user perspectives provided guidelines for the imple­
mentation of one of Morocco’s most costly and extensive range 
conservation projects (hereon after referred to as the PDPEO 
Furthermore, many Beni Guil house­
holds divided their livelihood activities 
between two locations: mobile tents and 
fixed homes. In this way they took 
advantage of diverse commercial and 
natural resources. This represents a 
strategy that alleviates pressure on 
those resources and requires flexible 
intra-household labor roles. The Beni 
Guil example therefore suggests that 
theories that do not question the 
simplistic dualism of nomadic versus 
settled households need reassessment. 
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Project).4 Project extension workers solicited input from local herd­
ers concerning their use and knowledge about rangelands. The 
project’s gender component, however, focused only on women’s 
income generating opportunities - not on their resource use.5  The 
project design also conceptualizes women’s and men’s activities as 
operating in entirely separate spheres. This WID approach of “add­
ing women on” obscures the ways gender relations within house­
holds meet changing livelihood responsibilities. 
Settlement and commercialization’s impact on gendered man­
agement of range resources remains unclear. This fieldwork is par­
ticularly problematic in more conservative pastoral societies, such as 
the Beni Guil and other bedouin, where female seclusion and gender 
segregation has prevented male researchers from gathering gender-
specific information.6 Only a few recent studies in Morocco (e.g. 
Alaoui 1995; Davis 1996; Steinmann 1993) and one edited volume 
(Belarbi 1995) have analyzed how socio-economic and environmen­
tal change affect gendered management of natural resources. The 
Beni Guil case provides a new empirical study that focuses specifi­
cally on flexible intra-household resource strategies and how these 
adjust to and shape environmental change. 
BACKGROUND AND ECOLOGY OF THE BENI GUIL 
STUDY AREA 
Much like other pastoral nomads across the region, the Beni Guil 
represent a large community whose livelihoods are rapidly shifting 
from extensive large-scale animal herding to intensive and sedentary 
agro-pastoral activities (Bencherifa 1996). Although the Beni Guil’s 
population is small (54,000 based on the 1994 CENSUS) their terri­
tory covers 25,000 km2 of the semi-arid steppe of Morocco’s Eastern 
High Plateau region. This represents a significant portion of 
Morocco’s rangeland resources. And while large scale nomadic 
movements of the past represented a sustainable adaptation to the 
ecology of arid environments, demographic, social and economic 
pressure has resulted in more intensive land-use practices. Some 
evidence suggests that the long-term sustainability of agricultural 
and pastoral livelihoods in this region are threatened (Le Houerou 
1993; Sidahmed 1992). Others have found that the social and human 
benefits outweigh the environmental costs (Bencherifa 1996). Findings 
here suggest that these environmental and socio-economic changes also 
carry different implications for gendered land-use practices. 
Until the middle of this century, Beni Guil livelihoods depended 
on raising their livestock by utilizing seasonally available grazing and 
water resources throughout their territory. Seasonal climate change 
prompted the Beni Guil to move their tents on camels and herd 
4 	 The “Project de Developpement des 
Parcours et de L’Elevage dans L’Oriental” 
(PDPEO Project) is a State and interna­
tionally funded range conservation project 
at a cost of $10 million (Department of 
Agriculture, Bouarfa 1996). The 10-year 
project began in 1990 and covers some 3.2 
million hectares of Morocco’s eastern High 
Plateau region. The objectives of the 
project are to curb land degradation and 
increase living standards for the 76,000 
inhabitants in the project zone. The project 
goals are met through: (1) diversification of 
fodder resources through government 
subsidized feed supplements, veterinary 
services, and transportation services; (2) 
placing 750,000 hectares of key rangeland 
into grazing fallow; (3) restoration of range 
cover through planting of fruit, fuelwood 
trees and fodder shrubs; (4) setting up 
wind barriers to curb dune accumulation; 
(5) better management of water points; (6) 
establishment of local pastoral cooperatives 
to manage distribution of new inputs and 
assume range-management responsibility, 
and; (7) income generating projects for 
women. The PDPEO Project is funded by 
the African Development Bank, Interna­
tional Fund for Agricultural Development, 
and the Moroccan Government. 
5 	 BenJelloun (1996) conducted an extensive 
study among Beni Guil women evaluating 
their constraints in accessing natural and 
commercial resources. The results of the 
research identified appropriate income 
generating activities for women. Three 
female extension workers currently 
manage women’s extension services. These 
include: wool and rug weaving coopera­
tives; chicken and rabbit raising; health care 
education, and; sewing lessons for girls. 
6 	 As a foreign and formally educated woman, 
I was able to engage in participant obser­
vation and conduct research among both 
men and women. 
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Figure 1 Research area of author. Map: Steinmann. 
 
 
  
 
their sheep and goats over distances of some 250 km to take advan­
tage of resources in diverse ecological zones. Although there are 
several ecological niches within this area, two dominant environ­
ments define the territory: the northern high plateau (Dahara) and 
the more arid southern pre-saharan environment (Sahara). These 
two landscapes are separated by a small mountain chain with eleva­
tions of up to 1,800 meters. 
Rainfall diminishes from north to south with a maximum of 450 
mm in the Dahara and 150 mm in the Sahara. Corresponding to the 
aridity index, vegetation cover varies between the two regions. In the 
Dahara, perennial grass (Stipa tenacissma) and the woody shrub 
(Artemisia herba alba) dominate. In more arid conditions of the 
Sahara, a greater variety of woody shrubs and succulents (Arthro­
phytum scoparium, Festuca algeriensis, Retama retam, Ziziphus lotus) 
replace perennial grasses. Annual plants (valued for their fodder and 
human medicinal properties) thrive in moist ecological niches such 
as low lying depressions (dayas) where rainfall run-off water col­
lects, and at higher elevations in the mountains that divide the 
Dahara and Sahara. Wild mushrooms (Agaricaceae) and large 
ground truffles (Terfezia, Tirmania) are found in areas where soils 
maintain moisture, such as in the daya Chott Tigri. 
Large-scale migrations were well adapted to these ecological and 
climatic variations (Bencherifa 1996; Johnson 1993). Threat of winter 
snowfall encouraged the tribes on the Dahara’s high plateau (1600 m) 
to move their herds to lower elevations and warmer climates in the 
Sahara. On their migration, the Beni Guil crossed alluvial plains, the 
Chott Tigri daya and several small mountains (Jabel El Ourark; Jabel 
Lakdar; Jabel Dakh). Along the way, men herded animals to diverse 
grazing resources and women stopped to collect a variety of wild 
foods, medicinal plants and fuelwood. Similar reverse migrations 
from the Sahara to the Dahara occurred in the spring. 
Until the late 1960s almost all Beni Guil households were fully 
mobile tent units. But, over the last thirty years, 35% of the Beni 
Guil families have settled permanently, and almost 80% of the 
households have shifted production to mixed farming, herding and 
other commercial activities (Bencherifa 1996). This change has 
discouraged large scale migrations between the Dahara and Sahara. 
Only wealthy households that own trucks still move animals across 
these diverse ecological zones. The increased use of trucks or the 
Until the late 1960s almost all Beni Guil 
households were fully mobile tent units. 
But, over the last thirty years, 35% of 
the Beni Guil families have settled 
permanently, and almost 80% of the 
households have shifted production to 
mixed farming, herding and other 
commercial activities. 
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interruption of long-distance migrations for settled households has 
had variable effects on intra-household resource uses. 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DISCUSSION 
OF FINDINGS 
Gender analysis, as an entry point to this research, sheds light on 
hidden male–female power dynamics that affect access to and man­
agement of natural resources. It uncovers complexities of land-use 
decisions at the household scale and helps explain emerging land-
cover patterns associated with pastoral settlement. Identifying gen­
der-specific resource management roles has important implications 
for development and range conservation programs, particularly 
where culturally prescribed gender roles influence the range of 
acceptable strategies for dealing with changing social, economic and 
natural environments.
 Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used to examine 
the two research questions: 
•	 How does gendered access to and management of natural 
rangeland resources change in response to sedentarization 
and commercialization of pastoral livelihoods in eastern 
Morocco? 
•	 How does gendered resource use affect the environment? 
This discussion presents data concerning three types of vegeta­
tion resources: wild mushrooms and truffles, medicinal plants and 
fuelwood. The author selected these resources because they repre­
sent important food and health resources to the household and 
because their collection has variable environmental consequences. 
As stated earlier, primary data was collected during ten months of 
participant observation in 159 Beni Guil households. These house­
holds represented various points on the continuum from mobile to 
settled (tent, village, town). Because Beni Guil migration patterns 
have essentially ceased between the ecologically distinct areas of the 
Sahara and Dahara, research was carried out in three geographic 
locations of the Beni Guil territory: 
•	 among fully nomadic mobile tent households in the Dahara 
and Sahara areas; 
•	 in two small rural villages (Maatarka and Mengoub Gare); and 
•	 in the two larger commercial towns: Tendrara and
 
Bouarfa.7
 
7 	 According to the 1994 national census, 
human population numbers in villages were 
286 in Mengoub Gare; 520 in Maatarka. 
As for towns, the population of Tendrara 
was 5,633 and Bouarfa 19,616. 
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PRELIMINARY RESEARCH AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
SURVEY DESIGN 
After a two month period of preliminary research and partici­
pant observation, the author confirmed that the degree of household 
mobility and socio-economic class constituted important variables 
determining gendered resource collection patterns. Since household 
wealth is culturally specific, five local informants from a cross-
section of the settled Beni Guil communities helped define the class 
categories and compiled a list of households within each strata. This 
participatory wealth ranking exercise provided the author with local 
definitions of class (Grandin 1988). 
Long distances between tent households prevented gathering a 
group of informants for the wealth ranking exercise. Instead, the 
author asked local Beni Guil political representatives (Sheiks and 
Mukkadems) from each tribal lineage to rank tent households. The 
author then re-confirmed the classifications with key indicators 
including: tent size; approximate number of animals; types of ani­
mals owned; transportation resources (e.g. mule-drawn carts or 
trucks); and, the number of non-pastoral wage earners contributing 
to the household. Households were then randomly selected for 
formal interviews. In the selected households, 159 women and 70 
men answered formal survey questions about mushroom, truffle, 
medicinal plant and fuelwood collection. 
In order to identify gender-specific management of these re­
sources, the survey asked male and female interviewees to: 
•	 indicate what rangeland resources they collect for the
 
household;
 
•	 identify locations and distances to these resources; 
•	 identify other household members who provide this re­
source to the household;
 
•	 note whether the quantity and quality of the resource had
 
gone up or down;
 
•	 identify the number of medicinal plants they knew; and 
•	 indicate whether they bought or sold any of these resources
 
at town markets.
 
Data gathered in formal survey questionnaires was analyzed 
using the SPSS 6.1 statistical program. The author analyzed categori­
cal variables using chi-square tests and logistical regressions. For 
interval data, t-tests and multi-variate regression tests were em­
ployed. However, formal questionnaires failed to capture the full 
range of insights needed for the study; therefore, several qualitative 
methods supplemented survey data. 
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QUALITATIVE AND PARTICIPATORY METHODS 
In order to understand how settlement affected resource man­
agement and landscape change, men, women, boys and girls from 
each research site were asked to participate in gender resource 
8 For further information about this method-mapping. This technique helped elicit input from women and men 
8 
ological tool, see Rocheleau 1987; 1995;
about their land-use practices, degrees of accessibility to the Slocum et al. 1995. 
resource and knowledge about the diversity of plant species and 
their locations in the landscape. 
The maps revealed that men and women have very different 
ideas about the relative importance of natural resources. These 
differences were related to gender-based responsibilities for provid­
ing the resource to the household. While men’s maps identified and 
located almost all of the dayas and water wells (sites where men take 
animals to graze and water), women’s maps included many moun­
tains (where medicinal plants grow) and sites where they collect 
fuelwood and mushrooms. The scale of the maps also varied signifi­
cantly by age and gender, reflecting mobility constraints associated 
with settlement and female seclusion. Strict surveillance of women 
and their infrequent interaction with outsiders sometimes led 
women to answer survey questions that matched culturally pre­
scribed gender myths9 rather than current activities. Consequently, 
participant observation verified that more flexible gender roles ex­
isted than revealed by the formal survey. 
In order to measure environmental changes associated with 
changing gendered collection patterns the author measured land 
cover and species diversity rates using 100 meter intercepts. These 
land cover intercepts were carried out in several key locations: on Gender myths are powerful stereotypes or9 
ideas about appropriate roles and activitiesremote portions of uninhabited rangelands, near mobile tent sites, 
for men and women. A gender myth can
near villages, and near larger towns. The author measured the height be a legend or an interpretation of religious 
and the width of each plant along the intercept line and catalogued scripture that defines gender-specific 
characteristics and behavior. Often theseits name for information about species diversity in a given area. 
exist in theory rather than in practice, but
Several 10 meter by 10 meter square transects were laid out to mea­ will be resorted to when confronted 
sure the frequency and diversity of plant species at given locations. directly, such as in an interview. For more 
information about gender myths andThe author also solicited local input in these exercises in order to 
methods for revealing the differences
catalogue land user’s knowledge about various plant species. between myth and reality see Fortmann 
and Rocheleau 1985; Slocum and Kindon 
1995. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT AND LOCATION OF MUSHROOMS 
AND TRUFFLES 
The disappearance of large-scale migrations in the Beni Guil 
territory has had a disparate impact on households settled in the 
Dahara and Sahara. Only 46% of interviewees in Dahara households 
said they collected mushrooms, compared to 85% in the Sahara. 
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Wild mushrooms and truffles do not grow on the Dahara plateau, 
and since few Dahara households still move their animals and tents 
across the Chott Tigri to the dayas in the Sahara, most have lost 
access to these resources. A closer analysis of those Dahara house­
holds still collecting mushrooms showed that they all had fixed 
homes and owned tents which they moved to the Sahara. The loss of 
access to these food resources, therefore, affects primarily fully 
settled Dahara households. 
Diminishing access to wild mushrooms also corresponded to a 
loss in knowledge about the locations of these resources. Respon­
dents in the Dahara knew, on average, 5.5 mushroom locations, 
compared to 10 known by Sahara respondents. Further loss of this 
environmental knowledge may eliminate opportunities for mush­
room and truffle collection in the Dahara’s younger generation, 
The maps revealed that men and especially if more households become permanently settled. 
women have very different ideas about The recently established commercial value of mushrooms and 
the relative importance of natural 
truffles ($4 per kilo for mushrooms and $7-10 per kilo for truffles) resources. These differences were 
provided women with a new income generating opportunity. More- related to gender-based responsibilities 
over, 85% of land-users who collected mushrooms were women (see for providing the resource to the 
Figure 2). The commercial and food value of wild mushrooms and household. While men’s maps identified 
truffles explains why almost 70% of all surveyed households col- and located almost all of the dayas and 
water wells (sites where men take lected these resources. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that for mushroom 
animals to graze and water), women’s and truffle collecting class and location were key variables that de­
maps included many mountains (where termined gendered mushroom and truffle collection. 
medicinal plants grow) and sites where 
Figures 2 and 3 show that compared to men, women in all loca­ they collect fuelwood and mushrooms. 
tions and class categories assumed primary roles for providing the 
resource to the household. This represents the continuation of a 
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Figure 2 Percent households where women collect mushrooms and truffles by 
location and class. 
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Figure 3	 Percent households where men collect mushrooms and truffles by location and 
class. 
traditionally female activity. Data revealed, however, that among 
women, class and location influenced access. The most significant 
finding was the rapid decline of women collecting these resources 
from tents to villages and towns. This suggests that the mobility of 
the household to various locations on the rangelands was a key 
variable that determined access. 
Another interesting pattern emerged from the data: the percent­
age of households that collected mushrooms was lowest in villages, 
not in towns. In villages the gender ratio of mushroom and truffle 
collection was almost equal, although rates were low for both 
groups. As mentioned earlier, land users in villages (particularly 
those in the Dahara) have lost access to wild mushrooms and truffles 
that grow in the Sahara. Furthermore, truck transportation to towns 
or to the sites where mushrooms and truffles grow was sporadic. 
Villagers therefore could not easily transport these goods home or to 
the town souks. 
Truck transportation was more readily available in town, par­
ticularly around weekly market days. This explains why a greater 
percentage of poor women in town, not in villages, collected mush­
rooms and truffles. Poor women in town took advantage of this 
transport in order to secure these resources for home consumption 
or to sell at the market. The significant increase of mushroom and 
truffle collection among poor town women suggests that their 
husband’s income was insufficient to cover food costs, so they col­
lected free range resources to meet livelihood needs. 
In town households, class and mushroom/truffle collection 
showed a linear correlation for both men and women, though this 
was not immediately apparent among the women. The likelihood of 
All respondents in this class category 
who said they collected wild foods lived 
in households that were both nomadic 
and settled and said that they collected 
only when spending time out at the tent. 
This important finding suggests the 
need to move beyond a dualistic 
conceptual model of the household as 
either nomadic or settled. 
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collecting mushrooms decreased as wealth increased. For example, 
only 8% of men in wealthy households collected mushrooms or 
truffles, compared to 13% in middle class and 16% in poor house­
holds. In town, 32% of women in wealthy households collected 
these fungi, compared to 30% in the middle class and 63 in poor 
households. The surprisingly high percentage of wealthy town 
women who collected mushrooms and truffles was explained by the 
fact that most wealthy Beni Guil have two households: a home in 
town and a tent on the rangeland. All respondents in this class cat­
egory who said they collected wild foods lived in households that 
were both nomadic and settled and said that they collected only 
when spending time out at the tent. This important finding suggests 
the need to move beyond a dualistic conceptual model of the house­
hold as either nomadic or settled. 
Class can also be an important variable depending on location of 
the household. For example, collection rates were universally high 
for women in tents. But class became an important variable in town, 
where mostly poor women collected mushrooms and truffles. The 
data suggest that the economic importance of mushrooms and 
truffles was linked to family food needs and the degree to which 
women could rely on male income earners. This case challenges 
conclusions which posit that commercialization and settlement 
diminish women’s control over natural resources and increase their 
dependence on male income earners (Horowitz and Jowkar 1992; 
Talle 1988) Among the Beni Guil, economic development, commer­
cialization, and settlement did not uniformly diminish women’s 
control over resources. In fact, commercial opportunities and avail­
ability of truck transportation in town created opportunities for the 
poor to access locations for collecting mushrooms and to generate 
income by selling them. The settlement of households in towns and 
greater integration into a commercial economy did not create a 
homogeneous class of female dependents. 
The Beni Guil case also suggests consequences for future genera­
tions. Data revealed that while only 10% of older women sold mush­
rooms they collected, 45% of women aged 20 to 45 and 70% of 
women under the age of 19 sold them. Older women were less ac­
customed to the cash economy and collected mushrooms and 
truffles primarily for consumption. But younger women, especially 
those not yet married or in female headed households, took advan­
tage of commercial opportunities. Young men were also increasingly 
involved in the collection of these resources while their older coun­
terparts rarely participated. 
More research is needed to confirm these trends in the future, 
but the data suggest that increased dependency on cash incomes has 
The data suggest that the economic 
importance of mushrooms and truffles 
was linked to family food needs and the 
degree to which women could rely on 
male income earners. This case 
challenges conclusions which posit that 
commercialization and settlement 
diminish women’s control over natural 
resources and increase their dependence 
on male income earners. 
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intensified searches for and extraction of these resources. The data 
presented here identifies which land users were most involved in the 
collection activity that could help target appropriate groups for 
participation in conservation efforts. 
The impact of these activities on the environment, particularly 
soil and wind erosion, warrants further research. Observations in 
the field suggested that truffle collection (which creates a hole of up 
to six inches in diameter) loosened soil and contributed to wind 
erosion. Increased demand for and use of trucks to access collection 
sites has resulted in the rapid expansion of a network of dirt roads 
throughout the Beni Guil territory. The roads have degraded large 
tracts of vegetation and have encouraged rain run-off and gully 
erosion during the rainy season. 
This example illustrates that both men and women have vested 
interests in commercial and technological change, regardless of 
negative environmental consequences. Findings also suggest the 
importance of moving beyond essentialist ideals of ecofeminism to 
more contextual analyses of gender roles and environmental man­
agement in relation to social and economic change. 
CHANGING MEDICINAL PLANT COLLECTING ACTIVITIES 
AND SPECIES KNOWLEDGE 
Medicinal plant collection patterns share both similarities and 
differences with the findings discussed above. One major difference 
is that the overall percentage of households that still collect medici­
nal plants (48%) was relatively low compared to households collect­
ing mushrooms (70%). The decline in the collection of traditional 
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Figure 4 Percent households where women collect medicinal plants by location and class. 
 
 
 
 
60 
Tent 
Village 
Town 
40 
% 
20 
0 
Figure 5 Percent households where men collect medicinal plants by location and class. 
medicinal plants suggests that land-users rely on alternative re­
sources to meet family health needs: they either buy medicinal 
plants at the town souk or use modern medical services. 
As noted with mushroom and truffle collection, the interruption 
of nomadic migrations from Dahara and Sahara reduced access to 
medicinal plants. In households that still collected medicinal plants 
women accounted for approximately 80% and men for 20% of 
individuals who collected. Primarily women performed the task. 
The survey results show, however, that men also collected medicinal 
plants and that class and degree of settlement influenced gendered 
patterns of collection. 
While overall collection rates were low, Figures 4 and 5 indicate 
that percentages were much higher for tent households than for 
those in villages or towns. Holding class constant, the percentage of 
women who collected medicinal plants declined as families became 
more settled. The exception, however, were wealthy women in town. 
As with mushrooms and truffles, these women came from house­
holds that had both house and tent and maintained access to range­
land resources while at the tent. 
For men, class more than location influenced collection patterns. 
For households in town, and to a lesser degree in villages, a higher 
percentage of poor men collected medicinal plants than middle class 
men, who collected more than wealthy men. The reverse was true 
for men in tents where a larger percentage of wealthy men collected 
medicinal plants compared to men in moderate and poor house­
holds. This pattern among men in tent households complemented 
the trend in women’s collection activities which were inversely 
related to class (40%). In tents, more poor women collected medici­
nal plants (70%) compared to moderate (53%) wealthy women. 
wealthy moderate poor 
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The data suggests that medicinal plant collection is still important in 
tent households compared to villages and towns. Cultural values of 
female seclusion explain why men take over this activity as house­
hold wealth increases. However, because tent households move to 
diverse locations on range lands, women in these households retain 
proximity and access to medicinal plant resources. Class did not 
influence women’s collecting activities in villages and towns and 
suggests that location was the key obstacle for accessing the plants. 
Access to (and knowledge about) medicinal plants declined most 
significantly for village households due to several reasons. Reduced 
household mobility was the primary factor. According to older 
women, the interruption of migrations and changing environmental 
factors discouraged younger women from collecting and learning 
about medicinal plants. The women argued that the landscape was 
not as green as it once was, particularly around villages. Opportuni­
ties for teaching younger generations about these plants therefore 
became limited. Drought severely affected the region in the 1980’s 
and early 1990’s so many of these annual plants did not grow during 
these years. Among respondents who did not collect medicinal 
plants, most gave one of the following reasons: “The plants are too 
far away;” “ They grow in the mountains;” “I don’t know them;” “I 
buy them at the souk” or, “I see the doctor in town.” 
Collection rates suggest that medicinal plants represented a 
valuable resource to women in mobile tent households and among 
the poor settled in town. Although rangelands were also denuded 
around larger towns of Bouarfa and Tendrara, the souk provided an 
alternative access to medicinal plants and constituted a new space 
for learning about medicinal plants. Younger generation women in 
towns knew more about medicinal plants than their village counter­
parts. Since herbalists at the town souks were not necessarily from 
the local area and often imported plants from other parts of Mo­
rocco, women may have increased their knowledge about a greater 
variety of medicinal plants. Moreover, town women, who were 
generally dependent on male income earners, used this opportunity 
to maintain control over their role as family healers. These data 
caution against assuming that all women who used traditional me­
dicinal plants for healing relied on local or indigenous knowledge.
 This case supports some but not all the findings of the indig­
enous knowledge literature.10 These theories generally posit that 
commercialization and integration of subsistence economies into a 
cash market reduces access to and knowledge about traditional 
medicines. Among the Beni Guil, declining collection of rangeland 
medicinal plants didn’t necessarily imply reduced access nor dimin­
ishing knowledge about medicinal plant species. The Beni Guil 
This case supports the need for 
employing integrated approaches to 
evaluate local knowledge and resource 
use. These perspectives challenge the 
orthodox theoretical dualism that pits 
“local knowledge and indigenous, 
sustainable systems” against “external, 
Western, non-sustainable systems” 
(Agrawal 1995; Batterbury 1997). 
Indeed, research suggests that more 
than half of all Beni Guil households 
surveyed said they bought traditional 
medicinal plants at the weekly souk. 
This demonstrates that at least for now, 
people benefit from commercial 
markets that allow them to combine 
traditional medicinal practices with 
modern alternatives. 
10 For a compilation of studies on the 
consequences of economic development 
on indigenous knowledge systems, see: 
Agriculture and human values Volume VIII. 
Numbers 1 and 2, 1991. 
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living in towns used souk herbalists as a way to access and learn 
about medicinal plants, although it is doubtful that future genera­
tions will be able to identify where these diverse plant species grow 
on their landscape. 
This case supports the need for employing integrated approaches 
to evaluate local knowledge and resource use. These perspectives 
challenge the orthodox theoretical dualism that pits “local knowl­
edge and indigenous, sustainable systems” against “external, West­
ern, non-sustainable systems” (Agrawal 1995; Batterbury 1997; 
Bebbington 1997). Indeed, research suggests that more than half of 
all Beni Guil households surveyed said they bought traditional me­
dicinal plants at the weekly souk. This demonstrates that at least for 
now, people benefit from commercial markets that allow them to 
combine traditional medicinal practices with modern alternatives. 
The fact that medicinal plants have become commercially avail­
able raises questions about environmental change and the availabil­
ity and rejuvenation potential of these diverse plant species. Further 
research is necessary to understand where souk herbalists collect 
plants and how their commercial activities affect plant diversity and 
availability in specific rangeland locations. 
MANAGEMENT OF FUELWOOD RESOURCES AND 
LAND-COVER IMPLICATIONS 
Compared to medicinal plants and wild mushrooms, it is easier 
to measure the environmental impact of changing fuelwood collec­
tion patterns. Based on dry wood weights, PDPEO project research 
found that average household fuelwood consumption ranged from 5 
Kg/day in the summer to 10 Kg/day in the winter (Bruck 1996). 
There were only slight variations of this consumption pattern be­
tween mobile tent households and settled village households al­
though the impact of fuelwood collection was most severe around 
villages (Maatarka and Mengoub). 
Primary data using land-cover intercepts indicated 10% vegeta­
tion cover near Maatarka, compared to averages of 25 to 40% near 
tents, and up to 50% coverage in uninhabited areas of the Dahara. 
Differences in regional vegetation ecology also represented impor­
tant factors affecting the impact of fuelwood collection. For ex­
ample, a large variety of woody shrubs make up the dominant 
vegetation cover in the Sahara, whereas quick-burning perennial 
halfa grass (Stipa tenacissma) dominates in the Dahara. Conse­
quently, households settled in the Dahara concentrate fuelwood 
collection on the halfa grass. It burns quickly, so women remove the 
grasses by the roots because this part of the plant burns longest. 
This practice removes vegetation cover and interferes with the 
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rejuvenation potential of the perennial grass. Pressure on fuelwood 
resources was also heavy in the Sahara. But, the relative demand on 
woody shrubs was lower since these are slow-burning fuel resources. 
Although land users also up-rooted some of these shrubs, they often 
cut species above the roots (e.g. Retama retam). This practice en­
courages plant rejuvenation. 
Village women also over-exploited fuelwood resources close to 
home because they preferred not to walk far from the surveillance of 
others, in accordance with the value of female seclusion. Fuelwood 
collection was concentrated around settlements diminishing both 
ground cover and species diversity. 
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Figure 6 Percent women collecting fuelwood by location and class. 
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Figure 7 Percent men collecting fuelwood by location and class. 
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Preferences and access to various fuelwood species depended on 
whether households were mobile tents or fixed in villages or towns. 
For example, in tents, land users collected on average 3.6 different 
fuelwood species, villagers used only 2.3 varieties, and in town only 
1.5 different plants were used. Research revealed that the best 
fuelwood species diminished relatively quickly compared to fast-
burning resources. The best hardwood species (e.g. Retama retam 
and Arthrophytum scoparium) were rarely found around villages, but 
were re-generating around larger towns. Range extension workers at 
the Agriculture and Development office in Bouarfa noted that 
around Bouarfa vegetation cover had actually improved due to the 
increased use of commercial fuel sources such as natural gas. 
The degree to which households relied on fuelwood resources de­
pended on class and location variables. And, as illustrated in Figures 6 
Many household resource responsibili­and 7, these variables shaped gendered fuelwood collection activities. 
ties such as collecting wild foods, Considering the differences in the scale, Figures 6 and 7 demon-
medicinal plants and fuelwood are 
strate that women bore the burden of fuelwood collection, particu­ increasingly shared by women and men 
larly in tent households. In villages and towns, both class and gender as households adapt to economic and 
variables came into play. In the villages, most women (between 75 environmental changes associated with 
and 85%) collected fuelwood. But, some 18 to 35% of the men also sedentarization. 
participated in this activity. In villages, natural resources provided 
cooking and heating fuel for most households. But, compared to 
women in tents, villagers travelled much farther (up to 12 miles one 
way) to collect wood. Since the cultural value of female seclusion 
discouraged women from travelling long distances alone, they en­
gaged in concentrated and less cautious extraction methods. This 
degraded not only vegetation cover but also species diversity around 
villages. Distances to fuelwood collection sites gradually increased so 
men more commonly accompanied women or were needed to drive 
mule-drawn carts or trucks in order to haul wood back home. 
The same pattern existed in towns, with some variation: only 
men and women in poor households collected fuelwood. As with the 
patterns for mushroom and medicinal plant collecting, the trends 
suggest that as households become more settled gender roles shifted 
from sex-specific activities to increasingly shared resource collection 
and management strategies. 
These data point toward several important findings. First, that 
access to some fuelwood species declined with settlement, threaten­
ing over-exploitation of particular species at some but not all settled 
locations. Range cover had actually improved around larger com­
mercial towns where alternative fuel resources were used. Second, 
concentrated fuelwood collection activities around villages and 
sedentary tents resulted in significant range cover loss and increased 
distances to fuelwood collection sites. Third, longer distances to 
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abundant fuelwood resources shifted the gendered nature of 
fuelwood collection and more men participated. Yet, interviews with 
PDPEO conservation project managers indicated a continuation of 
the perception or “gender myth” that fuelwood collection was 
women’s work. Men had not been identified as a ‘user group’ and 
were not included in educational efforts that encouraged cutting 
fuelwood resources above the roots. Understanding that these roles 
have begun to shift provides important information for targeting 
both men and women in conservation programs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Beni Guil case study in eastern Morocco demonstrates that 
gender-based resource management patterns shift in response to 
settlement, commercialization, and more intensive land-use prac­
tices. Many household resource responsibilities such as collecting 
wild foods, medicinal plants and fuelwood are increasingly shared 
by women and men as households adapt to economic and environ­
mental changes associated with sedentarization. 
Structural theories on women, environment and development 
posit that women lose control over resources as pastoral nomads 
settle and become integrated into a cash economy. The Beni Guil 
case suggests, however, that important nuances exist which cannot 
be reduced to class variables, gender stereotypes, or simple house­
hold mobility categories. In mobile tents men and women maintain 
easy access to a variety of range resources from different ecological 
niches. These households continue to move in order to take advan­
tage of seasonally available resources and assure women of close 
proximity to natural resources. Despite the integration of tent 
households into a commercial economy, most tasks remain sex-
segregated according to traditional roles. 
As households become more fixed in villages and towns, how­
ever, collection activities shift from women to men. According to 
the gender and environment literature, women’s loss of access to 
natural resources increases their dependency on male income earn­
ers. A more complex gendered adaptation occurs among the Beni 
Guil. Women often find alternative ways to access resources they 
need to fulfill their household responsibilities. However, this is more 
difficult in villages where access to natural rangeland resources or 
markets is limited. In villages, gender roles become most flexible. 
Weekly commercial market in towns also provide Beni Guil 
women settled there with new opportunities to maintain control 
over resources. Lower collection activities among women in town 
does not necessarily imply a corresponding loss of access to re­
sources nor a loss of knowledge about them. In towns, women take 
Contrary to the various theories, the 
weekly commercial market in towns 
provide Beni Guil women settled there 
with new opportunities to maintain 
control over resources. Lower collection 
activities among women in town does 
not necessarily imply a corresponding 
loss of access to resources nor a loss of 
knowledge about them. In towns, 
women take advantage of the market. 
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advantage of the market. Depending on class characteristics, women 
use the market in various ways. Wealthy and moderate town settlers 
no longer collect rangeland resources themselves but buy them at 
the market instead. Women in poor households use truck transpor­
tation available on market days to collect and then sell wild mush­
rooms and truffles. The weekly market provides poor women with 
an opportunity to generate income. 
The market also represents a new space for learning about me­
dicinal plants. Some research suggests that commercialization 
erodes indigenous knowledge systems and devalues women’s roles as 
family healers (Mehta 1996). The Beni Guil case suggests otherwise. 
Findings from this case support recent critiques of the orthodox 
dualism of indigenous/local/traditional versus external/commercial/ 
modern (Bebbington 1997; Batterburg 1997). Instead, a new ap-
The reconceptualization of household proach necessarily recognizes hybrid livelihood systems as complex 
mobility as well as careful attention to the strategies that rural households utilize to preserve tradition while adapt-
type of settlement (rural village or commer­
ing to social, demographic, economic and environmental change. cial town) provides more accurate insight 
Further, the Beni Guil example also points to a theoretical weak- into the gendered aspects of social 
ness in studies among pastoralists that view households as either adaptations to sedentarization and 
mobile or settled. Among the Beni Guil, some households are split environmental change. 
and represent units that are both fully mobile and settled. The 
reconceptualization of household mobility as well as careful atten­
tion to the type of settlement (rural village or commercial town) 
provides more accurate insight into the gendered aspects of social 
adaptations to sedentarization and environmental change. 
Examining how gender is embedded in ecological, cultural and 
economic structures at a given point in time also proves more useful 
than ecofeminist views that essentialize women with nature. The Beni 
Guil case demonstrates that women take advantage of new truck tech­
nology to reach more remote sites where they collect commercially 
valuable wild mushrooms and truffles. This strategy helps them main­
tain control over their roles as providers of food and fuel to the house­
hold even though this activity carries with it negative environmental 
consequences. Women also respect the cultural norm of female seclu­
sion, which encourages over exploitation of fuelwood resources close to 
home, suggesting a greater affinity with culture than with nature. 
By addressing the gendered responses to the environment as well 
as considering potential environmental impacts, this case study fills a 
gap in the geographic literature in North Africa and the Middle East 
that has looked at the environmental impacts of nomadic settlement 
and land-use intensification through larger-scale processes including: 
historical, political and economic contexts; erosion of local resource 
management institutions; land tenure changes; and demographic or 
technological change. By shifting the focus to intra-household dynam­
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ics, new insight is gained concerning environmental change and the 
future potential for sustainable livelihoods in North Africa’s arid lands. 
Promoting sustainable environmental management of Morocco’s 
rangelands requires adding intra-household analyses of constraints 
and opportunities in meeting livelihood needs. More information 
about gendered land-use practices will promote development policies 
and conservation programs that target appropriate land-user groups. 
Identifying how men and women’s resource interests intersect with 
class, location, and household variables suggests more accurate trajec­
tories of local scale land-cover change in the future. 
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Environmental Degradation in Eastern Turkey: The Case of Contract Farming 
Behrooz Morvaridi 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the integral links between a region’s economy and its natural resource degradation. Through a case 
study of the commercialization of agriculture in Igdir, Turkey, the paper seeks to show that natural resource degradation 
in particular and environmental change in general must be seen within the context of prevailing social and economic 
relations. Although it is, of course, impossible to examine resource change in isolation from the wider economy, it can 
also be difficult to appreciate fully the complex interaction of socio-economic and environmental processes. 
CONTEXT: THE SOCIETY-ENVIRONMENT 
RELATIONSHIP IN RURAL AREAS 
The “environment” in a relatively narrow sense is associated 
with the biophysical world. Environmental problems are, therefore, 
considered simply to be negative impacts on the natural world, such 
as the degradation of air and water resources and the loss of biologi­
cal diversity. The dichotomy between natural science as the appro­
priate discipline for the assessment of nature and social science as 
the discipline for the assessment of social relations sometimes 
tempts us to consider environmental problems as biophysical 
changes somehow separate from their social and economic impacts. 
After all, natural scientists and social scientists draw on distinct 
epistemologies and therefore have different ideas of what constitutes 
evidence or proof. One cannot ignore the fact that natural “science 
has… a central role since it is key to the identification and interpre­
tation of environmental problems,” but analysis in the social context 
remains essential (Yeardly 1992). The fact that much of the available 
data on environmental problems in rural areas tends to be exclu­
sively quantitative and biophysical means that the available facts are 
not always sufficient for understanding the anthropogenic processes 
behind environmental change. 
Humanity’s increasing capacity to manipulate nature has been a 
cornerstone of the development process. Human action has trans­
formed nature through technology and labor to the extent that we 
have mixed “our forces with its (nature’s) forces too deeply to be 
able to draw back and separate either out” (Williams 1980). Thus, it 
does not make sense to analyze “society” as the domain of human 
action which operates in the “environment,” the domain of natural 
cycles and processes. Conceptualizing environment as merely the 
material setting for social action implies that the two operate inde­
pendently of each other, which is simply not the case. 
 
 
      
 
Nature can no longer be said to exist independently of human 
intervention nor to structure social activity (Giddens 1994). Since 
without some form of human agency environmental issues do not 
exist, it is essential that our understanding and application of the 
concept “environment” be based on the interaction of society and 
nature (Dicken 1992; Blaikie 1987). The ability of human beings to 
manipulate nearly every aspect of the natural world challenges the 
notion that nature is somehow separate or autonomous from 
human culture. 
In rural areas, including those of the Middle East, environmental 
problems reflect the interrelationships among resource change, human 
productive activities, and the accompanying transformations of people’s 
lives. An environmental problem is therefore logically understood to be 
a situation in which human action affects natural resources in such a 
way as to place people’s welfare, income or livelihood at risk. In this 
sense environmental problems are social problems.1 
The interrelationship of society and environment has been 
largely neglected in academic literature on the Middle East in gen­
eral and on Turkey in particular, insofar as little attention has been 
paid to the subject of environmental problems at all at the policy 
level. In the Middle East, governments’ principal objective has been 
economic growth. In this context, programs aimed at intensifying 
agriculture have brought about significant social change in rural 
areas, in particular the restructuring of production relations through 
the integration of small subsistence farmers into the market. What 
governments have tended to ignore are the patterns of environmen­
tal degradation associated with the intensification of farming at the 
microlevel. Intensification (that is, increased yield) has become 
dependent on rising use of external inputs and mechanization. 
Many of the practices which are the manifestation of this policy, 
including excessive use of fertilizers, poor irrigation management, 
ignorance of fallow periods, and improper use of heavy machinery, 
seem to have driven environmental degradation in rural areas. 
Although land and water resources are not intentionally de­
graded, many forms of intervention which increase yields in the 
short-term pose risks for resource quality in the long-term. Unsus­
tainable practices are not only associated with poor farmers desper­
ate to increase productivity and unable to afford the correct balance 
of external inputs or capital investments; richer farmers also use 
fertilizers inappropriately at times. In an attempt to understand why 
farmers implement such practices, this paper examines production 
relations and underlying social tensions in the context of agricul­
tural commercialization in Turkey. 
1 This is not to deny the fact that natural 
processes cause biophysical changes which 
affect people. At the same time, I am of 
the position that natural disasters such as 
floods and volcanic eruptions are distinctly 
not environmental problems because 
although such events may impact negatively 
on people’s lives, they are a result of 
natural processes and not human action. 
What governments have tended to ignore 
are the patterns of environmental 
degradation associated with the intensifi­
cation of farming at the microlevel. 
Intensification (that is, increased yield) 
has become dependent on rising use of 
external inputs and mechanization. 
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I first studied the process of commercialization of agriculture in 
the Igdir region in 1982-83 and returned to it in 1995-96, with the 
intention of analyzing the continued process of macro- and micro­
level changes and the relationship between the two. Commercializa­
tion has involved the restructuring of production relations: contract 
farming, which ties growers to larger markets, has become the new 
norm, although the exact nature of contractual conditions has 
changed in line with government strategy. My examination of the 
data from two decades of commercialized agriculture focuses on the 
longer-term effects of continued cash cropping at both the regional 
and village levels. (The case study material is drawn from Ak village 
in Igdir province2 of eastern Turkey.) 
The processes of commoditization and intensification can put 
natural resources under pressure, often creating a need for greater 
“landesque capital,” i.e., investments in the long term maintenance 
of land quality and strategic decisions geared toward securing future 
continuity of production (Blaikie 1997). In this case study of sugar 
beet production in Igdir province, production expansion encour­
aged by government policy has led to the over-exploitation of land 
and water, amounting to the depletion of landesque capital. The 
government’s encouragement of farmers to increase crop yields 
without policies aimed at conserving the underlying resource base 
has resulted in numerous instances of environmental degradation. 
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROBLEMS IN RURAL TURKEY 
Since the 1980s, the Turkish government has moved toward 
liberalization and export-oriented economic reforms and away from 
the macroeconomic policies of the 1960s and 1970s (in which there 
was a growing role for state intervention in the economy through 
import substitution and industrialization). Moreover, since the 
demise of the Soviet Union, Turkey has been in a position to initiate 
new policies with regard to Central Asia, leading to growth in trade 
and thereby furthering its integration into the global network. 
How has agrarian development been affected by changes in 
macrolevel government policy? Since the 1960s the Turkish govern­
ment has attempted to transform the structure of agricultural pro­
duction by integrating family farms into the commercial market 
with the assistance of a price support policy, subsidies, and credit 
facilities provided by government agencies (Aksit 1993). The “liber­
alization” of domestic trade and investment and the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises in the late 1980s and 1990s have resulted in 
cutbacks to reduce farmers’ dependence on the state and to fully 
integrate them into the market. However, the extent to which this 
2  In 1992 Igdir was upgraded from a 
“district” to a “province” under the 
government’s Eastern Regional Develop­
ment Program to reinforce the area’s 
improved economic status and to 
encourage trading with Central Asia. 
The government’s encouragement of 
farmers to increase crop yields without 
policies aimed at conserving the 
underlying resource base has resulted in 
numerous instances of environmental 
degradation. 
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has been successful has yet to be fully examined, particularly at the 
microlevel. There is some evidence that farmers’ real incomes have 
declined and that even when state agencies continue to support 
farmers to some degree, delays in payments for crops to farmers and 
high inflation have added pressure to farmers’ incomes (Turel 1991). 
It is estimated that the Turkish population will double to 120 
million by the year 2050. The government therefore faces the prob­
lem of increasing agricultural productivity to meet the needs of a 
growing population. Greater than one third of the total land area in 
Turkey is used for arable farming (see Table 1). 
Given the constraints of land availability, climate, and topogra­
phy, the Turkish government has sought to intensify existing agri­
culture. Several environmental problems have become increasingly 
apparent since the intensification of agriculture on arable land, 
Table 1 Land Use in Turkeyalthough there is little data available identifying direct links between 
intensification and environmental problems. These problems in-
Type of Land Use Area % Total 
clude both soil erosion and reductions in soil quality (see Table 2). (million ha) 
Because intensification has coincided with economic liberaliza-
Agriculture 27.8 35.8tion and a growing demand not only for exports from rural areas, 
Pasture 21.7 27.9but also for the products of industry, there has been a shift of 
Forest/shrub 23.5 30.2investment to urban areas. This has undermined the subsidies and 
Urban 0.6 0.8support made available to rural areas during a time of agrarian 
Other 3.2 4.1change. What effect has this had on resource use? Are practices that 
Inland Water 1.1 1.4result in environmental degradation a response to changes in 
TOTAL 77.8 100macrolevel government policy? 
The impact of government policies is offered here as a case study Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1994. 
in a sugar-growing region of eastern Turkey. Igdir, bordered by Kars 
to the northwest, Agri to the south, and Armenia, Iran, and 
Azerbeijan to the east, is located in a valley with fertile land. Cereal 
(wheat and barley) and cash crops (sugar beet and cotton) are the 
principal crops cultivated. The case study of Igdir illustrates how 
macrolevel policy that links farmers with a state agency through 
cropping contracts affects production, farmers’ livelihoods, and 
natural resource degradation. 
CONTRACT FARMING AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROBLEMS: THE CASE OF IGDIR 
Turkey is striving to be self-sufficient in sugar production. Given 
current population figures and an average annual consumption of 
28 kg/capita, it is estimated that approximately 1.8 million tons of 
sugar are consumed each year. The Turkish Sugar Corporation, the 
state agency responsible for sugar cultivation, has planned for in­
creased cultivation by establishing sufficient infrastructure to cope 
with the increasing demand associated with population growth. As 
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part of the drive for self-sufficiency, increased sugar beet cultivation 
has been encouraged since the 1960s under government regional 
development programs aimed at bringing about the commercializa­
tion of agriculture. Igdir is typical of an area where sugar has been 
the dominant commercialized crop, made possible through expan­
sion of the cultivated area, the adoption of new technology, and 
improved infrastructure such as irrigation and roads. 
State support for sugar cultivation, which has been essential in 
regions such as Igdir to achieve the commercialization of farming 
households, is coordinated by the Turkish Sugar Corporation, which 
has a complete monopoly over the purchase and sale of sugar beet at 
fixed prices. Other crops such as cereals are bought and sold by both 
private merchants and government agencies. The Turkish Sugar 
Corporation has established vertical integration in local production 
through legal contracts with individual growers. Contract farming 
enables the Corporation to control both supply and demand for 
sugar beet. Contracts detail future purchase agreements, which 
include grade and quality standards and methods of cultivation 
including the application of inputs such as fertilizers. 
Contract farming can put farmers in a position to achieve greater 
access to credit, inputs (in particular, new technologies), and the 
market than their peers who are not operating under contractual 
arrangements. However, the grower is tied to the Corporation by 
market dependence and by credit for the purchase of capital inputs. 
The farmer’s loss of autonomy is particularly pronounced when 
debts to the Corporation are incurred, since the Turkish Sugar 
Corporation is the only external agency involved in sugar cultivation. 
Contracts tend to cover land management measures intended to 
optimize crop growth, crop quality, and production levels in the 
short-term agricultural cycle. The objective of maintaining resource 
quality over the long-term is not mentioned. Thus, the grower, and 
not the Corporation, is responsible for decisions about investment 
in the long-term maintenance of land quality and productive capac­
ity—landesque capital—under conditions in which the Sugar Cor­
poration encourages production growth. Environmental problems, 
such as deterioration in soil quality, waterlogging, and salinization 
have been identified in Igdir villages by the World Bank and by the 
State Hydraulic Authorities (DSA). Unfortunately, investments to 
mitigate environmental problems are not always undertaken, nor 
are they even possible for small farmers. At the same time, it appears 
that farmers adopt a variety of measures, such as the improper 
application of fertilizers or reduction of fallow periods, which pro­
duce high short-term yields but do lasting environmental 
damage. Why? 
Table 2 Types of Environmental 
Degradation in Rural Areas 
Environmental Problem Area 
(million ha) 
Medium Soil Erosion 14 
Severe Soil Erosion 2 
Salinization 1.5 
Urban Encroachment 3 
Waterlogging 2.8 
Total Affected Area 23.3 
Source: General Directory of Rural Services, 
1995. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND SUGAR CULTIVA­
TION: THE FARMER VERSUS THE CORPORATION 
Any analysis of the links between crop cultivation and environ­
mental degradation in Igdir involves analysis of the Sugar 
Corporation’s policy in the region since the 1980s, because produc­
tion relations are centered on sugar cultivation and contracts be­
tween the farmer and the Corporation. Following liberalization in 
Turkey, the Sugar Corporation has cut back on support to farmers 
and is more wary of its dealings with them. 
Since the 1980s, the number of sugar beet contracts in Igdir prov­
ince has increased substantially, and the area under sugar beet cultiva­
tion has risen from around 1,500 ha in 1970 to 6,500 ha in 1995, 
while cotton cultivation has decreased from approximately 7,200 ha 
to 1,400 ha over the same period (see Figure 1). With the support of 
a recent World Bank-funded irrigation program, the Sugar Corpora­
tion intends to cultivate a further 6,000 ha of sugar beet. 
The number of sugar beet factories in the area has facilitated Area under 
Cultivation 
increases in cultivation by making processing more accessible. The (x 100 ha) 
Erzurum Sugar factory was the only plant in the area in the early 
1980s, but now over 220,000 tons of beet is processed annually by 
four factories (see Table 3). 
Increases in cultivation have been achieved through several 
changes to contractual conditions. The Sugar Corporation has lifted 
Figure 1 Area under sugar beet and cotton
many of the former restrictions on cultivation. In the 1980s each cultivation in Idgar as a function of 
farmer was given a strict quota for the cultivation of sugar beet, time. 
which was not often more than two ha. This often meant that farm­
ers would register other members of their families–spouses, chil­
dren–in order to increase production (Morvaridi 1990). In the 
1990s, such restrictions were lifted and farmers could cultivate as 
much as they wanted. During the 1980s, the Corporation refused to 
contract with sharecroppers, believing that the risks were too high, Table 3 Amount of Sugar beet processed 
but it does so today with the names of both the landowner and the in Igdir. 
tenant entered in the contract. The landowner provides land and 
Factory location Tons processed
plowing, the sharecropper provides labor, and the cost of water and 
Agri 166,000fertilizer is shared. The sharecropper receives cash from the corpora-
Kars 42,000tion for crops, in contrast with traditional sharecropping arrange-
Erci 11,000ments in which he received a portion of the crop. 
Erzurum 3,500Interviewed farmers said that the cultivation and rotation of 
TOTAL 222,500crops on each plot of farmland is determined by sugar beet since it is 
the crop that produces the highest income per unit area. By reducing 
production rotation from once every four years to once every three 
years, under the instructions from the Corporation, farmers have 
been intensifying their resource use increase yields. The rotation in 
1982 was sugar beet /wheat/cotton/fallow or sugar beet/wheat/ 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
sugar
 beet 
cotton 
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 YEAR 
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fallow/wheat. In 1995 the rotation, shortened from four years to 
three, was sugar beet/wheat/wheat, or sugar beet/wheat/water 
melon. There has been a considerable reduction in, and even elimi­
nation of, fallow periods. For example, as Table 4 shows, in 1995 no 
land was left fallow. 
The Sugar Corporation deliberately targeted cotton as the crop 
to be substituted for by sugar beet, because the two products were in 
direct competition over resources, such as labor, land and water. 
When any product is increased at the expense of another, the mar­
ginal rate of substitution is always negative. When both sugar beet 
and cotton were cultivated, farmers needed to ensure that they had 
sufficient labor to manage both crops during hoeing and harvesting, 
since these tasks were carried out during the same period. A major 
managerial problem resulted for many farmers who found the crops 
competing over limited available labor (Morvaridi 1992, 1993). 
Sugar beet is purchased by weight according to sugar content. If 
the sugar content is below 16%, the purchasing price is 15% lower 
than the original set price. If sugar content is higher than 17%, 
farmers are paid 15% more. This is assessed by the scales (kantar) or 
weigh-bridge at one of four delivery locations—Igdir, Akyumak, 
Kikoynco, Yayci—not on individual farms. The price paid is based 
on an average of the total crop delivered to the weigh station, not on 
Table 4 Cropping patterns in Ak village, 1982 and 1995, area in ha. 
Crop Cultivated Proportion Cultivated Proportion 
area (1992) of total area (1995) of total 
wheat 156 27% 270 46% 
sugar beet* 187 32% 210 35% 
cotton 81 14% 32 5% 
barley 73 12% 31 5% 
fallow 58 10% 13 2% 
clover 13 2% 15 2% 
fruit 10 2% 10 2% 
trees 4 1% 1 0.2% 
other** 7 1% 0 0% 
degraded land*** - - 10 2% 
TOTAL 589 592 
Source: Turkish Government Water Authority. *Sugar Corporation, Igdir 1982/1995; 
**includes corn, vegetables, watermelon, etc.; ***field data. 
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the crop presented by each individual farmer. This system encour­
ages farmers to increase their income through tonnage rather than 
content. The Corporation is aware of the drawback of not being able 
to monitor weight and sugar content of crops raised by individual 
farmers, and the head of the Corporation admitted “we know all the 
farmers. We know the best farmers and the worst ones.” The Corpo­
ration plans to weigh and purchase from the farmers individually, 
but has yet to do so as a result of their own cost considerations. 
Farmers harvest their sugar crop on the instructions of the Sugar 
Corporation. The Corporation argues that it is logistically difficult 
to manage all farmers’ harvests concurrently because the sugar 
factory does not have the capacity to cope with the high volumes 
that would result. The Corporation therefore staggers the harvest 
time, and farmers complain that as a result of prolonging the harvest 
period they lose out. The later a farmer harvests, the more his cane 
gains in weight. This would appear to be to his benefit. However, 
farmers protest that when the sugar beet is weighed at the weigh-
bridge and the Corporation washes and cuts soil away from the beet 
they deliberately cut away too much of the skin. As a result the 
farmers lose revenue because the crop weighs less. 
The price of sugar beet is determined in relation to other crops, 
such as wheat and sunflowers. The Ministry determines the price of 
all crops in consultation with state agencies and the State Planning 
Organization, which advise on prices annually. The Corporation 
purchases sugar beet for 4,500 Turkish Lira (TL)/kg. This price takes 
into account the interest-free advance payments of 35% of their 
crop money (calculated as the cost of production) that the Sugar 
Corporation gives to the farmers. The real price for sugar beet would 
be 6000 TL/kg (1996 prices). The Corporation knows that the farm­
ers would not cultivate sugar beet if they were charged interest on 
loans or advances and that if they were operating in the private 
sector they would not be paid advance money for cultivation. It 
deliberately pays the remainder of the price six months late. It ar­
gues that this allows for the necessary time to process and sell the 
sugar beet crop so that it can afford to pay the farmers the cash owed 
them. The Corporation believes that farmers are fortunate to be 
advanced money interest-free, in any event. 
Many farmers complain that it is unfair that they receive crop 
payment up to six months late and that they continually lose out 
because inflation is high (up to 70% according to government and 
up to 100% by some unofficial estimates). Farmers assert that the 
sugar beet price is low in relation to the cost of fertilizer inputs. 
Additionally, over the past few years, the Corporation has offered 
farmers consumer goods such as stoves, televisions, refrigerators, 
The later a farmer harvests, the more 
his cane gains in weight. This would 
appear to be to his benefit. However, 
farmers protest that when the sugar 
beet is weighed at the weigh-bridge and 
the Corporation washes and cuts soil 
away from the beet they deliberately 
cut away too much of the skin. As a 
result the farmers lose revenue because 
the crop weighs less. 
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heating fuel, cooking oil, and even sugar itself, instead of paying 
them for their crops. One farmer told me, “They say that it is not 
compulsory to accept, but at the end of the day you have to accept 
some payments in kind.” 
The head of the Corporation justifies its payment policy stating 
that: “Instead of their sugar beet money, we give them consumer 
goods…and then reduce them from their crop money. We purchase 
them cheap because we buy in bulk and then we exchange them 
cheaply with sugar beet. That is why they all have televisions. They 
couldn’t purchase all these goods otherwise with their own income. 
That would be impossible. They are happy and we are happy be­
cause we need to save money.” 
The reality of contract farming is that farmers and the Corpora­
tion have an adversarial relationship based on mutual mistrust. 
Farmers in Igdir are dissatisfied with the Sugar Corporation, com­
plaining that its policy is geared to expanding production, but not to 
helping them. The Corporation complains that farmers refuse to 
accept their advice or appreciate the conditions under which the 
Corporation operates. This tension, centered on the constraints and 
limitations of contractual conditions, is manifested in approaches to 
land management. The dynamics between commercialization based 
on contract farming, social relations, and environmental problems 
become apparent at the local level. 
AK VILLAGE 
Ak is a village with household patterns, land distribution, and 
cropping patterns typical of Igdir province (see Table 4). To reduce 
costs, the Sugar Corporation concentrates sugar beet growing in 
designated areas in the village. The Sugar Corporation has selected 
the most fertile areas of the village for sugar beet growing on the 
basis of rotation. Land is fragmented in the village, and the major 
landowners who possess parcels of land in various locations are 
more likely to secure contracts to cultivate sugar beet every year. 
Table 5 shows the partitioning of land in parcels as a function of 
land holdings in Ak village. 
Households may cultivate sugar beet once every three years, but 
only if their land is in the selected area. The larger farmers are thus 
in an advantageous position to gain contracts and earn the high 
returns that sugar beet cultivation generates. 
The contract requires the formation of a group of between five 
and 30 farmers able to guarantee repayment of benefits received to 
protect the Corporation against any loss. Article Eight of the Growth 
of Sugar Beet Contract makes clear the joint responsibility of the 
group. Individual contracts are possible, but generally, only select 
The reality of contract farming is that 
farmers and the Corporation have an 
adversarial relationship based on 
mutual mistrust. Farmers in Igdir are 
dissatisfied with the Sugar Corporation, 
complaining that its policy is geared to 
expanding production, but not to 
helping them. The Corporation 
complains that farmers refuse to accept 
their advice or appreciate the conditions 
under which the Corporation operates. 
This tension, centered on the con­
straints and limitations of contractual 
conditions, is manifested in approaches 
to land management. 
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Table 5 Land Fragmentation in the Village, 1995. 
Cultivated No. of No. of No. of Avg. No. Avg. No. 
Area (ha) Households Land Parcels Sites of parcels of Sites 
0-1 28 34 28 1.2 1 
1.1-5 41 125 79 3.1 1.9 
5.1-10 24 189 93 7.9 3.9 
10.1+ 11 169 58 15 5.4 
TOTAL 104 517 258 5.5 2.5 
Source: author’s field data, 1995, 1996 
wealthy farmers maintain individual contracts and in Ak village all 
belong to a group. The groups have direct contact with the Sugar 
Corporation through a local manager who supervises the implemen­
tation of the contract, the distribution of inputs, cash and other 
supports to the farmers in order to insure proper growth and the 
production of quality beet. Table 6 shows the distribution of cash 
and subsidies by the Corporation to the contracted farmers by 
groups (1982 and 1995). 
Farmers receive cultivation income—that is, payment for the 
crop—and they are advanced wage money in two stages with which 
they are to employ wage labor during hoeing periods (Table 6: col­
umn 1). Farmers also receive fertilizers and seeds from the Sugar 
Corporation. The Corporation currently provides more and better 
quality seed varieties than it did previously—2500 to 3000 kg/ha 
seeds in 1995 as compared with 1500 kg/ha seeds provided 15 years 
ago. Yields have improved substantially, from 25 tons/ha in 1972 to 35 
in 1982 to 54 in 1995, well above the Turkish national average of 40 
tons/ha. This increase in yield is attributable to higher fertilizer inputs. 
Yield is one benchmark for land productivity: degraded land can 
be identified by lower yield characteristics. At the same time, land 
sustaining high yield may nonetheless be degraded, especially if 
increasing fertilizer inputs are required to sustain steady yield. In 
this case study, yield declines are not detected, but it is evident from 
fertilizer use patterns that soil degradation is occurring. 
INPUTS AND LAND QUALITY 
The intensification of agriculture in Ak relies on the greater use 
of external inputs to achieve good yields. The Sugar Corporation 
distributes two types of commercial fertilizers: “nitrogen-based” 
fertilizers (Azotlu Gubreler) consisting of (NH
4
)
2
SO
4
 (ammonium 
The Sugar Corporation attempts to 
monitor inputs and yields of sugar beet, 
but the farmers often deliberately ignore 
the Corporation’s advice in order to 
secure increases in their beet weight, the 
basis on which they are compensated. 
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Table 6  Distribution of cash and advances by the Corporation to the farmers of Ak Village, 1982 and 1995. 
Group No. Area Output Cultivation Wages for Fertilizers Yield 
# of Members (ha) (tons) income hoeing (x 100 kg) (tons/ha) 
(x 1000 TL*) (x 1000 TL) 
1982 
130 39 1370 59000 1220 238 35 43 
2 30 48 1700 65300 1440 276 35 
3 30 42 1360 58700 1240 261 33 
4 30 52 1690 73500 1380 334 32 
5 8 6 250 5510 150 23 39 
’82 TOTAL 128 187 6370 262000 5430 1132 34 
1995 
1 30 43 2170 21500 720 295 50 
2 30 45 2560 22700 740 334 57 
3 30 40 2230 20600 670 277 56 
4 30 40 2120 20400 660 289 53 
5 30 38 2100 20300 640 363 55 
’95 TOTAL 150 207 11180 105500 3430 1556 54 
Source: Local Sugar Corporation Office 1983 and 1996. *In 1983, US$1=TL186; in 1996, US$1=TL42000 (source: IMF International Financial 
Statistics, April 1995). 
sulfate, 20-21% N), NH
4
NO
3
 (ammonium nitrate, 33% N), 
NH
4
NO
3
-CaCO
3
(ammonium nitrate limestone, 26% N) and 
(NH
2
)
2
CO (urea, 46% N); and “composed” fertilizers (Kompoze 
Gubeler), 8-24-8 NPK (Sugar Corporation 1996). 
According to Corporation field technicians, Ak soils have be­
come acidic because of the incorrect application of fertilizers. The 
distribution and use of fertilizer is often an issue of contention 
between the Corporation and the farmers. The Sugar Corporation 
attempts to monitor inputs and yields of sugar beet, but the farmers 
often deliberately ignore the Corporation’s advice in order to secure 
increases in their beet weight, the basis on which they are compen­
sated. In 1994 the Corporation gave the farmers 500 kg/ha of com­
posed fertilizer and 150 kg/ha of nitrogenous fertilizer. The majority of 
farmers believe these amounts to be inadequate since they have only 
managed to produce yields of 25 tons/ha. If a combined total of 2000 
kg/ha were applied, they argue that yields could surpass 45 tons/ha. 
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The Corporation’s distribution of fertilizers varies from farmer 
to farmer. Poorer farmers generally receive more generous fertilizer 
applications than their wealthier counterparts, since the Corpora­
tion is aware that some wealthier farmers who complain that the 
Corporation does not give them adequate fertilizer will buy addi­
tional supply from other sources. For this reason they deliberately 
offer rich farmers less fertilizer out of the knowledge that these 
farmers have the financial resources to purchase extra on their own. 
However, poorer farmers tend to sell their fertilizers to the wealthier 
farmers because they need the immediate cash and the Sugar Corpo­
ration is late in providing crop payments. To compensate, they often 
apply high levels of the nitrogenous fertilizer to increase tonnage, 
guided by desire for the greatest yield in any one agricultural cycle, 
rather than by the desire to maintain soil quality over the longer term. 
The application of nitrogenous fertilizer alone (without com­
posed fertilizer) results in growth of the sugar beet root (that is, 
increased tonnage) at the expense of sugar content. Low sugar con­
tent becomes apparent in the factories and raises the costs of pro­
duction. Since this affects its accounts, the Sugar Corporation 
attempts to strictly monitor fertilizer application. The Corporation 
manager complained that “the farmers do not listen to us when we 
tell them to apply fertilizers in the following periods; for instance in 
the case of phosphorous we tell them to apply 10 kg during cultiva­
tion, 10 kg in the first hoeing, and 15 kg in the first irrigation, but 
the farmers apply fertilizers all in one go in March.” 
Some farmers complain about delays in harvesting the sugar crops 
brought about by the Corporation’s timetable. They argue that they are 
given little time to prepare land for the next sowing and end up having 
to plow wheat straight after sugar beet is harvested. They are also con­
cerned about residual fertilizers. The Corporation tests soil under con­
tract to analyze the amount of fertilizer required during the cultivation 
process, but once the sugar beet is harvested the soil is not re-tested so 
that farmers can judge the next application of fertilizer for the rotation 
crop to follow. The farmers argue that the Corporation shows no con­
cern for resource quality and production beyond the current crop cycle. 
Another farmer admitted: “If we leave our land fallow, produc­
tivity will increase. However, we no longer leave our land fallow 
because we cannot afford not to cultivate. In the old days we used 
to, but not nowadays. We need to keep applying more and more 
fertilizer because when we use the same amount of fertilizers as 
before we do not get the same yield. We have to apply more fertiliz­
ers in order to guarantee productivity even though we know that 
this has damaged our land.” 
Another farmer admitted: “If we leave 
our land fallow, productivity will 
increase. However, we no longer leave 
our land fallow because we cannot 
afford not to cultivate. In the old days 
we used to, but not nowadays. We need 
to keep applying more and more 
fertilizer because when we use the 
same amount of fertilizers as before we 
do not get the same yield. We have to 
apply more fertilizers in order to 
guarantee productivity even though we 
know that this has damaged our land.” 
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Generally, Ak farmers rely on chemical fertilizers rather than 
organic nutrient inputs such as manure. One interviewed farmer 
combines manure with fertilizer he receives from the Corporation 
and enjoys high yields, but he is in the minority. Before sugar beet 
was cultivated in the village, manure was used for organic fertilizer 
and to make tezek, used for fuel or to build houses. In recent years 
many farmers, in particular wealthier farmers, have decided not to 
keep livestock. Poorer households have continued to keep animals, 
but tend to use manure exclusively to make tezek for their own use 
and for sale to richer farmers. Rather than using manure on their 
own land for the benefit of their land, poorer farmers opt for imme­
diate cash. 
As well as impacting land quality, fertilizer application also 
-constitutes a threat to surface and drinking water through NO
3 
(nitrate) pollution. There are also human consumption threats: a 
poor household in the village remarked that cucumbers, watermel­
ons, and other produce have acquired a strange taste from fertilizer 
residues since the application of fertilizers for sugar beet began. 
IRRIGATION AND SALINIZATION 
Waterlogging and salinization have been identified in several areas 
of the village. The long-term impacts of salinization are deteriorating 
land quality and lower yield. In recognition of the potential extent of 
the salinization problem, a land rehabilitation and on-farm irrigation 
improvement project was funded by a substantial loan from the 
World Bank, in collaboration with DSA.3 The project, partially com­
pleted in 1996, aimed at mitigating the adverse affects of waterlogging, 
salinity, siltation and soil-plant-water reactions under irrigation. Both 
salinity and sodicity have affected parts of the area. 
Ak and other villages in Igdir are irrigated by the Aras river via a 
joint Turko-Soviet dam project completed in 1963. The State Hy­
draulic Works (DSI) controls and coordinates water distribution. In 
the case of Ak, traditional methods of on-farm irrigation have been 
used in the village because of irregular terrain which makes even 
water distribution difficult. On-farm irrigation involves dividing 
fields into 4-6 strips, separated from each other by a ridge. Water is 
released from the top of the field and each strip is irrigated sepa­
rately under strict control to ensure sufficient infiltration. The ridges 
are constantly maintained by a farmworker running up and down 
the field adding more soil with a spade to prevent seepage into ad­
joining strips of land. Control of water application is difficult and 
waterlogging and salinization have resulted. 
Some farmers, especially the poorer ones, deliberately apply 
more water than is necessary for sugar beets. There is no incentive 
3  Although the project was due to be com­
pleted in 1997 it is expected the DSA will 
continue implementation. Cost was estima­
ted at $100 million, of which a third is 
financed by the World Bank and the 
remainder by the Turkish government. 
The irrigated area addressed by the project 
reached 63,570 ha in 1996. 
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for efficiency since water charges are based on acreage and crop-type 
rather than on volume. They also underestimate the area of their 
land to the DSA so that they may pay lower water charges. One 
farmer explained the motivation: “Those who irrigate the field many 
times are not concerned with their land but with the size of the root 
of the crop. The bigger the root, the heavier it is and therefore the 
more it is worth. It’s another way of earning more money. The more 
water and fertilizer you use the heavier the root will be. Because we 
apply too much water and too much fertilizer our land has de­
graded. We are aware of the consequences.” 
Waterlogging and salinity can be prevented, both by reducing the 
application of water in excess of crop needs and by augmenting drain­
age, each of which has been an objective of the World Bank project. 
CONCLUSION 
In an examination of the dynamics of contract farming in sugar 
beet cultivation, this paper illustrates the links between social rela­
tions and environment. It demonstrates how farming contracts 
between a farmer and a state corporation are concerned with pro­
duction methods and levels, detailing land management measures 
which ensure crop growth and quality. However, the majority of 
contracts are incomplete in that they do not specify every eventual­
ity. The sugar beet grower is responsible for all costs of production 
and it is the farmer, not the Corporation, who bears risks related to 
labor and resource quality. Landesque capital and other environ­
mental costs are externalized from production contracts, allowing 
the Corporation to avoid any long-term responsibility for resources 
beyond the immediate short-term agricultural cycle. 
It is the peculiar construction of the “independence” of farmers’ 
contracts that is of value to large corporations, but this also leads to 
complex and tense social relations at the local level. It seems clear 
that the Corporation strives to gain high yields from farmers in 
return for little commitment. Farmers are aware of this and in turn 
attempt to beat the Corporation to gain as much income as possible 
through land management practices which in the long-run cause 
environmental problems on their own land. 
Analysis of environmental problems must go further than the 
quantitative natural scientific analysis, since quantifying resource 
change alone will not provide the whole picture. Qualitative data 
and longitudinal studies at the local level will enable us to better 
understand the complexity of environmental issues. As this paper 
demonstrates, declines in resource quality and availability are closely 
linked to the production process and accompanying social relations. 
To separate the two would result in superficial dualism. 
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ABSTRACT 
Desert Locusts, Schistocerca gregaria (Forskal), are the most dangerous of locust species. Under favorable environmental 
conditions, a few solitary individuals can dramatically multiply, form large swarms able to migrate great distances, and 
threaten agriculture over a large part of Africa, the Middle East1 and Southwest Asia. There have been six plagues of 
Desert Locusts this century, one of which lasted almost 13 years. Initial Desert Locust control efforts were largely 
curative; the trend in the twentieth century has been toward preventing such plagues from occurring. Affected countries 
have assumed ever more responsibility for monitoring locust breeding areas and treating infestations before they 
increase in size and number. Five of the 18 countries which currently undertake comprensive surveys for, and control 
efforts against locusts, are in the Middle East. Most recently, Saudi Arabia completed large scale control operations to 
prevent a sudden outbreak of locusts from becoming a plague. Over the years, our knowledge of the Desert Locust has 
evolved along with our ability to manage locust plagues. The challenge in the future lies in the implementation of control 
strategies that insure food security with minimal environmental consequences. 
INTRODUCTION 
Locusts are part of a large group of insects commonly called 
grasshoppers belonging to the family Acrididae. The Desert Locust, 
Schistocerca gregaria (Forskal), is one of about a dozen species of For the purposes of this paper, the Middle1 
short-horned grasshoppers (Acridoidea) that are known to change	 East is defined as those countries that 
extend from Egypt to Turkey eastwards totheir behavior and physiology in response to changes in population 
Iran, including the entire Arabian Peninsula. 
density by forming swarms of adults or bands of wingless nymphs 
called hoppers. Swarms may contain billions of individuals behaving 
in unison; they can migrate over hundreds or even thousands of 
kilometers. Bands can contain a similar number of non-flying 
nymphs which also act as a cohesive unit. True grasshoppers form 
neither bands nor proper swarms. However, the distinction between 
locusts and grasshoppers is not entirely clear-cut. There are some 
species, such as Oedaleus senegalensis, which occasionally form small 
loose swarms. Locusts such as the Tree Locust (Anacridium sp.) 
rarely form bands. Some locust species, such as the Australian 
Plague Locust (Chortoicetes terminifera), do not change shape and 
color in response to changes in density. 
DESERT LOCUST LIFE CYCLE 
The Desert Locust poses the greatest threat of all locusts to hu­
mans because hopper bands and adult swarms can rapidly arise and 
migrate, potentially threatening food security in some 60 countries 
in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. A desert locust lives three to five 
months although this is extremely variable and depends on weather 
and ecological conditions. The life cycle comprises three stages: egg, 
hopper, and adult (Figure 1). 
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immature adult 
Figure 1 The life cycle of the Desert Locust. 
Females lay egg pods containing 80 to 158 eggs in bare ground 
and often, but not exclusively, in moist sandy soil. They usually lay 
about three times. The eggs hatch in about two weeks although this 
can vary from 10 to 65 days (Ashall and Ellis 1962; Roffey and 
Popov 1968). The emerging hoppers develop in five to six stages 
over a period of about 30-40 days, depending on temperature. At 
the final molt, the young adult (or fledgling) emerges. Under opti­
mal conditions (lush vegetation, maximum day temperatures of 
30°C or more, and sufficient rain for vegetation growth), adults 
generally mature in about three weeks, although this process can 
take as along as eight weeks. If conditions are cool or dry, and there­
fore unfavorable for final maturation, immature adults can survive 
for six months or more. 
The great majority of the eggs that are laid survive and hatch. On 
the other hand, very few of the hoppers which emerge from the egg 
survive to fledge. Most die during the first instar stage due to inad­
equate water reserves, cannibalism and predation by ants. Cannibal­
ism, parasitism, and predation continue to take a toll during the rest 
of the life cycle. Nevertheless, between 5 and 10 viable adults result 
from a single female (Greathead 1966; Roffey and Popov 1968). 
PHASE CHANGE 
A Desert Locust has different states called phases: solitarious, 
when individuals are at low population densities; gregarious, when 
they are at high densities; and a transition from the solitarious phase 
to the gregarious and vice-versa known as transiens. 
The behavioral change depends on micro-scale environmental 
factors such as the spatial distributions of food plants, and macro-
scale factors such as convergent wind fields that force locusts to 
become concentrated in relatively small areas. This change can 
rapidly take place, often within a few hours of crowding (Roessingh 
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and Simpson 1994). The capacity to behave gregariously is passed 
from parents to their offspring and increases over several genera­
tions of crowding (Islam et al. 1994ab). The color of the locust also 
changes from brown in solitary adults to pink and yellow in imma­
ture and mature gregarious adults, respectively. Morphological 
changes (i.e. in color and shape) occur after the change in locust 
behavior. The full gregarious color takes one crowded generation to 
develop and shape takes two or more. The pronounced differences 
between gregarious and solitarious adults (their ambi-morphism if 
you will) meant that until 1921, scientists believed that gregarious 
and solitarious locusts were actually two different species. 
MIGRATION 
Temperature and wind influence the migration of both solitary 
adults and swarms. Solitary adults fly for only a few hours at night. 
Swarms generally take off several hours after sunrise in warm 
weather and fly throughout the day until just before or just after 
sunset. On especially hot days, swarms may settle around midday 
and take off again in the afternoon. Temperature limits the height of 
a flight. Swarms are thought to fly between 1,500 and 1,800 meters 
above the surface of the ground (Rainey 1963; Schaefer 1976). All 
major swarms travel downwind. In sunny warm weather, swarms 
tend to fly about 10 hours, but they have the ability to fly continu­
ously for 13-20 hours. A swarm is displaced at some fraction of the 
wind speed because many of the adults spend some time on the 
ground. The ground speed of a swarm is usually about 20-50% of 
the wind speed. The average daily rate of net displacement of 
swarms varies from 5 km in cool weather to 200 km in warm 
weather with a consistent wind direction. 
Desert Locust adults and swarms can migrate great distances in a 
short amount of time. They can stay in the air for long periods, for 
example, they regularly cross the Red Sea, a distance of more than 
300 km, and sometimes move across the Sahara from Sudan to 
Mauritania to Morocco, a distance of nearly 5,000 km (Figure 2). 
(1988) 
(1954) 
6,000 km 5,000 km 
300 km 
2,500 km 
Figure 2 Some examples of long distance Desert Locust migration. 
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There have been some exceptionally impressive swarm migra­
tions, for example from Northwest Africa to the British Isles in 1954. 
Over ten days in October, 1988, in the most spectacular migration in 
recent history, Desert Locusts crossed the Atlantic Ocean from West 
Africa to the Caribbean, a distance of about 6,000 km. 
DESERT LOCUST RECESSIONS AND PLAGUES 
In most years, Desert Locusts are usually restricted to the semi­
arid and arid deserts of Africa, the Middle East and Southwest Asia 
that receive less than 200 mm of rain annually. This is an area of 
nearly 16 million km2 covering 30 countries (Figure 3). 
There have been some exceptionally 
impressive swarm migrations, for 
example from Northwest Africa to the 
British Isles in 1954. Over ten days in 
October 1988, in the most spectacular 
migration in recent history, Desert 
Locusts crossed the Atlantic Ocean 
from West Africa to the Caribbean, 
a distance of about 6,000 km. 
Figure 3	 The Desert Locust recession area (dotted outline) in relation to the size of the 
continental United States. 
Within this area, low densities of solitarious locusts are perma­
nently present and breeding on a small scale in favorable habitats. 
The numbers are so low that hopper bands and swarms rarely form, 
and the threat to crops or food security of the host country is insig­
nificant. Scientists have labeled these relatively quiet periods as 
recessions. In the past, recessions have lasted from less than a year to 
seven years. 
When a favorable combination of conditions occurs, locust 
numbers and densities markedly increase, which leads to 
gregarization. This occurs in desert areas after rain falls in sufficient 
amounts and duration to allow locusts to concentrate and multiply 
which, unless checked, can lead to the formation of hopper bands 
and swarms. This is commonly referred to as an outbreak. After two 
or more successive seasons of solitarious-to-gregarious breeding 
occur in the same or neighboring regions, a dramatic increase in 
locust numbers and simultaneous outbreaks may follow; this is 
commonly referred to as an upsurge. During this period, both the 
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size of the total gregarious population and the size of the bands and 
swarms that make up that population increase and can lead to a plague. 
Outbreaks occur often but they do not necessarily lead to upsurges. 
Similarly, most upsurges die out before leading to a major plague. 
During plagues, Desert Locusts may spread over an enormous 
area of some 30 million km2, extending over all or part of 60 coun­
tries, which encompass more than 20% of the total land surface of 
the world. The Desert Locust thereby threatens the livelihood of a 
tenth of the world’s population. There have been nine major plagues 
between 1860 and 1997. Plagues occurred in 75% of the years be­
tween 1860 and 1963, but in only 12% of the years since then. They 
have varied in length from one to 22 years. The last plague occurred 
in 1987-89. 
PLAGUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
During this century, Desert Locust plagues have occurred in the 
Middle East on seven different occasions: 1901–1908, 1912–1917, 
1926–1933, 1941–47, 1949–1962, 1968 and 1987–89 (Waloff 1976) 
(Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 Plagues and recessions of the Desert Locust in the Middle East and elsewhere, 1860-1997. 
These plagues lasted between one and 14 years; they were sepa­
rated from each other by one to 19 years of calm (recession) in 
between. After the 1941-47 plague, there was a brief recession the 
following year, broken by an upsurge that led to a major plague that 
lasted 13 years, the longest continuous plague in the Desert Locust 
area this century (Waloff 1966). This plague was believed to have 
started in the Empty Quarter of Saudi Arabia following unusually 
high rainfall (Lean 1965). During 1949, it spread into the Arabian 
Peninsula and Iran as well as further east and west. Egypt reported 
swarms from 1950 onwards, Iraq, Israel, and Jordan in 1951, and 
Syria in 1953. By 1962, the plague was declining in the Middle East 
and a long recession period persisted from 1963 to 1985, occasion­
  
 
    
 
ally interrupted by a small outbreak or upsurge and one short-lived 
plague (1968) until the next major plague of 1987-89. There was an 
upsurge in 1993-96 which did not lead to a plague. Most recently, 
there was an outbreak in Saudi Arabia in 1997 which was controlled. 
Since 1860, swarms have been reported more frequently in 
southwestern Arabia than in other parts of the Middle East. There 
were a total of 72 years in which at least one swarm was sighted in 
this area (Table 1). 
Table 1 Swarms in the Middle East between 1860 and 1997. 
No. yrsNo. yrs % yrs 
w/swarms % plague yrs 
w/swarms w/swarms during w/swarms1860-1997 1860-1997 plagues 
The Desert Locust threatens the S. Arabian peninsula 72 52.2 41 56.9(south of 20N)	 livelihood of a tenth of the world’s 
population.N. Arabian peninsula 69 50.0 39 56.5(north of 20N) 
Arabia (east of 55E) 54 39.1 33 61.1 
Iran (south of 30N) 51 37.0 34 66.7 
Egypt & Sinai 44 31.9 36 81.8 
Israel & Jordan 39 28.3 30 76.9 
Iran, other areas 31 22.5 28 90.3 
Iraq 27 19.6 25 92.6 
Syria & Lebanon 25 18.1 19 76.0 
Turkey 13 9.4 13 100 
Swarms occurred more often in territories adjacent to southwest­
ern Arabia and in southern Iran than in northern areas of the Middle 
East. In these northern regions, swarm reports tended to coincide 
with plague periods. (These frequencies do not indicate the number of 
swarms, only whether any swarms occurred in a given year.) 
During the winter and spring of most years, relatively few 
solitarious locusts are present along the coastal plains of both sides 
of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Occasionally, similar numbers 
of locusts are present on the coast and in the interior areas of north­
ern Oman as well as in southeastern Iran. Only after locusts in these 
places substantially increase in numbers under unusually favorable 
conditions and form swarms do they threaten other countries in the 
Middle East. This is rare, however; Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon and Syria 
last reported swarms in 1962. Swarms may also invade the Middle 
East from Southwest Asia or Africa, but such swarms mostly affect 
the Arabian Peninsula. 
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DESERT LOCUST MONITORING IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
HISTORICAL SURVEYS 
Desert Locust monitoring and control was first the responsibility 
of farmers as they struggled to defend their crops. During the twen­
tieth century, governments have accepted the responsibility for 
organizing country surveys and control campaigns (Lean 1965). 
Although locust experts discussed the establishment of an interna­
tional anti-locust organization at a number of conferences (includ­
ing Rome 1931; Paris 1932; London 1934; Cairo 1936; Brussels 
1938), early international cooperation remained confined to re­
search activities rather than operational monitoring and control 
(Lean 1965). During World War II, the British established the well 
organized Middle East Anti-Locust Unit (MEALU), which com­
menced operations in Saudi Arabia in 1943, and in Yemen, Kuwait 
and Oman shortly thereafter. MEALU hired the explorer Wilfred 
Thesiger after WWII to undertake Desert Locust surveys in the 
Arabian Peninsula (Thesiger 1959). Experts from Egypt and India 
and workers from Sudan and Palestine assisted MEALU. In Egypt, a 
similar unit existed and operated as well in northwestern Saudi 
Arabia. In Iran, MEALU worked with Iranian, Russian, Indian and, 
later, American specialists (Lean 1947). MEALU was disbanded in 
1947 and replaced by the East African Desert Locust Survey (DLS) 
in 1948. 
DLS was responsible for monitoring known outbreak areas and 
making regular surveys of solitarious locust populations in Ethiopia, 
Iran, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Its headquarters was in 
Nairobi with field bases in Asmara, Hargeisa, Jeddah and Aden 
(Uvarov 1949). 
In the 1950s, there was a growing interest in international coop­
eration in monitoring locust populations. This led to United Na­
tions Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) coordination of 
international locust control efforts in the Arabian Peninsula begin­
ning in 1956, at which point the British units disbanded (Lean 
1965). In that same year, DLS merged into the DLCO-EA (Desert 
Locust Control Organization for Eastern Africa) which was based in 
Addis Ababa. In 1958, FAO and other UN agencies began ecological 
surveys in desert regions and marginal lands where Desert Locust 
outbreaks most often occur. During the ten year project, they sur­
veyed more than 110,000 km2, half of which were in Egypt, Iran, 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Equipment was provided to affected coun­
tries to allow regular monitoring and forecasting. International 
experts and field workers assisted in those countries where areas 
requiring regular surveys were too large for the national government. 
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In 1965, three long distance surveys were undertaken in Algeria, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran as part of the FAO ecological surveys. These 
surveys are thought to be the precursor to the system of national and 
international surveying and monitoring which now operates in 
locust affected countries. 
Monitoring and control efforts in the field before and after WW II 
were supplemented by the efforts of the Anti-Locust Research Cen­
ter in London (UK) which established a centralized system of re­
porting, mapping, and data analysis on the changing distribution of 
the Desert Locust in 1929. This organization provided monthly 
bulletins and forecasts to affected countries. Its work continued 
under the International Desert Locust Information Service (IDLIS) 
at the center from 1958 onwards, funded by the UK and FAO 
(Uvarov 1958). In 1979, FAO assumed this responsibility as part of 
its mandate and as a result IDLIS was replaced by the Desert Locust 
Information Service (DLIS) at FAO Headquarters in Rome. The DLIS 
is now part of the Locust and Other Migratory Pests Group at FAO. 
CURRENT SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
Over the years, strategies of Desert Locust control have evolved 
from curative efforts to an emphasis on prevention, that is, finding 
and treating infestations before they form large hopper bands and 
swarms. This requires regular monitoring of locust breeding areas and 
the ability to quickly mount small scale control operations in many of 
the 60 countries affected by the Desert Locust. Currently, about 18 
countries in Africa, the Middle East and southwest Asia maintain a 
regular survey program for monitoring the Desert Locust (Cressman 
1996). These are countries that are frequently infested and have there­
fore established specialized anti-locust units responsible for survey 
and control. These units are usually part of the Ministries of Agricul­
ture under the supervision of the Plant Protection Departments. Some 
units are autonomous while others are incorporated into the national 
plant protection or agricultural extension programs. 
Of the sixteen Middle Eastern countries considered in this paper, 
five have well established National Locust Units with nearly regular 
monitoring programs (Egypt, Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Yemen), 
four have smaller and less active programs as part of the general Plant 
Protection Department (Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, UAE), and seven do 
not have specialized units nor do they maintain programs (Bahrain, 
Israel, Lebanon, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Syria, Turkey). 
There are two basic types of surveys. Assessment surveys are 
conducted in areas that have a history of locust breeding or pres­
ence, or where rain has been recently reported or is thought to have 
occurred, or where reports of locusts have been received from local 
Over the years, strategies of Desert 
Locust control have evolved from 
curative efforts to an emphasis on 
prevention, that is, finding and treating 
infestations before they form large 
hopper bands and swarms. This requires 
regular monitoring of locust breeding 
areas and the ability to quickly mount 
small scale control operations in many 
of the 60 countries affected by the 
Desert Locust. 
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inhabitants, scouts, or agriculture extension agents. The purpose of 
an assessment survey is to monitor locust populations and assess the 
suitability of the habitat for breeding, and to determine whether 
significant populations are present that may require control. Search 
surveys are conducted in areas known to contain significant popula­
tions in order to estimate the total infested areas, and to delimit the 
areas that require control. Results from searching permit decisions 
on if, when, and how control should be conducted. 
Assessment surveys are generally the first type of survey to be 
undertaken in order to determine if locusts are present in an area or 
to identify areas of green vegetation where locusts are likely to 
gather. Estimates of densities made at each survey stop can be used 
to identify those areas where significant numbers of locusts (i.e. 
gregarious locusts, groups, or high numbers of solitary locusts) may 
be present. Once these areas are identified, a search survey in the 
identified areas determines the geographical extent and size of the 
infestations. From this information, the scale of risk and level of 
required control can be estimated. Information from both types 
of survey provides a more complete picture of the overall locust 
situation (Figure 5). 
Assessment 
Survey 
Significant populations 
foundno 
yes 
Search 
survey 
Assessment 
survey Control 
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solitary 
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poor 
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Figure 5 Schematic of Desert Locust monitoring and related decision-making. 
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Assessment surveys are regularly carried out in those countries 
with National Locust Units. Specialized staff from these units con­
duct ground surveys in four-wheel drive vehicles in desert areas. 
Survey itineraries usually include those areas where locusts or green 
vegetation were previously seen, areas that are known to be favorite 
locust habitats and areas in which there is no information. Surveys 
concentrate primarily on areas of natural vegetation, often in re­
mote, hard to access areas, rather than crop lands. Survey officers 
also gather information about locust sightings, green vegetation 
blossoming, and recent rainfall from agricultural extension agents, 
villagers, truck drivers, travelers, and nomads. 
At each survey stop, survey officers will walk several hundred 
meters, depending on the extent of the vegetation, and count the 
number of adult locusts that they disturb. Officers will also stop and 
closely inspect the ground or small bushes for hoppers. The results 
including the date, location, and notes on the vegetation and soil 
moisture are written on a standardized reporting form. More and 
more survey officers are using a hand-held geographic positioning 
system (GPS) to determine the latitude/longitude coordinates of 
their position. Surveys are generally conducted early in the morning 
and late in the afternoon when locusts are most active. 
Based on the results of a survey, the need for further assessment 
or search surveys can be determined. During search surveys, control 
targets may be identified which allow decisions to be made on the 
most suitable control method. 
Aerial surveys are sometimes undertaken at the beginning of the 
rainy season to identify areas of green vegetation for later inspection 
by ground teams. Another aerial survey may be conducted midway 
through the season and perhaps a final one at the end to provide 
updated information on the habitat. Most affected countries do not 
have the resources to carry out such surveys, with the exception of 
Pakistan which has its own fleet of aircraft. The DLCO-EA uses its 
aircraft to provide survey services to its member countries. 
Remote sensing imagery can assist in the detection of green 
vegetation and thereby help to guide ground survey teams. Since the 
late 1980s, imagery has been used in parts of West Africa and more 
recently (1997), in the Red Sea area. The imagery is captured and 
processed within the region of interest, in this case, Niamey (Niger) 
for West Africa and Asmara (Eritrea) for the Red Sea area. Remote 
sensing imagery currently has several limitations that must be over­
come before it can be used on a regular and operational basis. The 
primary limitation is the need for ground validation which is a time 
consuming and expensive exercise that must be carried out in 
several areas within a region since it is not possible to extrapolate 
Remote sensing imagery currently has 
several limitations that must be over­
come before it can be used on a regular 
and operational basis. The primary 
limitation is the need for ground 
validation which is a time consuming and 
expensive exercise that must be carried 
out in several areas within a region since 
it is not possible to extrapolate results 
from one area to another. 
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results from one area to another. Such validation is required to 
calibrate imagery and reduce the difficulty in interpretation. 
Furthermore, a procedure must be developed to deliver processed 
and calibrated imagery to users in locust-affected countries in a 
timely manner. Several research institutes and FAO are currently 
investigating these issues. 
ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING 
Ground and aerial survey teams transmit their findings to the 
National Plant Protection Headquarters for collation and analysis as 
well as to FAO Headquarters where analysis and forecasting at the 
international level is performed. In the case of a highly mobile pest 
such as the Desert Locust, a centralized system offers several advan­
tages over national or regional systems in terms of a global view of 
the locust, habitat and weather situation, access to data not easily 
available at other levels, objective interpretation of data, and the 
ability to provide affected countries with information that they 
themselves would not readily produce or otherwise obtain 
(Cressman 1997a). 
Until recently, data analysis was undertaken manually by plot­
ting survey results, rainfall reports, and habitat conditions on a 
series of maps of differing scales. These data were compared to 
historical data including locust frequencies and long-term average 
rainfall. In 1996, FAO introduced a geographic information system 
(GIS), SWARMS (Schistocerca Warning Management System). The 
system allows for storage of data in several databases, display of 
current data on maps consisting of various thematic overlays, and 
comparison to historical data (Cressman 1997a). In this way, the 
forecaster can better visualize the spatial and temporal relationships 
between the various data types and query the data in order to gain a 
good understanding of the current situation and how it may develop. 
At present, a smaller national GIS has been developed and is 
being evaluated for operational use in one of the affected countries 
(Cherlet, personal communication). The purpose of the system is to 
allow a National Locust Unit to better manage and analyze data 
collected in its country. There are strong links between the national 
GIS and SWARMS to allow sharing of data. In this way, it is antici­
pated that Desert Locust monitoring will become more of a coop­
erative effort and partnerships will develop among countries and 
with FAO in terms of data collection, transmission and analysis. 
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THE LOCUST OUTBREAK IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, 
1996-1997 
OVERVIEW 
An outbreak of Desert Locust during the 1996-97 winter was a 
classic example of a situation that could have led to an upsurge or a 
plague. Successive rainfalls made conditions extremely favorable for 
breeding along 900 km of the Red Sea coastal plain in Saudi Arabia 
(Figure 6). 
Figure 6	 Overview of the origins and development of a Desert Locust outbreak in the 
Arabian Peninsula, 1996-97. 
Good conditions persisted for nearly six months which led to a 
dramatic increase in locust numbers, most notably during March 
and April when hoppers and adults changed phase from solitary to 
transiens (Cressman 1997b). Large scale control operations involved 
more than 70 teams and four aircraft and used 340,000 L of pesti­
cide. (Saudi Arabia 1997). This effort prevented significant swarm 
formation and migration as well as any major loss to crops. 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
Solitarious Desert Locust adults were first reported on the Red 
Sea coastal plains of Saudi Arabia in November 1996. These adults 
probably originated from locusts from the Yemeni interior which 
had themselves appeared after a cyclone in June. Some of the 
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Yemeni locusts perished in control operations but others were prob­
ably drawn into the Red Sea Trench on southerly winds associated 
with an unusually strong and persistent depression over the north­
ern Red Sea in mid-November 1996. This depression also resulted in 
light to moderate rainfall over a large portion of the coastal plains 
along both sides of the northern Red Sea from 15-25 November. In 
Saudi Arabia, rains were reported on the coast from Al-Lith to Khulais 
but were estimated to have extended to Al-Wajh in the north. 
The majority of the incoming adults landed on the coastal plains 
of Saudi Arabia and most likely dispersed over a wide area from Al-
Lith in the south to Al-Wajh in the north, making it difficult to find 
them. Small scale breeding first occurred shortly after the rains, 
primarily near Al-Lith and Badr, producing a new generation of 
solitarious adults that appeared from late January onwards. Densi­
ties were still relatively low, mostly from 1-3 per ha with a few loca­
tions reporting up to 100 per ha. 
In mid-January, widespread light to moderate rains fell on the 
coast north of Jeddah to Yenbu. Adults are thought to have concen­
trated in this area during the following weeks, increasing in density 
to nearly 1-2 adults/m2 (10,000-20,000/ha) which was probably 
enough to induce a partial phase change from solitarious to 
transiens. Egg laying occurred shortly after the rains on the coastal 
plains near Khulais and Badr. 
Heavier laying by solitarious adults and groups of transiens 
occurred in late February in Al-Lith, Usfan-Tuwwal, Khulais, 
Rabigh, and during the first half of March in Usfan-Tuwwal, 
Masturah, Badr, Yenbu, and Umm Lajj. Breeding during the latter 
period was supplemented by several low density mature swarms 
reportedly coming from the western shore of the Red Sea on 8-15 
March. The swarms, which also laid eggs upon arrival, were esti­
mated to vary in size from 5-50 km2 with densities of 5-20 adults/m2. 
Other laying adult densities were estimated to be about 2-5/m2. 
Consequently, locust numbers rapidly increased during this period. 
High density hatching commenced about mid-March and in­
creased over the next few weeks in all areas. This led to large num­
bers of hoppers and, in some cases, grouping and small band 
formation during April. By the end of April, hoppers were fledging 
and new adults started to appear. 
Another period of laying occurred in early April that coincided 
with more rainfall. The breeding was primarily concentrated on the 
northern coast near Yenbu, Umm Lajj and Al-Wajh as well as fur­
ther south near Khulais. It consisted of late maturing adults from 
the incoming swarms combined with adults produced locally earlier 
in the year. Those in the north were not reported by locals who 
  
 
    
 
collect them for both personal consumption and for sale in local 
markets. Densities of laying adult groups were probably higher in 
northern areas than near Khulais and were estimated to be about 5­
20/m2. Hatching occurred in late April and new adults started to 
appear by late May. Fourth and fifth instar gregarious hopper 
groups were present near Al-Wajh at the end of May in densities of 
up to 50 hoppers per m2 (Cressman 1997b). 
Vegetation rapidly dried on the coastal plains in early May. As a 
result, most of the immature adults and a few small groups and 
swarmlets that had survived the control operations moved off the 
coastal plains and migrated across the Red Sea to Sudan where they 
arrived on 15 May and in Eritrea at the end of the month. By the 
end of the month, hopper groups and only low numbers of adults 
remained on the Red Sea coastal plains of Saudi Arabia. Most of 
these became concentrated in the few remaining green areas along 
the base of the foothills and some of the adults moved up the valleys 
of the foothills east of Khulais and Al-Wajh. By mid-June, vegetation 
was completely dry and the few remaining adults had left the coastal 
plains. On 21 June, one small swarm was reported in northern 
Yemen which later dispersed. 
CONTROL 
The National Locust Unit (Locust Control Center, Jeddah) of 
Saudi Arabia mobilized its resources, which are significantly greater 
than those of most affected countries. It began ground control op­
erations in mid-February against mature adult groups at Al-Lith, 
Khulais and Rabigh, treating a total of 1,000 ha. During March, the 
Saudis extended operations to all other areas with the assistance of a 
helicopter; they were able to spray more than 25,000 ha of laying 
adults, hopper groups, bands, and fledglings, including incoming 
swarms. During April, two fixed-wing aircraft joined the on-going 
operations and more than 81,000 ha of hopper bands and immature 
adults were treated. In May, an additional fixed-wing aircraft was 
added and 140,000 ha of mostly immature adults and some hopper 
bands were treated. In June, more than 28,000 ha were treated. 
During the entire campaign, more than 70 ground teams and four 
aircraft from the Saudi National Locust Unit applied more than 
340,000 litters of pesticide to approximately 3,500 km2. 
ASSESSMENT 
During the outbreak, average infestation levels (the percent of 
green vegetation in which locusts are present) were about 8% but 
varied from 1-30%. The initial buildup of locust numbers was 
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missed during the first four months (November - March) because 
adults were scattered along the coastal plains and foothills and often 
were not reported by locals. Such a large area is not only extremely 
difficult to monitor effectively but impossible to treat because of the 
wide dispersion and low density of the locusts involved. This prob­
lem was compounded by the fact that large expanses of green veg­
etation encouraged a general increase in locust numbers rather than 
concentrating the infestations at particular points. Hence, good 
control targets in which high numbers of locusts could be treated in 
small compact areas did not exist until the end of the season when 
vegetation began to dry up. This was after several periods of breed­
ing had occurred. 
Nevertheless, the Government of Saudi Arabia was able to mobi­
lize a large amount of resources to undertake a ground and aerial 
campaign that, given the difficult circumstances, significantly re­
duced locust infestation levels and effectively prevented the forma­
tion of large and numerous swarms. As a result, only groups of 
adults and a few small swarms formed and migrated from the 
coastal plains to the west, south and perhaps east. There were no 
reports of significant crop damage. 
DISCUSSION 
The Desert Locust has adapted to one of the harshest environ­
ments on Earth. It has developed a variety of mechanisms to survive 
in conditions of high temperatures, low rainfall, strong winds and 
sparse vegetation. Its ability to migrate long distances gives it access 
to vegetation over a huge area while at the same time decreasing 
threats to the species by natural predators. It quickly capitalizes on 
favorable conditions by rapid maturation and reproduction. As 
conditions become less favorable, it changes its behavior to that of 
an individual organism, which is more likely to survive in situations 
of diminished habitat. 
During the twentieth century, our understanding of the Desert 
Locust has evolved. It was originally thought that the Desert Locust 
was two different species, one solitarious and one gregarious. Dr. 
Boris Uvarov first demonstrated that it was indeed one single species 
with the ability to change its behavior in response to environmental 
changes. Since then, its biology, behavior, and population dynamics 
have been extensively studied in the field and the laboratory. Locusts 
and grasshoppers in general have often been the focus of research 
due to their conveniently large size and their relative ease of captive 
rearing. The remarkable ability of this species to survive during 
times of drought and vegetation scarcity, and also to capitalize in 
more humid times on relatively brief flowerings of vegetation has 
The Desert Locust has adapted to one 
of the harshest environments on Earth. 
It has developed a variety of mecha­
nisms to survive in conditions of high 
temperatures, low rainfall, strong winds 
and sparse vegetation. 
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meant that it poses a particular challenge to the human beings with 
whom it shares a habitat. 
Control techniques have also evolved from simply burying hop­
per bands and collecting adults to more complicated methods of 
chemical treatment. Most of this development occurred during this 
century and coincided with the advent and use of synthetic com­
pounds after WW II. The types of pesticides commonly used in 
locust control have changed from strong organochlorides to safer 
organophosphates as humans have become more aware of the effect 
of pesticides on the environment. For example, the organochloride 
dieldrin was the pesticide of choice from the 1950s onward because 
it persisted for months in the desert. However, such persistence also 
appeared to have detrimental effects on human health and the envi­
ronment and dieldrin was banned in the late 1980s. The concept of 
using a different formulation and applying pesticides at a lower dose 
rate in overlapping swaths was first tried out against locusts. This is 
commonly referred to as ultra-low volume (ULV) spraying and is 
the basis of current locust control. Today, the evolution of control 
agents continues as scientists develop and test alternative products 
such as insect growth regulators and mycopesticides, which are 
more target specific and environmentally friendly. 
Application methods have changed over the years from the 
spreading of arsenic by hand in the late 19th century to manual 
baiting and dusting, to the present day use of hand, vehicle-
mounted, and aerial ULV sprayers. Although the latter methods 
require a higher level of skill and expertise, they are much safer for 
the user. 
Finally, the strategies of managing Desert Locusts have advanced. 
Historically, farmers tried to control locust infestations using any 
available means when their crops were attacked. This rather unsys­
tematic approach, comparable to putting out brush fires as they flare 
up, often led to poor results and did not stop plagues from develop­
ing or spreading. WW II marked a turning point for locust survey 
and control. International cooperation was strengthened, specialized 
field units were established, systematic survey and control opera­
tions were undertaken, and new pesticides were developed and 
became available. Based on these advances as well as knowledge 
gained in the previous 50 years about the Desert Locust and its 
environment, alternative strategies were developed. 
The current strategy used by national and regional locust units 
focuses on the need to keep locust numbers at a sufficiently low level 
to prevent swarm formation and the development of plagues. Con­
trol decisions are based on information gathered by and exchanged 
with national agencies and international organizations that have 
It has only been during this century that 
our understanding of the Desert Locust 
and its relationship with the environ­
ment has increased to a point that 
allows for better management of this 
pest through improved strategies of 
monitoring and control. 
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developed programs to regularly monitor locusts and the weather in 
the desert before they reach agricultural areas. This strategy is quite 
effective because countries have come to accept that international 
cooperation is critical in the fight against the Desert Locust. Never­
theless, plagues are not always prevented and often substantial con­
trol operations are required to reduce locust numbers and try to 
bring a halt to an upsurge or plague. It has become apparent that 
such operations could be strategically applied at certain times or in 
specific areas. One example is the delaying of control operations 
until locusts become concentrated into a relatively small area, which 
would allow more locusts to be treated using a lower quantity of 
pesticides applied over a smaller area. 
CONCLUSION 
Desert Locusts have threatened agricultural crops for the past 
5,000 years or more. It has only been during this century that our 
understanding of the Desert Locust and its relationship with the 
environment has increased to a point that allows for better manage­
ment of this pest through improved strategies of monitoring and 
control. The use of modern technology has been of some help in 
reducing the large desert areas that must be surveyed and treated. 
Undoubtedly, the fragile environment of the deserts in Africa and 
the Middle East will continue to change in the future, partially as a 
function of human activity. It is likely that the Desert Locust will 
adopt itself to these changes in order to continue to survive as it has 
done in the past. Therefore, the challenge in coming years will be to 
adopt Desert Locust management strategies accordingly and apply 
them in a manner that continues to insure food security while mini­
mizing any detrimental effects on the environment. 
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“Virtual Water:” An Essential Element in Stabilizing the Political Economies of the Middle East 
J. A. Allan 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 
ABSTRACT 
Why has there been no war over water despite the fact that many economies in arid regions have only half the water 
they need? This paper posits that the Middle East region has been able to access water in the global system via trade, 
enabling economic systems to solve the water supply problem for the region. Water in the global trading system is 
known as “virtual water”– the water embedded in key water-intensive commodities such as wheat. The international 
wheat trade is a very effective and highly subsidized global system which operates to the advantage of countries 
experiencing water and food deficits. 
MIDDLE EAST AND GLOBAL WATER RESOURCES: 
THE LINK 
Whether there will be enough water for a future global popula­
tion double its present size is the subject of considerable contro- Whether there will be enough fresh­
versy. The answer to the question is of particular importance to the water for future populations is a 
peoples and political leaders of the Middle East and North Africa mega-question which is not given a 
fraction of the attention it deserves by (MENA). The region’s economies are already as dependent on 
scientists.imported water as they are on the renewable waters of the region, 
and that dependence is likely to increase over the coming decades. 
Freshwater needs are driven by rising populations. The range of 
the estimates of future global population vary by over 50%. In this 
uncertain information domain there is the opportunity for pessi­
mists and optimists to offer opposing interpretations. Whether to 
believe the optimists, including the author and most economists 
(Islam 1995; IFPRI 1995 and 1997; Dyson 1994), or the pessimists 
(Brown 1995 and 1996; Brown and Kane 1996; Postel 1995) de­
pends upon the assumptions used. 
Mega-questions tend either to be ignored or to attract difficult-
to-test ideological interpretations of religious intensity. Whether 
there will be enough freshwater for future populations is a mega-
question which is not given a fraction of the attention it deserves by 
scientists. In the 1960s and 1970s there were attempts in the former 
Soviet Union to review the world’s water balance (L’vovich 1969 
and 1974) and in the years since there have been further efforts to 
address global water availability and use (Shiklamanov 1985, 1986; 
Shiklamanov and Sokolov 1983; Shiklamanov and Markova 1987; 
and Gleick 1994). 
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Meanwhile international funding agencies are prepared to de­
vote millions of dollars annually to the provision of advice on water 
management and lending for water projects without offering a view 
on the status of global water. The World Bank has produced shelves 
of reports on water allocation and management for the interested 
professional and general reader (World Bank 1993a; Serageldin 1994 
and 1995) and for the specialist focused on local and regional issues 
(World Bank 1991, 1993a, and 1997). It has not, however, situated 
the debate in the global resource context. Only since 1994 has there 
been an attempt to address the subjects of water availability for the 
Middle East and North African region (FAO 1995a and 1997a) and 
water use by irrigation, the major water-using sector (FAO 1995b and 
1997b). These publications provide first approximations whose reli­
ability should continue to be tested. 
The upper and lower bounds of the above projections are quite 
high, but about Middle East water there is far less uncertainty. 
Although it is generally not publicized, the Middle East as a 
region actually ran out of water in the 1970s (Rogers 1994; Allan 
1994). In politics, facts which are judged to have costly political 
consequences can easily be ignored or de-emphasized. For leaders in 
the region, political imperatives are more compelling than scientific 
facts. On water, these imperatives have led to denials of the scope of 
domestic and regional water scarcity. An ex-Prime Minister of Egypt 
(Higazi 1994) and mid-1990s Egyptian ministers of water resources, 
agriculture and planning have all publicly asserted that Egypt has 
sufficient water (Arab Research Centre 1995). The discrepancy 
between the views of scientists and politicians in the assessment of 
acute scarcity generally stems from the politicians’ failure to account 
for the water required for increasing food production. Politicians 
limit their analysis to municipal, industrial, and agricultural job 
sustenance, and in doing so, claim water sufficiency despite the 
absence of large water volumes needed to grow crops to feed their 
populations. For politicians in almost all countries in the region the 
food gap caused by the insufficiency of water has to be ignored, 
because to draw attention to the food gap is politically suicidal. 
The reason the Middle East is important with regard to water is 
because it is the first major region to run out of water. The Tigris-
Euphrates riparians have not yet fully utilized their water resources 
but will do so in the coming decades. Similar problems are envi­
sioned among the upper riparians of the Nile. 
The major indicator of the scale of the water deficit of an 
economy is the level of its food imports, since water used in the 
agricultural sector exceeds by ten times the water used by the indus­
trial and municipal sectors combined. 
Although it is generally not publicized, 
the Middle East as a region actually ran 
out of water in the 1970s….For leaders 
in the region, political imperatives are 
more compelling than scientific facts. 
On water, these imperatives have led to 
denials of the scope of domestic and 
regional water scarcity. 
Table 1	 World population in the year 
2100 (IFPRI 1995). 
Low scenario: 7.7 billion 
Mid scenario: 9.4 billion 
High scenario: 11 billion 
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In the humid temperate latitudes, attention is rarely drawn to the 
relative demands of the agricultural and the municipal/industrial 
sectors, since crops can generally be grown in those regions without 
irrigation. In the arid and semi-arid Middle East, however, the 
dominance of the agricultural water demand is stark. There is little 
or no naturally occurring soil moisture there even during the winter 
rainy season. 
In the semi-arid and arid Middle East and North African region, 
water for irrigation is expensively won because of the costs of stor­
age and distribution. Moreover, that water which is diverted for the 
purposes of irrigation is lost to the industrial sector, putting water-
stressed riparians at a competitive disadvantage in terms of eco­
nomic (non-agricultural) production. The effective allocation of 
water between sectors to gain high returns and high levels of em­
ployment is fundamental to economic and political stability. 
THE REGIONAL WATER GAP AND THE GLOBAL 
WATER SURPLUS 
The production of every metric ton (1000 kg) of a food com­
modity such as wheat requires an input of about 1000 metric tons of 
water (equivalent to 1000 m3). The interannual trend in cereal im­
ports reflects a reasonable approximation of the capacity of an 
economy to meet its strategic food needs. Figure 1 illustrates the 
trend in cereal and flour imports in the Middle East and North 
Africa since the 1960s. 
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Figure 1 Wheat and cereal flour imports to the MENA region, 1961-1992. 
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Table 2 Per-capita annual water consumption. 
Drinking water: 1 m3 
Municipal and industrial uses: 100 m3 
Food production: 1000 m3 
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The leveling off in the trend in 1986 reflects changes in particular 
agricultural and food production policies by Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, the two biggest players in both cereal and flour production 
and consumption in the region. Egypt introduced wheat subsidies 
(to begin a shift away from cotton) and Saudi Arabia’s irrigation 
projects began to produce sufficient wheat for most of its needs (as 
it became a significant wheat exporter in the world market). Saudi 
Arabia has subsequently reduced its wheat production because it 
was palpably an unrealistic way to use its fossil water. 
Although the region has suffered fairly acute water scarcity since 
the 1970s, the peoples and their leaders refuse to recognize these 
resource and economic realities. Their interpretations of Middle 
East hydrological and economic contexts are at best underinformed 
and at worst dangerous. Figure 2 provides the estimated status and 
utilization of MENA water resources. 
Scientists cannot provide truly reliable information on either the 
supply side (the availability of water) or on the demand side (the 
current and future consumption of freshwater driven by future 
populations). In any event, the capability of the region’s hydrological 
system to meet the rising demands being placed upon it is in question. 
At the same time, however, the global hydrological system is 
expected to be able to meet the most significant element of global 
water demand, the global consumption of food. Assuming a 
medium water consumption scenario of 1500 m3/capita/yr, global 
freshwater needs are about 8.25 billion m3 (BCM) annually. Con­
sumption of this magnitude is well within the estimates of global 
freshwater availability (Rodda 1996), but there are differing inter­
pretations of the position vìs-a-vìs future demands driven by higher 
world population (Brown 1996; Postel 1997; IFPRI 1996). 
At this stage in history the Middle East’s water deficit is not 
serious because global systems (i.e. trade) balance the Middle East’s 
deficit (Allan 1994). It is economic systems and not hydrological 
and water engineering systems which achieve water security for the 
economies of the region. At the regional level there can only be 
degrees of pessimism about the future availability of water, at least 
for irrigated food production. On the other hand, optimism about 
the capacity to use the region’s water more productively is sound. It 
is on this aspect of water management that politicians and regional 
optimists focus. At the global level there is certainty neither about 
volumes of freshwater available nor about the capacity to use the 
water effectively. In these circumstances there is evidence to support 
the arguments of both optimists and pessimists. Because of the 
mighty error bars on the statistics produced by the as yet inadequate 
models of global change (Conway 1993; Conway and Hulme 1993 
Although the region has suffered fairly 
acute water scarcity since the 1970s, 
the peoples and their leaders refuse to 
recognize these resource and economic 
realities. Their interpretations of Middle 
East hydrological and economic 
contexts are at best underinformed 
and at worst dangerous. 
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Figure 2 Uncertain MENA scenarios: population and water consumption. 
and 1996; Conway et al. 1996) very different views emerge concern­
ing the capacity of the world’s agricultural systems to raise food. 
The pessimistic global freshwater scenario is persuasive if we assume: 
· static patterns of food and water consumption by individuals; 
· high estimates of the demographic transition; 
· static technology; 
· inflexible political and international institutions; and 
· ineffective trading systems. 
If, however, we assume: 
· increasing food and water consumption efficiencies; 
· lower range population projections (7-9 billion people); and 
· continued open trade, 
then we can conclude that the world’s water and food futures are 
uncertain but not seriously insecure.
 The specific deficits of the MENA region arise not from poor 
local resource endowment, which is significant, but from the inabil­
ity of agricultural sectors, governments, and international institu­
tions to adapt to the resource scarcity and take measures to find and 
mobilize substitutes. It must be recalled that human consumption 
should not be assumed to remain in the 1000-2000 m3/capita/yr 
range. Consumption rates in the vast semi-arid tracts of Africa south 
of the Sahara have been measured at as low as a mere 3.5 m3/capita/yr. 
Anxiety over municipal and industrial needs – even in the 
MENA region – is misplaced. The genuine tension over water in the 
region has been and will continue to be in the agricultural sector. 
Food production requires about 90% of a community’s water; 
should there be insufficient water for local food needs (the predica­
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ment of the Middle East since 1970) then “virtual water” has to be im­
ported. Domestic water is likely also to be augmented by desalination. 
While the underlying message in this paper is optimistic, it must 
be very strongly emphasized that the types of adjustment anticipated 
by the optimists cannot be achieved quickly. Thirty years is a rather 
short transitional period for the necessary major adjustments in 
water policies to be developed in response to limited water availabil­
ity. Adjustments such as the changes in the public perception of the 
value of water take time. The associated political discourses enabling 
fundamental changes in water policies may take decades. So deep are 
the belief systems and so challenging any proposal that beliefs should 
change that politicians are loathe to contradict them, even though the 
measures are essential for the stabilization of the political economy. 
How is it that the two camps, pessimists and optimists, can exist 
simultaneously and dispense such confusing contradictory interpreta­
tions? The central reasons are analytical uncertainty in the areas of 
freshwater availability and the impacts of various climate change sce­
narios on the supply side and of consumption rates on the demand side. 
VIRTUAL WATER AND THE PROBLEMSHED 
Watershed-based water budgets do not provide a complete source 
of explanation because they are not determinant of the options avail­
able to those managing a national economy. If national hydrological 
systems restrict economic options then politicians have to find rem­
edies in systems that do provide solutions. United States water re­
source specialists have coined the term “problemshed,” to make the 
idea of the “system” in which solutions can be found more accessible. 
National economies operate in international political economic 
systems – in problemsheds – and not just in hydrological systems – 
or watersheds. The political economy of the global trade in staple 
cereals is the relevant analytical catchment for water deficit econo­
mies. Access to, and management of, the problemshed is not re­
stricted to environmental systems; it necessarily includes extremely 
powerful and flexible economic systems as well. 
The shared and limiting watershed-based water budgets, with all 
their troublesome international relations, are dangerously misleading 
frameworks of analysis. The existence of solutions in “problemsheds” 
enables politicians to avoid the stresses of inter-riparian relations in 
the “watershed.” In brief, if half of the water needed to feed the 
MENA region’s people in the 1990s lies in the soil profiles of temper­
ate humid environments in North America, South America and 
Europe, it would be scientifically derelict to ignore that water. It 
would also be neglectful of scientists in general and the governments 
of water-short economies in particular to ignore predictable future 
Anxiety over municipal and industrial 
needs – even in the MENA region – is 
misplaced. The genuine tension over 
water in the region has been and will 
continue to be in the agricultural sector. 
Food production requires about 90% of 
a community’s water; should there be 
insufficient water for local food needs 
(the predicament of the Middle East 
since 1970) then “virtual water” has to 
be imported. Domestic water is likely 
also to be augmented by desalination. 
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competition for this water. The scientific neglect is just as serious as 
the predictable devious and selective hydropolitics engaged in by 
political interests. 
The coming fifty year transformation of the perceptions of the 
value of water (Allan and Radwan 1998) will be a tough environment 
for those looking for quick solutions. There is no reliable checklist 
with which to change the perceptions of large groups of people 
quickly. And people “convinced against their will (tend) to be of the 
same opinion still.” Even when perceptions have transformed and 
shifted, the implementation of new water policies, especially water re­
allocation policies, must be gradual. These processes will all be slow, 
sometimes painfully slow, for anxious agency officials and for econo­
mists and engineers because of limited funding and career horizons. 
As noted above, the foundation scientific concepts for economi­
cally and environmentally sound water policies require reforms and 
adjustments with high political prices (World Bank 1997). Politicians 
will defer for as long as possible paying these political prices, which 
can be so extreme as to involve loss of power. It requires a nearly 
inhuman level of courage for a political leader of a country that for 
five thousand years has enjoyed water security to announce that water 
resources are no longer adequate. 
Those innovators purveying economic and environmental facts of 
life which contradict the deeply held belief systems of whole popula­
tions will be ignored if they do not shape their message and pace its 
delivery to accord with political realities. The authors of the 1997 
World Development Report (World Bank 1997) put it another way, 
quoting Machiavelli: 
The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered 
under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcom­
ing from those who would prosper under the new. 
The Prince, Machiavelli, N., 1513. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately the water pessimists are wrong, but their pessimism is a 
very useful political tool, enabling the innovator to shift the eternally 
interdependent belief systems of the public and their politicians. The 
water optimists are right, but their optimism is dangerous because it 
enables politicians to treat water as a low policy priority, to delay 
innovation, and to thereby please those who perceive that they are 
prospering under the old order. Pessimists also bring more sensa­
tional stories to the media. Optimists bring a version of good news 
which is complicated and indigestible, as well as unsensational. 
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Playing Chicken on the Nile? The Implications of Microdam Development in the Ethiopian 
Highlands and Egypt’s New Valley Project1 
John Waterbury 
American University of Beirut 
Dale Whittington 
University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill 
ABSTRACT 
How Egypt and Ethiopia will defend or promote their interests in the Nile basin has recently become clearer. Egypt will 
again seek to create “facts on the ground,” this time a large new land reclamation and settlement scheme called the 
New Valley Project. Ethiopia too will create facts by proceeding with water resources development in the Blue Nile 
basin, including the construction of low-cost microdams. If Egypt and Ethiopia pursue these two unilateral initiatives, they 
may find themselves on a collision course that both may have difficulty changing. The challenge facing the Nile riparian 
countries is to find a balance between the upstream countries’ support for the principle of “equitable use,” and Egypt’s 
and Sudan’s support for the principle of “no appreciable harm.” Of all the riparian states Egypt has the most to gain 
from the establishment of a basin-wide framework for water resources development. It can ill-afford a future in which 
upstream riparians take unilateral actions with respect to water development projects. If Egypt would reduce its existing 
water use by 5–10 billion m3 and scale back or abandon the plans for the New Valley Project, there would be enough 
water available to strike a deal that would bring Ethiopia into the framework of a comprehensive Nile Waters Agreement. 
It is clear that the next century, if not the next millennium, will 
1 Reprinted from“Playing Chicken on the
witness rising international tensions over natural resources. What is Nile” by John Waterbury and Dale 
not at all clear is the way in which those tensions will be expressed Whittington, with the permission of the 
Natural Resources Forum, a publication ofand, one hopes, resolved. The issue facing nation states will be how 
the United Nations Department of
best to conduct and manage the arduous, time-consuming search for Economic and Social Affairs. 
cooperative solutions to resource utilization challenges. This search is 
underway for the most efficient ways to use transboundary waters, but 
it has so far yielded meager results. Without greater success in the 
future, the daunting challenges of satisfying the demands of growing, 
and, one hopes, better-off, populations will not be met. 
The problem is that the search for cooperation and the search for 
economic efficiency do not always complement each other. Coun­
tries, states, or communities like the European Union, cannot fully 
control the economic benefits arising from their own investments. 
Reducing power plant emissions may mitigate rain acidity and glo­
bal warming, but also allow other countries to avoid undertaking 
similar investments. When the threat of such “free-riding” is large, 
no one has much incentive to invest at home, nor is the situation 
right for a search for binding cooperative undertakings. 
International rivers provide striking examples of these problems, 
none more so than the Nile Basin. The authors have spent decades 
studying and writing about issues of water development and coordi­
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nated resource use among the ten countries that share the Nile.1 
This article does not propose to cover all or even most of the com­
plex issues facing the Nile riparians, but rather to focus on one set of 
bilateral relations, and arguably the most important, that between 
Egypt and Ethiopia. 
The Nile is a very long river but not one with much water. Its 
discharge is dwarfed by those of the Congo/Zaire, the Amazon, the 
Mississippi, and the Mekong. Its annual discharge is now pretty much 
used in its entirety by Egypt and Sudan, except in years of exceptional 
floods. In fact, by the terms of a 1959 agreement, significantly called 
the “Treaty for the Full Utilization of the Nile,” Egypt and Sudan 
divided the annual flow between them with 66% going to Egypt, 22% 
to Sudan, and the remaining 12% allocated to surface evaporation 
and seepage at the Aswan High Dam (AHD) reservoir. It was on the 
basis of this treaty that construction of the AHD went forward.
 No other riparians were party to this accord, nor was any share 
in the annual flow prudentially set aside for them. The treaty did 
anticipate future demands from the excluded riparians, but merely 
stipulated that Egypt and Sudan should deal with those demands 
jointly. Predictably, the upstream riparians, many at the time still 
under British control, were not pleased. However, Cold War rival­
ries, their own political instability combined with bouts of civil war, 
and their feeble economies did not allow upstream riparians to press 
any realistic claims to Nile water arising in or traversing their terri­
tories. The economic weakness has endured until today, although 
there are signs of recovery in Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Tanza­
nia. Some political stability has been secured in the last decade in 
Eritrea (independent in 1993), Ethiopia, and Uganda.2 The time has 
come when a few upper basin riparians may test the Egypto-
Sudanese status quo (Waterbury 1997). 
None of the projected demand scenarios involve truly large 
amounts of water. Many potential projects are hydroelectric power 
stations, which do entail reservoirs and attendant storage losses. But, 
even though the upper basin states have relatively abundant rainfall, 
it is erratic, seasonally concentrated, and not often in the regions 
where the soils are best for agriculture. Capturing river water for 
irrigation is an option that few upper riparians have exercised, but, 
with increasing demand for food from growing populations, they 
inevitably will in the near future. Because the flow of the Nile, so 
Egypt and Sudan claim, is fully used today, reductions in flow 
caused by an upstream state could disrupt existing patterns of agri­
cultural production in the downstream states. 
1 	 They are roughly from north to south: 
Egypt, Sudan (Main Nile), Eritrea, Ethiopia 
(the Blue Nile watershed), Kenya, Tanzania, 
Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zaire 
(Kagera Basin, Lake Victoria Basin, Lake 
Albert, and the White Nile). 
2 	 The fact that Sudan is still locked in civil 
war, Rwanda and Burundi trying to deal 
with the aftermath of or to avoid genocide, 
and Zaire (now the Congo), under the as-
yet untested grip of Lauren Kabila, means 
that any coordinated stance among the 
upper basin riparians will be nearly 
impossible to achieve. 
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 Egypt in particular has insisted that sunk costs in harnessing the 
Nile within its national boundaries give it a kind of property right to 
the resource. This right is all the more vital to Egypt in that it does 
not add a single drop to the Nile’s flow through its territory. There­
fore, Egypt will probably not relinquish any part of its “right” except 
under duress. 
Ethiopia, by contrast, on average provides 80-85% of the annual 
discharge of the Nile (through the Akabo-Baro, Blue Nile, and 
Atbara/Teccaze tributaries) yet to date uses virtually none of it. 
International law and the guidelines of international financial bodies 
such as the World Bank make it extremely difficult for an upstream 
riparian to undertake unilateral development of its portion of the 
river in the absence of consultation with and the consent of the 
downstream states. In this sense the downstream states hold veto 
3 Although Egypt’s and Ethiopia’s interests dopower over third-party financing of upstream development. Ethio­
conflict, there are important opportunities 
pia does not yet have the financial strength to undertake more than for cooperation and sharing of joint gains 
(Whittington and McClelland 1992).a few large-scale water resources development projects on its own 
and thus finds itself in a box.
4 This image has already been invoked with
Egyptian and Ethiopian interests are thus in potential conflict.3 respect to the Nile by Wolf (1996). The 
How they will defend or promote their interests has recently become game of “chicken” is played in various 
forms in different cultures, but the essenceclearer. Egypt will seek, once again, to create “facts on the ground,” 
of the game is to set in motion a course of
this time a grandiose scheme of land reclamation and settlement action that will lead to a collision for both 
called the New Valley Project (Figure 1). Ethiopia too will create parties unless one party takes action to 
prevent the calamity. But then the partyfacts by proceeding with low-cost construction of microdams. As 
that takes action, instead of being
the two strategies unfold, we expect to see a game of “chicken” on rewarded for averting disaster, loses the 
the Nile.4 game because he is thrown off course. For 
example, a game of chicken is sometimes 
played by automobile drivers who start at 
different places on a road, and start drivingMICRODAMS IN THE ETHIOPIAN HIGHLANDS 
straight at each other. If they continue on
In Tigray province alone, Ethiopia has plans to build 500 mi- course they will crash and both be killed. 
crodams over the next decade.5 These are small-scale projects that The driver who veers off course first 
prevents the crash, but ends up off thetypically provide water for irrigating a few hundred hectares. They 
road, and is termed the “chicken” because
can be built without foreign technical assistance or financing, largely his fear of death overcame his desire to 
with local labor. They are simple to design and can be constructed “win” the game. 
quite rapidly. Ethiopian farmers already possess many of the skills 
5 Tigray has historically been drought- and
necessary to proceed with a microdam strategy. A tradition of small- famine prone. It is also the province from 
scale irrigation is well-established; there are many small-scale irriga- which several of Ethiopia’s most powerful 
leaders, including Prime Minister Melestion schemes along streams and tributaries throughout the 
Zenawi, hail.
Ethiopian highlands. If peace and economic growth continue, these 
farmers will almost certainly pursue further efforts at small-scale 
irrigation and microdam development. It is unclear how many sites 
exist in the highlands for these microdams, but there are probably 
thousands (although many potential sites are not in the Blue Nile water­
shed, and thus their development would not affect Blue Nile flows). 
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Figure 1 Nile Drainage Basin. Source: Cartographic Section, DPI, United Nations. 
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These microdams have numerous potential problems. Many 
sites appear likely to silt up rapidly, and thus lose water storage 
capacity. Malaria may spread through the highlands as sites for the 
mosquito vector increase (Cropper et al. 1998). Moreover, it is not 
clear how much water such schemes will use and what the effect of 
this use will be on downstream flows. However, if Ethiopia is to 
undertake, through micro-dams, anything that would have a signifi­
cant effect on downstream flows, it would have to build thousands 
of microdams. 
There is currently little literature on microdam development in 
Ethiopia, but the storage capacity of approximately 500 microdams 
planned for North Gondar appears to be in the range of 100,000 to 
500,000 m3 each. However, for purposes of illustration let us assume 
microdams with larger storage capacities than these. Assume that 
5,000 microdam schemes were developed in the Nile drainage sys­
tem in Ethiopia, each with sufficient storage capacity to supply water 
to an associated irrigated area of 200 hectares each. This would 
involve a total irrigated area of one million hectares. If each hectare 
of irrigated land used 5,000 m3 annually, the total water use would 
be 5 billion m3 per year. Again, for purposes of illustration, let us 
assume that 5 billion m3 of water use in the Ethiopian highlands 
resulted in a net reduction at Aswan of 4 billion m3. This is over 
twice Egypt’s anticipated increase in long-term yield from the 
Jonglei Canal, should it ever be finished.6 
There is evidence from other parts of Africa that microdams can 
indeed affect downstream flows. For example, in his study, “The 
Impact of Small Farm Reservoirs on Urban Water Supplies in 
Botswana,” Jeremy Meigh (1995) concludes: 
These results…show clearly that development of small 
dams upstream of major reservoirs should never be allowed 
to proceed unplanned. Small dams can have significant 
effects on the runoff into and the yield from the large reser­
voirs, and therefore it is necessary to assess these effects and 
weigh the benefits of rural developments against the adverse 
effects of urban water users.…The development of fewer, 
somewhat larger dams, which minimizes evaporation losses, 
should be preferred to numerous smaller dams of the same 
total capacity, if it is found that this reduces the down­
stream impact. 
Thus, if one takes a long term view, the effect of thousands of 
microdam projects on water use in the Blue Nile basin and down­
stream flows should not be dismissed lightly. 
6 	 The Jonglei Canal project, begun in the late 
1970s and suspended in 1983, is designed 
to reduce spillage of the Albert Nile into 
the swamps of the southern Sudan, and to 
channel water that would otherwise be lost 
to evaporation downstream to northern 
Sudan and to Egypt. 
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There are at least three important features of the microdam 
projects that would appear to make them especially attractive to 
Ethiopia. First, such microdam projects do not require international 
financing. Second, it will be difficult to estimate accurately how 
much such projects reduce downstream flows of the Nile. Third, the 
microdam projects are militarily invulnerable. In the past Egypt has 
periodically threatened to intervene militarily if any upstream ripar­
ians interfered with its water supply. If Ethiopia’s use of water was 
based on thousands of small-scale irrigation schemes and microdams, 
Egypt would have few military options other than an attempt to oc­
cupy Ethiopia. It does not seem that this would be a credible threat. 
One can hardly imagine a worse place for Egypt to conduct a military 
campaign than the heavily-populated Ethiopian highlands.
 If Ethiopia continues to liberalize its economy and is politically 
stable, it may be anticipated that funds will be available from a vari­
ety of sources to finance microdams and other, larger water re­
sources development projects in the Blue Nile watershed. Because 
Ethiopia is now a major recipient of donor funds, it has considerable 
flexibility with its development budget. Local finances can be shifted 
away from projects that donors will fund to projects that they will 
not support.7 Donors can be played off against one another in the 
competition to finance attractive projects.8 Moreover, international 
capital markets will be an increasingly attractive option for financing 
many infrastructure investments. One must remember that poten­
tial hydroelectric projects in the Blue Nile basin, first described in 
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s 1964 study, have some of the 
highest economic rates of returns of any hydroelectric projects in the 
world, assuming the power generated could be marketed regionally 
(Guariso and Whittington 1987). Investment opportunities such as 
these have a certain inevitability about them, particularly in a world 
awash with private capital. 
There is a linkage between the development of hydroelectric 
projects in the Blue Nile drainage area and a microdam strategy. 
Very little of the Ethiopian highlands is now served with electricity. 
Thus, many microdam projects will have to rely on diesel pumps to 
lift water to fields (some can be gravity-fed). This will be expensive 
and often unreliable. Electricity from hydropower projects is thus 
needed to supply households in towns and villages throughout the 
highlands, and also to run pumps for microdam schemes. One of 
the problems associated with hydroelectric development in the Blue 
Nile basin is the lumpiness of most investment opportunities and 
the inability to use all of the hydropower generated quickly. The 
pumping necessitated by thousands of microdams might ameliorate 
this difficulty somewhat. 
7 	 Consider, for example, the Finchaa Dam, 
currently the only water storage facility in 
the Ethiopian Blue Nile Basin. This project 
was commissioned ca. 1970 exclusively as a 
hydropower scheme (to our knowledge, 
the only project identified by the U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation to have been 
implemented). However, with some 
assistance from the United States Agency 
for International Development, construc­
tion of a sugar cane refinery was initiated in 
1995. The Ethiopian government intends to 
finance an irrigated cane sugar scheme of 
some 6000 hectares downstream of 
Finchaa. 
8 	 Also, the World Bank has fewer restrictions 
on funding projects which improve or 
expand existing projects—so microdams 
are a kind of foot in the third-party funding 
door. 
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It is sometimes argued that Ethiopia does not really need irri­
gated agriculture because it has the alternative of rain-fed agricul­
ture, while Egypt has no alternative except increasing its irrigated 
area. Two points need to be made about this argument. First, many 
parts of the Ethiopian highlands are quite arid during the dry sea­
son, and farmers in such areas would clearly benefit from irrigation.
 Second, both Egypt and Ethiopia have the option of pursuing 
economic development strategies that will enable them to pay for 
imported food rather than expanding irrigated agriculture, and if 
their populations increase at current rates, both will have to do this. 
In the long term irrigated agriculture is not a feasible alternative for 
achieving food security for either Egypt or Ethiopia. 
There is precedent throughout the semi-arid regions of the 
world for what Ethiopia intends to do. A fairly dramatic example lies 
in Syria’s development of its watershed in the Yarmouk river basin. 
This river, whose annual discharge is only 380-400 million m3, 
serves as the border between Syria and Jordan, before emptying into 
Lake Tiberias (or Kinneret as it is known in Israel). For decades 
Jordan and Syria proposed the construction of a dam on the 
Yarmouk to capture winter flood waters and to generate hydroelec­
tricity. Part of the stored flood water was to be diverted into Jordan’s 
East Ghor Canal and used in the Jordan-Dead Sea valley for agricul­
ture. The hydropower was destined exclusively for Syria. The dam, 
first known as the Maqarin project and later as the Unity Dam, has 
never been realized because of initial objections by Israel (the down­
stream state). 
What is important for our story is that in the intervening years 
Syria proceeded quietly and unilaterally to construct dozens of small 
dams in its portion of the watershed. These dams store on the order 
of 155 million m3 of water. Since 1975 alone, 19 dams have been 
constructed with an aggregate storage of nearly 100 million m3 and 
five more are on the drawing boards (Soffer and Kliot 1991; Garber 
and Elias Salameh 1992). Even if Israeli acquiescence to the Unity 
Dam were obtained, it is now doubtful that the dam would make 
good economic sense, at least on the scale that it was originally 
conceived. Syrian action has reduced the average annual flow by 
roughly a third. 
Ethiopia’s microdam strategy does not preclude the development 
of larger water resources development projects in the Blue Nile 
basin. Indeed, Ethiopia is proceeding with both types of projects. In 
the fall of 1997 the Government of Ethiopia issued tenders for the 
construction and supervision phases of the first major hydroelectric 
power project on the Tekeze River. Located on the Upper Tekeze 
southwest of Mekelle, the final project is likely to have a total storage 
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capacity of about 8 billion m3 and an installed capacity of 200 MW. 
Ethiopia is financing this project itself, and, importantly, has not 
formally notified Egypt or Sudan of its plans. 
EGYPT’S NEW VALLEY PROJECT 
Information about this project available to the authors is limited 
to reports in the international and Egyptian press, and these news 
stories have often contained self-contradictions and obvious mis­
takes. However, the general scope of the project seems clear. Egypt 
plans to pump 5–10 billion m3 of water per year from the Aswan 
High Dam Reservoir, and put it in a new canal that will transport it 
to a series of new land reclamation projects in the Western Desert. 
When the plan is finished, perhaps 25 years from now, between 
300,000–500,000 additional hectares will be irrigated.9
 The interesting question, of course, is: where does Egypt imag­
ine that it will get this much additional water? There was some 
confusion in the initial press reports that this would be surplus 
water from the Tushka canal spillway. The Tushka canal spillway 
was built to discharge excess flood waters from the Aswan High Dam 
Reservoir when it reached extremely high levels (Whittington and 
Guariso 1983). Discharges into the Tushka canal spillway have been 
and will be very rare; indeed if the New Valley Project is finished as 
now envisaged, and its water demands factored into the operation of 
the Aswan High Dam Reservoir, the Tushka canal spillway will prob­
ably never be used again. So it is important to be clear that water for 
the New Valley reclamation efforts will be needed every year and thus 
must come from Egypt’s long term water allocation. 
Egypt contends that it will find the water supplies needed for the 
New Valley Project by using existing irrigation water supplies more 
efficiently, fostering water conservation efforts, abstracting ground­
water, using reclaimed wastewater, and shifting out of sugar cane 
and rice to less water-intensive crops.10 These measures, particularly 
conservation efforts and shifts in crop mix, could have a significant 
effect on Egypt’s water use. Egypt thus argues that it will not withdraw 
more than its share specified in the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. 
The international press has consistently reported that Egypt’s 
allocation of Nile waters is 55.5 billion m3. This misses the real 
story.11 As all the Nile basin riparians are well aware, Egypt’s alloca­
tion under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement is best understood as a 
deal with Sudan. Egypt’s allocation of 55.5 billion m3 is contingent 
upon zero water use by upstream riparians. At the time the 1959 
Agreement was signed, both Egypt and Sudan recognized that this 
assumption of zero water use by upstream riparians was not realistic 
in the long run, and they made provision for how the 1959 
9 	 The costs of the canal, the pumping 
stations, and ancillary projects in the New 
Valley, have been estimated at LE 300-500 
billion over the next twenty years, or about 
US$90 to $150 billion at the 1997 
exchange rate. Projected investments of 
that magnitude will attract many multi­
national firms. The Arab Fund for Social 
and Economic Development, representing 
the member states of the League of Arab 
States, has in principle agreed to finance 
some of these investments. Private 
investors, such as Prince Al-Walid Bin 
Talal of Saudi Arabia, intend to reclaim 
over 162,000 hectares in the New Valley. 
(see al-Ahram Weekly, July 24-30, 1997: 8). 
By contrast, Ethiopia cannot contemplate 
projects even fractionally as large or nearly 
as attractive to international contractors, 
purveyors of equipment, and agri­
businesses. 
10 	 It is important to note here that ground­
water in the old Nile Valley is not a 
different water source, i.e. it is replenished 
by Nile river water. In the New Valley, 
groundwater supplies are nonrenewable, 
and the groundwater level will likely fall 
rapidly as intensive pumping begins. 
11 	For an exception, see “Water fight: Egypt 
faces problem it has long dreaded, less 
control of the Nile.” The Wall Street Journal, 
Friday, August 22, 1997. 
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Agreement would be revised as upstream riparians started to claim 
rights to use Nile waters. Specifically, Egypt and Sudan agreed to 
reduce their water allocations equally to accommodate increased use 
by upstream riparians.
 In 1994 the authors proposed that the 1959 Nile Waters Agree­
ment should be revised soon to include Ethiopia (Whittington, 
Waterbury, and McClelland 1994). At the time, the authors argued 
that a reasonable reallocation of Nile water should give Ethiopia 
something on the order of 12 billion m3; and that Egypt and Sudan 
would need to reduce their water allocations by approximately 3 
billion m3 each—assuming Jonglei I and II and other “water conser­
vation projects” in the White Nile basin (Machar Marshes and Bahr 
el Ghazal) are not undertaken. The difference of 6 billion m3 could 
probably be made up by more efficient operation of an expanded 
system of reservoirs, including new dams on the Blue Nile, and 
reduced evaporation losses from the Aswan High Dam Reservoir.12 
Even if the upstream riparians did not use any Nile water in the 
future, Egypt would still need to find water savings on the order of 
5–10 billion m3 per year to complete the New Valley Project. While 
Egyptian policymakers’ willingness to take on the task of using 
Egypt’s existing water supplies more efficiently is laudable—this is 
without question the right thing to do—it is not clear, however, 
what it will cost to achieve water savings of this magnitude, nor how 
long it will take. It will clearly be an expensive undertaking that will 
require not only substantial capital investments, but changes in the 
institutional arrangements for farm-level irrigation management. 
As water becomes increasingly valuable in the Nile basin in 
economic terms, all riparians—not just Egypt—will need to use 
water more efficiently. However, since Egypt is by far the largest user 
of Nile water, its efforts in this regard will have the largest effect on 
the availability of basin-wide supplies. It is useful to separate two 
issues: (1) the extent to which Egypt can use its existing water sup­
plies more efficiently, and (2) whether these water savings should be 
applied, or allocated, to the New Valley Project. 
For example, if Egypt really does have the ability to save 5–10 
billion m3 of water annually, these savings could conceptually be 
allocated in a variety of ways. For example, they could be used to 
(i)	 achieve a revised Nile Waters Agreement; 
(ii)	 accommodate future industrial, municipal, and tourism 
growth in Egypt; 
(iii) undertake the New Valley land reclamation projects. 
Stated most simply, the New Valley Project requires water that 
could be used to reach a new Nile Waters Agreement that accommo­
dated the upstream riparians. 
12 Reservoirs upstream on the Blue Nile 
would reduce evaporation losses from the 
Aswan High Dam Reservoir because the 
surface-to-volume relationships are more 
favorable than at Aswan, and evaporation 
rates are lower. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR NILE BASIN DEVELOPMENT 
The New Valley Project and the microdam strategy would ap­
pear to carry significant risks for Egypt and Ethiopia. If Egypt and 
Ethiopia pursue these two unilateral initiatives, they may find them­
selves on a collision course that both may have difficulty changing. 
To better understand the nature of the problem, assume that 
Egypt is indeed committed to proceeding with the New Valley 
Project, and that it is as yet unclear (1) whether Egypt will succeed 
with its efforts to save 10 billion m3; and (2) whether Ethiopia will 
proceed with a microdam strategy. Table 1 presents the four possible 
outcomes; the numbers are not meant to be precise. In Case A Egypt 
succeeds in saving 10 billion m3 and Ethiopia pursues the microdam 
strategy. There is still a 4 billion m3 water deficit (measured at 
Aswan). In Case D Egypt fails to achieve its water savings and Ethiopia 
does not pursue a microdam strategy: there is a 10 billion m3 deficit. 
Case B is the worst scenario. Here Egypt fails to achieve the 
promised water savings, but still pursues the New Valley Project. 
Ethiopia proceeds with a microdam strategy, and the riparian coun­
tries are faced with a 14 billion m3 deficit. Only in Case C are serious 
problems avoided. Even in this case it is still assumed that the eco­
nomics of both the water savings and land reclamation work in 
Egypt’s favor. 
Because there is no comprehensive agreement on the Nile basin, 
any deficits will fall on Egypt and Sudan. The economically rational 
solution to the economic problem caused by water deficits is to 
import more grain (Allan 1996). Egypt is in a much better position 
to pursue this option than the other riparian states because of its 
stronger, more diversified economy and better infrastructure. But 
water deficits create not only economic problems but political diffi­
culties as well. Farmers and communities that run short of water 
Table 1 Four hypothetical scenarios for Nile basin development. 
Egypt proceeds with the New 
Valley Project and succeeds in 
achieving 10 BCM in water 
savings at acceptable cost 
Egypt proceeds with the New 
Valley Project and does not 
succeed in achieving 10 BCM in 
water savings at acceptable cost 
Ethiopia proceeds with a microdam 
strategy that uses 4 BCM 
(measured at Aswan) 
CASE A: 
Egypt has sufficient water supplies 
CASE B: 
Egypt is short 14 BCM annually 
Ethiopia does not proceed with a 
microdam strategy that uses 4 BCM 
(measured at Aswan) 
CASE C: 
Egypt has sufficient water supplies 
CASE D: 
Egypt is short 10 BCM annually 
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may have difficulty perceiving that the best solution is to import 
more grain; such parties may feel that their water has been stolen 
from them and seek noneconomic (diplomatic or military) solutions 
to their problems.
 In light of this analysis, let us examine the basic character of the 
“game” that appears to have developed between Egypt and Ethiopia. 
We will simplify greatly in hopes of capturing the essence of the 
problem and look at just three “moves.” In the first move, the Egyp­
tian leadership must decide whether to proceed with the New Valley 
Project; this has already been decided in the affirmative, but let us 
try to better understand this decision. 
Assume that Egypt has two choices: to pursue the New Valley 
Project or not (ignoring the question of the scale of the New Valley 
Project). If Egypt pursues the New Valley Project, Ethiopia can react 
in two ways: it can pursue its own water development options, or it 
can abandon (or delay) them. Consider each outcome from Egypt’s 
point of view. If Egypt proceeds with the New Valley project and 
then Ethiopia proceeds with its water development options (e.g. a 
microdam strategy), Egypt confronts a major water deficit. The 
Egyptian leadership can either deal with this deficit by importing 
food or pursuing a noneconomic strategy to force Ethiopia to re­
duce its water use. By this we mean that Egypt will use the political, 
diplomatic, or military powers at its disposal to pressure Ethiopia to 
reduce its water use. 
If Egypt reasons that it can easily deal with such a deficit by im­
porting food, this outcome is perhaps not too bad. On the other hand, 
if Egypt proceeds with the New Valley Project, and Ethiopia does not 
pursue its water development options (in order to avoid a confronta­
tion with Egypt), then Egypt wins the game: pursuing the New Valley 
Project has forced Ethiopia to back off of its water development plans. 
Now consider Egypt’s option not to pursue the New Valley 
Project. If Egypt decided not to proceed with the New Valley Project 
and Ethiopia proceeds with its water development options, Egypt 
faces a modest water deficit that it can choose to deal with either by 
importing food or by noneconomic means. If Egypt does not pro­
ceed with the New Valley Project and Ethiopia does not proceed 
with its water development options, the status quo is preserved. 
The difficult calculation from Egypt’s point of view is whether 
pursuing the New Valley Project will change the probability that 
Ethiopia will pursue its water development options. It is possible 
that Egypt hopes the New Valley Project will deter Ethiopia (and 
perhaps international lenders) from proceeding with water re­
sources development in Ethiopia because the latter parties can fore­
see where this collision course might lead (i.e., to Egypt pursuing 
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noneconomic alternatives for dealing with a water deficit). Seen 
from this perspective, the Egyptian decision to proceed with the 
New Valley Project has a certain strategic rationality because it 
provides Egypt the possibility of achieving the best outcome without 
major risks.
 In the second move, the Ethiopian leadership must decide how 
to respond to Egypt’s decision to proceed with the New Valley 
Project. Assume Ethiopia’s choice is whether or not to proceed with 
a water resources development option. If Ethiopia proceeds with 
water resources development, the most severe of the water deficits 
will occur (Table 1). The Ethiopian leadership must attempt to 
forecast how Egypt will respond in move three to this water deficit. 
If Egypt were to respond to Ethiopian water resources development 
by reducing water use and importing more food, this is the best 
outcome for Ethiopia: in effect Ethiopia wins the game. On the 
other hand, if Egypt responds by noneconomic means, Ethiopia has 
much to lose. Although this could be a very poor outcome for Ethio­
pia, it is by no means clear that it is the worst. Failure to develop its 
water resources may leave Ethiopia with increasingly complex politi­
cal and economic problems, as population growth, soil erosion, and 
deforestation contribute to a downward spiral of environmental 
degradation, decreasing food supplies, and famine. 
If the Ethiopian leadership responds in move two by not pursu­
ing a water development option, they avoid a possible collision with 
Egypt, but pay a high cost: an inability to develop irrigated agricul­
ture. Also, it may be the case that the Ethiopian leadership would 
not be able to prevent microdams and small-scale irrigation devel­
opment in the highlands even if it wanted to. If millions of peasants 
come to believe that small-scale irrigation will lead to a better life for 
them, it is questionable whether any government would have the 
political capital to stop them. 
We do not know, of course, which option the Ethiopian leader­
ship will choose. Let us assume that they decide to proceed with the 
water resources development option. We then turn to move three: 
how will Egypt respond to an Ethiopian decision to proceed with its 
water resources development option? From a rational perspective, 
Egypt’s choice should almost certainly be to deal with the resulting 
water deficit by importing more food and scaling back the New 
Valley Scheme. However, the Egyptian leadership may not be able to 
contain popular opinion in Egypt in favor of a confrontational 
response to Ethiopian water development. 
It is should now be clear why Egypt’s first move of proceeding 
with the New Valley Project carries such large risks. Under some 
plausible scenarios, the Egyptian and Ethiopian leadership could 
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lose their ability to control events. Just as it is important to recog­
nize that there are win-win situations for the Nile riparian countries 
(e.g., moving long-term storage upstream could provide water sav­
ings that can be shared), it is equally important to understand that 
there are lose-lose scenarios. 
We believe that, of all the riparian states, Egypt has the most to 
gain from the establishment of a basin-wide framework for water 
resources development. It can ill afford a future in which upstream 
riparians take unilateral action with respect to water development 
projects. Yet that is the precedent that Egypt has established by 
proceeding with the New Valley Project. If Egypt would reduce its 
existing water use by 5–10 billion m3—as it says it can do—and 
abandon the New Valley Project, there would be more than enough 
water available to strike a deal that would bring Ethiopia into the 
framework of a comprehensive Nile Waters Agreement. 
There is another conceivable option for Egypt to find the water 
necessary to do a deal with Ethiopia: water could possibly be saved 
from the White Nile swamps of Sudan. The White Nile water con­
servation projects (Jonglei I, Jonglei II, Machar Marshes, and Bahr el 
Ghazal) are estimated to yield a total of 18 billion m3 in water sav­
ings. Given their environmental repercussions, it seems unlikely that 
all of these projects will be built within any meaningful planning 
horizon. But Jonglei I and II alone would result in water savings of 
about 8 billion m3, roughly what is needed to bring Ethiopia into a 
new Nile Waters Agreement (in combination with water savings 
from resulted evaporation losses from the Aswan High Dam Reser­
voir). At some point in the future, Sudan might conceivably find 
itself in a pincer movement, in which Egypt and Ethiopia both want 
Jonglei I and II water savings for their joint purposes. Sudan could 
thus come under strong pressure from both Egypt and Ethiopia to 
press ahead with Jonglei I and II, but not share substantially in the 
projects’ benefits.13 
However, in the medium to long term, Sudan needs these water 
savings from the White Nile projects itself. Indeed, increased 
Sudanese water use may pose a greater problem for Egypt than water 
use in Ethiopia. Sudan has at least 8 million cultivable hectares 
between the Blue and White Niles; it currently irrigates only about 
10% of this area. It is hard to imagine a Sudanese future that is not 
based on intensive agricultural production. The day will come when 
Sudan may push ahead with this development option, even though 
it will be reluctant to confront Egypt. The development of Sudan’s 
potential would be best realized through cooperative development 
with Ethiopia, i.e. water storage sites in Ethiopia for transborder 
irrigation projects and the export of hydropower from Ethiopia to 
13 	The implementation of the White Nile 
water conservation projects would have 
another important consequence for the 
hydropolitics of the Nile basin. As long as 
water from the Equatorial lakes is lost in 
the Sudanese swamps, the regulation of 
these lakes has little value to Egypt. But if 
the White Nile water conservation 
projects are ever completed, then Egypt 
will have an intense interest in the 
development and regulation of reservoirs 
on what is Ugandan territory (particularly 
Lakes Victoria, Kyoga, and Albert). Uganda 
will then find itself in an entirely new 
political relationship with Egypt. 
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Khartoum-Omdurman. In the long run, a strategic alliance between
 
Sudan and Ethiopia is thus a possibility, and is an outcome that 
Egypt would try to avoid at all cost. 
DISCUSSION: THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF WATER 
It would seem appropriate for the Egyptian people to have a 
serious discussion about the water requirements of the New Valley 
Project, because the decision to proceed with the existing plans will 
have profound economic and security implications for their coun­
try. Central to this discussion should be an examination of the op­
portunity cost of water in different uses and locations. Thoughts on 
this issue are shared in this concluding section of the paper. 
The Nile Basin is water-scarce not because of too many people 
but because of too much agriculture relative to water supply. Agri­
culture here, as just about everywhere else in the world, accounts for 
upwards of 80% of all water use. Moreover, water is in most in­
stances used inefficiently, above all in agricultural systems like Egypt’s, 
where farmers are not made to pay anything for the water itself. 
In proposing the New Valley Scheme, Egypt, in a back-handed 
way, has acknowledged just how much waste and misallocation 
exists in the current system. By shifting cultivation from more to less 
water-intensive crops, by recycling more water, and by improving 
irrigation practices (from open surface delivery systems relying on 
gravity to pressurized drip or sprinkler irrigation), the 5-10 billion 
m3 that the New Valley Project will require can be found. Egypt had 
heretofore been at pains to assert that it had very little slack in its 
system, thereby defending the absolute necessity of retaining its full 
share as stipulated in the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. 
However, this leads to the question whether or not there might 
be a better way to achieve the goals of the New Valley Scheme with­
out using anywhere near the same amount of water. This is not to 
contest the goals in themselves. It is a fact that Egypt’s 60 million 
people are crammed into only 19,000 square miles, or a territory 
roughly the size of Switzerland. Over 90% of Egypt’s surface is unin­
habited. The New Valley project aims to move population out of the 
crowded Nile valley and into a sparsely inhabited set of oases lying 
to the west of the Nile valley. These oases are separated from the 
valley and major markets by several hundred miles of desert, and they 
are equally far from the Mediterranean coast and Egypt’s major ports. 
We should not lose sight of the fact that in the last one hundred 
years, Egypt’s densely inhabited areas have expanded significantly 
and in a manner that seems more logical than what is now being 
proposed. At the same time that the Suez Canal was excavated so, 
too, was the Ismailia Canal (named after Khedive Ismail, Egypt’s 
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governor at the time) to bring fresh water from the Nile to the new 
cities in the canal zone. From the 1870s on, the Ismailia canal has 
supplied irrigation water to what eventually became Sharqia Prov­
ince, an agricultural zone that today is a region virtually indistin­
guishable from much more ancient areas of settlement. The 
governorate of Sharqia, which directly benefited from the new canal, 
witnessed major population influx and growth. The census of 1907 
recorded Sharqia’s population as 876,000. By 1976, it had grown to 
2.6 million, and in 1986 reached 3.4 million. It boasts several large 
towns and cities, and it is fully integrated into the road and power 
grid of the Delta downstream of Cairo.
 More recently, beginning in the mid-1950s, a similar expansion 
took place along the western fringe of the Nile Delta, fed by the 
Western Nubaria canal. However, the process of settlement is rela­
tively new, and at present farming in the western zone is not in the 
hands of peasant smallholders but rather in those of commercial, 
mainly urban-based farmers. The point is, that Egypt has expanded 
its settled areas, and it has done so in a way that minimizes transport 
costs and disruption of existing patterns of settlement. If new settle­
ment is to be a function of expanded areas of cultivation and atten­
dant use of water for irrigation, it is suggested here that it is best to 
build out from the Delta and the valley lying to its south. Rather 
than distant and costly satellite colonies scattered across Egypt’s 
desert hinterland, the authors envisage new contiguous layers adja­
cent to the zones of traditional settlement.14 
However, there is a further question. We are not convinced that 
such settlement expansion need be dependent on agriculture. Presi­
dent Anwar Sadat launched, in much the same way as has President 
Mubarrak, his own scheme for breaking out of the old Nile valley. 
He proposed and launched a series of new cities in the desert, but 
not far from the settled areas. Although the schemes were seen at the 
time as a kind of publicity stunt, real money was invested and, in 
some instances, such as 10th of Ramadan City, a real boom in me­
dium and light manufacturing, all in the private sector, has taken 
place. Real, as opposed to fictitious, residency in these cities has 
been slow in coming, but it will doubtless come if their economic 
bases are sound.15
 It is suggested here that it is in this vein that the real opportunity 
cost for the water to be used in the New Valley Scheme, and for the 
capital that will be required to deliver it, should be seen. A simple bit 
of arithmetic will show what is at stake. Assuming that the New 
Valley will bring 500,000 new hectares under cultivation, and that 
reclamation and initial cultivation of those lands will require 20,000 
m3/ha per year for at least twenty years after the water is first deliv­
14 Such new settlements should, however, be 
located far enough away from the coast to 
avoid the risks associate with sea level rise 
from long-term climate change. 
15 The Government has offered a host of 
incentives to encourage businesses to 
locate in the new cities, and many 
entrepreneurs have established ‘dummy’ 
firms in them in order to take advantage of 
the incentives. Even when the firms are 
real, both management and labor may 
prefer to commute from near-by urban 
centers rather than to take up residence in 
the new cities. 
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ered.16 That would mean a water duty driven by agriculture of 10 
billion m3/yr or 18% of Egypt’s 1959 allotment. 
Supposing, on the other hand, that Egypt decides to develop a 
new city of 200,000 inhabitants over the same twenty-year period. 
Assuming also that each inhabitant uses 140 liters a day (a kind of 
mid-range average for households with private water connections in 
low and middle income countries). Households in this new city 
would use about 10 million m3/yr. If one increases this by 50% to 
allow for commercial and industrial use, then the city would use 15 
million m3/yr. The agricultural water use for the New Valley project 
(10 billion m3/yr), would be sufficient to support over 650 new cities 
of this size (with a total population of over 130 million people). 
Would food security be sacrificed by pursuing an urban, indus­
trial economic development strategy instead of expansion of irri­
gated agriculture? Not really. As Egypt’s population grows, albeit at 
slower rates, it will have little choice but to import at least half of its 
food and food-product needs. Increasing its cultivated surface by 
15% will not make much of a dent in that reality. Egypt’s future has 
to lie in the non-agricultural sector and the exports of manufactured 
goods and of services. New cities can be platforms for both. 
Why then is Egypt pursuing the New Valley Scheme? In part 
President Mubarrak is surely emulating both predecessors and con­
temporaries. In the 1950s, Egypt’s President, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, 
captured the country’s imagination with the Aswan High Dam 
project, and, in the last decade, Mo’ammar Qaddafi certainly cap­
tured attention — if not admiration — for his Great Man-Made 
River scheme in Libya. Engineering projects on this scale spin off 
billions of dollars in contracts, which is politically attractive (but 
alternative projects, such as new cities, would yield similar benefits). 
There may be a strategic consideration: to wit, that Egypt would like 
to create a buffer center of population in its hitherto mainly empty 
western desert. 
Finally, if the New Valley Scheme is brought to completion, it 
will be a major bargaining chip when and if Egypt is obliged to enter 
into negotiations with the other Nile riparians over reallocation of 
shares in the river. Established facts, based on actual water use and 
sunk costs, have always weighed heavily in establishing legitimate 
claims to shares in transboundary rivers. If the New Valley Scheme 
proceeds as planned, Egypt will have created a huge “fact.” In that 
sense, and even though Egypt may not use any water beyond the 
share allotted in the 1959 Agreement, it will have effectively 
precluded accommodation of the growing needs for water of its 
upstream neighbors, especially those of Ethiopia. 
16 	Note that in this illustrative calculation, we 
have used much higher water use per 
hectare estimates than we did for irrigation 
in the highlands of Ethiopia. This is because: 
(1) evapotranspiration is higher in the 
western desert of Egypt, (2) the Egyptian 
estimates assume year-round irrigation, 
while Ethiopian farmers may need irrigation 
only part of the year, and (3) the Ethiopian 
microdams may not have the storage 
capacity to supply higher amounts of water 
for irrigation. 
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CONCLUSION 
To summarize the above discussion: the challenge facing the Nile 
riparian countries is to change the existing property rights regime to 
the waters of the Nile without running the risks of the collision 
course described. This will require that the Nile riparians find a 
balance between the upstream countries’ support for the principle of 
“equitable use,” and Egypt’s and Sudan’s support for the principle of 
“no appreciable harm.” These two principles are in conflict, and 
their balancing will require accommodation and compromise on the 
part of all parties. 
Albeit in fits and starts, the Nile riparian countries now seem to 
be committing themselves to a process of dialogue, and interna­
tional donors are apparently ready to underwrite this effort with a 
major infusion of funds. However, both Egypt’s New Valley Project 
and Ethiopia’s microdam strategy create serious problems for this 
long-term strategy of dialogue and consensus building because they 
offer Egypt and Ethiopia unilateral water resources development 
options that both will find difficult to resist. The possibility of cred­
ible unilateral investments and rising populations means that time is 
not necessarily on the side the riparian countries and the donor 
agencies as they embark on a process of consensus building and 
dialogue. It may be easier to negotiate a revised Nile Waters Agree­
ment sooner rather than later. 
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Restructuring of Water Usage in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin: The Impact of Modern Water 
Management Policies 
Peter Beaumont 
University of Wales, Lampeter 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the ramifications of late twentieth century water management schemes–especially those initiated 
by the Republic of Turkey–for the riparians of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The Turks’ geographical position, and their 
ability to construct large water storage systems, has essentially given them command of the headwaters of the Euphrates 
and, to a lesser degree, the Tigris. The recent changes in water management of the Tigris-Euphrates basin have had, and 
will continue to have, profound consequences for the agricultural sectors of the economies of the riparian nations. By 
unilaterally decreasing the water available for irrigation in Syria and Iraq, Turkey has presented these nations with an 
aqueous conundrum that remains to be solved. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Tigris-Euphrates basin reveals evidence of water manage­
ment projects dating back over six millennia. Throughout this pe­
riod empires have waxed and waned. However, their power base has The Tigris-Euphrates basin reveals 
consistently been constructed on the wealth generated by irrigated evidence of water management projects 
dating back over six millennia. Through-agriculture (Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff 1988). The historical 
out this period empires have waxed and location of this activity has always been in the lower part of the basin 
waned. However, their power base has 
in what is now the country of Iraq. The scales of development have 
consistently been constructed on the 
varied from small diversion works to major engineering feats such as wealth generated by irrigated agriculture. 
the Nahrawan canal built during the sixth century CE. Since the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, however, widespread land aban­
donment has occurred, associated with a breakdown of the strong 
central government necessary for sustained widespread irrigation. 
It was only in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth cen­
tury that major irrigation development began to appear once more 
in the lower part of the Tigris-Euphrates basin. 
During this whole period, water management had been confined 
to the manipulation of the snow-melt flood waves of the two rivers 
in the lower part of the basin in the period from April to June. In 
low flood conditions there would be insufficient water available to 
irrigate all the crops which were planted and crop failures would 
occur in those highest areas of the flood plain at some distance from 
the river. In contrast, high flood conditions could not be easily 
controlled by the prevailing irrigation systems and so crop failure 
through excess amounts of standing water occurred. Besides these 
vagaries of the annual flood there were also problems associated 
with the high salinity of the soils. Given these difficulties, the drain­
age of saline irrigation waters from the fields was always a prime 
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concern. The system of water management which grew up was one 
which attempted to minimize the risks to crop growth. Another 
characteristic feature of this era was that only a small proportion of 
the total water in the river was being utilized for human activity. The 
vast majority of the water flowed unused into the Persian Gulf. 
HYDROLOGY OF THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES BASIN 
Understanding the hydrology of the basin is crucial to under­
standing the effects water management projects have on the rivers. 
The topography is such that all the highland regions are located in 
the north and eastern parts of the basin in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. 
These mountains reach heights of almost 3,500 m to the south of 
Erzincan and of around 4,500 m in the upper part of the Euphrates 
catchment near Lake Van. In the Tigris basin heights of up to 4,200 m 
are recorded in southeast Turkey in the catchment of the Greater 
Zab. It is in these highlands that almost all of the flows of the two 
rivers are generated as annual precipitation totals commonly ex­
ceeding 1,000 mm. Precipitation in the basin is largely confined to 
the winter months from October through to April. This means that 
a large proportion of the total falls as snow on the uplands and 
consequently the water is locked in the solid state on the mountain 
slopes until temperatures begin to rise in spring and early summer. 
Both the Tigris and the Euphrates are characterized by river 
regimes which exhibit strong snow-melt peaks. On the Tigris the 
month of peak discharge is April, while on the Euphrates it is a 
month later in May. Measured in Iraq, the months of March, April 
and May account for 53% of the mean annual flow of the Tigris. The 
period of maximum flow on the Euphrates in Iraq is shorter and 
later than that of the Tigris and is usually confined to the months of 
April and May. Discharge during these two months accounts for 
approximately 42% of the annual total. 
There still remains controversy over the actual annual flows of 
the two rivers, with different authors quoting different totals. How­
ever, these values tend to reflect differing observation periods, rather 
than fundamental disagreements as to how much water is present 
within the two river systems. The total flow of the Euphrates at Hit 
in northern Iraq is given as 31,820 MCM by Beaumont (1985). How­
ever, Kolars (1994) quotes a figure of 32,720 MCM. On the Tigris the 
overall discharge from the catchment is much greater and attains a 
value of around 52,665 MCM (Beaumont 1978). Kolars in 1994, how­
ever, quotes a value of 49,200 MCM. 
The main difference between the Euphrates and Tigris in terms 
of how their discharge is generated is that the Tigris receives water 
from a series of major tributaries in the mid-portion of its course. 
Both the Tigris and the Euphrates are 
characterized by river regimes which 
exhibit strong snow-melt peaks....there 
still remains controversy over the actual 
annual flows of the two rivers, with 
different authors quoting different 
totals. However, these values tend to 
reflect differing observation periods, 
rather than fundamental disagreements 
as to how much water is present within 
the two river systems. 
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The mainstream of the Tigris has a flow of 23,210 MCM annually at 
Mosul in northern Iraq (Kolars quotes 20,500 MCM), while the tribu­
taries contribute a further 29,455 MCM each year (Kolars quotes 
28,700 MCM). The largest tributary is the Greater Zab, which pro­
duces almost half the flow of all the tributaries. 
In contrast, on the Euphrates, all of the major tributaries are in 
the extreme upper part of the basin. This has important ramifica­
tions for the control of the two rivers. With the Euphrates it means 
that a single dam in the upper part of the catchment is capable of 
controlling a very large proportion of the flow of the river. The 
Ataturk Dam in Turkey achieves this level of control. On the Tigris, 
however, the fact that it receives water from the Greater Zab, the 
Lesser Zab, the Adhaim and the Diyala means that overall water 
management is more complex and requires the construction of a 
series of major dam projects on the individual tributaries to provide 
a comparable control of the flow. 
One of the problems in the Tigris-Euphrates system has been the 
variability of flow from year to year. Long-term records on the 
upper Euphrates before the construction of major dams (1937-1964) 
have revealed that minimum discharge can fall to 16,871 MCM/y 
(1961), while a maximum value of 43,457 MCM/y was recorded (1963). 
An even wetter year was recorded in 1969 when the flow just north 
of the Turkish border registered an annual discharge of 53,548 MCM. 
Such large variations in discharge have always made it difficult to 
plan irrigation schedules efficiently in the lower part of the basin 
when no water storage capacity has been available. On the Tigris River a 
similar pattern of flow variation can be observed. The observation 
period is 1946 to 1985 for the Cizre gauging station, Turkey. The aver­
age annual flow here is 16,800 MCM. In 1961 the flow fell to a minimum 
value of only 7,891 MCM, while in 1969 it peaked at 34,340 MCM. 
On the Euphrates, approximately 88% of the total flow of the 
main stream of the river is generated in Turkey, and a further 12% is 
added in Syria from the Sajur, the Balikh, and the Khabur. A sub­
stantial amount of precipitation which feeds these rivers falls over 
Turkey and enters them directly as runoff or as groundwater dis­
charge. It is very difficult to estimate just how much of the flow of 
these rivers is contributed from Turkish precipitation. However, it 
does seem likely that precipitation falling over Turkey accounts for 
at least 95% of the total flow of the Euphrates. Along the Tigris 
River, Turkey provides approximately 32% of the river’s discharge 
in terms of the mainstream. A large, although unknown, amount of 
the flow of the Greater Zab River also originates in Turkey. This 
discharge, together with that of the mainstream, probably raises the 
Turkish contribution to around 44% of the total flow of the Tigris. 
The main difference between the 
Euphrates and Tigris in terms of how 
their discharge is generated is that the 
Tigris receives water from a series of 
major tributaries in the mid-portion of 
its course…in contrast, on the Euph­
rates, all of the major tributaries are in 
the extreme upper part of the basin. 
This has important ramifications for the 
control of the two rivers. With the 
Euphrates it means that a single dam in 
the upper part of the catchment is 
capable of controlling a very large 
proportion of the flow of the river. 
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Of the combined flow of the two rivers, approximately 63.2% is 
generated on Turkish territory. With so much of the water of the 
two rivers coming from precipitation falling over Turkey, it is not 
surprising that the Turkish government feels that it has a strong 
claim to make use of what it considers to be its own waters. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The most important change in the twentieth century has been in 
the location of water management activity and the type of water 
controls introduced. In the Tigris-Euphrates basin it is only in the 
post-World War II period that the emphasis switches from down­
stream diversion schemes to upstream water storage projects. This 
represents a fundamental change in river management activity 
within the basin, brought about largely by the growing human abil- The most important change in the 
ity to manipulate the environment through fossil fuel subsidies and twentieth century has been in the 
technological change. This restructuring in the patterns of water location of water management activity 
usage has had a profound effect on all aspects of development within and the type of water controls intro-
the basin. This is especially the case as the population distribution duced. In the Tigris-Euphrates basin it is 
only in the post-World War II period within the basin up to the 1960s reflected the traditional patterns of 
that the emphasis switches from water management and agricultural production. 
downstream diversion schemes to Besides technological change there has also been an important 
upstream water storage projects. This 
political change. Prior to the twentieth century the whole of the represents a fundamental change in 
Tigris-Euphrates basin was under the control of a unified, although river management activity within the 
sometime weak, government. This situation lasted through World basin, brought about largely by the 
War I with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. After the War dif- growing human ability to manipulate the 
ferent political units controlled the upper, middle and lower parts of environment through fossil fuel subsidies 
and technological change. the basin. As a result the chance for unified development of the 
waters of the basin using twentieth century technology became 
increasingly remote. 
After World War II, water management focused on the construc­
tion of water storage facilities in the highland parts of the basin in 
Turkey on the Euphrates and in both Turkey and Iraq on the Tigris 
River. This form of water management usually had two objectives: 
generation of hydro-electricity and provision of large quantities of 
water for irrigation purposes. As this development activity and 
planning took place in the 1960s and early 1970s, it soon became 
evident that there was not going to be enough water available in the 
two rivers to satisfy the planned needs of the three major countries 
located in the basin (Beaumont 1978). Negotiations to reach a settle­
ment to the dispute over water volumes available to each of the 
riparian states have been attempted on a number of occasions, but 
have never been able to produce an agreement. Consequently, the 
three nations (Turkey, Iraq and Syria) all went ahead with their own 
development schemes with little consideration of the impact their 
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projects would have on the other states in the basin. 
Without doubt Turkey is in the strongest position with regard to 
its potential control of a large part of the water resources of the 
Tigris-Euphrates basin. It can develop its water management 
schemes, and the two downstream countries of Syria and Iraq will 
have to suffer the consequences of lower flow conditions. Initially 
Turkey constructed the Keban Dam in the 1960s on the upper 
Euphrates. However, it built this dam largely for the generation of 
hydro-electricity, and therefore, the volumes of water flowing down 
the river remained constant. What did change, however, was the 
pattern of discharge along the Euphrates. With the volume of water 
in the reservoir behind the Keban Dam, which amounted to 30,700 
MCM of gross storage and 17,000 MCM of active storage, it was now 
possible for the Turkish government to exercise a large measure of 
control over the flow of the river. It did this to achieve a more uni­
form flow pattern, attempting to limit minimum flows to 400 m3/s 
and maximum flows to 1000 m3/s. As a result, major floods or ex­
tremely low flow conditions were effectively eliminated from the 
Euphrates River. With the opening of the Keban dam a new chapter 
in the water management of the Euphrates River began. Greater 
control of flow was now possible, but as yet there was little need to 
use the water within Turkey for any productive purposes. The first 
stage of the restructuring of water usage had begun. 
To utilize more of the water in the Tigris and Euphrates, Turkey 
has embarked upon an ambitious series of schemes which are now 
usually referred to as the South-East Anatolia Project (Bagis 1989; 
Bilen 1994a and b; Altinbilek 1997). This project consists of 13 
individual, but related, schemes on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. 
Seven of these schemes are located on the Euphrates River. When 
fully implemented in the early years of the twenty-first century, they 
will permit the irrigation of 1,083,000 ha and will utilise up to 9,000 
MCM of water each year. On the Tigris River, the six planned schemes 
will irrigate 558,000 ha and use 3,700 MCM each year. These figures 
for water use come from official Turkish sources presented in the 
main planning documents for the scheme. However, field evidence 
suggests that water usage will be around 10,000 m3/ha. This indicates 
that actual water use figures could be in excess of 10,000 MCM/y on 
the Euphrates and over 5,580 MCM on the Tigris. The second stage of 
water restructuring in the Euphrates basin can be said to have begun 
with the first delivery of irrigation waters through the Urfa Tunnels 
in 1995. 
Of particular interest with the South-eastern Anatolia Project is 
the high level of commitment the government of Turkey has shown 
toward it. The financial provision for such projects from interna-
Without doubt Turkey is in the 
strongest position with regard to its 
potential control of a large part of the 
water resources of the Tigris-Euphrates 
basin. It can develop its water manage­
ment schemes, and the two down­
stream countries of Syria and Iraq will 
have to suffer the consequences of 
lower flow conditions. 
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tional organizations such as the World Bank is always dependent 
upon an agreement as to water use by all the states within the river 
basin. From an early stage in the planning process, Turkey realized 
that it would not be able to gain the agreement of Syria and Iraq for 
the use of the water volumes it proposed. Consequently, it was 
forced to finance the project entirely from funds generated within 
Turkey. This was a substantial drain on the finances of the nation, 
but indicates just how important the project was to the economic 
development of the nation. 
On the Euphrates in Turkey, the key structure is the Ataturk 
Dam, which is located approximately 80 km upstream from the 
Syrian border. Its two main purposes are to produce hydro-electric­
ity and to provide water for the irrigation projects being developed 
along the Syrian border. The reservoir has a gross storage capacity of 
Of particular interest with the South­48,700 MCM and an active storage capacity of 19,300 MCM. As a result 
eastern Anatolia Project is the high level of the construction of the Ataturk Dam, Turkey has now stated that 
of commitment the government of 
in the future (since 1990) it would only guarantee a flow down- Turkey has shown toward it…On the 
stream from the dam of 500 m3/sec. This represents about 50% of Euphrates in Turkey, the key structure is 
the natural flow of the Euphrates River at the Turkish border. Both the Ataturk Dam, which is located 
Syria and Iraq have disputed this figure and have stated that the approximately 80 km upstream from 
minimum flow should average at least 700 m3/sec. Turkey has so far the Syrian border. Its two main purposes 
are to produce hydro-electricity and to rejected this claim. 
provide water for the irrigation projects The pattern of water release from the Ataturk Dam is further 
being developed along the Syrian border. complicated by the fact that there are eight turbines in the dam 
which are capable of generating electricity. When running at full 
power, each of these turbines has a water throughput of 225 m3/sec. 
This means that if all eight were running at the same time at full 
capacity, the water discharge from the dam would be 1800 m3/sec. It 
would seem likely that maximum electricity generation from the 
Ataturk Dam will take place during the winter months, but actual 
amounts are difficult to predict. As far as water discharge is con­
cerned, what seems likely to happen is that during winter the release 
of water from the dam may be well in excess of the 500 m3/sec guar­
anteed by the Turkish government. In effect, this might mean a 
major change in the discharge pattern of the river, with maximum 
flow conditions in future occurring during the winter months in­
stead of in April and May. Downstream states are, therefore, likely 
to receive more water than they perhaps expected, but it will arrive 
at a time of year when it is not very convenient in terms of their 
likely water needs. 
In the future, Turkey may well face a choice between irrigation 
and hydro-electricity generation. Irrigation has such a large demand 
for water that the use of the generators in the Ataturk Dam will have 
to be severely limited in terms of their operating times if the maxi­
  
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mum irrigation program is to be attained. At the current time this 
might not be a problem for the Turkish government. However, as 
demands for electric power increase in the next century it is possible 
that Turkey might be willing to sacrifice some of its newly irrigated 
land so that more power can be produced. In the final analysis, 
everything will depend on whether the highest monetary value can 
be obtained from a cubic meter of water used for irrigation or for 
power production. 
When all the reservoirs on the Tigris-Euphrates system have 
been completed in the early years of the next century, the Turkish 
government will have substantial control over the flows of the two 
rivers. On the Euphrates, the active, or usable, storage of all the 
reservoirs which have been built or planned is 42,000 MCM. This 
compares with an annual flow of the Euphrates at the Syrian border 
of 30,377 MCM. Effectively, therefore, the storage capacity of the 
system is 1.38 times the annual discharge of the river, which means 
that the flow of the river can be easily regulated except during long 
drought periods, or a run of very wet years. On the Tigris, Turkey’s 
degree of control over the flow of the river is less marked. The 
planned active storage of the reservoirs on the upper Tigris is expected 
to be 15,246 MCM. This compares with an average annual flow of 
16,718 MCM for the river at the Cizre gauging station, which indicates 
that total water storage is less than the discharge of an average year. 
What is quite clear from this analysis is that Turkey really does 
have a stranglehold on the waters of the Euphrates River. At least 
88% of the river’s flow is generated within the country, and it has 
the ability to store a water volume equivalent to 1.38 times the aver­
age annual flow of the river at the Syrian border. However, Turkey 
has claimed that it will maintain a flow of 500 m3/sec of water across 
the border into Syria (15,768 MCM). Given the high storage capacity 
which Turkey now possesses along the river it seems likely that it 
would be able to achieve this objective without cutting back on its 
own irrigation needs. The expected irrigation demand in Turkey is 
thought likely to be at least 10,000 MCM each year, while the down­
stream flow requirement is 15,768 MCM. This gives a total annual 
demand of 25,768 MCM. To cause serious problems, the flow of the 
river would have to fall below 20,000 MCM/y for a number of years. 
The available long-term records reveal that the flow of the River 
Euphrates has only fallen below 20,000 MCM on three occasions in 
the 40 year period prior to 1980. 
On the Euphrates, the key to the downstream states of Syria and 
Iraq making the best use of the waters of the river lies in their stor­
age of as much of the water made available to them from Turkey 
during the winter period as possible. Both states already have storage 
In the future, Turkey may well face a 
choice between irrigation and hydro­
electricity generation…what is quite 
clear from this analysis is that Turkey 
really does have a stranglehold on the 
waters of the Euphrates River. 
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facilities available, but their combined capacity is low. In Syria the 
Tabqa Dam, built by the Russians in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
has a storage capacity of 11,900 MCM. In Iraq, the Haditha Dam, 
another project constructed by the Russians, has a storage capacity 
of 6,400 MCM. Taken together, these two facilities are capable of 
holding only about 58% of the original annual flow of the river at 
Hit, Iraq. Given Turkey’s need for hydro electricity, the water re­
leases from the Ataturk Dam in winter may well exceed the 500 m3/sec 
guaranteed by the Turkish government. The strategy of the two 
downstream countries must be to ensure that their reservoirs are full 
at the end of the winter period so that the water can be utilized for 
irrigation as soon as the agricultural season begins. Iraq will find 
itself in a very difficult position. With only 6,400 MCM of storage it is 
possible that a proportion of the winter flow of the river will flow 
into the Shatt al-Arab and effectively be wasted. The only other 
possibility might be early season watering of the fields to build up 
soil moisture concentrations. 
Syria is in the unusual position of being a downstream country 
with regard to Turkey and an upstream one in comparison with 
Iraq. Like Turkey, Syria had not made much use of the waters of the 
river prior to the 1960s. With the construction of the Tabqa Dam in 
the 1970s, there had been ambitious plans for major irrigation 
projects along the Euphrates, particularly in the lower reaches of the 
Rivers Balikh and Khabour (Manners and Sagafi-Nejad 1985). How­
ever, owing largely to a lack of funding, these projects did not com­
mence large-scale development until the late 1980s. In the 
mid-1980s it is claimed that no more than 208,000 ha were being 
irrigated (Kolar and Mitchell 1991). Over the last few years, how­
ever, the pace of development of irrigation networks has been con­
siderable. Associated with this trend has been a marked increase in 
water use. There is still uncertainty as to just how much irrigated 
land will be developed adjacent to the Euphrates River, but estimates 
suggest that it will be at least 475,000 ha by the early years of the 
twenty-first century. The expected water demand will be on the 
order of 4,750 MCM each year. However, certain government sources 
have suggested that the total irrigated area along the River Euphrates 
may eventually rise to close to one million ha. This does appear to 
be rather optimistic, but if achieved it would raise the water need to 
around 10,000 MCM/y. The greatest potential for this extra irrigation 
development would seem to be located in the lower part of the 
Khabour basin. 
The actual amounts of land which are cultivated in Syria are 
crucial as far as Iraq is concerned. If the lower figure proves to be the 
correct one, then Iraq should receive slightly more than 10,000 MCM 
On the Euphrates, the key to the 
downstream states of Syria and Iraq 
making the best use of the waters of the 
river lies in their storage of as much of 
the water made available to them from 
Turkey during the winter period as 
possible. Both states already have 
storage facilities available, but their 
combined capacity is low. 
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of water each year. If the Syrian irrigated area grows to around 1 
million ha, then the volume of water Iraq will receive will fall to 
about 5,000 MCM. It should be remembered that these figures prob­
ably represent minimum values and that Turkey is likely to release 
larger quantities of water than it has guaranteed as a result of power 
generation during the winter months. It is worth noting that during 
the 1960s Iraq was claimed to be using at least 16,368 MCM of water 
each year for irrigation in the region between Hit and Hindiyah 
(Ubell 1971). 
Syria also has a border on the Tigris River in the extreme north­
east of the country with Turkey on the opposite bank. Over the last 
few years Syria has approached Turkey about the possibility of ex­
tracting water from the Tigris and releasing it into the upper part of 
the Khabour basin. From an engineering point of view this would be 
a fairly straight forward project. Iraq, however, is not keen to lose 
water from the Tigris which it considers to belong to itself, even 
though in the long term it might well benefit from greater flows 
along the Euphrates. 
Since the early 1980s and the beginnings of the war with Iran, it 
has been extremely difficult to obtain accurate statistics on agricul­
tural activity within Iraq. Although Iraq has known for almost 20 
years that it would face smaller water amounts once the South­
eastern Anatolia and the Syrian irrigation schemes were completed, 
there is little evidence to suggest that Iraq has planned any formal 
adjustments to its own irrigated areas. Indeed, it is only in the 1990s 
with the opening of new Syrian projects and the completion of the 
Ataturk Dam that Iraq has had to face up to the issue of smaller 
water amounts. Its response seems to have been to leave it to the 
local districts to cope as best they can with the smaller water vol­
umes. This seems to imply that the more difficult areas to irrigate in 
any region will be abandoned first, thereby causing the total irri­
gated crop area to contract. 
The position in the Tigris watershed is at the moment less critical 
than in the Euphrates. In the first place, Turkey controls a much 
smaller part of the total flow, namely 16,800 MCM out of a total of 
52,665 MCM each year. This represents only 31.9% of the average 
flow. Turkey also theoretically could control the upper part of the 
Greater Zab, but topographic conditions make this highly unlikely. 
Of the total volume of water in the Tigris, Turkey, at the moment, 
has plans to utilize up to 5,500 MCM for irrigation schemes, although 
many of these projects will not be complete until the early years of 
the twenty-first century. As yet, Turkey has not made any statement 
as to a particular value of flow level which it will guarantee on the 
Tigris. Equally, in terms of the total active water storage capacity 
Over the last few years Syria has 
approached Turkey about the possibil­
ity of extracting water from the Tigris 
and releasing it into the upper part of 
the Khabour basin. From an engineer­
ing point of view this would be a fairly 
straight forward project. Iraq, however, 
is not keen to lose water from the Tigris 
which it considers to belong to itself, 
even though in the long term it might 
well benefit from greater flows along 
the Euphrates. 
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which it controls, Turkey will have only 15,246 MCM located within 
its borders. This represents only 29.4% of the mean annual flow for 
the basin as a whole. 
From the above, it can be seen that Iraq has much greater control 
of the waters of the Tigris than it has of the Euphrates. Once Turkey’s 
needs have been met, this will leave about 47,165 MCM for Iraq. This is 
an enormous quantity of water and should, theoretically, permit the 
irrigation of up to 3,628,000 ha with a water rate of 13,000 CM/ha or 
up to 4,716,500 ha with an irrigation rate of 10,000 m3/ha. 
The fact that Iraq has so much water available in the Tigris basin 
may go some way to explaining why its criticism of Turkey’s stance 
on the Euphrates River has been so restrained. It is true that com­
plaints have been made about the release of only 500 m3/sec by 
Turkey on the Euphrates, but they have not been pursued with the 
vigor that might have been expected if Iraq’s vital interests were 
indeed being threatened. 
With all the water to which it has access on the Tigris, it is con­
ceivable that Iraq might well decide to divert part of this water over 
to the irrigated areas along the Euphrates. This could be achieved via 
the Tharthar Depression, but experiments have shown that this is 
likely to increase the salinity of the water considerably and so is 
unlikely to be a practical proposition. Another suggestion is a tun­
nel/canal following for the most part the 500 m contour between the 
Tigris and the Euphrates. This would be a large scale project, as the 
canal would be over 200 km in length. However, if built, it would be 
able to deliver water to the Euphrates downstream from the Haditha 
Dam. The flow of water into the canal could easily be controlled 
from the Mosul Dam on the Tigris. Such a scheme would permit the 
continued cultivation of much of the land on the Euphrates in Iraq 
which will soon be going out of cultivation as the result of the re­
duced water supply along the river following the expansion of the 
Turkish irrigated area. This obviously has considerable attraction to 
the Iraqi government, since it would mean that the social disruption 
in the villages along the river would be minimized. 
FUTURE WATER DEMANDS 
The demand for water can be thought of in two principal ways: 
first, a demand which can be satisfied because water is available, and 
second, a demand which cannot be met owing to water scarcity. 
Until the 1960s the water demands of all three countries in the basin 
could be satisfied with water to spare. Since then, as water demands 
in the upper part of the basin have increased, the situation has 
changed and will continue to do so for the next two decades until all 
the planned irrigation projects are fully commissioned. 
The fact that Iraq has so much water 
available in the Tigris basin may go some 
way to explaining why its criticism of 
Turkey’s stance on the Euphrates River 
has been so restrained…with all the 
water to which it has access on the 
Tigris, it is conceivable that Iraq might 
well decide to divert part of this water 
over to the irrigated areas along the 
Euphrates. This could be achieved via 
the Tharthar Depression, but experi­
ments have shown that this is likely to 
increase the salinity of the water 
considerably and so is unlikely to be a 
practical proposition. 
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Several scholars have addressed the problem of demand for 
water over the years and all have reached the same conclusion, 
namely, that there is not sufficient water in the Euphrates River to 
meet the needs of the three countries with interests in the watershed 
(Beaumont 1978; Kliot 1994; Kolars 1994; Altinbilek 1997). On the 
Tigris, the situation is less serious, but even here the most optimistic 
scenarios only register a flow into the Shatt al-Arab of about 9,500 to 
10,500 MCM when all the irrigation schemes are in operation (Kolars 
1994; Altinbilek 1997).
 On the Euphrates, both Kolars and Kliot suggest a maximum 
water demand in Turkey of around 21,500 MCM each year when all 
the irrigation projects are commissioned (Table 1). 
This seems a very high figure when it is remembered that the 
planned irrigation area on the Euphrates only amounts to 1,083,000 
ha. With the water volume quoted this would seem to imply a water 
usage rate of 19,853 cubic m per hectare or a much larger area under 
irrigation. A more realistic calculation would seem to be a figure of 
about 10,000 m3/ha, giving a total water demand figure of 10,830 
MCM. Even if an irrigation tariff of 12,000 m3/ha was used, a maxi­
mum demand of only 12,996 MCM is reached. On top of this there 
are, of course, evaporation losses from the major dams along the 
Euphrates which amount to 1083 MCM. This gives a total of between 
11,913 and 14,079 MCM, which is reasonably close to the figure 
quoted by Altinbilek (Table 2). 
For Syria, Kolars quotes a water demand of 11,995 MCM and 
Kliot, 13,400 MCM, while Altinbilek gives a total of only 5,500 MCM. 
Here the situation is much more difficult to assess, because every­
thing depends on the size of the irrigated area which is eventually 
developed by Syria. It would seem that the total figure will be be­
tween 475,000 and 1,000,000 ha when all projects are completed. 
However, at the moment, it is difficult to be any more precise than 
this as the Syrian government has been extremely slow to begin the 
schemes which were planned more than 20 years ago. Annual water 
demands for these irrigated regions would be 4,750 MCM (for the 
lower value of 10,000 m3/ha) to 12,000 MCM (for the higher value of 
12,000 m3/ha). On top of this evaporation from the reservoirs along 
the Euphrates is 630 MCM each year (Table 2). 
The question of water demand in Iraq becomes something of a 
theoretical concept. If Turkey and Syria extract the maximum ex­
pected volumes of water from the Euphrates, the discharge into Iraq 
will be reduced to around 5,000 MCM each year. Evidence suggests 
that even in the 1960s Iraq was extracting 16,368 MCM between Hit 
and Hindiyah to irrigate around 1,230,000 ha (Ubell 1971). It is also 
known that considerable irrigation was taking place downstream 
  
Table 1 Potential water demand on the 
Euphrates after the year 2020 in 
MCM/y. 
Country Kolars Kliot Altinbilek 
Turkey 21,600 21,500 14,500 
Syria 11,995 13,400 5,500 
Iraq 17,000 16,000 15,500 
Total demand 50,595 50,900 35,500 
Available water 32,720 31,000 31,680 
Balance -17,875 -19,900 -3,820 
(Kolars 1994; Kliot 1994; Altinbeck 1997) 
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Table 2	 Revised water demand estimates for the Euphrates basin for the period after the 
year 2020 in MCM/y (author’s estimates). (Note: for Syria and Turkey the 
minimum irrigated area values are calculated using a minimum water tariff of 10,000 
m3/ha and the maximum area values with a tariff of 12,000 m3/ha. For Iraq the 
water tariffs used are 13,300 m3/ha and 15,000 m3/ha respectively.) 
Country Irrigation Water Use Evaporation Total 
Turkey 10,830-13,000 1,100 12,000 -14,000 
Syria 4,750-12,500 630 5,400 -12,600 
Iraq 24,400-27,500 600 25,000 - 28,100 
Total demand 42,300 - 54,800 
Available water 31,800 
Balance -10,500 to 23,000 
from Hindiyah at this time, though exact amounts are unknown. 
Altinbilek (1997) states that in 1970 only 400,000 ha were being 
irrigated along the Euphrates and 800,000 ha along the Tigris. How­
ever, these figures would seem to be incorrect. McLachlan (1985) 
states that the irrigated area in Iraq in 1970 was 3,680,000 ha. The 
vast majority of this would be located in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. 
Kliot quotes figures from the late 1980s and early 1990s which esti­
mate the actual irrigated area along the Euphrates River in Iraq as 
1.0 to 1.29 million ha. It is, however, acknowledged that at this time 
the irrigated area had been reduced as a result of the Iran-Iraq war 
of the 1980s. The total area on the Euphrates which can be irrigated 
is thought to be 1,833,000 ha (Kliot 1994). If this is a realistic figure 
it means that total water demand at some time in the future could 
rise to 24,379 MCM/y with an irrigation rate of 13,300 cubic metre/ 
hectare. For a rate of 15,000 cubic m per hectare the total demand 
would rise to 27,495 MCM (Table 2). Table 2 clearly shows that the po­
tential water deficit on the Euphrates River after the year 2020 might be 
as high as from 10,500 to 23,000 MCM each year. Since there will be 
enough water in the river to satisfy the full needs of both Turkey and 
Syria, it will be Iraq which will be least able to satisfy its potential needs. 
On the Tigris the overall situation is similar. There is general 
agreement that water demand for Turkey will be between 6,700 and 
8,000 MCM each year (Table 3). The calculations of the present au­
thor suggest that the likely water demand for the planned irrigation 
of 558,000 ha will be between 5,580 and 6,696 MCM/y (Table 4). 
Evaporation from a total of nine proposed reservoirs, with a total 
surface area of 693 km2 is likely to add a further 624 MCM to the 
demand. This is based on an evaporation rate in these upland valleys 
of 900 mm/y. 
Syria’s use of water from the Tigris remains something of an 
enigma. It would be possible to divert water from the Tigris and 
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pump it into the upper Khabur. However, without the active support 
of Turkey it would only be possible to obtain significant quantities of 
water during the high flow period. What is certain, though, is that 
Syria’s demand for water to be used within the catchment of the River 
Tigris itself will be small as it does not have access to suitable land. 
Potential water demand in Iraq is high with estimates from 
29,200 to 40,000 MCM/y (Table 3). As with the Euphrates, it is ex­
ceedingly difficult to obtain accurate statistics as to the area of irri­
gated land. Kliot quotes a figure of 2 million ha being irrigated in 
the Tigris basin in the late 1980s and a total irrigable area of between 
2.8 and 4 million ha (Kliot 1994). If these figures are correct, poten­
tial water demand could rise to values of between 37,240 and 60,000 
MCM/y based on water tariff figures of 13,300 to 15,000 m3/ha (Table 
4). Prediction of maximum evaporation losses for all the reservoirs in 
Iraq is difficult to calculate owing to the lack of data, but will be at 
least 1,000 MCM/y. Taking these figures for the Tigris as a whole sug­
gests a surplus of around 8,000 MCM/y for the lowest figures, but a 
deficit of over 15,500 MCM/y if the higher values are utilized (Table 4). 
If the newly calculated water demand data for the Euphrates and 
Tigris Rivers are summed, they provide an estimate of the overall 
balance for the basin in the period after 2020 (Tables 2 and 4). The 
minimum data estimates point to a possible water deficit of 2,233 MCM /y. 
However, the maximum values reveal a huge potential deficit of 
38,641 MCM. This, it will be noted, is greater than the average flow of 
the Euphrates River. 
WATER QUALITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL / 
RESOURCE ISSUES 
In all the water management projects which have been planned 
to date for the Tigris-Euphrates basin, the emphasis has been on 
water volumes, with relatively little consideration being given to 
water quality. In general, the natural water quality of the Tigris-
Euphrates basin is high, especially during the spring/early summer 
snow-melt period. Within the next decade or so it is possible that 
water quality along the mainstreams of the Tigris and the Euphrates 
might change significantly for the worse. The main problem is that, 
with most of the diverted water being used for irrigation, there is a 
potentially serious problem with regard to the quality of the irrigation 
return waters. In general about 20% of the water which is applied in 
irrigation drains off the fields and makes its way into adjacent water 
courses or percolates downwards to the water table. From here this 
water will eventually drain back into stream and river systems. 
This water will carry with it a wide range of dissolved chemicals. 
Some of these will be naturally occurring, including various salts 
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Table 3 Water demand and water availability on the Tigris in the period after 2020. MCM/ 
annum. (Kolars 1994; Kliot 1994; Altinbilek 1997). 
Country Kolars Kliot Altinbilek 
Turkey 6,700 7,200 8,000 
Syria 0 500 0 
Iraq 29,200 40,000 31,900 
Total demand 38,700 47,700 39,900 
Available water 49,200 48,000-52,600 49,570 
Balance 10,500 300-4,900 9,670 
which are present in dryland soils. However, these waters will also 
pick up a wide range of chemicals, including pesticides, herbicides 
and petroleum products which are associated with modern agricul­
tural practices. The net result is that the quality of any receiving 
waters can be severely affected by these irrigation return waters. 
What is difficult, however, is to be able to predict just how severe an 
effect will be generated, as this depends so much on local environ­
mental conditions and the actual agricultural practices which are 
being utilised. On the Euphrates it is possible to identify two rivers 
which will carry most of the return waters from the Turkish irriga­
tion projects. These are the Rivers Balikh and Khabur. On these 
rivers, estimates suggest that flows are likely to increase significantly 
as a result of the addition of irrigation return waters. This will be of 
especial significance on the Balikh River, which has a low annual 
discharge. Estimates here suggest that when all the Turkish and 
Syrian irrigation projects are in operation, the flow of the river 
might increase up to 3.5 times its normal flow as a result of the 
impact of irrigation return waters (Beaumont 1996). Just what the 
impact of these waters will be on the quality of the mainstream of 
the Euphrates is unknown, but it might well be considerable during 
the low summer flow period. 
Water management projects, wherever they are located, will also 
have an impact on the overall ecology of the river. The most impor­
tant changes will be in terms of the regime of the river as well as on 
water volume. With all the storage facilities now located in the up­
per part of the basin of the two rivers, the snowmelt peaks, which 
were such characteristic features of the two rivers, have been greatly 
reduced. This is particularly the case on the Euphrates River. The 
effect of this will probably be greatest in the lower part of the basin 
in the wetlands of the Shatt el-Arab, where the whole ecology of the 
marshes has evolved in response to these snow-melt peaks. With the 
attenuation of these peaks, together with the much lower overall 
flows which the marshes will be receiving, the impact on the natural 
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In all the water management projects 
which have been planned to date for the 
Tigris-Euphrates basin, the emphasis 
has been on water volumes, with 
relatively little consideration being given 
to water quality. 
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Table 4	 Revised water demand figures for the Tigris River for the period after the year 
2020 in MCM/year (author’s estimates). (Note: For Turkey the minimum irrigated 
area values are calculated using a minimum water tariff of 10,000 m3/ha and the 
maximum area values with a tariff of 12,000 m3/ha. For Iraq the water tariffs used 
are 13,300 m3/ha and 15,000 m3/ha respectively.) 
Country Irrigation Water Use Evaporation Total 
Turkey 5,600-6,700 630 6,200-7,300 
Syria 0 0 0 
Iraq 37,200-60,000 1,000 38,200-61,000 
Total demand 44,400-68,300 
Available water 52,700 
Balance +8,200 to -15,700 
environment will be considerable. The future survival of the 
marshes must, therefore, be put in question merely as a result of the 
changes which have occurred, or are likely to occur, in the upper 
parts of the basin in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. However, there are 
other more local pressures which the marshes have to face as well. 
These concern the large drainage canals which the Iraqi government 
has decided to build through the marshlands of southern Iraq. 
When fully completed these channels will carry the water from the 
two rivers through the marsh regions much more rapidly and lead 
to further dewatering of these wetland regions. 
Given the political standing of Saddam Hussein in the West it is 
not surprising that many Western commentators have placed all the 
blame on Iraq for the potential disruption of the ecology of the 
marshes of the Shatt al-Arab. This is, however, a rather extreme view 
of the situation as the future of the marshes has already been threat­
ened by the major new irrigation works in the upper part of the 
basin. In reality, the Iraqi actions have merely exacerbated what was 
already a critical situation. It also has to be recognized that attitudes 
to the draining of wetlands have changed markedly in the relatively 
recent past. When the Israelis drained the Huleh Marshes in the 
1950s, it was regarded at the time as a great feat of human ingenuity 
in converting a marshy “wasteland” into productive agricultural 
land. When the Iraqis undertook the same operation in the 1990s 
current convention wisdom accuses them of ecological devastation. 
There is no doubt that the marshes of the Shatt el-Arab represent 
one of the world’s great wetlands and that the drainage of this eco­
system will destroy a rare environment. However, the Iraqis will 
claim that valuable agricultural land can be produced from the 
marshes. While it is likely that high quality agricultural land can be 
created, the question has to be posed as to where the water to irri-
When the Israelis drained the Huleh 
Marshes in the 1950s, it was regarded 
at the time as a great feat of human 
ingenuity in converting a marshy 
“wasteland” into productive agricultural 
land. When the Iraqis undertook the 
same operation in the 1990s current 
convention wisdom accuses them of 
ecological devastation. 
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gate this new land will come from. There is also concern that at least 
part of the Iraqi government’s reason for draining the marshes is to 
exercise greater political control over the inhabitants of this highly 
inaccessible landscape rather than to produce more food for its people. 
All three countries of the basin are suffering from the effects of 
continued population growth, which will greatly increase the pres­
sure on available resources (see Winkler, this volume). Although it is 
true that the populations of the three countries do not all dwell 
within the basins of the Tigris-Euphrates, there can be no doubt that 
the impact of this growth will be felt there. The population growth 
rates experienced by all three countries during this century have 
been remarkable (Table 5). From the 1940s to the present day their 
populations have increased by between three to five-fold, and be­
tween 1995 and 2025, in the cases of Iraq and Syria, they look likely 
While it is likely that high quality to more than double again. Even in Turkey a more than fifty percent 
agricultural land can be created, the growth rate is postulated. 
question has to be posed as to where 
Besides population increases, there are also increases in the the water to irrigate this new land will 
standards of living of the populations. In turn this means that water come from. There is also concern that at 
usage in an urban/industrial context is likely to go up also. Although least part of the Iraqi government’s 
the increases are high in percentage terms, the actual water volumes reason for draining the marshes is to 
remain low when compared with the predicted irrigation demands. exercise greater political control over 
the inhabitants of this highly inacces-Even so, obtaining sufficient water for some of the rapidly growing 
sible landscape rather than to produce cities may begin to cause problems. 
more food for its people. This leads us to the question of whether water in the twenty-first 
century can continue to be used for irrigation purposes in dryland 
regions (Beaumont 1994; 1997). The issues are water availability and 
maximum economic productivity. There is no doubt that if water is 
available at zero cost, as is the case with water in most rivers in the 
Middle East, then it will be used by local farmers for irrigation pur­
poses. This is, indeed, the basis of traditional agriculture throughout 
the region and it is often the only way available for the peoples of the 
area to farm. In the future, however, with continued increases of 
pressure on available water resources, many governments will be 
forced to cut back the volumes of water allocated to irrigated agri­
culture in an attempt to ensure that the urban/industrial regions 
receive all the water they need for continued growth. It is important 
Table 5 Populations in millions. (Population Reference Bureau, 1995) 
Country 1940s 1960s 1972 1995 2025 
Turkey 17.8 27.7 37.6 61.4 95.6 
Syria 2.5 4.4 6.6 14.7 33.5 
Iraq 4.1 6.7 10.4 20.6 52.6 
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to realize that this urban/industrial demand is relatively small when 
compared with irrigation needs and should be able to be easily met 
from available resources (Beaumont 1997). 
CONCLUSION: THE QUEST FOR MAXIMUM WATER 
PRODUCTIVITY 
It is possible to recognize in the Tigris-Euphrates basins evidence 
of water management strategies stretching over more than six mil­
lennia. However, the length of time of operation of the different 
systems varies enormously. The system which lasted the longest was 
one which can be described as manipulation of the flood waves of 
the two rivers. With this method, the water volumes provided by the 
rivers were accepted as fixed and the management strategy consisted 
of utilizing a relatively small proportion of the spring and early 
summer flood-melt waves for irrigation purposes in the lower part 
of the basin. In some years, the diversion works were overwhelmed 
by the sheer magnitude of the floods, while in other years there was 
insufficient water to irrigate all the land that it had been intended to 
cultivate. This strategy was utilized from about six thousand years 
ago when irrigation first began in the Tigris-Euphrates lowlands up 
to the opening of the Keban Dam in the 1960s. 
The second stage began in the 1960s with the creation of signifi­
cant water storage capacity behind dams in the upland parts of the 
two catchments. For the first time, there was an attempt to store 
water from the time it was generated by nature to the time it was 
needed by human societies. At first the storage capacity was small, 
but with time, as more dams were completed, the total volume of 
water in storage has grown. By the time the South-eastern Anatolia 
project in Turkey is completed in the early years of the twenty-first 
century, total water storage capacity in Turkey alone will be in ex­
cess of the annual flow of the two rivers within its boundaries. 
Through the forty year period, from 1960 to the end of the twen­
tieth century, there has also been a change from excess water avail­
ability to a situation in which there may not be enough water to 
meet the planned requirements of the riparian countries. From the 
year 2000 onwards we can foresee a new phase in water manage­
ment, characterized by growing water shortages. This pressure on 
the available water resources will be compounded by major declines 
in water quality along the mainstreams of the Tigris and Euphrates 
Rivers as more and more irrigation projects are opened in the upper 
parts of the basin. Just how severe this decline in water quality will 
be and its impact on other water users is impossible to estimate at 
the present time. 
This leads us to the question of whether 
water in the twenty-first century can 
continue to be used for irrigation 
purposes in dryland regions.... There is 
no doubt that if water is available at 
zero cost, as is the case with water in 
most rivers in the Middle East, then it 
will be used by local farmers for 
irrigation purposes. 
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With continued population growth, increasing attention will be 
focused on the feasibility of using irrigation water to produce food 
crops. It is certainly possible that during the early decades of the 
twenty-first century there might well be a decrease in irrigated agri­
culture throughout the basin as increasing volumes of water are 
transferred to economically more productive uses in urban/indus­
trial environments. 
In effect, the twentieth century has seen a restructuring of water 
use in the basin of the Tigris-Euphrates. Although the main ele­
ments of the new management strategy are already in place, in terms 
of the major dams and reservoirs, the full impact of these changes 
will not be realized for at least another decade. Inevitably the re­
structuring of water usage will have economic and social impacts as 
well, which will be painful for the local inhabitants. In the lower part 
of the basin, rural areas will not be able to sustain the same high 
level of population that has been the case in the past. This might 
suggest that rural depopulation will increase, putting further pres­
sures on the already crowded urban centers. By contrast, both rural 
and urban populations seem bound to increase in the upper part of 
the basin in Turkey, as economic opportunities grow hand in hand 
with the expansion of irrigated areas which have previously not been 
cultivated in any widespread manner. 
The next stage in water management in the Tigris-Euphrates 
basin is likely to concern adjustments with a new emphasis on the 
value of water. The critical factor is likely to be the maximum eco­
nomic productivity which can be achieved from the utilization of a 
cubic meter of water. Just how quickly this approach will permeate 
the basin will depend on the pressure put on the water resource base 
and how individual governments will react. In Turkey, considerable 
political and financial resources have already been committed to 
agricultural development. However, it will be interesting to see if 
there is a change in cropping patterns within the basin with less 
emphasis being placed on the lower value crops such as wheat and 
barley. Under the proposed irrigation schedules for the South­
eastern Anatolia Project, wheat is planned to account for 25% of the 
irrigated area, and barley and other feed grains a further 15% 
(Altinbilek 1997). A relatively small cut-back in these figures would 
release large quantities of water which could be utilized for other 
purposes, including hydroelectric power. 
A similar change will probably also occur in Iraq. In the short-
term it seems inevitable that there will be land abandonment along 
the Euphrates as Turkey’s use of the Euphrates increases. 1995 was 
the year when the first water for irrigation purposes was sent 
through the Urfa tunnels in Turkey from the lake behind the 
In effect, the twentieth century has seen 
a restructuring of water use in the basin 
of the Tigris-Euphrates. Although the 
main elements of the new management 
strategy are already in place, in terms of 
the major dams and reservoirs, the full 
impact of these changes will not be 
realized for at least another decade. 
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Ataturk Dam, and over the next decade the volume of water utilized 
for such purposes seems set to increase rapidly. Iraq will, therefore, 
have to come to terms quickly with a changing situation in which 
available water amounts along the Euphrates will steadily decline. 
However, Iraq is fortunate in possessing large oil reserves, which 
means that it should be able to substitute money for water and so 
obtain the food it needs by the purchase of crops on the world market 
(see Allan, this volume). 
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Qanats and Lifeworlds in Iranian Plateau Villages 
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University of Texas, Austin 
ABSTRACT 
Through a review of the literature on qanat history, this article provides an overview of one of the most significant 
hydraulic technologies of the pre-modern Middle East. The article covers qanat origins, diffusion and construction 
techniques, then compares the productivity and sustainability of qanats with modern deep well systems powered by 
motorized pumps. The replacement of qanats with deep wells has serious implications for the ground water resources 
of much of the Middle East. The profound importance of qanats in shaping the lifeworlds of villagers in pre-modern 
Iranian plateau settlements has meant that the shift towards reliance on deep well systems has had ramifications for 
plateau society that go far beyond water resource exploitation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the arid Middle East and North Africa, water short­
ages have become increasingly acute. Population growth combined 
with agricultural expansion and intensification have heightened 
demand for domestic, industrial, and agricultural (especially irriga­
tion) water use. Local surface and subsurface water resources are no 
longer sufficient to meet these burgeoning needs throughout the Domestic water is in such short supply 
region. Domestic water is in such short supply that it is rationed in a that it is rationed in a number of Middle 
number of Middle Eastern cities, and, as the region’s cities continue Eastern cities, and, as the region’s cities 
continue to grow, it is likely that urban to grow, it is likely that urban water demand will also grow. In rural 
water demand will also grow. areas, irrigation water is increasingly scarce. A scarcity of irrigation 
water will force small farmers off the land and increase food imports 
across the Middle East. 
To meet growing demands for water, governments and other 
investors in the Middle East have abandoned traditional, sustainable 
(but less productive) water supply systems in favor of modern, less 
sustainable (but more productive) hydraulic systems. In river val­
leys, modern dams have been constructed to trap surface water. 
Where surface water is not available, modern pumping technologies 
that provide access to previously unknown or inaccessible ground­
water reservoirs are coming into widespread use. 
One of the most striking example of this shift in water technolo­
gies has been the case of qanats. These ancient, gravity-flow water 
supply systems, which have provided dependable, renewable sup­
plies of water to Middle Eastern towns and villages for millennia, are 
being rapidly replaced by a more productive but less sustainable 
water technology, deep wells. On the Iranian plateau, an important 
heartland of qanat-watered settlement, this change in water technol­
ogy is draining aquifers, altering the distribution of towns and vil­
lages, and transforming the lifeworlds of Iranian villagers. 
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QANATS AND SETTLEMENT IN THE OLD WORLD 
THE NATURE OF QANATS 
Qanats are gently sloping subterranean tunnels dug far enough 
into alluvium or water-bearing sedimentary rock to pierce the un­
derground water table and penetrate the aquifer beneath. Water 
from the aquifer filters into the upper reaches of these channels, 
flows down their gentle slope, and emerges as a surface stream of 
water at or near a settlement. Qanats are generally constructed on 
the slopes of piedmont alluvial fans, in intermontane basins, and 
along alluvial valleys. In these locations, this groundwater collection 
system has long brought water to the surface and supported settlement 
in regions where no other traditional water technology would work. 
Most of these gravity-flow tunnel-wells are relatively short, some 
five kilometers or less in length (Beaumont l989). The longest, how­
ever, extend 40 or 50 kilometers beneath ground level before surfac­
ing at a settlement (English l966). The cross section of a qanat 
tunnel is roughly one-and-one-half meters high and one meter wide, 
large enough to accommodate men working. Every 50 to 100 meters 
or so on the surface, vertical shafts are dug down to a depth of any­
where from 10 to 100 meters to the water-bearing tunnels. These 
shafts provide air to qanat diggers working beneath the surface and 
also enable excavated soil to be removed from the tunnel and lifted 
to the surface. The shafts provide repair teams with relatively easy 
access to tunnels when blockages occur. The donut-shaped spoil 
heaps around the tops of these vertical shafts appear on the surface 
as a chain-of-wells, a distinctive feature of landscapes in qanat­
watered regions. These markers chart the subterranean pathways of 
the qanat tunnels (English 1968; Beaumont 1971; Goblot 1979). 
ORIGINS AND DIFFUSION 
Qanats first appeared in the mountains of Kurdistan in western 
Iran, eastern Turkey, and northern Iraq more than 2,500 years ago 
in association with early mining in that region. Several factors ex­
plain this origin. Most importantly, perhaps, this region is one of the 
oldest mining and metallurgical centers in the Middle East. The 
need to dig tunnels in the search for minerals meant that the inhab­
itants of the region had mastered the basic technology necessary for 
qanat construction. Qanats differ little from the horizontal adits dug 
into hillsides by early miners. Indeed, these adits may well have been 
sloped to drain unwanted seepage as they are today. Additionally, 
and somewhat ironically, the earliest report of a qanat system is 
chronicled on a tablet narrating the destruction of the qanats which 
provided water to the city of Ulhu (modern Ula), located at the 
The need to dig tunnels in the search for 
minerals meant that the inhabitants of 
the region had mastered the basic 
technology necessary for qanat 
construction. 
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DIAGRAM OF A TYPICAL QANAT
 
Figure 1 Cross Section and Aerial View of a Qanat. Qanats are ancient water supply systems constructed using a simple technology. The vertical 
shafts are not “wells,” despite the term “chain-of-wells” often used to describe their appearance on the landscape. 
northwestern end of Lake Urmia by Sargon II in 714 BC (Laessøe 
1951). Soon thereafter, Assyrian cities, particularly those located on 
the upper Tigris River, relied on qanats for drinking water. Some­
what later, the capital city of the Medes, Ecbatana (modern 
Hamadan) was watered by qanats as was Darius’s capital city of 
Persepolis (Forbes 1955; Goblot 1963). 
Under the Achaemenids (550–331 BC), when Persian rule ex­
tended from the Indus to the Nile, qanat technology spread well 
beyond the confines of the Iranian Plateau. The Achaemenid rulers 
provided a major incentive for qanat construction by allowing 
qanat builders and their heirs to retain profits from newly-built 
qanats for five generations. As a result, thousands of new settle­
ments were established and others expanded. To the west, qanats 
were constructed from Mesopotamia to the shores of the Mediter­
ranean as well as southward into parts of Egypt and Arabia. They 
were particularly important sources of water in the foothills of 
eastern Iraq, the Syrian Desert, and the Hadhramaut. In the Yemen 
and in Oman, qanats are locally called falaj (plural: aflaj). 
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To the east of Iran, where they are generally known by the Persian 
term kariz, qanats came into use in Afghanistan, the Silk Road oases 
settlements of Central Asia, and the Chinese province of Sinkiang 
(now Xinjiang), although whether this diffusion occurred under the 
Achaemenids or some later Persian dynasty is uncertain. Strangely, in 
the Turfan Basin, which has one of the most extensive qanat systems 
in the world, it is possible that many of the qanats were built by im­
ported Turki laborers in the 1700s (Stein 1933).
 The expansion of Islam initiated a second major diffusion of 
qanat technology. The early Arab invasions spread qanats across 
North Africa into Spain, Cyprus, and the Canary Islands. In most of 
North Africa, they were called fughara, and were built and main­
tained by a specialized caste of black slaves. In Morocco, qanats were 
referred to as khittara (or rhettara). 
Qanat use was especially intense in three areas of the Maghrib: 
on the borders of the Tademait Plateau just south of the Great West­
ern Erg in central Algeria; on the northern slopes of the Atlas Moun­
tains of Morocco, particularly near the city of Marrakech; and south 
of the Atlas in the Tafilalt of Morocco (Fenelon 1941; Lo 1953; 
Margat 1958). Interestingly, qanat technology may have been intro­
duced into the central Sahara and later into Western Sahara by Jews 
or Judaized Berbers fleeing Cyrenaica during Trajan’s persecution in 
AD 118 (Briggs 1960). 
In Spain, qanats were used marginally in the province of Catalonia 
and at Madrid where they were called gálerias (Asin 1959: Plate XVII). 
They are important sources of water in Cyprus and on Gran Canaria 
and Tenerife in the Canary islands (Humlum 1965). 
New World qanats are found in Mexico at Parrás, Canyon 
Huasteca, Tecamenchalco, and Tehuacán and in the Atacama re­
gions of Peru and Chile at Nazca and Pica. The qanat systems of 
Mexico came into use after the Spanish conquest; those of the 
Atacama, however, may predate the Spanish entry into the New 
World (Kaeger 2, 1901; Troll 1963). 
QANAT CONSTRUCTION 
The spread of qanats throughout the arid lands of the northern 
hemisphere during the pre-modern period may be explained by the 
fact that they use an efficient mix of available capital and technology 
to supply critically scarce water. Because qanats could provide reli­
able and sustainable access to previously unavailable supplies of 
groundwater, people throughout the arid zone embraced their use, 
despite the cost in money and time to build and maintain them. 
During much of the pre-modern period, many qanat systems 
were built by powerful political leaders, whose rule was often 
Because qanats could provide reliable 
and sustainable access to previously 
unavailable supplies of groundwater, 
populations throughout the arid zone 
embraced their use, despite the cost in 
money and time to build and maintain 
them. 
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Figure 2	 A Qanat-fed Alluvial Fan Village. A detailed understanding of subtle variations in 
topography, landscape, and subsurface water conditions is required in the siting of 
a qanat. Only well-known and respected muqannis are entrusted with site 
decisions. (Illustration by Ann Coffin Delano) 
appraised by the number of qanats constructed during their reign. 
For example, slaves and captives were trained to construct qanats 
under the Achaemenid and Sassanian kings. Maintenance and re­
pairs were accomplished by corvée (forced labor). 
THE MUQANNIS 
More recently in Iran, a hereditary class of professional qanat 
diggers called muqannis build and repair these systems. These spe­
cialists travel from place to place on the Iranian plateau, for ex­
ample, working at one settlement where a flash flood has damaged a 
qanat, and then moving on to another where a lowered water table 
requires that a qanat tunnel be extended deeper into the alluvium. 
The most famous muqannis come from the desert city of Yazd. 
They are paid high wages, and command respect. The hazardous 
nature of their work has inspired a body of folk custom and belief. A 
muqanni will not work on a day he considers to be unlucky, or if he 
sneezes on that day. Floods and cave-ins in the qanat tunnels are 
frequent, and deaths among muqannis occur. Older muqannis are 
considered blessed or at the very least lucky. Prayers are said over a 
muqanni each time he descends into a qanat, a ceremony that makes 
a deep impression on Iranian villagers. 
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SITE, GRADE, AND ALIGNMENT 
The construction of a new qanat (which is quite rare at present) 
is a sophisticated engineering feat accomplished with simple tools. 
The success of the undertaking is determined by two decisions made 
by a muqanni before the actual construction of the qanat begins. The 
first of these is to determine the site of the “mother well” (madari 
chah) which marks the furthest extent of the qanat from the settle­
ment; the second is to establish the alignment and grade between the 
qanat’s origin and destination. 
When the muqanni decides on a potential site for the madari 
chah, one or more trial shafts (gamaneh) are dug deeply enough to 
penetrate the water table. A variety of geographical factors are 
weighed in the muqanni’s decision as to where these shafts are lo­
cated. Among these factors are local slope conditions, the surround­
ing topography, subtle changes in vegetation, available groundwater, 
and the proposed destination of the water. 
Favorable site conditions for relatively short qanats often occur 
near the mouths of dry alluvial valleys. For long qanats, the general 
topographic setting is more indicative of the likelihood of accessible 
sources of groundwater. Once a trial shaft has struck water, the 
muqanni must be certain that this well has pierced the water table or 
alternatively has penetrated a relatively constant source of ground­
water perched on an impermeable stratum. If so, this shaft becomes 
the “mother well” of the qanat whose length will be measured from 
this point to the place where water surfaces (mazhar). 
Next, the muqanni must measure the precise alignment and 
grade of the qanat tunnel, the most difficult engineering task in the 
entire construction process. The alignment of the qanat must con­
nect the water-filled base of the “mother well” with a point on the 
surface immediately above the settlement by means of a gently slop­
ing tunnel. If the alignment is miscalculated and the qanat emerges 
some distance away from the settlement, water will have to flow in 
an open channel from this point to the houses and fields below, 
increasing both evaporation and seepage. If the gradient of the tun­
nel is too steep, water rushing down its course will erode the walls 
and collapse the qanat. If the gradient is too shallow, water will pond 
and stagnate in the tunnel. In many cases, the qanat tunnel follows 
an indirect, looping pathway to its destination, curving to maintain 
proper grade on steep slopes. 
The maximum gradient for a short qanat is roughly 1:1,000 or 
1:1,500. In a long qanat tunnel, the grade is close to horizontal. 
These calculations are made using a spirit level suspended between 
two pieces of twine each about 10 meters long (Beckett 1953: 48). 
Using only these tools, a skilled muqanni is able to determine both 
The many hazards that attend qanat 
construction have, not surprisingly, 
endowed the profession of muqanni 
with a certain notoriety. 
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Figure 3 Muqannis Excavating Soil from a 
Qanat Shaft. Spoil lifted by windlass 
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the proper alignment and grade of the qanat tunnel even when it 
runs for kilometers beneath rugged terrain. 
EXCAVATION 
The excavation of the tunnel starts in the dry, downslope section 
of the qanat at the mazhar and works back toward the “mother 
well.” Vertical shafts connect the tunnel with the surface every 50 to 
100 meters or so, as noted above. In some cases, these shafts are dug 
first, and the tunnel is constructed to connect their bases. 
A team headed by a muqanni works together in the construction 
of a qanat. The muqanni excavates the tunnel with a small pick and 
shovel, while his apprentice packs the loose dirt into a rubber bucket 
(in earlier times a skin bucket). Two laborers at the surface haul the 
dirt up the shaft using a windlass (charkh). If the qanat tunnel 
reaches depths of 75 to 100 meters, a second windlass is set in a 
niche halfway down the vertical shaft and the dirt is transferred 
from one bucket to another at this point in order to facilitate the 
excavation process. 
The greatest dangers in qanat construction occur when the tun­
nel reaches the wet, water-bearing section. Here, the muqanni and 
his apprentice work with water flowing around them, in poor venti­
lation, and with the constant threat of cave-ins. In some cases, 
vertical shafts fill with water before reaching tunnel depth. The 
muqanni must then dig upward from the tunnel to the pooled water 
in the shaft, and try to avoid the rush of water when the break­
through is made. Where the tunnel passes through a deposit of soft 
sand and the tunnel is likely to collapse, baked clay hoops (nays) are 
encircles the vertical shafts that linkinserted in the tunnel to provide extra support. 
the qanat tunnel with the surface.
Below ground, muqannis carry a castor oil lamp for both illumi- Clearing blockage from qanat 
nation and testing the quality of the air in the tunnel. If the flame tunnels is usually required every 
few years.dies for want of oxygen, the diggers know to leave the tunnel and dig 
(Illustration by Ann Coffin Delano)
another vertical shaft to provide more air. Where the qanat’s tunnels 
are very deep and ventilation is particularly poor, vertical shafts are 
dug on either side of the tunnel. A fire is lit to make the stale air rise 
up one shaft and draw fresh air down the other (Noel 1944). In 
some areas, notably Yazd, twin qanats are built side-by-side, en­
abling muqannis to move from one tunnel to the other. The many 
hazards that attend qanat construction have, not surprisingly, 
endowed the profession of muqanni with a certain notoriety. 
TIME AND COST 
The time required to construct a qanat varies with the capital of 
the owner, the stability of ownership, underground soil and water 
conditions, the length of the qanat, the amount of water desired, the 
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skill of the muqanni, and a variety of other social, economic, and 
environmental factors. In an alluvial fan village in Kirman, a qanat 
one kilometer in length with a mother well 45 meters deep was in 
construction for twenty-seven years, largely due to three changes in 
ownership. By contrast, a qanat in a similar location some three 
kilometers in length with a bifurcated tunnel and two mother wells 
50 and 55 m in depth began to flow after seventeen years. The re­
spective costs of these short, alluvial fan qanats were approximately 
$10,000 to $11,000 per km in the late 1960s (English 1966). 
The cost of constructing a 40 km long qanat to the basin city of 
Kirman with a mother well 90 m deep was approximately $213,000 
when completed in 1950. Given inflation, higher wages, the dwin­
dling number of muqannis, and the political instability of modern 
Iran, the costs of building such a qanat today would likely be pro­
hibitive. Confidence in future political and economic stability would 
have to be considerable to induce an investor to finance new qanat 
construction today. 
QANAT TECHNOLOGY AND DEEP WELLS 
Qanats were in wide use throughout the dry lands of the Old 
World until recently for several reasons. First, qanats are made of 
local materials. Second, they tap aquifers using no source of power 
other than gravity. Third, water is transported for substantial dis­
tances in these subterranean conduits with minimal loss of water 
through evaporation and with little risk of pollution. Water loss 
through percolation is reduced by lining the tunnels with clay hoops 
when they pass through loose sand, and by infusing their beds with 
layers of impermeable clay. 
QANATS: WATER AS A RENEWABLE RESOURCE 
The rate of flow of water in a qanat is controlled by the level of 
the underground water table. Thus a qanat cannot drain an aquifer, 
because its flow varies directly with the subsurface water supply. 
When properly maintained, a qanat is a sustainable system that 
provides water to settlements indefinitely. Qanats exploit ground 
water as a renewable resource. 
The self-limiting features of qanats that make them a sustainable 
technology can, however, be their biggest drawback, particularly when 
they are compared with the range of technologies available today. 
First, the flow of water in qanats varies from year to year depending 
on the recharge rate of the aquifer. In the Middle East, where drought 
hits on average once every four years, this uncertainty often results in 
conservative cropping strategies geared to the cultivation of low-risk, 
low water-consuming, low value crops like wheat and barley. 
The rate of flow of water in a qanat is 
controlled by the level of the under­
ground water table. Thus a qanat 
cannot drain an aquifer, because its 
flow varies directly with the subsurface 
water supply. When properly main­
tained, a qanat is a sustainable system 
that provides water to settlements 
indefinitely. 
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Second, water flows continuously in a qanat, and although some 
winter water is used for domestic use, much larger amounts of irri­
gation water are needed during the daylight hours of the spring and 
summer growing seasons in Middle Eastern villages. Although this 
continuous flow is frequently viewed as wasteful, it can, in fact, be 
controlled to a large degree. During periods of low water use in fall 
and winter, water-tight gates can seal off the qanat opening 
(mazhar) damming up and conserving groundwater for periods of 
high use. In spring and summer, night flow may be stored in small 
reservoirs (ambar) at the mouth of the qanat and held there for 
daytime use (Beaumont 1989). Moreover, much perceived seasonal 
water loss infiltrates the soil beneath the qanat tunnel and thus 
recharges the aquifer. 
Third, the body of custom and law (shari’a) relating to qanats 
codified in the Kitab-i Qani (Book of Qanats) in the ninth century 
strives to protect the investment of qanat owners in permanent 
agricultural settlement. The law of harim (borders), for example, 
prohibits the sinking of new mother wells within one kilometer of 
existing qanats. As a result, large areas of land in the vicinity of cities 
like Tehran, Sulamaniyah, Yazd, Kirman, Herat, and Qandahar, 
where the density of tunnel wells is high, are closed to new settle­
ment. This, in effect, stabilizes agricultural acreage in regions with 
growing populations (English 1966). 
Again, the major limitation (and paradoxically the major advan­
tage) of qanats is that their rate of flow is limited by the aquifer 
height. Should the water table fall during a drought, so will the 
amount of water filtering into the water-bearing section of the 
qanat. If the aquifer rises, the flow of water increases. This makes 
qanats a sustainable, renewable source of water, but it also makes 
them inadequate water producers vis-à-vis  modern demands. The 
rapidly increasing demand for water generated by population 
growth and agricultural expansion in the modern Middle East can­
not be accommodated by qanats. 
DEEP WELLS: WATER AS A NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE 
By contrast, deep wells have several putative advantages over 
qanats. First, deep wells are not limited by slope or soil conditions 
and can be located at sites convenient to transportation networks, 
populations centers, and markets. Second, they draw water from 
deep in the aquifer where seasonal variations in flow do not occur. 
Third, because deep wells can be turned on or off at will, they are, 
theoretically, conducive to water conservation. 
But deep wells also have disadvantages. The construction, main­
tenance, and fuel costs (for motorized pumps) of deep wells are high 
By far the major disadvantage (and 
advantage) of deep wells, however, 
involves their success in meeting the 
growing need for water in the Middle 
East. Deep wells can draw water from 
permanent aquifers on demand without 
regard to rates of recharge. The 
technology, therefore, enables people to 
exploit their water resources in an 
unsustainable fashion. 
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(Overseas Consultants 1949). Moreover, deep wells cannot be built 
using local materials and local labor. By far the major disadvantage 
(and advantage) of deep wells, however, involves their success in 
meeting the growing need for water in the Middle East. Deep wells 
can draw water from permanent aquifers on demand without regard 
to rates of recharge. The technology, therefore, enables people to 
exploit their water resources in an unsustainable fashion. The ability 
of deep wells, and motorized pumps, to withdraw water in excess of 
an aquifer’s recharge rate makes this modern technology very attrac­
tive in the short term. As a result, however, water is fast becoming a 
non-renewable resource in areas where deep wells are used. 
QANATS AND VILLAGE LIFEWORLDS 
Like all water technologies, qanats require a nexus of environ­
mental and social conditions in order to be effective over time. On 
the Iranian plateau, reliance on qanats promoted high levels of social 
and ecological adaptation. They inspired a need for social cohesion 
that permeated virtually all areas of village life. 
Qanats defined village lifeworlds on the plateau by (1) determin­
ing settlement location; (2) structuring built environments within 
settlements; and (3) requiring social cohesion in water allocation, 
water distribution, water use, and system maintenance. These 
lifeworlds framed the horizons of everyday life in plateau settle­
ments, encompassing people’s firsthand involvement with the prac­
tical world, the world of values, and the world of goods (Buttimer 
1976; Seamon 1979). With the shift from qanats to deep wells, wa­
ter-based social patterns are in flux. 
WHERE PEOPLE LIVE 
Qanat technology was known in Iran by the sixth century BC, 
when Indo-Iranians began to settle as agriculturists, to worship one 
god (Ahura Mazda), and to conquer the Old World. Three centuries 
later, when the Parthians invaded Iran, qanats were in widespread 
use on the Iranian plateau (Polybius X: 28; Vitruvius VIII: 6.3). By 
this time, qanats had opened alluvial fans to settlement, enabled 
basin cities to expand, and established the foundations of modern 
plateau settlement patterns. 
Qanats became an important factor in where people lived. The 
largest towns were still located at low elevations on the floors of 
intermontane basins and in broad river valleys. Most of these early 
settlements were defended by a fortress (qal’eh) whose water was 
drawn from hand-dug wells that reached down to shallow water 
tables. Qanats enabled these settlements to grow by tapping water­
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rich aquifers located deep beneath neighboring alluvial fans. Qanats 
carried water from the fans below ground for many kilometers to 
such settlements providing supplementary water to irrigate more 
extensive fields and sustain larger urban populations. 
Even more dramatically, qanats made it possible to establish 
permanent settlements on the alluvial fans themselves. Earlier set­
tlers had bypassed the alluvial fans because water tables there were 
too deep for hand-dug wells, and the wadis on these slopes were too 
deeply incised in the fans for simple diversion channels. In these 
locations, qanats tapped somewhat more limited “water hinter­
lands” with underground water drawn from upslope alluvial depos­
its in mountain valleys. For the first time, small towns and villages 
were built at these higher elevations. And further up river valleys in 
the mountains, small qanat-watered hamlets appeared. 
Figure 4	 Qanats Converging on the City of Kirman. Built during the course of many 
centuries, large numbers of qanats converge on most Iranian Plateau cities. Some 
of these old qanat tunnels cross back and forth between channels, others are twin 
qanats one or both of which may be active, and many have been abandoned. No 
map of the resulting labyrinth of qanat tunnels is available. Note the differences in 
surface definition on the image caused by drifting sand. 
  

    
 
In many areas, these water hinterlands formed a series of pro­
gressively smaller arcs with the qanats of each higher settlement 
starting where those of the next lower settlement ended. Although 
configurations varied on the plateau, frequently the regional settle­
ment pattern exhibited a correlation in age, size, water rights, and 
elevation. The largest place was the oldest and the lowest, and usu­
ally had prior rights to the largest water catchment basin. In any 
case, over much of the Iranian plateau these new upland settlements 
increased the cultivated area, supplied additional food to urban 
centers, provided living space and work for a growing population of 
farmers, as well as upland bases for herders and fuel collectors.
 The Iranian plateau was the first core area of intensive qanat 
use. Even today, as much as one third to one half of the irrigated 
fields and orchards on the plateau–an estimated 15 million acres–are 
still watered by qanats. Cities like Tehran, Qum, Qazvin, Hamadan, 
Nishapur, Yazd, and Kirman received virtually all of their water 
from tunnel-wells until deep wells were introduced after World War 
II. In the 1960s, an estimated 21,000 qanats were still functioning in 
plateau settlements with an additional 17,500 used but in need of 
repair (Ghahraman l958). Their aggregate length has been placed at 
more than 160,000 kilometers, and their total discharge at 20,000 
cubic meters per second (Goblot l962). 
Although these figures are not precise, they convey a sense of the 
scale of qanat use on the Iranian plateau, the role of qanats in defin­
ing the location of settlements, and their importance in the day-to­
day lives of Iranian villagers. In more immediate ways, qanats 
defined the built environments of towns and villagers, the architec­
ture of daily lives. 
THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
The built environments of most alluvial fan towns and villages 
on the Iranian Plateau are aligned along the major watercourses 
(shahjub) that run from the mouth of the qanat down slope through 
the length of the settlement. In larger and more complex basin 
settlements, smaller streams of water emanating from the points of 
division (maqsam) of several qanats form a spatial skeleton of paral­
lel pathways lined by village structures, walled orchards, and gar­
dens. They are trunk lines of human activity. 
Most alluvial fan settlements are triangular in shape. Below 
walled orchards and gardens at the top of the village, secondary 
distribution channels (jub) branch outward from the maqsam to 
form “water lattices” that broaden the area being cultivated. These 
smaller streams irrigate an elaborate grid of rectangular plots (kort) of 
irrigated land bounded by low, parallel levees (Bonine 1982; 1979). 
Figure 5	 A Water Divider in Mahan. Two 
granite blocks were imported to 
Mahan to build a maqsam which 
subdivided the water emerging 
from two qanats into three major 
streams (shahjub) of equal flow. At 
some past time, one of the granite 
blocks was dislodged by a flash 
flood. Because of disagreement 
about its precise location prior to 
the flood, it was never reposi­
tioned. The owners of the major 
stream on the right clearly gained 
water because of the new position 
of the divider after the flood. The 
owners of the central stream lost 
water. Note that a third qanat 
enters the stream on the right 
below the maqsam. 
(Illustration by Ann Coffin Delano) 
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The rectangular shape of these fields is designed to deliver the re­
quired amount of water to the kort by the time its flow reaches the 
plot’s downstream end. Rectangular fields also assist in measure­
ment of area at times of land subdivision, inheritance, or sale. 
The linear constraints that qanats place on settlement morphol­
ogy is most obvious in small alluvial fan villages, where a single 
watercourse runs downstream through the settlement providing 
water to each household compound, orchard, and garden before 
irrigating grain fields downslope. Each household compound has 
the right to water its courtyard garden and to utilize the water for 
domestic purposes. The structures in these small places are strung 
out along the major stream channel; they parallel the slope of the 
land along the axis of the alluvial fan. 
Interestingly, qanats also underlie the street patterns of larger 
cities as well. In some cities, qanat water flows in tunnels beneath 
residential areas and surfaces near the cultivated area. Staircases 
from the surface (payab) reach down to these streams. The first 
payab usually is at a public cistern where drinking water is available 
to the entire community. Sometimes these cisterns are sizable vaults 
as much as l0 meters across and 15 or more meters deep with spiral 
stairs leading down to small platforms at water level. In cities like 
Herat in Afghanistan, these cisterns are ancient constructions en­
cased in tile. Other more modest urban payabs are found along 
major streets, and even in some alleys, a factor that probably played 
an important role in the social and physical layout of the town. 
Where tunnels run beneath houses, private payabs slope down to 
the stream providing water for various domestic uses. In wealthy 
homes, special rooms are constructed beside the underground 
stream with tall shafts reaching upward to windcatchers (badgir) 
above roof level. Air caught by the badgirs , which are oriented to 
prevailing summer winds, is forced down the shaft, circulates at 
water level, and provides a cool refuge from the afternoon heat of 
summer. Needless to say, land located above submerged qanat tun­
nels, and houses with private payabs , are highly valued (Honari l989). 
Bonine has discerned an orthogonal street pattern in cities like 
Kirman, Yazd, and Sabzevar where long, straight streets intersect at 
right angles forming huge “superblocks” with many short, blind alleys 
branching off major thoroughfares at right angles (Bonine l979). 
These grids do not conform to the rigid geometry of classical Greek or 
Roman towns, but they have distinctly geometric configurations. In 
Bonine’s view, these configurations were established on a network of 
water channels used to irrigate nearby orchards and fields. As in alluvial 
fan settlements, slope is crucial. Topography and water flow are the 
elemental principles of Iranian settlement geography (Bonine 1979). 
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SOCIAL PATTERNING 
In some rural settlements, the location of structures reflects the 
dynamics of water use and social status. Above the village, particu­
larly where the slope is relatively steep, one or more water mills 
(asiab) are built to grind the grain of nearby villages and hamlets. In 
these Norse-style mills, water drops five or more meters to power a 
vertical shaft that turns a heavy mill stone (Wulff 1966). Closer to 
the top of the settlement, at least one branch of the qanat’s water is 
diverted at a maqsam to a public reservoir or cistern, a communal 
bath (hammam), and a mosque. The reservoir or cistern provides 
clean water to all people in the community. The communal baths, 
which are only found in larger settlements, are used by surrounding 
villagers for bathing. The pool of water at the mosque is used for reli­
gious ablutions in kur , or sacred water (English 1966). 
Within the settlement, the location of each household com­
pound along the primary stream determines the quantity and qual­
ity of its water supply. As a result, household location frequently 
reflects the social and economic status of its residents or owner. The 
more prosperous households of landlords, merchants, and religious 
leaders are in the upper section of the village where water is clean 
and plentiful. The courtyards of these dwellings display central pools 
with canals lined by flowers dividing the gardens into sections. The 
poorer households of small landowners, sharecroppers, and day 
laborers are located downstream in the village where the volume of 
water is diminished and more polluted. The compounds in this 
district are given over to the cultivation of alfalfa (for fodder), fruit 
trees, spices, herbs, and vines. 
Moving downstream through the village, water loss by evapora­
tion, seepage, and domestic use can result in as much as a 40% 
decrease in water available to the lower sections of the village. 
Though there is a difference in the price of a share of water depend­
ing on where it is used in the settlement, the price difference is rarely 
commensurate with water loss which varies considerably during the 
year. In most settlements, then, the powerful live in the upper 
reaches. The qanat, more often than not, enters the village at the 
household compound of the most influential local landlord (arbab) 
(Cressey 1959). 
In larger towns watered by several qanats, these water-based 
social gadients often are obscured by settlement history. Frequently, 
a maze of twisting distributary channels covers the landscape whose 
diversions are vestiges of past business transactions, marriage agree­
ments, and bequests. But in most settlements, social patterns are 
directly related to water quantity and quality. Alterations in one 
system involve changes in the other. 
Qanats usually are built by wealthy 
individuals, but the constant need for 
tunnel repairs owing to natural disasters 
or social dislocations leads to rapid 
fragmentation in ownership. Many 
qanats have as many as two to three 
hundred owners and the water of some 
qanats is divided into as many as 
10,000 time shares. 
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Variations in water quality from one part of a village to another 
are reduced by customs of sequential water use that demand coop­
eration, an example of community needs taking precedence over 
personal influence. As noted above, a public cistern is often located 
at the top of the settlement. Its water is reserved specifically for 
drinking and cooking. In a pool below the cistern, dishes and cutlery 
may be washed using sand as the cleansing agent. After water is 
directed to the communal bath, additional pools are drawn off from 
the main channel (shahjub) in which household utensils may be 
washed with soap, and still further downstream animals are watered 
and straw soaked for use in construction. After these communal needs 
are met, the now polluted water flows directly to the fields. This hier­
archy of use conserves water and reduces pollution (Roaf 1989). 
Strict and unforgiving adherence to QANAT OWNERSHIP 
communal methods of water rotation In many villages, qanat ownership is widely diffused throughout 
and maintenance of the water supply the population, and this widespread stake in the water supply system 
system are perhaps most important in 
reinforces social cooperation. Qanats usually are built by wealthy maintaining the social cohesion of 
individuals, but the constant need for tunnel repairs owing to natu­ qanat-watered villages. 
ral disasters or social dislocations leads to rapid fragmentation in 
ownership. Many qanats have as many as two to three hundred 
owners and the water of some qanats is divided into as many as 
10,000 time shares. 
In some cases, the system of dividing water goes back hundreds 
of years. The current division of water at Ardistan in central Iran, 
for example, dates back to the 1200s when Hulagu Khan, the grand­
son of Genghis Khan, ordered that the town’s water be divided into 
twenty-one shares with each share allotted to a specific quarter 
(Lambton 1953). 
A complete record of changes in ownership exists for the 
Vakilabad qanat built in Mahan, a town southeast of Kirman, in the 
1860s (English 1989). Initially, its water was divided among three men 
in six shares. One-sixth of the water was allotted to the then custodian 
of the Shah Ni’matullah Vali Shrine. This portion has increased to 
one-third of the water and is now owned by twenty of his descen­
dants. The remaining water was sold off bit by bit such that some 
seventy families now own shares in the qanat. In another qanat system 
in the same town, water ownership has fragmented to such a degree 
that the owner of the smallest portion has rights to only thirty seconds 
of water once every twelve days. In Lambton’s view, the historic in­
ability of the Iranian upper class to retain property intact over time is 
the primary reason that Iran never developed a feudal aristocracy 
comparable to that of medieval Europe (Lambton 1969). 
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WATER DISTRIBUTION AND SYSTEM MAINTENANCE 
Strict and unforgiving adherence to communal methods of water 
rotation and maintenance of the water supply system are perhaps 
most important in maintaining the social cohesion of qanat-watered 
villages. The distribution of water in these settlements is based on 
ownership of time shares in the annual flow of a qanat. These rota­
tions take account of variations in diurnal and seasonal flow as well 
as differences in plot location, soil conditions, rates of seepage, and 
evaporation. 
In general, water is divided into an indefinite number of time 
shares, or sahms, in a given water rotation period (Lambton 1953; 
Bonine 1982). The sahms are measured by volume in terms of 
qasabs, the theoretical amount of water required to flood-irrigate an 
area of roughly thirty square yards once every twenty-four hours. 
One hundred qasabs  (in theory) would irrigate an acre of land, 
except that a qasab varies in volume from one place to another. 
Moreover, qanats as well as subdivisions of qanats (e.g. streams 
created after division at a maqsam) rotate water on different time 
schedules ranging from once every six days or twelve days to once 
every eighteen, nineteen, twenty-one or twenty-two days. The length 
of the rotation period varies with volume of flow and crops under 
cultivation, but a host of other lesser environmental factors also 
come into play. 
In a relatively simple example from Mahan near Kirman, water 
from one of the towns’ four qanats is divided into fifteen sahms with 
a volume of forty qasabs per day on a twelve day rotation. In this 
case, each sahm is equal to ninety-six minutes of water once every 
twelve days or enough water to irrigate forty qasabs of land. In addi­
tion, each sahm is subdivided into six dangs, each composed of six 
habbeh. According to this measurement system, one dang would 
equal sixteen minutes of water and one habbeh a single minute of 
water once every twelve days. 
Most systems of water distribution, however, are much more 
complex. In a more typical case based on another qanat in the same 
settlement, the flow of water passes through twelve separate water 
dividers or maqsams that allocate water to specific fields at specific 
times on specified days in a conjoined eighteen, nineteen, and 
twenty-one day rotation (English 1989). 
The person responsible for guiding the water through channels 
to the right field at the right time is the water master (mirab) or 
water bailiff (mubashiri ab). This official often directs a bevy of 
assistants who keep the channels clean, open and close small gates to 
specific fields, and breach levees when required. In some smaller 
communities, these tasks are handled directly by the community of 
When communal efforts fail, village 
water supplies diminish and in some 
cases the settlements are abandoned. 
Government land reform programs in 
the 1960s, for example, required 
written deeds to determine water 
ownership. Some settlements honestly 
or otherwise produced deeds that taken 
together made up more than twenty-
fours hours of water a day. The 
resulting chaos led to violent ownership 
disputes and sometimes to total social 
breakdown. 
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water users (Spooner 1974). In the past, mirabs measured units of 
flow with a water clock (tas) based on the time it took for a metal 
cup with a hole in the bottom to sink in a container of water. Re­
cently, these clepsydras have been replaced by clocks. 
Annual repairs and cleaning of the qanat are usually required to 
maintain its flow, and communal meetings of qanat owners are held 
to decide the annual allocation of funds for this purpose. Although 
large water owners tend to dominate these meetings, votes are cast 
by shares. Other system responsibilities such as the payment of the 
mirab, his assistants, and crop watchers (either in cash or kind) are 
also decided in this fashion. In addition, more general community 
needs are dealt with by vote or custom—among these are payments 
to the carpenter, blacksmith, and other artisans vital to village life. 
Although social equality is rare in qanat-watered villages, village 
cooperation is a necessary adaptation to the ecological and social 
demands of this water technology. This social cohesion, and the 
water systems they are designed to preserve, defined the lifeworlds of 
Iranian villagers. 
When communal efforts fail, village water supplies diminish and 
in some cases the settlements are abandoned. Government land 
reform programs in the 1960s, for example, required written deeds 
to determine water ownership. Some settlements honestly or other­
wise produced deeds that taken together made up more than 
twenty-fours hours of water a day. The resulting chaos led to violent 
ownership disputes and sometimes to total social breakdown. In 
other very small settlements where disputes over water rights oc­
curred, lotteries were held on the autumnal equinox in an effort to 
distribute scarcity more equitably. Water owners formed a circle, 
and at a signal from the village headman threw out any number of 
fingers on one or two hands. Starting with the headman, the fingers 
were counted around the circle of owners. Counting off the result­
ant total, the person at the end of the count received water on the 
first hour of the first day of the rotation. The lottery continued until 
each man had a definite time to receive water. Needless to say, own­
ers near the end of the rotation usually received no water. 
CONCLUSION 
Qanats are renewable water supply systems that have sustained 
agricultural settlement on the Iranian plateau for millennia. By their 
very nature, qanats have encouraged sustainable water use. Their 
major limitations are that they are expensive to build and produce 
relatively small amounts of water. As a result, few qanats are being 
built today. Instead, qanats are being replaced by deep wells which 
produce more water to meet the current demand and support more 
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intensive patterns of land use. 
These deep wells mine water from fossil aquifers at rates well 
beyond replacement levels. Most are drilled in basin areas where 
water tables are close to the surface. As aquifers are drained, the 
qanats of alluvial fan settlements that share the same aquifer dry up 
when the water table lowers, and settlements eventually disappear. 
The communal patterns of social adaptation that bound together the 
lifeworlds of Iranian villagers for centuries disappear as well. In fact, 
evidence suggests that deep wells have made many small farmers 
dependent on well owners, have failed to increase agricultural pro­
duction significantly, and bode poorly for the long term survival of 
many long-established settlements (Ehlers and Saidi 1989; Kielstra 
1989). The desire for short term benefits has prevailed; the long 
term costs remain to be seen. 
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ABSTRACT
 
This paper explores why Iran was a particularly fertile ground for repeated visitation of cholera in the 19th century.
 
Along with certain unique Iranian cultural and religious factors, the author demonstrates how Iranian urban ecology,
 
particularly the qanat system, contributed to the fatal spread of the epidemic. These multi-faceted conditions, the author
 
concludes, resulted in distinct modes of disease transmission and mortality in Iran.
 
“The cholera is the best of all sanitary reformers; it overlooks no 
mistake and pardons no oversight.” 
The Times (London), 5 September 1848 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the subject of national identity and the verity of 
topographical boundaries as reflections of a tangible identity has 
been an immense source of controversy among academics (Jackson 
and Penrose 1994; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1993; Ranger 1992). 
The Middle East has been at the heart of this debate, principally due 
to the nature of its shifting national frontiers and the relative youth 
of a number of its nation-states (Khalidi 1997; Bozdogan and Kasaba 
1997). It should come as no surprise, therefore, that aside from the 
obvious cultural, linguistic, and historic antecedents, the physical 
environment of the Middle East has also been utilized by scholars as 
an identity-building apparatus.1 In this paper I hope to expand this 
debate by looking at a Middle Eastern national entity’s unique expe­
rience with a pathogen during the great pandemics of the 19th cen­ 1 One does not need to look any farther 
tury. By examining Iran’s encounter with the Cholera bacillus, this than the colloquial use of the great river-
systems from the “Oxus to the Nile” inpaper will reveal environmental and cultural factors that made Iran’s 
delineating the geographical-cultural
experience with Asiatic cholera distinct from that of other countries boundaries of the Middle East. 
across the globe which were gripped by the same microbe. 
I seek to demonstrate how the Islamic disposition toward “sa­
cred-law” as the yardstick for purity, together with the lack of any 
sanitary base, made Iran a fertile ground for repeated visitations of 
cholera. Aside from Iran’s own unique legacy, the attributes which 
predisposed it to repeated invasions of Asiatic cholera can also be 
used as an opportunity to assess the larger Middle Eastern legacy with 
epidemic diseases, which sets it apart from its European, Asian, and 
African counterparts. Furthermore, in evaluating these cultural and 
environmental factors, one can see the emergence of a degree of 
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continuity in Iranian urban ecology as well as in its human dimen­
sions, embodied by its religious ideologies, which stem from Avestan 
and Talmudic traditions. More than anything else, these continuities 
attest to the importance of considering historical trends in the ecol­
ogy of illness in the Middle East, so as to better understand current 
environmental issues in that region. 
ORIGINS OF THE ASIATIC CHOLERA PANDEMICS 
The cradle of cholera’s numerous visitations in the 19th century 
can be traced to the banks of the Ganges River where the Cholera 
bacillus had been thriving for centuries in its warm waters and the 
intestines of its neighborly human hosts. A “fecal-oral” disease, 
cholera is passed from the excrement of its victims into the food or 
water source of a community whereby it is ingested by a slew of new 
victims. The bacteria eventually find refuge in their hosts’ digestive 
tracts, at which point the warm alkaline environment of the small 
intestine provides the ideal environment for the germs to multiply 
with great rapidity. Ironically, it is not the presence of the bacterium 
that causes the demise of its victims; rather it is the host’s immune 
response that unleashes the lethal poison of the germ. Consequently, 
the most violent symptoms of cholera emerge as a result of the 
bacterial cells’ destruction by the immune system, which releases the 
powerful toxin that they contain. It is this venom that causes the 
lethal manifestations of the disease (Snowden 1995). The pallet of 
these symptoms, which includes massive vomiting, diarrhea, and the 
blue-gray pallor of its victims, paints an abysmal picture. Indeed, 
one could say that the victims of the disease bear the very faces of 
death as a result of the loss of a quarter of their body fluid, which is 
the cause of the emaciated, blue-gray pallor and sunken eyes of the 
stricken. The Hippocratic signs of impending death are further 
brought to bear with the comatose and apathetic state of cholera’s 
victims (Snowden 1995). 
The penetration of the East-India Company into inner-
Hindustan and the globalization of trade with the Indian sub-conti­
nent, provided the Cholera bacillus with a suitable vector through 
which it could spread on an international scale.2 Maritime trade 
with India, which provided fast ships and frequent ports of call, 
allowed infected goods, such as recycled clothing or foodstuffs, to be 
spread from port to port. Furthermore, the relative rapidity of travel 
from India to a variety of ports of call, such as southern Iran, al­
lowed infected human vectors also to serve as reservoirs for the 
spread of the disease. This vector was especially significant during 
the heyday of the anti-contagionist philosophy regarding cholera, in 
the mid-19th century, which had partly emerged as a result of the
 2 	Of course this trend in global pandemics is 
nothing new. Ever since the first civiliza­
tions and emergence of global trade, 
disease has accompanied human quests to 
penetrate new markets. The genesis of 
Black Death in medieval Europe was a 
product of the newly globalized economic 
position of Europe, through Venetian trade 
in the Crimea, which incidentally (and 
fatefully) was also the port of call for 
caravans from China and central Asia. 
Patterns of epidemics and their impact on 
civilization have been beautifully exposed in 
recent works by William McNeill and 
Alfred Crosby. Unfortunately, the views on 
the nature and impact of disease on 
civilization seem to be fairly uniform, and 
the field is certainly in need of some 
dissenting views as to the nature and 
impact of these diseases on humanity; see 
W. H. McNeill, Plagues and peoples (New 
York: Doubleday, 1979) and Alfred W. 
Crosby, Ecological imperialism: the biological 
expansion of Europe, 900–1900 (Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
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futility of quarantines and was to some extent due to the epidemic’s 
selective impact.3 
GROUNDWORK FOR AN EPIDEMIC 
Iran was perfect territory for acquiring and subsequently “ex­
porting” epidemics to other continents. Known as the “crossroad of 
civilizations” on account of its central position within the Eurasian 
plateau and its strategic position in the path of the historic trade and 
invasion routes, Iran had a long history of also being on the “cross­
road” of global pandemics. In classical times it was The Plague of 
Justinian that crossed this land, followed by the medieval bubonic 
plagues, and, in the 1880s, an influenza pandemic. This singular 
position in the path of visitations was also due to Iran’s territorial 
vastness. With a geographical area of about 1,648,000 km2 and a 
In contrast to the blind and indiscriminatefrontier length of roughly 4,440 km, about half of which rested on 
3 
ravages of the medieval Black Death,
the shores of the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, the Iran of the cholera’s victims in Western Europe and 
1890s presented many venues for the overland and maritime impor- North America belonged to the category 
of the poor and disenfranchised. Catego­tation of disease into its lands. During this time, the Iranian domin­
rized as “the dangerous classes” by the
ions bordered the Russian Empire to the north, Mesopotamian and Victorian elite, this group, more than any 
Anatolian districts of the Ottoman Empire to the west, and Afghani- other, was feared as a source of radical 
predisposition and social unrest; see Evansstan and British India to the east. Regrettably, this meant that Iran 
1988. 
was in an ideal position to acquire epidemics from the east and 
4 Contrary to the accusations of 19th­subsequently export them to European territories through its exten­
century sanitarians, the Ottoman Empire
sive common border with the Russian Empire. and Russia, rather than Iran, bore the 
The cholera pandemics of the 19th century illustrate Iran’s role brunt of the responsibility in cholera’s 
westward transmission. Indeed, althoughas Europe’s “hazardous underbelly.” Indeed, during the very first 
Iran lacked effective sanitary defense
cholera pandemic (1830–1837), Europe acquired the disease mechanisms to protect it from the eastern 
through the common Russo-Iranian border. This event was replayed flow of the epidemic, it very frequently 
acquired the disease from its northern andduring the fifth European cholera epidemic (1869–74), when the 
western neighbor.
disease entered Europe via Iran and Russia. In 1892, Iran again 
served as the transit point for cholera’s westward journey.4 Natu­
rally, it was a new-found position in the global maritime trade 
economy which had played an important role in sustaining Iran’s 
key position in the export of cholera to Europe. Indeed, the British-
Indian commerce, with its important relay ports in the Persian Gulf, 
served as a critical vector for the propagation of Asiatic cholera from 
its home in India to Iran. Consequently, visitations of cholera usu­
ally began their European-bound journeys in Persian Gulf ports that 
had important commercial links with British India. However, it 
should be acknowledged that British trade alone was not solely 
responsible for abetting the epidemic. Iran’s central position in the 
Islamic pilgrimage route from the east also served as an important 
vector for the importation of cholera from India. 
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The pilgrimage to Mecca, better known as the hajj, is one of the 
five pillars of the Islamic faith. After the opening of the Suez Canal 
in 1869 and the development of effective railway routes in the 
Caucasus and between Alexandria and Port Said, many wealthier 
pilgrims from Iran, Afghanistan, and central Asia took advantage of 
this circuitous, but more comfortable, northern route to Mecca 
(Farahani 1990). Characteristically, pilgrims travelling this route 
would leave Tehran by caravan or horse carriage to the Caspian port 
of Enzeli. From there, a Russian steamer would transport them to 
Baku, where they could acquire railroad passage through the 
Caucasus to the port of Batum in Turkey. From Batum a steamer 
would transport them to Istanbul and onward to Alexandria in 
Egypt. From Alexandria, they could continue by rail to the Suez, 
where maritime passage could be obtained to Yanbo and Jedda, and 
from those ports caravan transportation could be obtained to Mecca 
(Farahani 1990). 
With the ubiquity of the steamer and railroad in the Middle East, 
not only did pilgrimage to Mecca become faster, but cholera’s 
spread also achieved a greater velocity and diffusion throughout the 
region. On that account, the 1871 and the 1892 cholera epidemics 
followed this new pilgrimage route into Iran, either disseminated by 
pilgrims coming back through the Red Sea or carried by Mecca 
bound travelers from northern India and Afghanistan (Lorimer 
1915). Incidentally, Iran’s unique Shi’ite sectarian identity also 
served to further compromise its people to the threat of cholera 
visitations. This was due to Shi’ite ziyarats (devotional visits) to the 
holy shrines Najaf and Karbala in Mesopotamia, which provided a 
regular flow of traffic to cholera stricken areas. Located near the 
banks of the Euphrates and the Gulf, these areas were usually a focal 
point for pandemics originating in India, and, as could be observed in 
the 1899 epidemic, as one of the vectors for cholera’s journey into Iran. 
As such, for a variety of reasons Iran was ripe for the visitations 
of cholera; nonetheless, the question remains: why were these epi­
demics still occurring in the 1890s, at a time when the scourge of 
Asiatic cholera had largely been arrested throughout Western 
Europe and North America?5  Why was it that, unlike the Western 
European powers, Iranian authorities could not halt the flow of the 
outbreak? The answer to these questions can be found in Iran’s weak 
central administration and in its sanitary neglect and lack of medical 
facilities, which together with religious and cultural factors predis­
posed and perpetuated Asiatic cholera among the Iranian populace. 
5 	 Nevertheless, recent work by Snowden 
shows that epidemics of Asiatic cholera 
continued in Europe, well into the 20th 
century. Asiatic cholera in epidemic form 
also appeared in Hamburg in 1892; see 
Snowden 1995 and Evans 1987. 
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WEAK CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION 
The Qajar dynasty (1796–1925) was marred by a feeble and 
hampered central government, which was essentially at the whim of 
the various “peripheral” power centers. Nasir al-Din Shah’s (1831– 
1896) reign was not an exception. In the north, Russian and Otto­
man hegemony and meddling in administrative matters, together 
with Turkoman and Kurdish raids, weakened his government’s hold 
on the region. In central and southern provinces of Iran, the 
Bakhtiyari, Qashqa’i, and Khamsa tribal confederacies, together with 
British interests in the Gulf and Baluchistan regions, were wholly 
unsympathetic and even antagonistic toward any measure that 
would extend the central government’s administrative hold and 
threaten their position. This weakness vis à vis the provinces was 
also perpetuated by the custom of assigning princes as provincial-
governors or simply auctioning ministerial appointments to inept 
administrators. Although in theory these governors were representa­
tives of the Crown and accountable to the Shah, in practice they 
were fairly autonomous. This abuse was sustained in part by virtue 
of Nasir al-Din’s own dislike of bureaucracy and tendency toward a 
balance-of-power principle that rarely placed overwhelming author­
ity in the hands of any one party. Consequently, any attempt by 
reform-minded premiers to increase the power of the central gov­
ernment met its demise at the hand of magnates and the European 
powers in the peripheries whose stronger influence in court circles 
overwrote ministerial authority (Bakhash 1978; Nashat 1982; 
Amanat 1997). 
The deficiency of the Iranian administration was also reflected in 
the delay of organized response to the crisis of epidemics in the 19th 
century. Indeed, it was only in 1868 that the first National Sanitary 
Council (Majlis-i hifz al-sihha) assembled in Tehran. The Council, 
headed by Dr. Joseph Desiree Tholozan, the Shah’s chief physician, 
composed a report in which a summary of past epidemics was 
brought to light together with the need for sanitary and quarantine 
improvements as a means of preventing the future flow of cholera 
(Tholozan 1995). Although theoretically sound, the Council’s pro­
posals could never be executed owing to the lack of authority on the 
part of the central government to enforce intrusive and restrictive 
measures in the provinces. Furthermore, the failure of defensive 
implementation was also due to the Council’s lack of mandate and 
to irregular meetings, which invariably only took place when a full-
blown epidemic was already at hand. It was not until 1904, in accor­
dance with the provisions of the 1903 International Sanitary 
Convention of Paris, that a regularly meeting Iranian Sanitary 
Council was inaugurated (Gilmour 1925). This paucity in regulation 
The deficiency of the Iranian adminis­
tration was also reflected in the delay of 
organized response to the crisis of 
epidemics in the 19th century. Indeed, 
it was only in 1868 that the first 
National Sanitary Council (Majlis-i hifz 
al-sihha) assembled in Tehran. 
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 explains the inability to enforce quarantine measures in Iran during 
periods of crisis such as the 1889 cholera epidemic when “a quaran­
tine station [that] had been established by the Persian Government 
was so contrived that it did not hinder at all the traffic carried on 
between Persia and Mesopotamia” (Dickson 1893–94).6 Moreover, 
in a culture that condoned “tax-farming” as a means of acquiring 
revenue, it was deemed acceptable to auction off the administration 
of quarantines to the highest bidder. Hence, those who were ap­
pointed to supervise cordons sanitaires during periods of crisis usu­
ally managed them for personal profit, and orders issued by the 
central government were not always obeyed (Camposampiero 1893– 
94).7 Ironically, the Government’s weak authority sometimes com­
pelled “peripheral” powers, such as the various regional tribes, to 
assume the management of sanitary measures and quarantines to 
protect their own people. 
Dr. Camposampiero relates as an instance of the efficiency of 
cordons sanitaires, that when cholera prevailed at Mashad, the chiefs 
of the tribes of Bujnurd and Ghuskan, in the neighborhood of that 
city, interrupted all interaction between their camps and the infected 
places, and thus kept themselves free of the outbreak 
(Camposampiero 1893-94). 
This administrative weakness vis à vis sanitation and response to 
epidemics was part of a larger “pathology,” the symptoms of which 
expressed themselves in the urban sanitary decay that characterized 
many cities in Iran.8 
URBAN SANITATION AND NEGLECT 
The occurrence and intensity of Asiatic cholera in the Iran of the 
Qajar period refutes the commonly assumed link with 19th century 
urbanization and its associate the Industrial Revolution. Although 
an accurate population census of Iran in the 19th century is lacking, 
an estimate in 1867 puts the total population at 4 million, with a 
mere 850,000 souls inhabiting the principal cities.9  Indeed, urban­
ization and the pattern of city growth observable in Western Europe 
did not occur in Iran until well into the 20th century. Even as late as 
1925, only 2.5 million were urban dwellers, out of a population of 
about 11.8 million, indicating that the Iranians had kept the charac­
teristic pattern of 21% in metropolitan settlements (Ehlers and 
Floor 1993). Furthermore, urban populations were not concentrated 
in any one Iranian city. Instead, masses were equally distributed 
among a number of regional centers. For example, in 1913, 
Tehran—Iran’s capital and most populated city—boasted 350,000 
inhabitants (Issawi 1976; Curzon II). Now, taking the 21% “urban­
dwellers factor” together with an appraisal of the total Iranian 
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6 	 The inefficient quarantine enforcements 
were certainly not limited to the Iranian 
case. During his travel through Egypt from 
Mecca in 1886 Mirza Mohammad Hosayn 
Farahani tells us that: “When officials are 
posted to the quarantine, it is as if they 
[had been appointed] officials in charge of 
fleecing and plundering the pilgrims. One of 
the circumstances that makes this clear is 
that the authorities of the quarantine, 
especially the chief doctor, take something 
from the captains of the steamers so they 
won’t cause any trouble: If someone dies 
during the two days stopped at the 
quarantine, they don’t renew the period 
and do not delay the steamer; see 
Farahani 1990: 291. 
7 	 On the concept of tax farming and the 
purchase of offices, Curzon tells us that 
“so long as the gift of office is largely 
determined by the strength of the purse, 
corrupt administration must prevail, and 
honest men will go to the wall.” See 
Curzon 1892, I: 498. 
8 	 The issue of urban decay was not unique 
to the Iranian context. Indeed, throughout 
the Middle East, sound urban planning was 
a prime concern that came to light 
following European models of urban and 
sanitary renewal; see Rosenthal 1980: 22. 
9 The first national census of Iran was held in 
1956; see Bharier 1968 and Issawi 1971: 
28–29. 
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population in 1890 at nine million, we can safely estimate that the 
total population living in cities and large towns as late as the 1890s 
stood at about 1.9 million. 
Obviously, with an overwhelming segment of Iranians leading a 
rural or sedentary life, the urban significance, with respect to the 
Iranian experience with Asiatic cholera, might be questioned. How­
ever, this issue is immediately resolved by the very nature of the 
“center-periphery” relationship in 19th-century Iran. Most impor­
tantly, villages, rural settlements, and even nomadic tribes, together 
with larger towns and cities were part of an organic system that 
depended on one another for survival. Owing to this mutual depen­
dence, urban centers in Iran were the site for bazaars in which farm­
ers and herders sold their harvest and cattle to feed the cities in 
exchange for the manufactured commodities of urban artisans, 
which they brought back to their tents and villages. As a result of its 
role, the bazaar became a regular icon of the Iranian urban land­
scape, ensuring frequent interaction between the “centers” and the 
“peripheries.” This meant that when a cholera epidemic broke out 
in a town or city, the bazaars became centers of infection, through 
which peasants and nomads carried the disease to the surrounding 
villages and campgrounds (Clemow 1893–94). 
Trying to depict the urban sanitary condition during the Qajar 
era may seem like a gargantuan task in itself. Nevertheless, in a 
country of vastly contrasting climes and environments, which is 
mirrored by the variety of regionally determined designs of its urban 
landscape, the features of municipal sanitation (or lack thereof) 
remain remarkably similar throughout Iran. Tehran of the 1890s is a 
prime example of the unsanitary condition observable throughout 
urban centers in the Qajar era. As Curzon remarks: “That the city 
has yet much to do before it realizes the full aspiration of its royal 
Hausmann is evident as soon as we enter the gates” (Curzon 1892). 
By comparing Nasir al-Din Shah to Baron Hausmann, famed sani­
tarian and architect of Paris, Curzon’s taunt was unwittingly appro­
priate. Indeed, although the city had undergone some 
reconstruction in 1870s, which included the widening of some 
streets and the inauguration of several parks, on the whole, Tehran 
remained a city devoid of sanitary planning or municipal mainte­
nance (Nashat 1982). Dirty streets, stagnant and contaminated pools 
of water, and a suffocating atmosphere characterized its scorched 
summer months. Tehran’s oppression reached such intolerable 
levels that it was commonplace for anyone who could afford it to 
escape the city for the cool shelter of the surrounding mountains, 
leaving behind the aromas of putrefying matter and the constant 
harassment of flies and mosquitoes (Polak 1865). Furthermore, with 
As a result of its role, the bazaar 
became a regular icon of the Iranian 
urban landscape, ensuring frequent 
interaction between the “centers” and 
the “peripheries.” This meant that 
when a cholera epidemic broke out in 
a town or city, the bazaars became 
centers of infection, through which 
peasants and nomads carried the 
disease to the surrounding villages 
and campgrounds. 
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the exception of the cities of Isfahan and Rasht—which obtained 
their water exclusively from wells—highly unsanitary subterranean 
aqueducts, known as qanats, conducted the crucial municipal water 
supplies throughout most of Iran (Wulf 1968; Goblot 1979). 
Since antiquity, qanats had been used as a method of securing 
water from distant places (See English, this volume). Their shelter­
ing character allowed the water to traverse through warm climes 
with the least amount of loss due to evaporation. These channels 
were constructed by sinking vertical shafts every twenty or thirty 
yards and connecting them by tunneling (Gilmour 1925). Tehran’s 
own water supply originated from streams and underground springs 
in the Shemiran slopes at the foot of the Elburz range to the north of 
the city. Departing from the aforementioned sources, the qanats 
conveyed water to the city, branching off among the important 
streets where they remained underground but very close to the 
surface. Once within the municipal boundaries, water from the 
qanats could be obtained by moving stone slabs that covered the 
channels traversing under the streets and alleys. Frequently nothing 
covered the qanats within city confines. In wealthier districts of 
Tehran, water was led to the houses through underground networks, 
whereas in the poorer neighborhoods, the water reached the surface 
and traveled in gutters on both sides of the street (Gilmour 1925). 
This water served the dual purpose of consumption and domestic 
usage; and hence, by its very nature and use the qanat system per­
10 During the 1848 cholera epidemic, which
petuated infection among urban dwellers. Indeed, a chemical analy­ claimed 53,000 victims in England and 
sis of water, conducted in 1924, from six qanats as they entered Wales, Snow published several pamphlets 
and papers (On mode of communication ofTehran revealed water of potable quality in only two cases. In three 
cholera), in which he claimed that the
other cases the water purity was questionable and in one case the disease was a specific water-borne 
water was definitely unfit for drinking. These results were especially	 infection that was distinct from other 
fevers. During the 1854 epidemic he wasshocking due to the fact that these samples were taken from closed 
able to support his argument through two 
qanats before they were open to contamination (Gilmour 1925). famous epidemiological investigations. The 
This meant that even before entering the city, water purity had been	 most famous of the two was the mapping 
of the occurrence of cholera in his own
pre-ordained, and protection from pathogens was not necessarily a neighborhood of Soho and tracing the 
correlate with income levels or neighborhood, since the same source guilty party to a single contaminated well in 
Broad (now Broadwick) Street.He which supplied the poor in the southern districts of Tehran also 
accomplished this by finding visitors who
found its way into the city’s wealthiest mansions. More than any- had drunk from the well and succumbed to 
thing else, it was this system of water supply that was the main con- the disease, and by showing that the 
workers at the local brewery, who hadveyor of the cholera epidemic, mainly due to the “fecal-oral” cycle of 
unrestricted access to beer as a prerequi­
the infection, whereby the cholera bacterium had to be ingested by site for their job, were relatively immune. 
an unsuspecting host. As John Snow (1813–1858) had suggested in His careful and detailed analysis convinced 
local aldermen that the well was the sourcehis investigations of outbreaks in England, more often than not it 
of cholera and they removed the handle to
was the polluted drinking water of a community that was respon­ the well’s water-pump (see Bynum 1994). 
sible for the outbreaks.10 
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Throughout Iran, even if the qanat water was uninfected before 
entering the cities, it had ample opportunities to get contaminated 
while traversing the urban streets. With the lack of proper sewage 
and waste disposal throughout Iranian municipalities, the cholera 
bacterium easily made its way into the drinking water (Morton 
1940). In the city of Bouroudjird, for example, the household sew­
age drained freely onto the streets towards the middle of the city, 
where an immense pit received all the waste, which was subse­
quently left there to be sterilized by sunlight (Fuevrier 1894). More­
over, if the bacterium was not already in the water system through 
the thin porous pavement, the tradition of watering the roads for 
cleaning purposes would then introduce the infection into the thinly 
covered qanats and drinking gutters lining the throughways. Indeed, 
the drinking gutters, which supplied the poorer districts in Iran, 
were open to all kinds of contamination. In the city of 
Muhammareh, for example, the only form of sewage was a channel 
cut down the middle of each street, which was generally choked up 
except after rain. In another city, Shushtar, the streets became recep­
tacles for domestic sewage, which was left on-site until rainwater 
washed the foul matter away. Obviously, open waterways were ex­
posed to dirt and rainwater and the waste that was left on the streets, 
but where nature did not carry infection it was the inhabitants 
themselves who contaminated their drinking water directly. In 
Tehran, for example, it was not unusual to see children playing in 
the gutters or people washing their animals or dirty linens in them; 
in some cases the linens would be the clothes of a victim who had 
succumbed to cholera and hence strewn with fecal matter. More 
blatant forms of pollution came in the form of direct introduction 
of feces into the waterways. Indeed, the Persian word for latrine was 
Kinar-i ab, “the water’s edge.” Hence, it was not unusual to see 
children defecating in the gutters, which a little farther up were 
being used for drinking purposes or pre-prayer ablution. Further­
more, cemeteries were often built next to the very waterways that 
supplied drinking water to the community. In the city of Hamadan, 
for example, the municipality’s largest cemetery was built next to the 
banks of the main waterway entering the city. This trait made mu­
nicipal waterways highly compromised and open to infection espe­
cially via soil infection and “corpse washing” using the river’s 
water.11 To the untrained contemporary European mind, the univer­
sal disregard for sanitation might was passed off as a simple case of 
“oriental ignorance;” however, the lack of proper precautions found 
its source in cultural and religious beliefs of the Iranians which were 
at the very center of the popular conception of cleanliness (nizafat) 
and pollution (nijasat), doctrines, which, when put to the test, 
11 These characteristics also explain the 
reasons for the British Legation’s private 
purchase of a qanat, which was completely 
subterranean (sometimes running up to 
two hundred feet beneath the surface) 
from its source in the mountains to the 
legation grounds in Tehran. Indeed, it can 
be said that it was this safe water source 
and proper quarantining that saved the 
British and American legations from 
outbreaks of cholera within their com­
pounds. The British legation supplied the 
American legation with safe drinking water 
free of charge (see Pearson 1903). 
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proved to be more than effective in guarding the health of an urban 
population; however, it was Asiatic Cholera which proved to be the 
singular Achilles’ Heel in Islamic conceptions of purity.12 
RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL PREDISPOSING FACTORS 
When Dr. James E. Baker disdainfully observed that “Persians 
‘religiously’ hold to the idea that running water cannot be defiled,” 
he could not have known the irony of his statement (Baker 1886). 
Indeed, at the very root of the Islamic Iranian sanitary culture lay 
the belief that running water could be considered immaculate for 
rituals and consumption unless its color, taste, or smell indicated the 
presence of impurities. Furthermore, water from stagnant sources 
such as ponds, reservoirs, and wells was also considered pure, like 
running water, so long as its volume occupied at least one korr (350 
liters), the religiously prescribed volumetric quantity that assured 
purity. Accordingly, to be considered clean, the water that was 
stored from qanats, in home reservoirs, also had to agree with the 
quantitative delineation of purity (Poonawala 1991). Consequently, 
basins were always guarded from dropping below 1 korr, which 
assured that the water was potable, no matter how long it had stood 
stagnant. This faith, rooted in the hadith (prophetic traditions) 
explains why Iranians did not conceptualize the idea of jubs or 
qanats as sources of infection and propagation of disease, for such a 
notion would have challenged their very system of beliefs. Indeed, 
the 19th century witnessed an almost obsessive concern with “ritual” 
purity or taharat. Indeed, the innumerable fatwas (edicts) and reli­
gious prescripts are an indication of the preoccupation of the ‘ulama 
with the subject of cleanliness and the influence of these opinions on 
the general public at this time.13 Nevertheless, a minority of Irani­
ans—such as Nasir al-Din Shah—did espouse the European concep­
tion of water-born infections and as a result they employed a saqqa 
(water-carrier), whose task was to ensure the drinking water’s purity 
by bringing it from the source where the qanat first came to the 
surface.14 
The same Islamic tradition that delineated the guidelines for 
water purity also required that Iranians copiously wash the bodies of 
the deceased before burial. This system, coupled with the staunch 
belief in the purity of running water, led many to wash the bodies of 
their loved ones who had died of cholera in jubs and streams which 
supplied the urban qanats. In addition, faith in the purity of running 
water also allowed graves to be dug right above the city qanats and 
close to other sources of drinking water, without any concern for 
pollution (Bell 1894). Unfortunately, faith in the purity of running 
or voluminous water, along with the religious obligation to wash the 
12 It should be recognized that even water 
polluted by the cholera bacillus in itself 
cannot give rise to illness since under 
normal conditions stomach acids should 
destroy the germs. However, prolonged 
periods of malnutrition and famine lower 
stomach acidity and breech the body’s 
normally effective defense mechanisms. 
Famine and malnutrition were chronic 
problems in nineteenth century Iran and it 
should come as no surprise that cholera 
outbreaks paralleled periods of drought 
and dearth. 
13 Some examples of this genre are: Al-
Bihbanani, Risala fi kayfiyyat wujub al-tahara 
(Manuscript: Sepahsalar 2487); Al-Ansari, 
al-Tahara (Ed. Tabriz, 1303); Al-Rashti, al-
Tahara (Manuscript: Masjid-I Aízam 367). 
Even the late Imam Khomeini had a 
fascination (a common theme with the 
‘ulama as we have seen) with the subject 
of ritual cleanliness and purity in daily life, 
see Khomeini, K. al-Tahara (Qom-Najaf, 
1382–90). 
14 The father of Amin ul-Soltan, had started 
his career as the Sakka Bashi (chief water-
carrier) of Nasir al-Din shah (see Feuvrier, 
Trois Ans: 187). 
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dead, would prove disastrous during cholera epidemics. The high 
casualty rates during Iran’s encounter with these visitations are a 
testament to the role of the unsanitary condition of the urban water 
supply in perpetuating and abetting Asiatic cholera.
 Although cholera’s etiology made it principally rely on the inter­
mediary of drinking water to be disseminated, the Shi’ite tradition 
of seeking entombment in the holy cities of Karbala and Mashhad 
gave Asiatic cholera in Iran the unique opportunity to continue to 
use a person as a vector for transmission, long after he or she had 
been “dead and buried.” 
Even when they are buried, the bodies are not allowed to 
rest in peace. The richer families hold it a point of honor to 
lay the bones of their relations in some holy place—Kerbela 
[sic.], where Hussein was slain, or the sacred shrine of 
Meshed [sic.]. They therefore commit them only tempo­
rarily to the earth, laying them in shallow graves, and cover­
ing them with an arched roof of brickwork, which practice 
accounts for the horrible smell around graveyards after an 
outbreak of cholera. A few months later and long before 
tome has killed the germs of disease, the bodies are taken 
up, wrapped in sackcloth, and carried, slung across the 
backs of mules, to their distant resting place, sowing not 
improbably the seeds of a fresh outbreak as they go. 
(Bell 1894) 
Essentially, these mule-driven caravans traveled from city to city 
in Iran, collecting the deceased and a small sum of money in ex­
change for a promise to the family of the departed that their loved 
ones would be buried in one of the Holy Cities (Mashhad or 
Karbala) for which they were bound. Often, the bodies were en­
closed in an imperfectly nailed box, so as to facilitate transport, an 
operation that was accomplished by tying a pair of the coffins to the 
sides of a mule (Sheil 1856). The obvious result of this engagement 
was that caravans of stench and disease were continuously streaming 
across Iran, carrying and spreading infection at every halt. Some­
times the owners of the transports would decide to dispose of the 
corpse short of the promised destination so as to cut the costs of 
labor and conveyance. On these occasions, it is quite conceivable 
that the bodies were disposed of in rivers and streams, which might 
have also supplied drinking water of a town or village.15 
Cholera in Iran did not always go hand in hand with what con­
temporary European observers labeled as a culture of unsanitary 
praxis. Sometimes, the pursuit of cleanliness, and the virtues of 
15 During the 1870 cholera epidemic, Dr. 
Dickson—chief physician to the British 
legation—credits the exhumation of 
bodies (victims of cholera) to be buried at 
a holy site, with the renewed outbreak of 
cholera in Iran. (Great Britain, The Public 
Record Office, Foreign Office, General 
Correspondence; Dickson to Granville, FO 
60/326, no. 282). 
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bathing proved just as lethal as burial practices and the pollution of 
water. Indeed, the hammam (public bathhouse) in Iran became an 
important center for the propagation of cholera during times of 
epidemic. This condition came about for a variety of reasons, which 
included the customary location of the hammams, below the street 
level, so as to facilitate pumping and carrying water; a characteristic 
that also allowed sewage and garbage to have easy access to these 
locales (Gilmour 1925). Furthermore, the tubs in the hammam were 
usually filled with tepid water that was recycled from previous bath­
ers, and it was not uncommon to see the sick or diseased bathing 
side by side with the healthy, especially since many traditional rem­
edies for cholera recommended bathing (Baker 1886). Hence, not 
only did Iran’s physical construct help spread cholera, but also a 
variety of cultural factors made people more predisposed to the 
disease. The only questions that remain, in this regard, are the fac­
tors for the limited frequency of outbreaks and the reasons for Iran 
is never becoming an endemic region for cholera. 
CONCLUSION 
For students of medical history, the Victorian era, roughly span­
ning from the 1830s to the closing years of the 19th century, is a 
period of prodigious innovation and advances in the medical sci­
ences. This period marks the beginnings of the Christian and Mus­
lim worlds’ divorce from the Galenic ethos, which had dominated 
their medical practice for over two millennia. Essentially, the foun­
dations of various disciplines of contemporary medical sciences 
were built in the 19th century, and no discipline characterizes this 
debut more than the field of epidemiology and public health.16 
Obviously, we should not confound our “modern” image of the 
epidemiologists with the Victorian “sanitary physicians,” nor should 
we lead ourselves into believing that this “sanitary” outlook emerged 
overnight. Nevertheless, most historians of medicine would agree 
that the cholera pandemics of the 19th century were instrumental in 
the emergence of this new intellectual-scientific trend. Indeed, the 
sanitary-physician of the 19th century emerged in part as a result of 
active campaigns on the part of European governments to prevent 
the flow of epidemics into their lands. Moreover, these sanitary 
physicians, together with the active participation of their ruling 
administrations, took dynamic measures to change their environ­
ment and augment the sanitary standards of their citizens. 
During the 19th century Iran was not isolated from these emerg­
ing intellectual trends in medicine. The Dar al-Fonun, or the Poly­
technic College of Tehran, with its Europeanized medical school 
and Austrian instructors, is indicative of the change insofar as the 
16 For an in-depth exposition of medicine and 
public health in Victorian England, see W. 
F. Bynum’s Science and the practice of
 
medicine in the nineteenth century,
 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1994. A more focused account of the 
foundations of epidemiological science in 
Victorian England is presented in David E. 
Lilienfeld, The greening of epidemiology: 
sanitary physicians and the London 
Epidemiological Society, (1830–1870), 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 1975, 52: 
503–528 and A. Dodin and J. Brossollet, 
L’epidemie de cholera de 1832, ou la 
naissance de l’epidemiologie moderne, in 
Hommage à Marcel Baltazard, Paris, Institut 
Pasteur, 1972. 
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medical curriculum was concerned. The issue that remains perplex­
ing is the seeming lack of Iranian impetus in putting new ideas 
dealing with sanitation and public health into practice.17  This is a 
discrepancy, which, I propose, can be solved by comparing the 
Iranian experience with cholera with its European counterparts. 
Indeed, a corresponding look into the subject reveals that part of the 
European motivation in creating a “sanitary police” emerged out of 
the cholera’s selectivity in that it impacted the lower ranks of Euro­
pean society more than its notable classes. The obvious repercus­
sions of such discriminate casualties were that they bred an inherent 
suspicion and hatred of the “upper classes,” which were not affected 
by the epidemics. European governments felt that in due course 
such resentments would lead to insubordination and rebellions, and 
in some cases such uprisings, due to cholera, were actually experi­
enced. Hence, there was a very tangible self-preserving interest on 
the part of the European governments to institute change. Cholera 
in Iran, on the other hand, selected its victims on a much more 
democratic basis. Epidemics affected prince and peasant regardless 
of class or status; hence, the motivation to improve the foundations 
of public health was much less pressing. Obviously, this is but one 
symptom of a more general pathology within the Qajar government, 
which prevented it from instituting adequate sanitary measures.18 
Nevertheless, it gives us yet another perspective on the uniquely 
Iranian response, which emerged from its experience with the visita­
tions of Asiatic cholera. 
It should be reemphasized that Iran’s experience with repeated 
visitations of Asiatic cholera, which included a distinct mode of 
transmission and mortality, indicates that pathogens and patterns 
of illness do somewhat legitimize boundaries and cartographic 
delineations. In essence this signifies that in as much as the cultures 
and national identities in the Middle East mirror the ecology and 
environment of that region, these distinguishing cultural and envi­
ronmental features in turn give rise to unique physical and social 
responses to contagious diseases that further distinguish individual 
countries. The transmission of Asiatic cholera in 19th-century Iran, 
therefore, becomes a measure of that country’s unique environmen­
tal and cultural identity. Consequently, Iran’s central position on 
the Eurasian plateau, its unique practice of water husbandry, its 
predominantly Shi’i faith, together with a weak central administra­
tion during the 19th century, have direct bearing on Asiatic cholera’s 
pathogenesis and transmission in that country. 
17 An active countrywide attempt at arresting 
the progress of epidemic diseases only 
occurs in the 1970s under the leadership of 
Dr. Joseph Desiree Tholozan, the Shah’s 
French physician, and E’tezad al-Saltana, the 
Shah’s staunchly conservative Minister of 
Science. For more on the roots of Iran’s 
sanitary regime, see my upcoming article: 
Defending the Guarded Domain: Epidemics 
and The Emergence of an International 
Sanitary Police in Iran. 
18 Obviously, the lack of adequate state 
revenues and the decentralized “tribal” 
nature of Qajar polity were also great 
obstacles to the implementation of 
adequate sanitary measures. Homa Nateq 
gives a more conspiratorial reason for the 
administrative inaction to the threat of 
cholera by showing the epidemics as a 
“tool” used by the ruling class to distract 
the populace from administrative 
corruption and abuse. See Homa Nateq, 
Mosibat-e Vaba va Balay-e Hokoomat 
(Tehran: Nashr-e Gostareh, 1977). 
19 This distinct experience with illness can be 
seen in Iran’s encounter with the 1918– 
1919 influenza pandemic. During Influenza’s 
visitation, Iran had distinct patterns of co-
morbidity and significantly higher mortality 
as compared to other countries that were 
gripped by the pandemic; see my upcoming 
article in the Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine, Compromised constitutions: the 
Iranian experience with the 1918–1919 
Influenza Pandemic. 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Amanat, A. 1997. Pivot of the universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian monarchy 1831–1896. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. New York: 
Verso Books. 
Baker, J. E. 1886. (M.R.C.S., English Medical Superintendent, Her Britannic Majesty’s Telegraph Staff in 
Persia), A few remarks on the most prevalent diseases and the climate of the north of Persia, Appendix 
to Mr. Nicolson to the Earl of Rosebery, no. 5, Tehran 10th May 1886, Parliamentary Papers, A & P, 
vol. 67: 324, 325. 
Bakhash, S. 1978. Iran: monarchy, bureaucracy & reform under the Qajars: 1858–1896. London: Anchor 
Press. 
Bell, G. 1926. Persian pictures. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1st ed. 1894: 67–68. 
Bharier, J. (1968) A note on the population of Iran, 1900–1966, Population Studies, XXII: 2. 
Bozdogan, S. and Kasaba, R., eds. 1997. Rethinking modernity and national identity in Turkey. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press. 
Bynum, W. F. 1994. Science and the practice of medicine in the nineteenth century. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Camposampiero, Dr. 1893-94. On the recent outbreak of cholera in Persia. In Transactions of the 
Epidemiological Society of London, XIII: 156. 
Clemow, F. G. 1893–94. A contribution to the epidemiology of cholera in Russia, Transactions of the 
Epidemiological Society of London, XIII: 67. 
Crosby, A. W. 1986 Ecological imperialism: the biological expansion of Europe, 900–1900. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Curzon, G. N. 1892. Persia and the Persian question, 2 vol. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.: 306, 494. 
Dickson, E. D. 1893-94. The outbreak of cholera in Mesopotamia and Syria in 1889, 1890, and 1891. In 
Transactions of the Epidemiological Society of London, XIII: 146. 
Ehlers, E. and W. Floor. 1993. Urban change in Iran, 1920-1941, Iranian Studies, 26 (3-4): 253. 
Evans, R. J. 1988. Epidemics and revolutions: cholera in nineteenth century Europe, Past and Present, 
no. 120. 
Evans, R. J. 1987. Death in Hamburg: society and politics in the cholera years, 1830–1910. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Farahani, M. M. H. 1990. A Shi’ite pilgrimage to Mecca 1885–1886: The “safarnameh”of Mirza Mohammad 
Hosayn Farahani, ed. by E. L. Daniel and trans. by H. Farmayan, Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Feuvrier, J. 1894. Trois ans à la cour de Perse [Three years at the Persian court], Paris: F. Juven: 382. 
Fisher, W. B. 1968. The Cambridge history of Iran, volume I: The Land of Iran, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 441. 
Gilbar, G. G. 1976. Demographic developments in late Qajar Persia 1870–1906, Asian and African Studies 
11 (2): 131. 
Gilmour, J. 1925. Report on an investigation into the sanitary conditions in Persia. Geneva: League of Nations: 
50-51; 57. 
Goblot, H. 1979. Les Qanats: une technique d’acquesition de l’eau. Paris: Mouton. 
Hobsbawm, E. J. 1993. Nations and nationalism since 1780: program, myth, reality. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
  
 
  
 
    
 
Issawi, C., ed. 1971. The economic history of Iran 1800–1914. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Jackson, P. and J. Penrose, eds. 1994. Construction of race, place and nation. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Khalidi, R. 1997. Palestinian identity: the construction of modern national consciousness. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Lorimer, J. G. 1915. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, ‘Oman, and Central Arabia, 2 vol. Calcutta, India: 
Superintendent Government Printing. 
McNeill, W. H. 1979. Plagues and peoples. New York: Doubleday. 
Mohammad Isma’il al-Bukhari, Jami’ Hadith 23: 9; cited in Maulana Muhammad Ali, a manual of Hadith. 
Lahore: The Ahmadiyya Anjuman. 
Morton, R. S. 1940. A doctor’s holiday in Iran. New York: Funk Wagnals Company: 265. 
Nashat, G. 1982. The Origins of modern reform in Iran, 1870–1880. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Pearson, R. 1903. United States Envoy to Persia, to John Hay, Secretary of State, Tehran, September 10, 
1903 (Pearson to Hay); State Department #M223, No. 15. Diplomatic Series; National Archives, 
Washington, DC. 
Polak, J. E. 1865. Persien, das Land und seine Bewohner. Ethnographische Schilderungen (Leipzig: Broukhaus, 
1865); Persian trans., Safarnama-ye Polak: Iran va Iranian, trans. K. Jahandari (Tehran: Khawrazmi, 
1361/1982. 
Poonawala, I. K. 1991. AB “water:” II Water in Muslim Iranian culture, Encyclopaedia Iranica, E. Yarshater, 
ed., V: 27–28. 
Ranger, T., ed. 1992. The invention of tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rosenthal, S. Foreigners and municipal reform in Istanbul: 1855-1865, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, II: 2272–45. 
Sheil, Lady M. 1856. Glimpses of life and manners in Persia, London: J. Murray: 197–98. 
Snowden, F. M. 1995. Naples in the time of cholera, 1884–1911. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Tholozan, Dr. 1869. Rapport à sa Majesté le Chah sur l’état actuel de l’hygiene en Perse. Progres à realiser et 
moyens de les effectuer. Teheran: litographie, Aout 1869. In Kotobi, L-D. 1995. L’Emergence d’une 
politique de santé publique en Perse Qadjare (XIX-XXe Siècles), Studia Iranica 24: 267–268. 
Wulf, H. E. 1968. The Qanats of Iran, Scientific American 218: 94-105. 
AMIR ARSALAN AFKHAMI is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History at Yale University and a medical student 
at George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences. His dissertation is entitled: “Iran in the Age 
of Visitations: Cholera and the Politics of Public Health 1866–1911.” 
Amir Afkhami, Department of History, Yale University, 320 York Street, New Haven, CT 06520. E-mail: 
amir.afkhami@yale.edu 
 
 
      
Hydrostrategic Decisionmaking and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the idea of hydrostrategic territory (that is, territory over which sovereignty has been sought 
politically or militarily solely because of its access to water sources) and its role in the establishment of national bound­
aries, warfare, and negotiations in the Jordan River watershed. It argues that although water resources constitute a 
critical factor in interstate tensions and relations in the region, they have never served as the sole determinant in 
strategic affairs. No boundaries have been drawn, no military strategies pursued, and no negotiating positions espoused 
solely on hydrostrategic grounds. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Water” and “war” are topics being assessed together with in­
creasing frequency. Articles in the academic literature (Cooley 1984; 
Gleick 1993; Starr 1991; and others) and the popular press (Bulloch 
Invariably, writings on “water wars” point and Darwish 1993; World Press Review 1995) point to water not 
to the arid and hostile Middle East as an 
only as a cause of historic armed conflict, but as the resource which 
example of a worst-case scenario, where 
will bring combatants to the battlefield in the 21st century. Invari­ armies have in fact been mobilized and 
ably, writings on “water wars” point to the arid and hostile Middle shots fired over this precious resource. 
East as an example of a worst-case scenario, where armies have in Elaborate “hydraulic imperative” theories 
fact been mobilized and shots fired over this precious resource. have been developed for the region which 
Elaborate “hydraulic imperative” theories have been developed for cite water as the prime motivator for 
military strategy and territorial conquest. the region which cite water as the prime motivator for military 
strategy and territorial conquest. 
The argument is thus: water is a resource vital to a nation’s sur­
vival, from its inhabitants’ biology to their economy; the scarcity of 
water in an arid environment, often referred to as “water stress,” 
leads to intense political pressures; the Middle East is a region not 
only of extreme political conflict, but also one in which states are 
reaching the limits of their annual freshwater supply; therefore, 
Middle East warfare and territorial acquisition must be related to the 
region’s “water stress.” 
This paper examines in detail the link between water and land—the 
nature of “hydrostrategic territory”—in this “worst-case” water conflict 
between Arabs and Israelis. The central question is: in the absence of 
any other compelling strategic or legal rationale, does territory exist (a) 
over which sovereignty has been sought politically or militarily, or (b) 
which would be insisted upon in the course of current territorial 
negotiations, solely because of its access to water sources? 
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Figure 1 The Jordan River Watershed (Wolf 1995).
 The approach is to subdivide the question as follows: 
•	 Have boundaries been drawn historically on the basis of the 
location of water access? 
•	 During warfare between competing riparians, has territory 
been explicitly targeted or captured because of its access to 
water sources? 
•	 In the course of negotiations, has territory with access to 
water sources (but lacking any strategic component) been 
considered vital for retention by any of the riparians? 
 
 
      
BORDERS, BOUNDARIES, AND HYDROSTRATEGIC 
TERRITORY 
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to distinguish 
“hydrostrategic” territory (that is, land surface which has strategic 
value solely on the basis of water resource access) from other terri­
tory under conflict. 
Ratzel defines the difference between a border line and a border 
fringe: “the border fringe is the reality and the border line is the 
abstraction thereof” (cited in Prescott 1987). The term “boundary” 
has become more common for the line, while “frontier” and/or 
“border region” are used regularly to refer to the zone on either side 
of the boundary (O’Loughlin 1994). Prescott (1987) defines bound­
aries as “the line of physical contact between states” and identifies 
them as sources of both conflict and cooperation among states. 
The link between the attributes of the border region and interna­
tional conflict has been well documented. Ratzel emphasized the 
physical components of boundaries, arguing that states should 
establish strong military boundaries, including mountain slopes and 
the far banks of rivers (cited in Prescott 1965). The functional ap­
proach of political geography, as defined by Hartshorne (1950), 
Jones (1954), and others, describes the motives of state behavior; 
Douglass (1985) specifies security as the fundamental goal of a state: 
“security for its political system, its economic system and for its 
people....” Homer-Dixon (1991) offers a broad definition of security 
along similar lines, to include human physical, social, and economic 
well-being. If delineation of boundaries does not further these goals 
for states on both sides of the line, they themselves can become a 
cause of conflict. Waterman (1984) describes the hardships of the 
peoples of Ireland and Palestine brought about by the imposition of 
boundaries which insufficiently take geography into account. Cohen 
(1986) lists almost one hundred boundary disputes and describes 
the most important elements which contribute to them. 
One problem is that many of these elements can be in opposi­
tion. As Tonkin (1994) points out, borders imply scarcity: “Borders 
now imply potential contestation and scarcity, a sense that territory 
is either in short supply or potentially valuable.” 
Water certainly is a source of boundary conflict. Prescott (1965) 
describes disputes over water bodies which mark or cross a bound­
ary (including territorial waters) as the most common source of 
functional disputes, and both he and Bingham et al. (1994) describe 
such examples from around the world. In contrast, ignoring water in 
favor of other parameters of boundary delineation has also proved 
unwise. The boundary between India and Pakistan, for example, was 
drawn mostly on the basis of religious considerations, all but ignor­
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ing the dependence of populations on both sides on the waters of 
the Indus. Religion has been sufficient to unify either country 
(Donnan and Wilson 1994), and ignorance of the location of water 
has necessitated years of negotiations and elaborate engineering 
works to physically divide the river (Biswas 1992). 
It is difficult to distinguish between military strategy, defined by 
one military officer as “from where are they shooting and from 
where will we shoot back” (cited in Wolf 1995), and “hydrostrat­
egy,” the influence of the location of water resources on strategic 
thinking. Rivers are invaluable barriers against tanks and troop 
movements and are also used to delineate boundaries. High ridges, 
ideal for military positioning, are also often local watershed bound­
aries. As Minghi (1963) points out, much thought was given to the 
relationship between boundaries and security particularly in the 
1 Prescott makes the important point thatperiods including the two world wars—times of intense boundary 
Curzon differentiated between “natural” 
delineation. In 1907, Lord Curzon (cited in Prescott 1965) described and what Ratzel and, later, Kjellen 
the superiority of “natural” boundaries,1 being dependent on physi- mislabeled as the geopolitically “Natural” 
frontiers, to which nations ought to strive.
cal geographic features, over “artificial” boundaries of latitude and To avoid such confusion, Broek (1940) 
longitude. Writing during World War I, Holdich (1916) linked the argues for the term “physiographic” 
boundary.concept of security with boundaries, arguing that, whether it is 
natural or artificial, a boundary should act as a barrier which “must Holdich also suggests that annexation of2 
be made as secure as nature or art can make it.”2 Rivers, he argued,	 any territory against the will of its 
inhabitants is “a political blunder” (p. 499).may make good boundaries (second to mountain ranges), provided 
“the channel is narrow in a rock-bound bed.” Lyde (cited in Minghi 
1963), arguing in 1915 that the prime function of a boundary was not 
as a barrier, but rather as “a feature which encourages peaceful interna­
tional discourse,” suggested that rivers made in fact the most desirable 
boundaries, providing “a maximum of peaceful associations.” 
Johnson (1917), Broek (1942), and others have pointed out 
problems unique to river boundaries, including the difficulty in 
accommodating geomorphic change and the fact that rivers often 
flow through heavily populated areas. With World War II, however, 
came the development of new military technology bringing a di­
mension to warfare which, along with a greater awareness of the 
importance of ethnic and economic relations between states, obvi­
ated the role of boundary-as-barrier (Spykman 1942, cited in 
Minghi 1963). The war also graphically contradicted Lyde’s ideas on 
the boundary as an inducer of peace. With both arguments contro­
verted, Jones (1945) concludes (not surprisingly) that rivers are 
especially troubling boundaries but that, “unfortunately, rivers 
probably [will continue to be] adopted as boundaries even though 
the geographer or engineer inveighs against them.” Jones is also 
among the earliest observers to detail the conflict-inducing aspects 
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of international rivers, notably the difficulty in allocating the water 
of a shared river. 
It is precisely these conflicting elements of water sources—their 
strategic value in the traditional sense, their functional value in a 
domestic sense, and their practical role in delineating boundaries— 
which inform the central questions of this paper. “Hydrostrategic” 
territory must then be operationally defined as that territory which 
has strategic value primarily because of its access to water resources 
for irrigation, drinking and/or electric power. This is distinct from 
strategic territory in a traditional military or political sense, includ­
ing what Cohen (1986) calls “strategic water space,” or water-related 
territory which provides traditional strategic value. 
WATER AND BOUNDARIES 
In this section, I seek to answer the first question posed in the 
introductory section: have boundaries been drawn historically in the 
Middle East on the basis of the location of water access? 
BOUNDARY PROPOSALS AND DELINEATION: 1913-1923 
After the first Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland in 1897, 
European Jewry began its efforts to gain the support of Ottoman or 
British authorities for a Jewish state in Palestine (which had been 
under Ottoman rule for 400 years). Even without commitments for 
independent nations, both Jewish and Arab populations began to 
swell in Palestine—the former in waves of immigration from Yemen 
as well as from Europe, and the latter attracted from other parts of 
the Arab world to new regional prosperity (Sachar 1969; McCarthy 
1990). According to McCarthy (1990), Palestine had 340,000 people 
in 1878 and 722,000 by 1915. 
During World War I, as it became clear that the Ottoman Em­
pire was crumbling, the heirs-apparent began to jockey for positions 
of favor with the inhabitants of the region. The French held favor 
with the Maronite Catholics of Lebanon and therefore focused on 
the northern territories of Lebanon and Syria. The British, mean­
while, began to seek a coalition with (1) the Arabs from Palestine 
and Arabia, for military assistance against the Turks and (2) the Jews 
of Palestine, for both military assistance and the political support of 
Diaspora Jewry (Ra’anan 1955). As the course of the war became 
clear both the colonial powers and the local populations began to 
refine their territorial interests. 
A detailed description of the lengthy process which led to the 
final determination of boundaries for the French and British man­
dates and informed the boundaries of modern Lebanon, Syria, Jor­
dan, and Israel, is beyond the scope this paper.3 The influence of 
3 	 Details of the transition can be found in the 
works of Ra’anan (1955), Sachar (1969, 
1987), and Fromkin (1989). 
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Figure 2 Boundaries proposed for Palestine, 1916-1919 (Weizmann Letters 1968). 
water resources along the Palestine-Syria border is described by 
Garfinkle (1994), and along the Palestine-Lebanon frontier by Hof 
(1985) and by Amery (1996). The following outline of events leading 
up to the Anglo-French Convention in 1923 emphasizes only certain 
decisions, and is based on the works mentioned above. The inter­
ested reader is referred to that literature for more detail. 
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The Zionist Position 
The Zionists began to formulate their desired boundaries for the 
“national home” to be determined by three criteria: historic, strate­
gic, and economic considerations (Zionist publications cited in 
Ra’anan 1955). 
The Jews’ historic concerns coincided roughly with British allusions 
to the biblical “Dan to Beersheba” area. The Zionists articulated mini­
mum requirements which had to be supplemented with territory allow­
ing military and economic security. Military security required desert 
areas to the south and east as well as the Beka’a Valley, a gateway in the 
north between the Lebanon Mountains and Mount Hermon. 
Economic security was defined by water resources. The entire 
Zionist program of immigration and settlement required water for 
large-scale irrigation and, in a land with no fossil fuels, for hydro-
power. The plans were “completely dependent” on the acquisition of 
the “headwaters of the Jordan, the Litani River, the snows of Hermon, 
the Yarmuk and its tributaries, and the Jabbok” (Ra’anan 1955). 
In a flurry of communication between world Zionist leaders, the 
aspects of historic, strategic, and economic security became increas­
ingly linked with the Jordan headwaters. 
The guiding force on the boundary position of the Jewish side 
was Aaron Aaronson. In charge of an agricultural experimental 
station at Atlit on the Mediterranean coast, Aaronson’s research 
focused on weather-resistant crops and dry-farming techniques. 
Convinced that the modern agricultural practices which would fuel 
Jewish immigration were incompatible with “the slothful, brutish 
Ottoman regime” (Sachar 1979), he concluded that Zionist settle­
ment objectives required alliance with the incoming Allied Forces. 
Aaronson initiated contact with the British to establish a Jewish spy 
network in Palestine, which would report on Turkish positions and 
troop movements. Perhaps because of his training both in agricul­
ture and in security matters, Aaronson became the first to argue for 
boundary delineation based specifically on future water needs. 
Aaronson’s “The Boundaries of Palestine” (January 27, 1919, un­
published, Zionist Archives), drafted in less than a day, argued that,
 in Palestine, like in any other country of arid and semi­
arid character, animal and plant life and, therefore, the 
whole economic life directly depends on the available 
water supply. It is, therefore, of vital importance not only 
to secure all water resources already feeding the country, 
but also to insure the possession of whatever can conserve 
and increase these water—and eventually power—re­
sources. The main resources of Palestine come from the 
Economic security was defined by water 
resources. The entire Zionist program 
of immigration and settlement required 
water for large-scale irrigation and, in a 
land with no fossil fuels, for hydro-
power. The plans were “completely 
dependent” on the acquisition of the 
“headwaters of the Jordan, the Litani 
River, the snows of Hermon, the 
Yarmuk and its tributaries, and the 
Jabbok”. 
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North, from the two mighty mountain-masses—the Leba­
non range, and the Hermon....The boundary of Palestine 
in the North and in the North East is thus dictated by the 
extension of the Hermon range and its water basins. The 
only scientific and economically correct lines of delinea­
tion are the watersheds. 
Aaronson then described the proposed boundaries in detail, as 
delineated by the local watershed (see Figure 2). He acknowledged 
that, with the exception of the Litani, the Lebanon range sends no 
important water source towards Palestine and could not therefore be 
claimed on a hydrological basis. It was the Hermon, he argued, that 
was the genuine ‘Father of Waters’ which could not be severed from 
(Palestine) without striking at the very root of its economic life.” 
Returning to the Litani, Aaronson argued that 
[it] is of vital importance to northern Palestine both as a
 
supply of water and of power. Unfortunately its springs lie
 
in the Lebanon. Some kind of international agreement is
 
essential in order that the Litani may be fully utilized for
 
the development of North Palestine and the Lebanon.
 
Aaronson’s rationale and boundary proposals were adopted by 
the official Zionist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, led by 
Chaim Weizmann. The “Boundaries” section of the “Statement of 
the Zionist Organization Regarding Palestine,” which paraphrased 
Aaronson, read: 
The economic life of Palestine, like that of every other
 
semi-arid country depends on the available water supply.
 
It is therefore, of vital importance not only to secure all
 
water resources already feeding the country, but also to be
 
able to conserve and control them at their sources.…
 
The Hermon is Palestine’s real “Father of Waters” and
 
[Palestine] cannot be severed from it without striking at
 
the very root of its economic life.…Some international
 
arrangement must be made whereby the riparian rights of
 
the people dwelling south of the Litani River may be fully
 
protected. Properly cared for these head waters can be
 
made to serve in the development of the Lebanon as well
 
as of Palestine (Proposals dated February 3, 1919,
 
Weizmann Letters 1983, Appendix II).
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Aaronson thought his ideas had been misrepresented in the 
official Zionist position, perhaps because he was not included in the 
final drafting. In an angry letter to Weizmann, he complained that 
the draft was “a disgrace and a calamity” (emphasis Aaronson’s) and 
expressed shock that, for one of the delegates, “a ‘watershed’ is the 
same as a ‘thalweg.’ Incredible, but true...” (unpublished letter, 
February 16, 1919, Weizmann Archives). 
In June of 1919 Aaronson died in a plane crash on his way to the 
Peace Conference and the Zionist proposals were submitted without 
revision. Nevertheless, the importance of the region’s water re­
sources remained embedded in the thinking of the Zionist establish­
ment. “So far as the northern boundary is concerned,” wrote Chaim 
Weizmann later that year, “the guiding consideration with us has 
been economic, and ‘economic’ in this connection means ‘water 
supply’” (Weizmann Letters, September 18, 1919). 
The Arab Position 
The Arab delegation to the Peace Conference was led by the 
Emir Feisal, younger son of Emir Hussein of the Hejaz. Working 
with T. E. Lawrence, Hussein and his sons had led Arab irregulars 
against the Turks in Arabia and Eastern Palestine. After the war, 
Feisal had developed a relationship with Chaim Weizmann as both 
prepared for the Peace Conference. After a meeting in 1918, Feisal 
said in an interview: 
The two main branches of the Semitic family, Arabs and 
Jews, understand one another, and I hope that as a result 
of interchange of ideas at the Peace Conference, which will 
be guided by ideals of self-determination and nationality, 
each nation will make definite progress towards the real­
ization of its aspirations (cited in Esco Foundation 1947). 
Feisal also initially expressed support for Jewish immigration to 
Palestine, in part because he saw it as useful for his own nationalist 
aspirations. At a banquet given in his honor by Lord Rothschild in 
1918, he pointed out that, “No state could be built up in the Near East 
without borrowing from the ideas, knowledge and experience of 
Europe, and the Jews were the intermediaries who could best translate 
European experience to suit Arab life” (Esco Foundation 1947). 
In a meeting later that year, Feisal tried to enlist Weizmann’s 
support against French policies in Syria. Weizmann in turn outlined 
Zionist aspirations and, “asserted his respect for Arab communal 
rights” (Sachar 1969). The two also agreed that all water and farm 
boundary questions should be settled directly between the two parties. 
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Feisal and Weizmann formalized their understanding to support 
each other’s national ambitions on January 3, 1919, in a document 
which expressed mutual friendship, recognition of the Balfour Dec­
laration, stating that: 
All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate 
immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly 
as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through 
closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking 
such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be pro­
tected in their rights, and shall be assigned in forwarding their eco­
nomic development (original reproduced in Weizmann Letters), 
providing, Feisal hand-wrote in the margin, that Arab requests 
were granted. “If changes are made,” he wrote, “I cannot be 
answerable for failure to carry out this agreement.” 
The Arab requests were spelled out in a memorandum dated 
January 1, 1919. Because the territory in question was so large— 
including Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian Peninsula—so 
geographically diverse, and for the most part, well-watered, it is not 
surprising that water resources played little role in the Arab delib­
erations. Feisal requested the following (Esco Foundation 1947): 
•	 that Syria, agriculturally and industrially advanced, and 
considered politically developed, be allowed to manage her 
own affairs; 
•	 that Mesopotamia, “underdeveloped and thinly inhabited 
by semi-nomadic peoples, would have to be buttressed…by 
a great foreign power,” but governed by Arabs chosen by 
the “selective rather than the elective principle;” and 
•	 that the Hejaz and Arabian Peninsula, mainly a tribal area 
suited to patriarchal conditions, should retain their 
complete independence. 
Two areas were specifically excluded: Lebanon, “because the 
majority of the inhabitants were Christian,” and had their own 
delegates (Amery 1996 ), and Palestine, because its “universal char­
acter was left to one side for mutual consideration of all parties 
interested” (Esco Foundation 1947). 
Once testimony was heard at Versailles, the decisions were left to 
the British and the French as the peace talks continued, culminating 
at San Remo in 1920, as to where the boundaries between their 
mandates would be drawn. 
The French supported the Lebanese claim that the “historic and 
natural” boundaries of Greater Lebanon should include the sources 
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Figure 3 Disputed area, March–September 1919 (Hof 1985). 
of the Jordan River (Sachar 1979), including the Galilee Region. 
They claimed that the Litani was needed for development in Leba­
non, while the snows of the Hermon provided water for Damascus. 
In 1919, the British first suggested the “Meinertzhagen Line” as a 
boundary (see Figure 2). Based mostly on British security require­
ments, this line was similar in the north to the Zionist proposals, 
and was rejected by the French for similar reasons. In September the 
British put forward the compromise “Deauville Proposal,” which 
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granted Palestine less territory than the Zionists sought, but still 
included the southern bank of the Litani and the Banias headquar­
ters. At the time, Banias was thought (incorrectly) to be the biblical 
Dan, thereby allowing the British to remain true to their claim of 
Palestine “from Dan to Beersheba” (Hof 1985). 
Finally, to best comply with French objections, the British pro­
posed a border running north from Acre to the Litani bend, then 
east to Mount Vernon, which would increase Lebanese territory but 
leave the headwaters in Palestine (Ra’anan 1955). 
Although the French rejected each of these proposals, Phillips 
Berthelot, the foreign minister and negotiator to an Anglo-French 
conference on the Mideast in December 1919, indicated that Prime 
Minister Clemenceau was insisting on the Sykes-Picot line, but that 
he was prepared
 to agree that one-third of the waterpower of the waters flow­
ing from Mount Hermon southwards into the Palestine of the 
Sykes-Picot agreement should be allotted to the Zionists 
under an economic arrangement with France. The French 
could do no more than this (cited in Ra’anan 1955). 
At the San Remo Conference in April 1920, an agreement was 
reached in which Great Britain was granted the mandates to Pales­
tine and Mesopotamia, and France received the mandate for Syria 
(including Lebanon). During the remainder of the year, last minute 
appeals were made both by the British and the Zionists for the inclu­
sion of the Litani in Palestine or, at the least, for the right to divert a 
portion of the river into the Jordan basin for hydropower. The 
French refused, offering a bleak picture of the future without an 
agreement and suggested, referring to British and Zionist ambiguity 
as to what was meant by a ‘National Home,’ “Vous barbotterez si 
vous le voulez, mais vous ne barbotterez pas à nos frais” (“You will 
flounder if you like, but you will not flounder at our expense.” But­
ler and Bury 1958). 
On December 4, 1920, a final agreement was reached in principle 
on the boundary issue which mainly addressed French and British 
rights to railways and oil pipelines as well as incorporating the 
French proposal for the northern boundaries of six months prior. 
The French delegation did promise that the Jewish settlements 
would have free use of the waters of the Upper Jordan and the 
Yarmuk, although they would remain in French hands (Ra’anan 
1955). The Litani was excluded from this arrangement. Article 8 of 
the Franco-British Convention, therefore, included a call for a joint 
committee to examine the irrigation and hydroelectric potential of 
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the Upper Jordan and Yarmuk “after the needs of the territories 
under French Mandate,” and added that 
…in connection with this examination the French govern­
ment will give its representatives the most liberal instructions 
for the employment of the surplus of these waters for the 
benefit of Palestine (cited in Hof 1985). 
The final boundaries between the French and British mandates, 
which later became the boundaries between Israel, Lebanon, Syria, 
and Jordan, were worked out by an Anglo-French commission set 
up to trace the frontier on the spot. They generally circumvented 
settlements, divided territory on an ethnic basis (consistent with the 
wishes of the inhabitants), and retained the link between settlements 
and their agricultural land. The results were submitted in February 
1922 and signed by the British and French governments in March 
1923 (Ra’anan 1955; Hof 1985). 
The frontier would run from Ras en-Naqura inland in an east­
erly direction along the watershed between the rivers flowing into 
the Jordan and into the Litani; the line was then to turn sharply 
north to include in Palestine a “finger” of territory near Metulla and 
the eastern sources of the Jordan. 
Rather than include the Banias spring within Palestine as in the 
French proposal of six months prior, the border ran parallel to and 
100 meters south of the existing path from Metullah to the Banias. 
The French insisted on inclusion of this road in its entirety to facili­
tate east-west transportation and communication within its man­
date, as it was a stretch of the main route from Tyre to Quneitra. 
This northern border meant that the entire Litani and the Jordan 
headwaters of the Ayoun and Hasbani would originate in Lebanon 
before flowing into Palestine. The Banias spring, meanwhile, would 
originate and flow for 100 meters in Syrian territory, then into Pal­
estine. Since Palestine had a promise of water use, and also access to 
the Banias Heights which overlooked the spring, the fact that the 
actual spring lay outside of the boundaries was not of immediate 
concern. Of the headwaters of the Jordan, however, only the Dan 
spring remained entirely within Palestine. 
From the Banias, the border turned south toward the Sea of 
Galilee, along the foothills of the Golan Heights, parallel and just 
east (sometimes within 50 meters) of the Huleh Lake and the Jordan 
River. Rather than passing through the middle of the Sea of Galilee, 
the border ran 10m east of its shores (even if the level should rise 
because of a proposed dam), leaving the entire lake, the town of El-
Hama, and a small triangle just south of the Jordan’s outflow within 
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the territory of Palestine. The latter two territories were already 
included in Zionist plans for water diversion and hydroelectricity 
generation. The arrangement was beneficial to Palestine’s 
hydrostrategic positioning, and, although it was made mainly for 
administrative reasons, “to make customs inspection easier,” it was 
also expressed that the development plans should proceed without 
international complication (Ra’anan 1955). Nevertheless, according 
to the agreement, fishing and navigation rights on the lake were 
retained by the inhabitants of Syria. Later, between 1948 and 1967, 
Syria claimed the shoreline as the de facto border, and argued for 
riparian rights to the lake on that basis. 
At the Yarmuk, the border went eastward along the river, meet­
ing up with the Sykes-Picot line into the Syrian desert and south of 
the Jebel Druze. The final agreement made no mention of joint 
4 The boundary was originally defined as theaccess to French-controlled waters. 
location of the river in 1922. However, 
Administrative divisions would further convolute the boundaries after the Jordan shifted 800 meters 
westward during the winter of 1927-28,along the Jordan. In May 1921, Churchill offered the Emir Abdullah 
the British high commissioner decided that
reign over that part of the British Mandate east of the Jordan River. the boundary would henceforth be the 
Transjordan became a semi-independent entity in 1923 and an center of the water bodies mentioned, 
wherever they meandered. A similar shift inindependent kingdom in 1946. While the division was originally 
the streambed, and consequently in the
between administrative units under one authority—the British boundary, occurred in the winter of 1978­
Mandate—the boundary, as defined by the center of the Jordan 79 (Biger 1994). 
River, the Dead Sea, and Wadi Araba/Arava, would eventually be­
come the international boundary between Israel and Jordan.4 
Although the location of water resources had been an important, 
sometimes over-riding issue with some of the actors involved in deter­
mination of the boundaries of these territories, it is clear from the out­
come that other issues took precedence over the need for water 
development. These other factors ranged from the geostrategic (the 
location of roads and oil pipelines) to the political (alliances and rela­
tionships among British, French, Jews, and Arabs) to the historical (how 
well versed one or another negotiator was in biblical geography). 
Partition and Jewish Statehood: 1922-1948 
During the 1930s and 1940s, water was a focus of several reports 
which tried to determine the “economic absorptive capacity” of 
mandate Palestine. In the absence of clear immigration policy, both 
Jewish and Arab residents of Palestine became increasingly frus­
trated, taking out their hostility on each other as well as on the 
British. Over time, the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab 
states increasingly became the most advocated option, first in an 
Anglo-American plan in 1946, and later, when Britain ceded the 
Mandate to the United Nations, in the U.N. Partition Plan of 1947. 
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Figure 4 United Nations plan for the partition of Palestine, November 1947 (Sachar 1979). 
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In the case of partition the Zionists identified three areas that 
were essential to a viable Jewish state: the Galilee region with the 
Jordan headwaters, the populated coastal zone, and the Negev 
Desert, to absorb “the ingathering of the exiles.” In the late 1930s, 
the Jewish Agency (the Zionists’ pre-state governing body), sensing 
that partition was imminent, embarked on an intensive settlement 
program, building 55 farm communities between 1936 and 1939 
(Sachar 1979). The northern Galilee was targeted in order to rein­
force the projected boundaries and guarantee the inclusion of those 
portions of the Jordan headwaters left from the Mandate process. 
The Zionist position on partition and the minimum territorial 
requirements for a viable Jewish state was increasingly influenced by 
Walter Clay Lowdermilk. In 1944 Lowdermilk, the director of the 
U.S. Soil Conservation Service, published a plan commissioned by 
the Jewish Agency. In contrast to the Ionides Plan of 1939, 
Lowdermilk asserted that proper water management would generate 
resources for four million Jewish refugees in addition to the 1.8 
million Arabs and Jews living in Palestine at the time. He advocated 
regional water management, based on work of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA), to develop irrigation on both banks of the Jordan 
River and in the Negev Desert as well as construction of a canal from 
the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea to generate hydro-power and 
replenish the diverted fresh water (Naff and Matson 1984). 
Referring to Lowdermilk’s work, a 1945 aide memoire on Pales­
tine described Zionist reservations on partition: 
With the sea in the West, the Jordan and the Power and 
Potash concessions in the East, the chief water resources in 
the North, and the main land-reserves in the South, any 
partition scheme seems bound to disrupt the country’s 
economic frame, and wreck the chances of large-scale 
development (April 6, 1945, cited in Weizmann Letters). 
At the same time, a 1944 study, “The Water Resources of Pales­
tine,” undertaken by Mekorot (the national water company for 
Jewish Palestine) described an “All-Palestine Project,” for irrigation 
and hydroelectric development. The study included frontier adjust­
ments which would be desirable for a basin-wide development 
scheme in Palestine. 
It was suggested that the mandate border be moved upstream 
where it met the Hasbani, Dan, and Banias headwaters to allow for 
more effective drainage; eastward along Lake Hula to leave room for 
a conduit on the east side of the lake; and upstream along the 
Yarmuk to include an area of about 80 km2 of Transjordan to 
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develop a series of impoundments along the river (Mekorot Water 
Company, Ltd.1944). It should be noted that, although the report 
included plans to bring Litani water into the Jordan watershed, it 
was assumed that an agreement would have to be reached with the 
Lebanese government to do so. Lebanese territory was not included 
in the list of desirable frontier adjustments. It should be noted fur­
ther that there is no evidence that any of the territorial suggestions 
of the Mekorot study were ever included in political decision mak­
ing, nor were the proposed boundary modifications raised in subse­
quent negotiations. 
Water and Boundaries—Conclusions 
Prescott (1987) notes that the most common cause of boundary 
disputes can be found in the history of the boundary—especially 
where the “evolution” of the boundary is “incomplete.” In answer to 
the question of water’s influence on boundaries posed at the begin­
ning of this section, it is clear that water sources have played a role, 
albeit one subservient to other concerns, in the delineation of inter­
national boundaries, first between the British and French Mandates, 
then between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. In particular, the political 
and military policy makers of Israel had explicit interests in retain­
ing the northern headwaters of the Jordan River, arguing for them 
in political arenas and reinforcing claims through settlement policy. 
The goal, however, was reached with only marginal success. While 
the headwaters of the Jordan originated in the territories of three 
separate entities, Israel had been successful in retaining riparian 
access to both banks of the Jordan River above the Sea of Galilee, 
and sovereignty over the entire lake. Yet it is also clear that once 
boundaries were agreed to in a legal forum in 1923, development 
plans were modified to fit the legal boundaries and not vice versa. 
WATER AND WAR 
The next aspect of “hydrostrategic territory” to be addressed is 
the relationship between military strategic thinking during wartime 
and the location of water resources. During warfare between com­
peting riparians, has territory been explicitly targeted, captured, or 
retained because of its access to water sources?5 
THE WAR OF 1948 
On February 2, 1947, Great Britain officially turned the fate of 
Palestine over to the United Nations. The U.N. Special Committee 
on Palestine recommended partition into two states but included a 
vehicle for joint economic development, “especially in respect of 
irrigation, land reclamation, and soil conservation.” 
5 	 The wars of 1956 and 1973 are not inclu­
ded because, in the author’s judgment, they 
did not contain any hydrologic component. 
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Figure 5 (Mekorot 1944). 
The U.N.-delineated Arab and Jewish states are displayed in 
Figure 5. Jerusalem was to be an international city, and the Jewish 
state would pay an annual stipend of four million pounds to the 
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Arab state to reflect the more advanced agricultural and industrial 
position of the former (U.N. Resolution on the Partition of Palestine 
1947, Chapter 4). The General Assembly approved the Partition 
Plan on November 29, 1947. 
Though the Jewish Agency reluctantly accepted partition, the 
Arab states rejected it outright. When the British pulled out of Pales­
tine in May 1948, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi 
Arabia went to war against the new state of Israel. Maintaining the 
three aforementioned critical zones—the Galilee region with the Jordan 
headwaters, the populated coastal zone, and the Negev to absorb antici­
pated immigration—became the foci of the Israeli war effort. 
Partition cost the Israelis three other strategic points along 
waterways, the repercussions of which would be felt through 1967. 
As mentioned above, during the Mandate negotiations, the 
French had denied the Zionists the Banias Spring because an access 
road they needed crossed the waterway about 100 meters down­
stream. To guarantee access to the water, though, a small hill over­
looking the stream, Givat Banias, had been included in Palestine. 
Second, the town of El-Hama, located on one of the few flat areas 
within the narrow Yarmuk valley, and an adjacent triangular area 
from the Yarmuk to the shores of the Sea of Galilee were included 
within Palestine territory, specifically to facilitate water resources 
development. Both of these areas were lost to the Syrians during 
fighting in 1948 (Sachar 1979). (Also, the Syrians crossed the Jordan 
River in the Huleh Lake/Daughters of Jacob Bridge region, an area 
targeted by water planners as the site of the first major Israeli recla­
mation project.) Finally, although the Israeli army had occupied a strip 
of Lebanese territory along the elbow of the Litani, they pulled back to 
the Mandate boundaries as part of the armistice agreement, in the 
unfulfilled hopes of gaining a peace treaty with Lebanon (Hof 1985). 
The 1948 war added a new type of boundary to the region—the 
Armistice Line. While the boundary between the British and French 
mandates had the permanence and force of international law, the 
Armistice agreement which was signed separately between Israel and 
each of its neighbors was explicitly only a temporary military agree­
ment (Hareven 1977). Negotiations continued in an unsuccessful 
quest for a permanent peace agreement culminating in Lausanne 
late in 1949 (Caplan 1993). Water was never mentioned during the 
Rhodes Armistice talks and was referred to only intermittently dur­
ing the Lausanne Conference.6 
The differences between permanent legal boundaries and the 
Armistice Line manifested themselves in how each boundary seg­
ment was treated by each combatant. 
6 	 The eighth point of the British Eight-Point 
Plan submitted in July 1949 was a call for 
“an Israeli-Arab agreement for sharing the 
waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers” 
(Caplan 1993). 
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The Israel-Lebanon Boundary 
Israel had occupied Lebanese territory up to the Litani River, yet 
withdrew its forces to the international boundary as a result of the 
Armistice Agreement. Amery (1996) suggests that Israel’s with­
drawal was based on the belief that it could make peace with a 
Christian-led Lebanon, and that joint Lebanese-Israeli water re­
sources development could proceed without territorial annexation 
(citing Berger (1965) as arguing that Israel would not have withdrawn 
from southern Lebanon had it not been convinced of these results). 
The Israel-Syria Boundary 
Syria occupied about 60 km2 of Israeli territory during the war at 
three locations, as described above: (1) the Banias Springs area, (2) 
the Huleh Lake/Daughters of Jacob Bridge region, and (3) the tri­
angle from El-Hama to the southeastern shores of the Sea of Galilee. 
During the Armistice talks, Syria agreed to withdraw from all of this 
territory, save Givat Banias and El-Hama, provided that the remain­
ing territory would not be militarized by Israel. While both of these 
were included in Israeli water development plans, Israel did not 
push for their return, given the presumed temporary nature of the 
Armistice Line. 
Neff (1994) suggests that Syria withdrew with the understanding 
that final borders, including final sovereignty of the three demilita­
rized zones (DMZs), would be negotiated in the future. Israel, in 
contrast, considered itself the legal sovereign of these areas, legal 
heir to the northern territory within the British mandate. 
The Israel-Jordan Boundary 
The pre-war boundary between British-mandate Palestine and 
Transjordan, delineated when Britain split Palestine in two in 1922, 
followed the middle of the Yarmuk River, the Jordan River, the Dead 
Sea, and Wadi Araba southward to the Gulf of Aqaba/Eilat (Biger 
1994). After the war, Jordan claimed jurisdiction over the West Bank. 
Nowhere is the assumption that the Armistice Line was to be tempo­
rary more clear, however, than in the “Green Line” dividing the West 
Bank from Israel. While negotiations continued officially in Rhodes, 
Sachar (1979) describes secret meetings which took place directly 
between the Israelis and King Abdullah and his advisors at the king’s 
winter palace. The agreement which was reached was informed not 
only by the location of the two armies at war’s end, but also by the 
location of roads and railways, as well as hilltops and high ground for 
local strategic advantage. The line, drawn in green on a map at a scale 
of 1:250,000,7 cut villages from their land, divided towns from the 
7 	 At that scale, the width of the line alone 
allowed for territorial ambiguity of 250m 
along the boundary (Biger 1989). 
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Figure 6 Rhodes armistice demarcation line, 1948 (Sachar 1978) 
  
 
    
 
springs on which they relied, and occasionally split settlements in two 
(Biger 1989). As Biger (1989) points out, “in no case did the terms of 
agreement provide for continuing rights of access by inhabitants to 
their vital land and water resources.” 
As a result of the 1948 war, the Jordan River was even more 
divided than it had been under the Mandates. The Hasbani rose in 
Lebanon with the Wazzani, a major spring of the Hasbani, situated 
only a few kilometers north of the Israeli border. The Banias flowed 
for five kilometers in Syrian territory before crossing into Israel. The 
Dan rose and remained within Israeli territory. The confluence of 
the three, the Jordan River, flowed along the Israeli-Syrian border, 
often through a demilitarized zone, until it reached the Sea of Gali­
lee. The sea lay wholly in Israel, with the Syrian border ten meters 
from the eastern coast. The Yarmuk rose in Syria, then became the 
Syrian-Jordanian border until its confluence with the Jordan. South 
of the Sea of Galilee, the Jordan River formed first the Israeli-Syrian 
border, then the Israeli-Jordanian border below the confluence with 
the Yarmuk, finally flowing wholly into Jordanian territory and the 
Dead Sea, which was about one quarter Israeli and three quarters 
Jordanian. Groundwater was similarly divided, with the recharge 
zones of two springs on which Israel increasingly relied, the Yarkon 
and the Tanninim, originating in the Jordanian territory of the West 
Bank (see Figure 6). 
THE WAR OF 1967 
Water Resources and Background to the War 
The legacy of the partition and the 1948 war was the division of 
the Jordan River in a manner so convoluted that unilateral water 
resources development, the only strategy possible among the hostile 
riparians, would lead inevitably to conflict. By the early 1950s, Arab 
states were discussing organized exploitation of two northern 
sources of the Jordan—the Hasbani and the Banias (Stevens 1965). 
The Israelis also made public their All Israel Plan, which included 
the draining of Huleh Lake and swamps, diversion of the northern 
Jordan River and construction of a carrier to the coastal plain and 
Negev Desert—the first out-of-basin transfer for the watershed 
(Naff and Matson 1984). 
Jordan, in 1951, announced a plan to irrigate the East Ghor of 
the Jordan Valley by tapping the Yarmuk. At Jordan’s announce­
ment, Israel closed the gates of an existing dam south of the Sea of 
Galilee and began draining the Huleh swamps, which lay within the 
demilitarized zone with Syria. These actions led to a series of border 
skirmishes between Israel and Syria which escalated over the sum­
mer of 1951 (Stevens 1965). In July 1953, Israel began construction 
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Figure 7 Jordan/Yarmuk river system (Medzini 1976). 
on the intake of its National Water Carrier at the Daughters of Jacob 
Bridge north of the Sea of Galilee and in the demilitarized zone. 
Syria deployed its armed forces along the border and artillery units 
opened fire on the construction and engineering sites (Cooley 1984). 
Syria also protested to the U.N. and, though a 1954 resolution for 
the resumption of work by Israel carried a majority, the USSR ve­
toed the resolution. The Israelis then moved the intake to its current 
site at Eshed Kinrot on the northwestern shore of the Sea of Galilee 
(Garbell 1965). 
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Against this tense background, President Dwight Eisenhower 
sent his special envoy Eric Johnston to the Middle East in October 
1953 to try to mediate a comprehensive settlement of the Jordan 
River system allocations.8 Johnston’s initial proposals were based on 
a study carried out by Charles Main and the Tennessee Valley Au­
thority (TVA) at the request of the U.N. to develop the area’s water 
8 	 For a detailed normative assessment of the 
Johnston framework, see Elmusa (this 
volume). 
Figure 8 (Wolf 1995) 
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resources and to provide for refugee resettlement (Main 1953). Both 
Israel and a united Arab League Technical Committee responded 
with their own counterproposals. The Israeli “Cotton” plan included 
integration of the Litani River’s flow into the Jordan basin, with a 
subsequent increase in allocations to Israel. The Arab plan rejected 
integration of the Litani and substantially reduced Israel’s share as 
compared with the Main plan. Johnston worked until the end of 
1955 to reconcile these proposals in a Unified Plan amenable to all 
of the states involved. In the Unified Plan, Johnston accomplished 
no small degree of compromise. Although they had not met face to 
face for these negotiations, all states agreed on the need for a re­
gional approach. Israel gave up on integration of the Litani and the 
Arabs agreed to allow out-of-basin transfer. The Arabs objected, but 
finally agreed, to storage at both the Maqarin Dam and the Sea of 
Galilee so long as neither side would have physical control over the 
share available to the other. Israel objected, but finally agreed, to 
international supervision of withdrawals and construction. Alloca­
tions under the Unified Plan, later known as the Johnston Plan, 
included 400 million m3 (MCM)/yr to Israel, 720 MCM/yr to Jordan, 35 
MCM/yr to Lebanon, and 132 MCM/yr to Syria (Unpublished summa­
ries, U.S. Department of State). 
The technical committees from all sides accepted the Unified 
Plan, but continuing political support could not be garnered and the 
Plan was never ratified. Nevertheless, Israel and Jordan have gener­
ally adhered to the Johnston allocations and technical representa­
tives from both countries have met from that time until the present 
two or three times a year at “Picnic Table Talks,” named for the site 
at the confluence of the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers where the meet­
ings were held. 
As each state developed its water resources unilaterally, their 
plans began to overlap. By 1964, Israel had completed enough of its 
National Water Carrier that actual diversions from the Jordan River 
basin to the coastal plain and the Negev were imminent. Although 
Jordan was also about to begin extracting Yarmuk water for its East 
Ghor Canal, it was the Israeli diversion which prompted President 
Nasser to call for the First Arab Summit in January 1964, a meeting 
which brought together heads of state from the Mideast and North 
Africa specifically to discuss a collective Arab strategy on water. 
The options presented at the summit were (1) to complain to the 
U.N., (2) divert the upper Jordan tributaries into Arab states (as had 
been discussed by Syria and Jordan since 1953), or (3) to go to war 
(Schmida 1983). The decision to divert the rivers prevailed at a 
second summit in September 1964 and the Arab states agreed to 
finance a Headwater Diversion project in Lebanon and Syria and to 
The technical committees from all sides 
accepted the Unified Plan, but 
continuing political support could not 
be garnered and the Plan was never 
ratified. Nevertheless, Israel and Jordan 
have generally adhered to the Johnston 
allocations and technical representa­
tives from both countries have met 
from that time until the present two or 
three times a year at “Picnic Table 
Talks,” named for the site at the 
confluence of the Yarmuk and Jordan 
Rivers where the meetings were held. 
  
 
    
 
Figure 9 (Wolf 1995) 
help Jordan build a dam on the Yarmuk. They also made tentative 
military plans to defend the diversion project (Shemesh 1988). 
In 1964, Israel began withdrawing 320 MCM/yr of flow from the 
Jordan water into its National Water Carrier and Jordan completed 
a major phase of its East Ghor Canal (Inbar and Maos 1984). In 
November 1964, the Arab states began construction of their Head­
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water Diversion Plan to prevent the Jordan headwaters from reach­
ing Israel. The plan was to divert the Hasbani into the Litani in 
Lebanon and the Banias into the Yarmuk where it would be im­
pounded for Jordan and Syria by a dam at Mukheiba. The measure 
would divert up to 125 MCM/y, thereby cutting by 35% the installed 
capacity of the Israeli Carrier and increasing the salinity in the Sea of 
Galilee by ~60 ppm (Unpublished memorandum, U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency, May 1962). In March, May, and August of 
1965, Israeli tanks attacked the diversion works in Syria. The final 
incident, which involved both Israeli tanks and aircraft on July 14, 
1966, stopped Syrian construction. 
These events set off what has been called “a prolonged chain 
reaction of border violence that linked directly to the events that led 
to the (June 1967) war” (Safran, cited in Cooley 1984). 
Boundaries Following the 1967 War 
The boundaries following the 1967 war, determined by an un­
signed cease-fire agreement, have generally held until very recently. 
The boundary between Israel and Lebanon, which was not in­
volved in the war, remained the international boundary of 1923; the 
boundary between Israel and Syria extended well beyond the Armi­
stice line and demilitarized zones of 1949 to include the plateau of 
the Golan Heights as far as Quneitra9; the boundary with Jordan 
returned past the Green Line of 1949 to the 1922 British Mandate 
division between Palestine and Transjordan along the Jordan River. 
In addition to the territorial gains and improvements in 
geostrategic positioning which Israel achieved in the war, it also 
improved its hydrostrategic position. With the Golan Heights, it 
now held two of the three northern headwaters as well as high 
ground over much of the Yarmuk, together making the Arab Head­
waters Diversion impossible. The West Bank provided riparian 
access to the entire length of the Jordan River and also overlay a 
major aquifer system which Israel had been tapping into from its side 
of the Green Line since 1955 (Garbell 1965). Jordan had endeavored 
to transport 70-150 MCM/y from the Yarmuk River to the West Bank, 
but given the results of the war, its plans were abandoned. 
THE WAR OF 1982 
In 1982, Israel mounted its second operation against the Pales­
tinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon. Its first offensive, 
named “Operation Litani,” was conducted four years earlier. Then, 
Israel had stopped its advance at the Litani River and had turned 
over portions of southern Lebanon to the South Lebanon Army 
(SLA) under the command of Major Sa’ad Haddad. Haddad 
9 	 There was some change along the Israel-
Syria border as a consequence of the 1974 
war. During that war, Syrian forces crossed 
westward past Quneitra but did not 
descend from the Golan Heights. Although 
the Israeli counter-attack extended east 
again across Quneitra, the town itself was 
returned to Syria following a 1974 
Disengagement Agreement (Hareven 
1977; Sachar 1979). 
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reportedly agreed to protect Israeli interests in the region, in par­
ticular to defend against attempted Palestinian incursions through 
the area to Israel. In addition, the militia is reported to have pro­
tected the Jordan headwaters of the Hasbani by closing some local 
wells and preventing the digging of others (Naff and Matson 1984). 
Some Israelis involved in these issues contest these reports. Accord­
ing to an Israeli officer who dealt with Haddad, extensively, the 
Lebanese major made perfectly clear to the Israeli threat, “We will 
cooperate with you, but there are two subjects which are taboo—our 
land and our water” (Wolf 1995). 
In 1979, engineers from Mekorot, Israel’s water planning agency, 
developed plans to divert from 5-10 MCM/y from the Wazzani 
springs for irrigation in Shi’ite southern Lebanon and in Israel. To 
allow the project to flow on gravity alone, a slight northward modi­
fication of the Israeli-Lebanese border, by about one kilometer, was 
considered (Wolf 1995). These plans were vetoed by Major Haddad. 
In the 1982 war, the Litani was again the initially stated objective, 
but by July, Israeli forces had surrounded Beirut. After the invasion 
was launched by then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, a “water 
hawk” who had frequently spoken of seizing the Litani, Israel cap­
tured the Qirawn Dam and immediately confiscated all hydro-
graphic charts and technical documents relating to the Litani and its 
installations (Cooley 1984). Israel retreated from Beirut but retained 
a “security zone” of territory extending from the international 
boundary north to a bend in the Litani. 
WATER AND WAR—CONCLUSIONS 
Evidence of a “Hydro-strategic Imperative” 
In recent years, particularly since Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 
1982, the notion of a Middle East “hydraulic imperative” has been 
developed both in the academic literature and the popular press. 
The theory, which might be better termed the “hydrostrategic im­
perative,”10 points to some combination of the following facts (see, 
for example, Davis et al. 1980; Stauffer 1982; Schmida 1983; Stork 
1983; Cooley 1984; Dillman 1989; Beaumont 1991): 
•	 Early Zionist lobbyists and planners, from Chaim 
Weizmann at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, through 
the Hays and Cotton plans of the 1940s and 1950s, have advo­
cated inclusion of either the Litani River within Israeli bound­
aries or of Litani water into the Jordan River watershed. 
•	 The 1967 War had been precipitated by tensions over Israeli 
and Arab water diversion schemes, and the war itself had 
greatly strengthened Israeli “hydro-strategic” positioning. 
10 	“Hydraulic” refers to the mechanics of 
water under pressure. “Hydrostrategic” as 
defined earlier, describes the link between 
the location of water resources and 
strategic decision-making. 
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•	 The 1979 Litani Operation left Israeli allies in control of the 
lower Litani river and the Hasbani headwaters. 
•	 The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon included capture of 
the Qirawn Dam and related data. Even after Israel’s with­
drawal, the “Security Zone” still leaves Israel in control of 
the area from Taibe and slightly north—the most likely site 
for any Litani to Jordan basin transfer. 
Particularly during the years of Israeli occupation from 1982 to 
1985, several analysts used this history to speculate about Israeli 
actions in Lebanon. Some predicted scenarios ranging from a simple 
diversion of the 100 MCM/yr available at the lower Litani and others 
conjectured a permanent occupation of the entire Beka’a Valley 
south of the Beirut-Damascus Highway which, along with the re­
moval of Lebanese water infrastructure and the forced de-popula­
tion of southern Lebanon, would allow diversion of the entire 700 
MCM/yr flow of the Litani into Israel.11 
Others have argued that Israel retains access to the Litani 
through its “security zone” because it is, in fact, covertly diverting 
water into the Jordan basin. According to John Cooley, “it was small 
wonder that the first Israeli diversion plans for the Litani have come 
into being” (cited in Soffer 1991). More recently, Beaumont (1994), 
has written that Israel “may well be stealing Lebanese water for its 
own use.” Frey and Naff (1985), even while arguing against the 
imperative theory, do suggest that: 
Although water may not have been the prime impetus behind 
the Israeli acquisition of territory...it seems perhaps the main 
factor determining its retention of that territory. 
Thomas Naff of the University of Pennsylvania later testified to 
Congress that “...Israel is presently conducting a large-scale opera­
tion of trucking water to Israel from the Litani River...” (U.S. House 
of Representatives 1990). Naff (1992) has since modified his posi­
tion to argue that “water ... was instead trucked to units of the Is­
raeli-supported Lebanese Army of South Lebanon in the same area 
as a reward for their cooperation.” 
Beaumont (1991) is among those who, building retroactively on 
the charges regarding Lebanon, now include the 1967 war as proof 
of water driving Israel’s territorial “imperative:” 
To avoid each of the states (Lebanon and Syria) control­
ling their own water resources, Israel invaded southern 
Lebanon and the Golan Heights of Syria in 1967. The 
11 This last scenario is described in detail in 
Stauffer (1982). 
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pretext given was strategic reasons, but the control of the 
water resources of the area seems a more compelling and 
realistic reason. 
Rebuttal to the Imperative 
The theory that water has driven strategic thinking during war­
time has been critiqued on political and technical grounds by Naff 
and Matson (1984), Wolf (1995), Soffer (1995), and Libiszewski 
(1995), as well as on economic grounds, by Wishart (1989). To 
examine the validity of a “hydrostrategic” imperative, two questions 
must be answered: (1) was the location of water resources a factor in 
the military strategy of Israel in 1967, 1978, or 1982 and, (2) is Israel 
now diverting water from the Litani River? 
The 1967 War 
It has already been noted that conflict between Syria and Israel 
over water resources contributed to tensions leading to the 1967 
fighting, although the hydrologic aspect ended almost a year before 
the beginning of the war itself, which in the south was well away 
from sensitive water sources (with Egypt expelling the U.N. forces in 
the Sinai and blocking Israeli shipping to Eilat). The Sinai was the 
first front when war broke out on June 5, 1967, with the straits of 
Sharm-el-Sheikh being the primary objective. 
The hydrostrategic locations over which Israel gained control 
during the war were on the West Bank, including the recharge zones 
of the Mountain Aquifer system and on the Golan Heights, includ­
ing the Banias headwaters of the Jordan River. 
Before the war, and even in its first days, Israel had agreed not to 
engage in combat with Jordan, as long as Jordan did not attack. 
Jordan did launch several artillery barrages in the first days of the 
war, though, which opened up the West Bank as the second front 
(Sachar 1979). 
Finally, despite attacks from Syria, Defense Minister Moshe 
Dayan was extremely reluctant to launch an attack on the Golan 
Heights because of the presence of Soviet advisors and the conse­
quent danger of widening the conflict (Slater 1991). For the first 
three days of the war, Dayan held off arguments from several of his 
advisors, including the CO of the northern command, David Elazar, 
to launch an attack on the Golan Heights. Finally, a delegation from 
the northern settlements, who had often experienced Syrian sniping 
and artillery barrages, traveled to Tel Aviv to ask Dayan to take the 
Heights to guarantee their security. Only then, on June 9, did Israeli 
forces launch an attack against Syria (Slater 1991). 
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In the taking of the Golan Heights, the aforementioned water 
sources were incidental conquests as Israeli forces moved as far east 
as Quneitra. The only exception was the conquest of the town of 
Ghajar, an Awali village which had no strategic importance in the 
military sense (it neither contained combatants nor was it situated 
in a strategic position). Ghajar does, however, directly overlook the 
Wazzani springs, which contribute 20-25 MCM/y to the Hasbani’s total 
annual flow of 125 MCM/y. During dry summer months, the Wazzani 
is the only flowing source of the Hasbani. Moreover, Ghajar was the 
site of the projected dams for the Arab Diversion project. 
Oddly, Ghajar was not even taken during the hostilities. During 
the fighting, Israeli troops stopped directly outside of the town since 
they believed Ghajar to be situated on Lebanese territory (and Israel 
did not want to involve Lebanon in the war). It turned out that the 
town was Syrian, having been misplaced on 1943 British maps. Cut 
off from the rest of Syria during the war, a delegation from Ghajar 
traveled to Beirut to ask to be annexed but the Lebanese were not 
interested. Three months after the war, another delegation traveled 
to Israel and asked that the village become Israeli. Only then did 
Israeli control extend north through Ghajar (Khativ 1988; interview, 
Khativ, October 1991). Only the village itself was included, though, 
and most of its agricultural land remained in Syria. Mekorot engi­
neers did install a three-inch pipe for drinking water for the villagers 
from the Wazzani springs which, although literally a stone’s throw 
from the village, was left under Lebanese control (interviews, Khativ, 
Paldi, October 1991). 
Extensive literature exists on the detailed decision making in the 
events before, during, and after the 1967 war, but there is almost a 
complete absence of references to water, either as strategic targets or 
as propaganda by either side. See, for example, Institute for Palestine 
Studies (1970), which includes almost no mention of water; Brecher 
(1974), who includes chapters on both “Jordan Waters,” and “The Six 
Day War,” but documents no link; and Laqueur (1967, 50), who 
claims that, “(water) was...certainly not one of the immediate reasons 
for hostilities.” Stein and Tanter (1980) do not mention water at all. 
Hostilities of 1978 and 1982 
The same absence of documentation is true for the Israelis’ 
operations in Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 (see, for example, 
MacBride 1982). Israel’s ally in southern Lebanon, Major Sa’ad 
Haddad, had made clear to Israel in 1979 that water was not to be 
discussed. It was Haddad, too, who quashed Israel’s 1979 plans for a 
diversion of the Wazzani springs. Tamir (1988), a major general 
who helped outline Israel’s strategic needs in 1967 and in 1982, 
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described in detail the military strategy of the 1982 war. Here, too, 
references to water are conspicuously absent. 
While the Israel Defense Forces planning branch does have an 
officer whose responsibilities include water resources, both the officer 
with those responsibilities during the 1982 war and Tamir (personal 
communications, 1991) insist that water was not, even incidentally, a 
factor in the war. When pressed on the subject, Tamir replied: 
Why go to war over water? For the price of one week’s 
fighting, you could build five desalination plants. No loss 
of life, no international pressure, and a reliable supply you 
don’t have to defend in hostile territory. 
Even if water was not the immediate cause of the war, another 
question remains: does Litani water reach Israel? Despite the inher­
ent difficulty in proving the absence of something, my answer, after 
investigating as closely as possible, is no. This conclusion is based on 
the following (discussed in more detail in Wolf 1995): 
1) The Litani River has a natural flow of about 700 MCM/y. A dam 
at Qirawn in the Beka’a Valley and irrigation and hydropower diver­
sions completed in the mid-1960s reduce the lower Litani flow to 
300-400 MCM/y (Kolars 1992). This lower section, flowing within 
kilometers of the Hasbani and the Israeli border, historically had 
presented the possibilities of diversions in conjunction with the 
Jordan system, and Israel has carried out seismic studies and intelli­
gence reports to determine the feasibility of a Litani diversion (Naff 
and Matson 1984). These reports concluded that a diversion would 
be economically unattractive and, in any event, politically infeasible 
until cooperation could be developed with Lebanon (Wolf 1995). 
The Lebanese position was and continues to be that rights to Leba­
nese water should be retained for future Lebanese development. 
2) Reports of a secret diversion tunnel were investigated by U.N. 
forces, as well as by members of the international press, to no avail 
(Soffer 1991). All relevant sources of spatial data indicate only two 
water pipelines crossing the Lebanon-Israel border previously men­
tioned—a three-inch pipe from the Wazzani springs in Lebanese 
territy to the town of Ghajar in Israel, and a ten-inch pipe from 
Israel into the Lebanese village of R’meish. 
3) Hydrologic records show neither unaccounted-for water in 
the Israeli water budget after 1978 nor increases in the average flows 
of the Ayoun or the Hasbani, the most likely carrier streams for a 
diversion. Because of three years of drought, on October 14, 1991, 
the Israeli Water Commissioner asked the Knesset to allow pumping 
of the Sea of Galilee below the legal ‘Red Line’, the legal water level 
Even if water was not the immediate 
cause of the war, another question 
remains: does Litani water reach Israel? 
Despite the inherent difficulty in proving 
the absence of something, my answer, 
after investigating as closely as possible, 
is no. 
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below which the entire lake is in danger of becoming saline. On the 
same day, a field investigation showed that both the Ayoun and the 
Hasbani above the Wazzani springs were dry. 
4) A hypothetical trucking operation is even more difficult to 
prove or disapprove. Both Mekorot officials (interview, Turgemon, 
October 1991), and Israeli military officers responsible for southern 
Lebanon acknowledge that witnesses may have seen Israeli military 
water trucks in southern Lebanon. Each has suggested that the most 
likely explanation is that the trucks were carrying drinking water 
from Israel to Israeli troops stationed in the “security zone.” Israeli 
military code, they point out, insists that soldiers drink water only 
from official collection points, all of which are in Israel. 
An officer who has acted as liaison officer between Israeli and 
South Lebanon forces doubts that anyone saw Israeli trucks filling at 
the Litani, pointing out that the 20-ton “Rio’s” which are used to 
carry water could not make the grade of the military road which 
leads away from the Litani, if the trucks were full (interview, Octo­
ber 1991). Soffer (1991) has calculated that a cubic meter of water 
trucked from the Litani into Israel would cost about $4 to $10, as 
compared to about $1.50 for a cubic meter of desalinated water. 
The Hydrostrategic Imperative—Conclusions 
After closely examining the arguments both in favor and against 
a hydrostrategic imperative driving military and territorial 
decisionmaking, it is possible to answer the question posed at the 
beginning of this section: “Has territory been explicitly targeted, 
captured, or retained because of its access to water resources?” 
I argue the following: 
1) Water resources were not a factor for strategic planning in the 
hostilities of 1948, 1967, 1978, or 1982. By this I mean that the deci- 12 Nevertheless, Amery (1993) has 
speculated that Israel will, at a minimum,sion to go to war, and strategic decisions made during the fighting, 
pressure Lebanon to make Litani water 
including which territory was it necessary to capture, were not influ- available as a prerequisite to Israeli military 
withdrawal.enced by water scarcity or the location of water resources. The loca­
tions of water resources were not considered strategic positions 
(except in the purely military sense), nor were they a factor in 
retaining territory immediately after the hostilities. 
2) There is no evidence that Israel is diverting any water from the 
Litani River, either by pipe or by truck. In fact, since 1985, when 
central southern Lebanon lost its own water supply, an average of 
50,000 m3/mo has been piped into that region from wells in north­
ern Israel (Wolf 1995). As a consequence, it is difficult to view water 
as a rationale for Israeli retention of Lebanese territory.12 
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WATER AND NEGOTIATIONS 
As noted above, years of warfare have obscured most of the original 
boundaries between Israel and her neighbors. The June 1967 war erased 
the boundaries determined in the 1949 armistice agreement on all fronts, 
with the exception of the line between Israel and Lebanon, in favor of 
unsigned ceasefire lines between the combatants. These in turn gave way 
to the lines of the Disengagement Agreement of 1974 on the fronts be­
tween Israel and Syria, and Israel and Egypt. The post-1967 years, and 
particularly the recent period of peace talks, have been characterized by a 
quest for stable boundary lines, taking into account the lessons of the past. 
The question which remains is how much of the quest for permanent 
boundaries is influenced by the location of water resources. 
BOUNDARY PROPOSALS: STRATEGY AND 
HYDROSTRATEGY 
The search for acceptable boundaries began immediately after 
the June 1967 war. For Israel, the guiding rationale was that territo­
rial concessions should be balanced by security needs, defined differ­
ently depending on where one was situated on the political 
spectrum. For the Arabs, regaining all land captured during the war 
became the operative imperative, shadowing subsequent negotia­
tions. In the survey of boundary proposals which follows, I exclude 
the extreme positions of either side—from a “Greater Israel” on one 
side to the elimination of Israel on the other—but rather describe 
those which incorporate the concept of territorial compromise in 
exchange for peace, as provided for in United Nations Resolutions 
242 (1967) and 338 (1973).13 Since Israel controls the territory and 
presumably will not withdraw unless its strategic and political goals 
are met in negotiations, this analysis focuses on studies which inves­
tigate Israeli interests in withdrawal.14 However, Foucher’s (1987) 
warning that, “in the case of the strategic debate over Israel, the 
West Bank and neighboring Arab states, one may have reason to 
consider that ‘secure border’ for Israel and ‘security for all’ are not 
synonymous concepts,” should be borne in mind. 
Immediately after the 1967 war, the Israeli government spelled 
out strategic needs (none of which related to water), which, if met, 
would result in its withdrawal from occupied territory. According to 
Moshe Dayan, the Golan Heights were negotiable even without a 
peace treaty, and, with such a treaty, so was the rest of the territory 
captured in 1967, save East Jerusalem (Slater 1991). This approach 
was met by the “three no’s” of an Arab Summit in Khartoum in 
August 1967—no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations with 
Israel (Sachar 1979). As a consequence, Israel strengthened its posi­
tion in the newly occupied territories through settlement activities: a 
13 These U.N. resolutions, the basis for peace 
negotiations between Israel and each of its 
neighbors, call for “the right of every State 
in the area to live in peace within secure 
and recognized boundaries,” and 
“withdrawal of armed forces from 
territories occupied.” Definite articles were 
purposely omitted in the latter clause (i.e. 
‘territories,’ not ‘the territories’), specifically 
allowing for some flexibility in boundary 
negotiations (see Julius Stone’s forward to 
Blum 1971). 
14 I was not able to find many sources from 
an Arab perspective which dealt with the 
specifics of territorial compromise. Two 
exceptions are Kharmi (1994), who allows 
for Palestinian territorial adjustments in 
negotiations provided Israel reciprocates 
with a like amount of land from within 
green line Israel, and Falah (1995) who, 
with Newman, argues that a “good” 
boundary between Palestine and Israel 
would incorporate both internal and 
external perceptions of threat. Since 
neither study has an explicit hydrologic 
component, neither is described in detail 
here. 
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string of kibbutzim was established on the Golan Heights in 1967-68 
from Senir, on Givat Banias overlooking the Banias headwaters, 
south along the ridge of the Heights overlooking the previously 
demilitarized zone, to Mevo Hama, adjacent to Hammat Gader with 
its access to the Yarmuk River. Senir and Hammat Gader were each 
situated in what had been until the war the demilitarized zone— 
territory which had been part of the British Mandate, but that Syria 
had occupied in the 1948 war, then had withdrawn from under 
demilitarized conditions as part of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. 
The same strategy of holding conquered land as an inducement 
to peace talks was followed immediately after the 1982 war in Leba­
non. In 1983, an Israeli-Lebanese agreement was signed which called 
for an Israeli withdrawal from all of Lebanon. The agreement was 
abrogated in 1984 however, and, consequently, Israel justifies its 
continued presence in the “security zone” (Tamir 1988). 
The Allon Plan 
As mentioned, Israel began to use settlement activity as a way of 
reinforcing its strategic interests immediately following the war of 
1967. The Labor government which ruled Israel until 1977 adhered 
generally to guidelines devised by minister Yigal Allon to address 
Israeli security concerns. 
The plan mainly emphasized the Jordan Valley and the eastern 
slope of the West Bank mountain range facing Jordan. It should be 
noted that the Allon Plan was neither endorsed nor ratified by any 
Israeli government, although it guided the Labor government’s 
settlement policy until 1977. 
Some Israeli settlements were established outside of the Allon propos­
als during the Labor years—a few reportedly to help protect Israel’s 
groundwater resources on the northwest corner of the West Bank. As 
mentioned above, Israel had since 1955 been tapping into the Western 
sub-basin of the Mountain Aquifer (an aquifer whose recharge area 
occurs on the West Bank). Because of the disparate water table depths for 
this aquifer in the coastal plain and in the Judean hills (about 60m in the 
plain, 150-200m in the foothills, and 700-800m in the hills (Goldschmidt 
and Jacobs 1958; Weinberger 1991), and the resulting cost differences in 
drilling and pumping wells in these areas, this aquifer is especially vulner­
able to over-pumping along a narrow westernmost band of the northern 
lobe of the West Bank, in the region of Galgilya and Tulkarm. 
Some settlement plans for the late 1970s referred in part to this line, 
and about five settlements around Elkanna were reportedly sited in part 
to guarantee continued Israeli control of the water resources on its side of 
what would soon be referred to as a “red line” (Pedhatzor 1989; State of 
Israel memoranda, April-July 1977). 
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Figure 10 The Allon plan (Alpher 1994). 
Post-1977 Boundary Studies 
In 1977, the right-wing Likud party gained control of the Israeli 
parliament for the first time. As Israeli Prime Minister Menahem 
Begin was preparing for negotiations with Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat, he asked the Water Commissioner at the time, Menachem 
Cantor, to provide him with a map of Israeli water usage from water 
originating on the West Bank, and to provide guidelines to where 
Israel might relinquish control, if protecting Israel’s water resources 
were the only consideration. 
Cantor concluded that a “red line” could be drawn beyond 
which Israel should not relinquish control, north to south following 
roughly the 100-200m contour line along both “lobes” of the West 
 
 
     
 
Figure 11 West Bank groundwater (Shuval 1992). 
Bank (see Figure 11). Israeli water planners still refer to this “red 
line” as a frame of reference (interviews, Golani, October 1991; 
Shmuel Cantor, December 1991), and it has occasionally been in­
cluded in academic boundary studies of the region. This concept 
was later expanded by others to areas of the northern headwaters 
and the Golan Heights. 
A brief description of those which mention water as a territorial 
imperative follows: 
Cohen’s “Defensible Borders” 
Cohen (1986) explored “the geopolitics of Israel’s border ques­
tion,” addressing possible boundary negotiations with a Palestinian 
political entity over the West Bank and with Syria over the Golan 
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Figure 12 (Wolf 1995) 
Heights. His recommendations for boundary adjustments were 
considered from the perspective of defensible borders for Israel 
within the framework of territorial compromise, and included fac­
tors of a “strategic-tactical” and a “demographic-economic” nature. 
They included, explicitly, defensive depth, surveillance points, mar­
shaling areas and corridors, water control, space for Israeli popula­
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tion and industrial growth, absence of dense Arab populations, and 
psycho-tactical space. 
In describing the influence of the above principles, Cohen de­
scribed how water might influence territorial compromise: Israel 
would need to retain sovereignty over the Banias-Har Dov-Hermon 
shoulder headwaters region, the Golan slopes east of the Upper 
Jordan, and the Golan Heights that overlook the Sea of Galilee and 
the Lower Yarmuk and its Raqqad tributary. On the West Bank, 
Cohen argued that Israel should annex the territory which extends 
until the “subterranean water divide,” which he identifies as extend­
ing 2-6 km east of the Green Line.15 Despite his acknowledgment 
that this territory includes Arab population centers, Cohen argued 
that the substantial geopolitical advantage that Israel would gain 
(presumably over and above the hydrostrategic considerations) 
would outweigh those concerns. Overall, for all the factors listed 
above, Cohen advised Israel to annex approximately 20% of the 
West Bank, 19% of the Gaza Strip, and 50% of the Golan Heights 
(see Figure 13). 
The Jaffee Center’s “Arrangements” 
In 1991, the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv Uni­
versity asked two researchers, Yehoshua Schwartz, the director of 
Tahal, Israel’s water planning agency, and Aharon Zohar, also at 
Tahal at the time, to undertake a study of the regional hydrostrategic 
situation and the potential for regional cooperation. The result, a 
300-page document titled, “Water in the Middle East: Solutions to 
Water Problems in the Context of Arrangements between Israel and 
the Arabs,” was one of the most comprehensive studies of its kind 
(Schwartz and Zohar 1991). It examined a number of possible sce­
narios for regional water development, including possible arrange­
ments between Israel and Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza. 
Scenarios were included both for regional cooperation and for its 
absence. Evaluations included hydrologic, political, legal, and ideo­
logical constraints. The impacts of potential global climatic change 
were also considered. The study showed, in the words of Joseph 
Alpher, the director of the Jaffee Center, “the potential beauty of 
multilateral negotiations” (interview, Alpher, December 1991). 
Some of the findings of the study contradicted government 
policies at the time, however. In the sections on possible arrange­
ments between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Israel and 
Syria, maps of the West Bank and Golan Heights included lines to 
which Israel might relinquish control of the water resources in each 
area, without overly endangering its own water supply. The line in 
15 Cohen is probably referring to Cantor’s 
“red line.” The watershed divide is actually 
several kilometers inland along the ridge of 
the Samarian and Judean Hills. 
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Figure 13  Cohen’s “defensible borders” (Cohen 1986). 
the West Bank, which was based on Cantor’s “red line,” suggested 
that Israel might, with legal and political guarantees, turn control of 
the water resources of more than two-thirds of the West Bank over 
to Palestinian authorities without threatening Israel’s water sources 
from the Yarkon-Tanninim (Western Mountain) aquifer, although 
the authors advocated retaining control beyond the “red line.” The 
same was true of more than half of the Golan Heights (see Figure 13). 
These maps contradicted the position of the Ministry of Agricul­
ture. Headed by Rafael Eitan of the right-wing Tsomet party, the 
Ministry’s position was that, to protect Israel from threats to both 
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the quantity and quality of its water, Israel had to retain political 
control over the entire West Bank.16 On December 12, 1991, 70 
copies of the report were sent throughout Israel for review, includ­
ing to the Ministry of Agriculture. Calling the maps mentioned “an 
outline for retreat,” Rafael Eitan and Dan Zaslavsky, whom Eitan 
had recently appointed Water Commissioner, insisted on a recall of 
the review copies and a delay in the release of the report. In January 
1992, the Israeli military censor backed the position of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and, citing sensitivity of the report’s findings, cen­
sored the report in its entirety.17 
Alpher’s Proposals 
Once negotiations began in 1991, boundary proposals took on 
new urgency. In one of the most comprehensive post-negotiation 
examinations of West Bank boundary options, Alpher (1994) both 
summarizes previous proposals for final boundary arrangements, 
including the recent “Third Way” and Sharon plans (neither of 
which have a hydrostrategic component), and offers his own. In 
defining Israel’s requirements in a negotiated agreement, Alpher 
specifies Israel’s needs according to nine parameters: security, water, 
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16 Eitan’s position, argued in full-page ads in 
the Israeli press, has little basis in 
hydrogeology, as discussed in Wolf 1995. 
17 When peace talks began in 1991, the 
document remained censored out of fear 
that it would reveal an Israeli negotiating 
strategy. At press, the document has not 
been made public. 
Figure 14 Alpher’s “Water Boundaries” (Alpher 1994). Figure 15 Alpher’s “Final Boundaries” (Alpher 1994). 
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demography and politics, the “heritage dimension,” the “historic 
dimension;” Hebron; Israeli Arabs and the danger of irredentism; 
“the economic dimension;” and the need to straighten the borderline. 
Alpher relies on the unpublished Jaffee Center report of 1991 
described above for his description of hydrostrategic territory.18 He 
delineates West Bank territory which might be annexed to Israel in 
order to protect the Western sub-basin of the Mountain Aquifer, as 
defined first as Cantor’s “Red Line”—the westernmost section of the 
northern lobe of the West Bank, and a region around Jerusalem. 
Alpher notes that, while annexation would guarantee Israeli 
control of water resources, adequate supervision and control ar­
rangements are possible without annexation—perhaps through the 
implementation of a joint water regime. He also points out that the 
territories of the West Bank which are vital for continued control 
over water management have already been heavily settled because of 
their importance with regard to security. Thus, he concludes: 
...the water issue is not necessarily a decisive rationale for 
annexation. At the same time, to the extent that the water 
issue is juxtaposed geographically with additional vital issues 
such as security and demography, then it may be seen to 
further enhance an annexation solution. 
Alpher finally seems to weigh in against annexation. In his final 
map incorporating all of the parameters he defines as crucial, no 
territory which was identified as being important for water alone is 
slated for annexation. 
Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations19 
The Gulf War in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
caused a re-alignment of political alliances in the Mideast which 
finally made possible the first public face-to-face peace talks between 
Arabs and Israelis, in Madrid on October 30, 1991. During the bilat­
eral negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors, it was 
agreed that a second track be established for multilateral negotia­
tions on five subjects deemed “regional,” including water resources. 
These two mutually reinforcing tracks—the bilateral and multilat­
eral—have led, at this writing, to a treaty of peace between Israel and 
Jordan and a declaration of principles for agreement between Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority. Both have had a water component in 
terms of allocations and projects, but in neither has water had influ­
ence on the discussions over final boundaries. 
18 Alpher was director of the Jaffee Center 
when it commissioned the 1991 study. 
19 For a more detailed accounting of the 
agreements between Israel and Jordan the 
Palestinian Authority, see the text of the 
water components of the Israel-Jordan 
treaty and Oslo II, pp. 284-296 and 
Shamir’s commentary, this volume. 
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Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace 
Israel and Jordan have had probably the warmest relations of any 
two states legally at war. Communication between the two has taken 
place since the creation of each, ameliorating conflict and facilitating 
conflict resolution on a variety of subjects, including water. As noted 
above, the so-called “Picnic Table Talks” on allocations of the 
Yarmuk have taken place since the 1950s and negotiations formulat­
ing principles for water-sharing projects and allocations have oc­
curred in conjunction with, and parallel to, both the bilateral and 
multilateral peace negotiations.20 These principles were formalized 
on October 26, 1994, when Israel and Jordan signed a treaty of 
peace, ending more than four decades of a legal, when not actual, 
state of war. 
For the first time since the states came into being, the treaty 
legally defines mutually recognized water allocations. Acknowledg­
ing that “water issues along their entire boundary must be dealt with 
in their totality,” the treaty spells out allocations for both the 
Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers and Arava/Araba groundwater, and calls 
for joint efforts to prevent water pollution. Also, “[recognizing] that 
their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs,” the 
treaty calls for ways of alleviating the water shortage through coop­
erative projects, both regional and international. 
The peace treaty also makes some minor boundary modifica­
tions. As noted above, the Israel-Jordan boundary was delineated by 
Great Britain in 1922 and followed the center of the Yarmuk and 
Jordan Rivers, the Dead Sea, and Wadi Araba. In the late 1960s and 
1970s, Israel had occasionally made minor modifications in the 
boundary south of the Dead Sea to make specific sections more 
secure from infiltrators. They had also done so on occasion to reach 
sites from which small wells might better be developed. In the last 
sixteen years, no modifications were made except on the rare occa­
sion that one of these local wells ran dry and had to be re-dug. All of 
these territorial modifications were reversed and all affected land 
was returned to Jordan as a consequence of the peace treaty, al­
though Israel retains rights to the water which comes from these 
wells. Moreover, a small enclave of Jordanian territory in the Arava 
is being leased back to Israel in 25 year increments. 
One other area was similarly affected. In 1926, a Jewish entrepre­
neur named Pinhas Rutenberg was granted a 70 year concession for 
hydropower generation at the confluence of the Yarmuk and Jordan 
Rivers on land leased by TransJordan. The dam he built for that 
purpose was destroyed in the fighting of 1948 and the 1949 Armi­
stice Line left a small portion of Jordan under Israeli control. This 
land was farmed by the kibbutz Ashdot Ya’akov, which was estab­
20 For more details on the bilateral and 
multilateral talks on water, see Wolf 
(1995b). 
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lished in 1933. With the 1994 peace treaty, sovereignty of the land 
was returned to Jordan, who in turn leased it back to the Israelis, 
and Israeli kibbutzniks now travel into Jordanian territory regularly 
to farm their land. 
Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles and Interim Agreement 
On 15 September 1993, the “Declaration of Principles on In­
terim Self-Government Arrangements” was signed between Palestin­
ians and Israelis, which called for Palestinian autonomy in, and the 
removal of Israeli military forces from, Gaza and Jericho. Among 
other issues, this bilateral agreement called for the creation of a 
Palestinian Water Administration Authority. Moreover, the first 
item in Annex III, on cooperation in economic and development 
programs, included a focus on: 
... cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Devel­
opment Program prepared by experts from both sides, which 
will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management 
of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will 
include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of 
each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint 
water resources for implementation in and beyond the in­
terim period. 
At approximately the same time, Israeli water managers discov­
ered an additional 70 MCM/yr of available yield in the Eastern sub-
basin of the Mountain Aquifer—the only one of the three main 
West Bank groundwater units which was not being overpumped at 
the time. This probably did not hurt Jericho’s choice as the first 
West Bank town to be given autonomy. 
Between 1993 and 1995, Israeli and Palestinian representatives 
negotiated to broaden the interim agreement to encompass greater 
West Bank territory. On September 28, 1995, the “Israeli-Palestinian 
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” com­
monly referred to as “Oslo II,” was signed in Washington DC. The 
question of water rights was one of the most difficult to negotiate, 
with a final agreement postponed to be included in the negotiations 
for final status arrangements. Nevertheless, tremendous compro­
mise was achieved between the two sides: Israel recognized the Pal­
estinian claim to water rights, of an amount to be determined in 
final status negotiations, and a Joint Water Committee was estab­
lished to cooperatively manage West Bank water and to develop new 
supplies. This committee also supervises joint patrols to investigate 
illegal water withdrawals—their first “action” was to discover and 
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put a stop to illegal drilling in the area of Jenin in December 1995 
(Israeline, December 20, 1995). 
According to the agreement, Israeli forces are scheduled to with­
draw from six Palestinian cities in order from north to south, and 
from 450 towns and villages throughout the West Bank. The final 
status of Israeli settlements in the West Bank has yet to be deter­
mined. No territory whatsoever was identified as being necessary for 
Israeli annexation due to access to water resources. The second and 
third cities scheduled for Israeli withdrawal—Tulkarm, and 
Kalkilya, fall well within Cantor’s “red line” delineated in Israeli 
studies as being necessary to retain for water security. 
Negotiations among Israel, Syria and Lebanon 
As of this writing, water has not been raised in official negotia­
tions between Israel and Syria.21 Serious bilateral negotiations have 
only taken place since the fall of 1995 and, given the influence Dam­
ascus has on Beirut, Israel/Lebanon talks are not likely until Israel 
and Syria make more progress. Israelis had hoped to begin talks on 
water resources with the Syrians at a meeting in Maryland in Janu­
ary 1996, but the Syrians reportedly refused to broaden the scope 
(Israeline, January 24, 1996). 
The basis for Israel/Syria negotiations is the premise of an ex­
change of the Golan Heights for peace. The discussions thus far have 
focused on interpretations of how much of the Golan, with what 
security arrangements, and for how much peace. The crux of the 
territorial dispute is the question of to which boundaries Israel 
would withdraw—the boundaries between Israel and Syria have 
included the international boundary between the British and French 
mandates (1923), the Armistice Line (1949), and the cease fire lines 
from 1967 and 1974. 
The Syrian position has been an insistence on a return to the 
borders of June 5, 1967, while Israel refers to the boundaries of 1923. 
Although it has not been mentioned explicitly, the difference between 
these two positions is precisely over access to water resources. The 
only distinction between the two lines is the inclusion or exclusion of 
the three small areas which made up the demilitarized zone between 
1949 and 1967 — Givat Banias, the Daughters of Jacob bridge area 
and the town of El-Hamma/Hamat Gader—a total of about 60 km2. 
Each of these three territories were included in British Palestine spe­
cifically because of their access to the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers and, 
since each is a relatively low-lying area with no strategic importance, 
their access to water is still considered paramount. 
In fact, even before the Israel-Syria negotiations began, a flurry 
of articles has stressed the importance of water on the Golan 
21 In unofficial “Track II” discussions, water 
was the focus of meetings in which Israelis 
and Lebanese were present as early as 
1993, and in which Israelis and Syrians 
participated in 1994. Participants at these 
meetings did not necessarily have official 
standing. 
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Heights. As mentioned above, Schwartz and Zohar (1991) advised 
Israeli retention of the Golan Heights west of the Jordan River wa­
tershed line in order to guarantee continued control of both water 
quantity and quality (see Figure 13). In a 1994 study, Shalev (1994), 
himself a retired general in the Israeli army, cites five other retired 
generals on the importance of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan to 
the protection of water resources. Even in his small sample, Shalev 
finds a range of military opinions, from those who suggest that 
Israel retain a physical presence on the Golan Heights, to those who 
advocate retention of at least the plateau above the Sea of Galilee, to 
those (such as former Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur) who argue that 
the water problem can be resolved politically in a peace treaty, and 
that the territory is not vital. Shalev concludes that Syria would not 
risk a war with Israel for water, especially since a diversion would 
take years to construct and would constitute a clear casus belli. It 
stands to reason, Shalev argues, that countries involved in water-
sharing agreements would want to maintain them. 
In the meantime, Schiff (1995), Tarnopolsky (1996), and others 
have argued in the popular Israeli and Jewish press that water’s 
paramount importance may scuttle negotiations over the Golan, 
while Israeli politicians from the Labor party, including Prime Min­
ister Shimon Peres and his Foreign Minister Ehud Barak, argue that 
while the land may be negotiable, the water is not (Jerusalem Post, 
January 6, 1996 and January 27, 1996). 
Water and Negotiations—Conclusions 
In answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section, 
“How much of the quest for negotiated boundaries has been influ­
enced by the location of water resources?” the evidence seems to 
suggest: not much. This is not to say that water has not been an 
important topic in each set of negotiations—quite the opposite. The 
questions of water allocations and rights have been intricate and 
have been only partially resolved, and even so with great difficulty. 
Nevertheless, with the concluded negotiations between Israel and 
Jordan and the ongoing talks between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority (and despite the quantity of studies identifying 
hydrostrategic territory and advising its retention) no territory to 
date has been retained simply because of the location of water. Solu­
tions in each case have focused on creative joint management of the 
resource, rather than insistence on sovereignty. 
The pattern which does seem to be emerging, however, is that 
water in addition to one or more other concerns, may justify reten­
tion of territory. For example, in the absence of any legal claims, 
security interests, or settlements, Israel withdrew from territory 
In answer to the question posed at the 
beginning of this section, “How much of 
the quest for negotiated boundaries has 
been influenced by the location of water 
resources?” the evidence seems to 
suggest: not much. This is not to say that 
water has not been an important topic in 
each set of negotiations—quite the 
opposite. The questions of water 
allocations and rights have been intricate 
and have been only partially resolved, 
and even so with great difficulty. 
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which it had occupied from Jordan—even those small portions 
which had hydrostrategic importance. What was important was an 
agreement on water management, not territory. 
By contrast, Israel developed some settlements on the 
westernmost side of the West Bank to address security and demo­
graphic concerns in addition to protecting its water supply. While 
control of much of this territory is being turned over to the Palestin­
ians, determination of the final status of those settlements has been 
postponed until the final round of negotiations. Again, the solution 
was found through agreements guaranteeing joint water manage­
ment, precluding the need for annexation of territory. 
These principles may be played out in negotiations between 
Israel and Syria as well. While Syria insists on the Armistice Line as 
it stood on June 5, 1967, Israel is arguing for boundaries based on 
the 1923 international division between the British and French 
mandates—the difference being three small areas of vital hydrostra­
tegic importance. Based on the experience of other regional bound­
ary delineations, Israel is likely to address hydrostrategic territorial 
concerns in conjunction with its legal claims. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Michel Foucher (1989) describes cross-border “realities and 
representations” thus: 
Border analysis does not only deal with space, but also with time. 
So boundaries can be considered as time written in space—not 
merely the past, but also a special relationship with that past 
which stands as an inevitable background to current geopolitical 
decisions. 
I have sought to address in this paper the existence of hydrostra­
tegic territory (that is, territory over which sovereignty has been 
sought politically or militarily solely because of its access to water 
sources) and its role in boundaries, warfare, and negotiations. 
Hydrostrategic behavior has occurred in the political realm but it 
has not occurred in the military realm. 
Have boundaries been drawn historically on the basis of the 
location of water access? Beginning with the Paris Peace Talks in 
1919 and ending with the 1923 mandate boundaries, the Zionist 
position clearly defined their future state in hydrologic terms, seek­
ing as much of the Jordan Basin as possible, and occasionally some 
of the Litani as well. They were only marginally successful in achiev­
ing these goals, losing two of the three headwaters, but retaining 
most of the flow of the upper Jordan and all of the Sea of Galilee. 
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The watershed was further divided in the 1922 creation of 
Transjordan in territory east of the Jordan River, Dead Sea, and 
Wadi Araba/Arava. The Zionists attempted to reinforce their sover­
eignty of the headwaters region through settlement activity in the 
late 1930s, always within negotiated boundaries. 
It seems clear that water was uppermost in the minds of planners 
and political decisionmakers, particularly among the Zionists, as 
boundaries were negotiated over the years. However, despite studies 
advocating the need for greater access to water through 1947, official 
adherence to sovereignty over such hydrostrategic territory has ceased 
each time negotiations over legal borders have been concluded. 
During warfare between competing riparians, has territory been 
explicitly targeted, captured, or retained because of its access to 
water sources? This has been the most elaborately argued question 
in the literature relating water resources to Arab-Israeli relations, 
although it is too rarely investigated in detail. In contrast to the 
functionalists and advocates of a “hydrostrategic imperative,” water-
related territory seems actually to have played almost no role in 
Arab-Israeli warfare. Close examination of strategic planning and 
military decision making and tactics suggest no evidence at all that 
water was a factor in the hostilities of 1948, 1967, 1978, or 1982. The 
only instance in which territory was sought for access to water was a 
brief attempt by Israel in 1979 to move the boundary with Lebanon 
about a kilometer north to gain access to the Wazzani Springs—an 
attempt quickly vetoed by the local Lebanese commander. 
In the course of peace negotiations, has hydrostrategic territory 
been seen as vital for retention by any of the riparians? Here, too, 
the answer seems to be no, despite a flurry of studies recommending 
Israeli retention of territory to protect its water sources. That is not 
to say that water has not been a difficult topic for negotiations 
between Israel and its neighbors—again, quite the opposite, but the 
debate has been over rights, allocations, and management, not over 
territory. Of territory identified in Israeli studies as being vital to the 
protection of Israel’s water resources, none has been retained by 
Israel because of the location of water alone. This has been true of 
agreements completed as of this writing—the 1994 treaty of peace 
between Israel and Jordan, and the 1993 Declaration of Principles 
and the 1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and Palestinian 
Authority—where arrangements were made for joint management 
and sovereignty concerns were not highlighted. 
Hydrostrategic territory is being insisted upon, however, in 
ongoing negotiations when at least one other compelling justifica­
tion exists. Israel may point to demographic and/or security con­
cerns over some Jewish settlements which were reportedly sited to 
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protect Israel’s groundwater resources, for example. And Israel’s 
insistence that boundaries with Syria be drawn at the 1923 mandate 
line rather than according to the temporary 1949 armistice agree­
ment is based on precedent and its interpretation of international 
law as well as on perceived hydrostrategic needs. 
The facts show that water has had much less impact on the Arab-
Israeli conflict than is increasingly argued, certainly in strategic, 
spatial, and territorial terms. As Libiszewski (1995) concludes in a 
thorough study of water and security in the Middle East, 
the Arab-Israeli conflict is not primarily a struggle “over 
water.” The conflict is over national identity and existence, 
territory, as well as over power and national security. 
In this context, water has played a minor role but only, it seems, 
in conjunction with one or more of these overriding imperatives. 
The true lesson of the Arab-Israeli experience seems not to be of 
water as exacerbator of conflict but rather, as the people in the re­
gion move from war to peace and the desire for sovereignty gives 
way to principles of joint management, of water as inducer to coop­
eration. As Lord Curzon (cited in Prescott 1987) said in 1907, “fron­
tiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the 
modern issues of war and peace.” 
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Water Agreements Between Israel and Its Neighbors* 
Uri Shamir 
Technion, the Israel Institute of Technology 
ABSTRACT 
Israel signed a Peace Treaty with Jordan in October 1994, and the Oslo II Agreement with the Palestinians in September 
1995. Both agreements address issues of water between the two parties to the agreement. The purpose of this paper is 
to review and discuss these agreements, so we can draw some lessons from them. 
BACKGROUND: WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Although the estimates differ somewhat, there is little doubt that 
Middle East water resources are being used to the limits of their 
availability. Some of the sources (particularly groundwater) are 
over-utilized; that is, current annual extraction exceeds average * Article includes text of water-related 
provisions of the Jordan-Israel Treaty andannual replenishment. Analyses in the professional literature uni­
the Oslo II Agreement between Israel and 
formly indicate that there is an acute water shortage in the region. the Palestinian Authority as an appendix. 
The Middle East’s population is growing (see Winckler, this 
volume), an ever-increasing percentage of it in the cities. Standards 
of living are rising, and with them unit water consumption rates. 
The product of these two increasing parameters—population and 
per capita water use—translates into rapidly escalating urban re­
quirements for potable water. 
Currently, agriculture utilizes approximately 70% of the fresh­
water in the Middle East. Although this percentage is somewhat 
lower in the more industrialized areas, agriculture is likely to remain 
the major water-consuming sector in coming decades. However, 
rising urban needs will require diversion of some potable freshwater 
resources away from agriculture to the cities. This will be accom­
plished in two main ways: improved water use efficiency and substi­
tutions of reclaimed wastewater for irrigation and uses other than 
direct human consumption. The latter is compatible with the in­
creasing production of urban wastewater. Meanwhile, maintaining 
the viability of agriculture in the region is desirable for a variety of 
reasons, among them food self-sufficiency and the preservation of 
rural pastoral lifestyle in the social fabric. 
As freshwater utilization has reached the limits of its availability 
in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Jordan, interna­
tional tensions over scarce water have increased. Several attempts 
have been made to reach a water agreement in the region, the best 
known of which is the “Johnston Agreement,” named after the 
American envoy Eric Johnston, who visited the region several times 
between 1953 and 1955 (see Elmusa, this volume, and Wolf, this 
volume). At the time his mission ended, Johnston had proposed 
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three somewhat different versions of an agreement, one each to 
Syria, Jordan and Israel, with specified allocations for each. The 
basis for allocations in his proposals was agricultural use of water, 
calculated via the areas of arable land of each riparian. The Johnston 
agreement was never ratified. In later years, Amercian envoys Rich­
ard Armitage and Philip Habib made attempts to reach an agree­
ment on water allocations between the regional parties, but were 
never successful. 
Political, institutional, and economic constraints have hindered 
water quality protection in the region, resulting in threats to human 
health and the integrity of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. Re-use 
of treated wastewater for irrigation can contribute to the reduction 
of such hazards. 
THE WATER PROVISIONS OF THE JORDAN-ISRAEL 
TREATY OF PEACE 
Since the early 1980s, progress has been made on the ground 
between Israel and Jordan. Meeting in the field, close to the diver­
sion point from the Yarmuk River into the Jordanian King Abdullah 
Canal (KAC, earlier known as the Ghor Canal), water experts from 
the two sides met to consider Jordanian requests for increasing the 
diversion into the KAC. Trustful and solid relations developed in 
what came to be known as the “Picnic Table Talks” (see Wolf, this 
volume), and Israel consented to alleviate some of the water short­
age in Jordan by increasing the quantities diverted. This, however, 
did not change Jordan’s position that it was entitled to more water 
from the Yarmuk, as well as from the Jordan, including from the Sea 
of Galilee. Jordan stood by the position that it is riparian to the 
entire Jordan River (from its headwaters in the Banias, Hasbani, and 
Dan springs) and saw Israel’s diversion of water from the Sea of 
Galilee into its National Water Carrier as a breach of internationally 
accepted principles. Israel, on the other hand, maintains, as it did 
then, that Jordan is riparian only to that portion of the Jordan along 
their common border, and therefore has no legitimate claim to the 
Jordan River upstream of its confluence with the Yarmuk. 
This was the situation when the two countries entered direct 
negotiations, following the procedure established in the Madrid 
peace conference of 1991. Many rounds of negotiations ensued, in 
Washington and later in the region. In the beginning, there were 
two Arab delegations to the Washington rounds: a Jordanian delega­
tion with Palestinian participation, and a Palestinian delegation with 
Jordanian presence. (This resulted from Israel’s refusal at the time to 
recognize the Palestinians as a separate entity.) Jordan delayed its 
agreement to the “Agenda” for the final peace talks until Israel and 
Jordan stood by the position that it is 
riparian to the entire Jordan River, from 
its origin, and saw Israel’s diversion of 
water from the Sea of Galilee into its 
National Water Carrier as a breach of 
internationally accepted principles. 
Israel, on the other hand, maintains, as 
it did then, that Jordan is riparian only to 
that portion of the Jordan along their 
common border, and therefore has no 
part in the Jordan upstream from its 
confluence with the Yarmuk. 
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the Palestinians signed the Oslo I Accord on the White House lawn 
on September 13, 1993. The “Agenda” had been ready a year earlier, 
but was signed only the day after the Israeli-Palestinian agreement, 
at the State Department in Washington. This led to intensification 
of the negotiations, which moved to the region, and culminated in 
the Peace Treaty. 
The state of belligerency between the two countries came to an 
end with the signing of the Peace Treaty, celebrated by a ceremony 
in the Arava/Araba Valley just north of Aqaba/Eilat, on October 26, 
1994 (referred to herein as “the Treaty”). It is a comprehensive 
agreement, covering all areas of concern between the two countries, 
including water. 
The agreement on water was one of the last issues to be con­
cluded at all night meetings in the Jordanian Palace between the 
water negotiators—Dr. Munther Haddadin for Jordan and Mr. 
Noah Kinarti for Israel—with His Majesty King Hussein and Prime 
Minister Rabin working out the final details. 
GENERAL BACKGROUND AND THE JOINT WATER 
COMMITTEE 
Article 6 of the Treaty states the principles relating to water, and 
Annex II details the “Water Related Matters.” The agreement covers 
two distinct geographic areas, the first of which runs along the Jor­
dan River from its confluence with the Yarmuk River to its 
confluence with Wadi Yabis at Tirat Zvi (the point at which the 
northern border of the West Bank meets the Jordan River), the 
second of which begins near the Dead Sea and extends down to the 
Red Sea at Eilat/Aqaba through Emek Ha’Arava/Wadi Araba. 
The opening statement of Article 6 (“With the view to achieving 
a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems 
between them”) stresses that this is a final agreement. Still, the nego­
tiating parties each have recognized the need for future flexibility, 
and thus a Joint Water Committee (JWC) has been formed (Annex 
II, Article VII) as a permanent institution. The JWC is charged with 
implementing the Treaty and with resolving additional water-related 
matters which may arise subsequently. 
The JWC consists of three members from each side. There is no 
third party involvement; however, Article 29 of the Treaty states 
that “Disputes arising out of the application or implementation of 
this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations. Any such disputes 
which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by 
concilliation or submitted to arbitration.” The JWC obviously 
comes under the supervision of their respective national leaders, 
via the relevant Ministers. 
The agreement on water was one of the 
last issues to be concluded at all night 
meetings in the Jordanian Palace between 
the water negotiators—Dr. Munther 
Haddadin for Jordan and Mr. Noah Kinarti 
for Israel—with His Majesty King Hussein 
and Prime Minister Rabin working out the 
final details. 
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The Treaty establishes two JWC sub-committees, one each for 
the northern and southern areas (Annex II, Article VII.2). The 
northern sub-committee deals with matters relating to the Jordan/ 
Yarmuk, and the southern with groundwater in the Arava/Araba. 
According to Article 6.3 of the Treaty “The parties recognize 
that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. 
More water should be supplied for their use through various meth­
ods, including projects of regional and international co-operation.” 
That is, the parties have recognized that by dividing the existing 
sources both will still face shortage, and thus endeavor not only to 
divide the “pie” but also to enlarge it. This is also an appeal to the 
international community for assistance in augmenting the region’s 
water resources, as one of the so-called “fruits of peace.” 
The specific areas of cooperation, as outlined in Article 6.4, are: 
development of existing and new water resources, increasing of 
water availability, including regional co-operation on a regional 
basis, and waste minimization; prevention of contamination of 
water resources; mutual assistance in the alleviation of water short­
ages; information transfer; joint water research and development, 
and “review of the potentials for enhancement of water resources 
development and use.” 
WATER ALLOCATIONS, STORAGE, AND QUALITY 
PROTECTION IN THE JORDAN-YARMUK RIVER SYSTEM 
The Agreement does not mention “water rights,” but states that 
“the parties agree mutually to recognize the rightful allocations of 
both of them in Jordan River and Yarmuk River waters and Arava/ 
Araba groundwater, in accordance with agreed-upon acceptable 
principles, quantities and quality as set out in Annex II, which shall 
be fully respected and complied with” (Article 6.1). This indicates the 
pragmatic approach adopted by the parties; rather than insisting on 
what their respective rights might be according to the vague and 
somewhat contradictory international law on the subject, the parties 
agreed on specific water quantities, qualities, times and locations. 
Allocations are taken up in Annex II, Article I. Israel is allotted 
flows from the Yarmuk River, specified for a “summer” period 
(May 15 to October 15) and a “winter” period (October 16 to May 
14), with the remainder allocated to Jordan. To implement these 
allocations, “Jordan and Israel shall cooperate to build a diversion/ 
storage dam on the Yarmuk River directly downstream of the 
Adassiya Diversion/point 121.” (Annex II, Article II.1.) Preliminary 
work in the location where the dam is to be constructed has been 
ongoing, but there is still no agreement on the precise location, 
design and operation, or environmental protection. 
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Israel stores in its system 20 million m3 per year (MCM/y) of 
winter flows in the Yarmuk, to be returned to Jordan in the sum­
mer. This is done with a pipeline, 3.2 km long, “...from the Jordan 
River directly upstream of the Deganya gates on the river.” (Annex 
II, Article I.2.a). The pipeline was constructed by Jordan, partly on 
Israeli territory, at its expense, and is operated by Jordan. Jordan 
pays Israel the operating costs of this system, and no compensation 
for the value of the water itself. A recent agreement by the Israeli 
Minister of Infrastructure Ariel Sharon resulted in an increase of 25 
MCM/y to Jordan from this source. 
Jordan is given allocations from the Jordan River: “Winter pe­
riod – 16th October to 14th May of each year. Jordan is entitled to 
store for its use a minimum average of (20) MCM of the floods in the 
Jordan River south of its confluence with the Yarmuk” (Annex II, 
Article I.2.b). This is conditioned on the assumption that “Israel is 
entitled to maintain its current uses of the Jordan River waters be­
tween its confluence with the Yarmuk and its confluence with Wadi 
Yabis/Tirat Zvi” (Annex II, Article I.2.c). Agreement on how this 
translates into actual quantities has not been settled, and studies of 
potential for storage on the Jordan River have not been completed 
yet. 
Annex II, Article I.2.d entitles Jordan to “an annual quantity of 
(10) MCM of desalinated water from the desalination of about (20) 
MCM of saline springs now diverted to the Jordan River.” The brine 
from this operation cannot be discharged into the watercourses, as is 
the case with other low quality waters. “Jordan and Israel will each 
prohibit the disposal of municipal and industrial wastewater into the 
courses of the Yarmuk or the Jordan Rivers before they are treated 
to standards allowing their unrestricted agricultural uses.” (Annex 
II, Article III.3.) 
According to Annex II, Article I.3: “Jordan and Israel shall coop­
erate in finding sources for the supply to Jordan of an additional 
quantity of 50 MCM/y of water of drinkable standards. To this end, 
the Joint Water Committee will develop, within one year from the 
Treaty’s entry into force, a plan for the supply to Jordan of the above 
mentioned additional water. This plan will be forwarded to the 
respective governments for discussion and decision.” 
This particular matter is one of the major outstanding issues on 
which the parties have not as yet reached a plan, two years after the 
expiration of the deadline. Jordan has insisted that it is Israel’s re­
sponsibility to supply this water from its sources, and has repeatedly 
demanded that it be supplied from the Sea of Galilee. Israel’s posi­
tion was that the sources for this water should be found on both 
sides of the border, and that Jordan should pay the full price of 
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developing and supplying it. The recent decision by Minister Ariel 
Sharon to supply an additional 25 MCM/y to Jordan from the Israeli 
system constitutes a deviation from this position. The first deliveries 
of those volumes were transferred to Jordan in the summer of 1998. 
GROUNDWATER IN WADI ARABA/EMEK HA’ARAVA 
This is the area between the Dead Sea and the port cities of Eilat/ 
Aqaba. “… some wells drilled and used by Israel along with their 
associated systems fall on the Jordanian side of the border. These 
wells and systems are under Jordan’s sovereignty. Israel shall retain 
the use of these wells and systems in the quantity and quality de­
tailed in Appendix 1, that shall be prepared by December 1, 1994. 
Neither country shall take, or cause to be taken, any measure that 
may appreciably reduce the yields or quality of these wells and sys­
tems” (Annex II, Article IV.1) 
Furthermore, “Israel may increase the abstraction rate from wells 
and systems in Jordan by up to (10) MCM/year above the yields re­
ferred to in paragraph 1 above, subject to the determination by the 
Joint Water Committee that this undertaking is hydrogeologically 
feasible and does not harm existing Jordanian uses. Such increase is 
to be carried out within five years from the entry into force of this 
Treaty” (Annex II, Article IV.3). 
OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS 
It must be stressed that the Jordan-Israel water agreement is a single 
component in a comprehensive peace treaty. What it accomplishes for 
each of the parties must be viewed in this light, and not in isolation. 
The northern pipeline from the Jordan River in Israel to the 
KAC, built and operated by Jordan, and Israel’s continued use and 
potential expansion of the groundwater in the Jordan in the south, 
are quite unique in international water agreements. This interlink­
ing of water systems, allowing entry of one country into the territory 
of the other, should be viewed as an indication of the mutual trust 
and commitment which prevailed when the agreement was negoti­
ated and concluded. 
The Treaty is a permanent one. It is also fairly pragmatic and 
certainly complex, making it possible to present different perspec­
tives on what it achieves for each side. This allows interested parties, 
on both sides, to characterize the agreement as either an achieve­
ment or a failure in domestic fora. 
Protection of water quality and of the environment is an integral 
part of the Treaty. And yet, there is concern that while other parts of 
the Agreement have strong interests behind them (water users), the 
environmental interests may not have strong and specific interests to 
This inter-linking of water systems, 
allowing entry of one country into the 
territory of the other, should be viewed 
as an indication of the mutual trust and 
commitment that prevailed when the 
agreement was negotiated and 
concluded. 
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stand for them. It is therefore the role of the national authorities to 
make sure that the environment does not get short-changed. 
The parties recognize the need to develop additional water, not 
merely to divide the existing sources. 
The Treaty does not specify how shortages (in the Yarmuk and 
Jordan) are to be allocated between the sides; instead the task is left 
for resolution by the JWC. 
Syrian involvement in the Yarmuk is an important factor. The 
construction of storage reservoirs on the Yarmuk and water uses 
from the Yarmuk in Syria have a critical influence on the discharge 
of the river remaining for Jordan and Israel. Any future agreement 
between Israel and Syria is likely to have a significant effect on the 
flows of the Jordan, and thus there is a possibility of having to de­
crease the quantities specified in Jordan-Israel Treaty, but also per­
haps inspiring creative alternatives for increasing the quantities 
available to all parties in the Jordan basin. 
Similarly, the agreement is likely to need adjustment when a final 
Israeli-Palestinian water agreement is discussed, for areas in the 
Jordan Valley and elsewhere in the West Bank. 
THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI WATER AGREEMENT IN 
OSLO II 
Oslo II is an interim agreement signed between the Palestinians 
and Israelis in September 1995, named with reference to “Oslo I,” 
the initial Declaration of Principles which initiated the peace process 
in September 1993. Article 40 of the Agreement’s Annex III, entitled 
“Water and Sewage,” was initialed by the water negotiators—Mr. 
Nabil Sharif for the Palestinians and Mr. Noah Kinarti for Israel—in 
the early morning hours of September 18, 1995. It was the first 
portion of the overall Interim Agreement to be concluded between 
the two sides. 
INTRODUCTION OF THE NOTION OF RIGHTS, GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES, AND THE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY 
While Jordan consented to discussing “allocations,” the Palestin­
ians succeeded in including in the Agreement an explicit reference to 
water “rights.” The first substantive language of the water provisions 
of the Interim Agreement is as follows: “Israel recognizes the Palestin­
ian water rights in the West Bank. These will be negotiated in the 
permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status 
Agreement relating to the various water resources” (Article 40.1). 
The Interim Agreements’ principles echo the Jordan-Israel 
Treaty’s declarations on the necessity to augment existing reserves 
and to maintain existing uses (Article 40.2, 3a) and to prevent water 
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quality deterioration (Article 40.3b, f). The Agreement notably adds 
language on sustainability (in terms of both quantity and quality) 
and on the factoring of interannual variability in hydrologic condi­
tions (Article 40.3c,d). Wastewater reuse is introduced as a principle 
(Article 40.3f), as is avoidance of harm (Article 40.3h). Finally, the 
Agreement calls for coordinated operation, management, and devel­
opment of water and sewage systems and insurance that the provi­
sions of the Agreement are applied to all resources and systems, 
including those under private ownership or operation (Article 
40.3g,i). “Coordinated” should be understood in this context as an 
alternative to “joint.” “Joint” would mean joint ownership and 
management of a resource, and the nature of joint ownership must 
obviously be defined, for the principle to be made practical. “Coor­
dinated” indicates that each side is sovereign in its domain, but 
agrees that certain matters (which have to be defined, to make the 
agreement practical) are managed together. 
There is significant substantive language on regulatory and man­
agement authority which calls for the transfer by Israel (and, of 
course, the assumption by the Palestinians) of water and sewerage 
powers and responsibilities in spheres “related solely to the Palestin­
ians, that are currently held by the military government and its Civil 
Administration” (Article 40.4). There are, nonetheless, caveats 
which postpone resolution (like other critical components of the 
peace process) until the final status negotiations, including “owner­
ship of water and sewage-related infrastructure in the West Bank” 
(Article 40.5). 
DATA ON THE MOUNTAIN AQUIFER 
Schedule 10 of the Agreement places numerical estimates on the 
“utilization, extraction, and … potentials” of the sub-basins of the 
Mountain Aquifer, which it refers to as the Eastern, Northeastern, 
and Western Aquifers. (See Wolf, Figure 9, this volume.) The East­
ern Aquifer is estimated to have an annual recharge of 172 MCM, of 
which 40 MCM (from wells) are utilized by Israelis, 54 MCM (24 MCM 
from wells and 30 MCM from springs) are utilized by Palestinians and 
an additional 78 MCM are “to be developed.” The Northeastern Aqui­
fer is estimated to yield 145 MCM, of which 103 MCM (from the Gilboa 
and Beisan springs, including wells) are utilized by Israelis and 32 
MCM are utilized by Palestinians (25 MCM to users around Jenin and 
17 MCM from the East Nablus springs). The Western Aquifer is esti­
mated to have an annual recharge of 362 MCM, of which 340 are uti­
lized within Israel and 20 MCM by the Palestinians. An additional two 
MCM from springs around Nablus is also to be utilized by Palestinians. 
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ADDITIONAL WATER 
The Agreement states that “Both sides have agreed that the fu­
ture needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank are estimated to be 
between 70 - 80 MCM/y” (Article 40.6), and then details the addi­
tional water to be provided to the Palestinians “during the interim 
period” (Article 40.7), some projects to be constructed by Israel, 
others by the Palestinians. The total quantity specified in these 
projects is 28.6 MCM/y, of which 5 MCM/y is dedicated to Gaza from 
the Israeli water system (Article 40.7.a.6, b.3), 17 MCM/yr “...to the 
Hebron, Bethlehem and Ramallah areas from the Eastern Aquifer 
or other agreed sources in the West Bank” (Article 40.7.b.2), and the 
remainder (6.6 MCM/y) from a number of specified sources and 
systems. 
THE JOINT WATER COMMITTEE (JWC) AND A JOINT 
SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM (JSET) 
The Joint Water Committee provisions (Article 40.11-15, and 
Schedule 8) are far more detailed in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement than in the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty. Although the 
Agreement does not specify the size of the committee (stating only 
that representation from the two sides must be equal in number), it 
is more specific as to the functions of the body (see Article 40.12.a-j 
and Schedule 8). Most significantly, all new water development in 
the area under jurisdiction must receive approval from the JWC 
from the planning stages onward (see Article 40.1.a-b, 2.d). 
All JWC decisions are to be “reached by consensus, including the 
agenda, its procedures, and other matters” (Article 40.13). There is 
no reference to arbitration or other third party dispute resolution 
mechanisms, although the Committee is obviously entitled to seek 
advice or involvement by external entities, if it so agrees. 
The Agreement also establishes enforcement arms of the JWC, 
termed “Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams” (JSETs), to be 
comprised of at least two members from each side, with costs shared 
equally, to “monitor, supervise, and enforce Article 40 and [Sched­
ule 9]” and granted extremely broad inspection and data collection 
powers (Article 40.17, Schedule 9.5.a-f.). 
WATER RESOURCE PROTECTION AND SEWAGE SYSTEMS 
The Interim Agreement requires the parties to “take all necessary 
measures” for the prevention of water quality deterioration and 
pollution, the protection of water and sewage systems in their own 
and the counterpart’s jurisdictions (Article 40.21-24) as well as to 
reimburse the counterpart for “any unauthorized use or sabotage” 
to water systems under its responsibility (Article 40.24). 
The Interim Agreement requires the 
parties to “take all necessary mea­
sures” for the prevention of water 
quality deterioration and pollution, the 
protection of water and sewage systems 
in their own and the counterpart’s 
jurisdictions (Article 40.21-24) as well 
as to reimburse the counterpart for 
“any unauthorized use or sabotage” to 
water systems under its responsibility 
(Article 40.24). 
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OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS 
It must be stressed that this is an interim agreement. As such, it 
may indicate a direction for the final status agreement, but is not 
binding for that stage. 
Like in the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, this is but one part of an 
overall agreement. It should be viewed in this context, and not in 
isolation. As in the case of Jordan, the Interim Agreement is prag­
matic. However, the leading statement deals with “water rights,” 
which are then deferred to the final status negotiations. 
The agreement is rather complex, making it possible to present 
different perspectives on what it achieves for each side. This enables 
interested parties, on both sides, to characterize the agreement in 
domestic settings as either an achievement or a failure. 
The Agreement is more comprehensive than the Israel-Jordan 
Treaty with respect to monitoring and enforcement (as evidenced by 
the establishment of JSETs) and with respect to the specific func­
tions of the joint oversight bodies. 
Water and sewage are dealt with jointly, reflecting the danger 
which sewage poses to the environment and water resources, and its 
importance as a source of water for irrigation. 
The agreement recognizes the need for both parties to develop 
additional water, not merely divide the existing sources. 
The water agreements between Israel and its two neighbors– 
Jordan and the Palestinian Authority–will obviously have to be 
coordinated and brought in line. 
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Appendix
 
Excerpted from the Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, signed October 26, 1994 on the Israel-Jordan border in the Arava/ 
Araba Valley: 
ARTICLE 6 
WATER 
With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems 
between them: 
1.	 The Parties agree mutually to recognize the rightful allocations of both of them in Jordan River 
and Yarmouk River waters and Araba/Arava ground water in accordance with the agreed accept­
able principles, quantities and quality as set out in Annex II , which shall be fully respected and 
complied with. 
2.	 The Parties, recognizing the necessity to find a practical, just and agreed solution to their water 
problems and with the view that the subject of water can form the basis for the advancement of 
cooperation between them, jointly undertake to ensure that the management and development 
of their water resources do not, in any way, harm the water resources of the other Party. 
3.	 The Parties recognize that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More 
water should be supplied for their use through various methods, including projects of regional 
and international cooperation. 
4.	 In light of paragraph 3 of this Article, with the understanding that cooperation in water-related 
subjects would be to the benefit of both Parties, and will help alleviate their water shortages, and 
that water issues along their entire boundary must be dealt with in their totality, including the 
possibility of trans-boundary water transfers, the Parties agree to search for ways to alleviate 
water shortage and to co- operate in the following fields: 
a.	 development of existing and new water resources, increasing the water availability includ­
ing cooperation on a regional basis as appropriate, and minimizing wastage of water 
resources through the chain of their uses; 
b.	 prevention of contamination of water resources; 
c.	 mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages; 
d.	 transfer of information and joint research and development in water-related subjects, and 
review of the potentials for enhancement of water resources development and use. 
5.	 The implementation of both Parties’ undertakings under this Article is detailed in Annex II. 
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ANNEX II 
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Treaty, Israel and Jordan agreed on the following Articles on water 
related matters: 
ARTICLE I: ALLOCATION 
1. Water from the Yarmouk River 
a. Summer period - 15th May to 15th October of each year. Israel pumps (12) MCM and 
Jordan gets the rest of the flow. 
b. Winter period - 16th October to 14th May of each year. Israel pumps (13) MCM and Jordan 
is entitled to the rest of the flow subject to provisions outlined hereinbelow: Jordan con 
cedes to Israel pumping an additional (20) MCM from the Yarmouk in winter in return for 
Israel conceding to transferring to Jordan during the summer period the quantity specified 
in paragraphs (2.a) below from the Jordan River. 
c. In order that waste of water will be minimized, Israel and Jordan may use, downstream of 
point 121/Adassiya Diversion, excess flood water that is not usable and will evidently go to 
waste unused. 
2. Water from the Jordan River 
a.	 Summer period - 15th May to 15th October of each year. In return for the additional water 
that Jordan concedes to Israel in winter in accordance with paragraph (1.b) above, Israel 
concedes to transfer to Jordan in the summer period (20) MCM from the Jordan River 
directly upstream from Deganya gates on the river. Jordan shall pay the operation and 
maintenance cost of such transfer through existing systems (not including capital cost) and 
shall bear the total cost of any new transmission system. A separate protocol shall regulate 
this transfer. 
b.	 Winter period - 16th October to 14th May of each year. Jordan is entitled to store for its 
use a minimum average of (20) MCM of the floods in the Jordan River south of its 
confluence with the Yarmouk (as outlined in Article II below). Excess floods that are not 
usable and that will otherwise be wasted can be utilized for the benefit of the two Parties 
including pumped storage off the course of the river. 
c.	 In addition to the above, Israel is entitled to maintain its current uses of the Jordan River 
waters between its confluence with the Yarmouk and its confluence with Tirat Zvi/Wadi 
Yabis. Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity equivalent to that of Israel, provided how 
ever, that Jordan’s use will not harm the quantity or quality of the above Israeli uses. The 
Joint Water Committee (outlined in Article VII below) will survey existing uses for docu­
mentation and prevention of appreciable harm. 
d.	 Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity of (10) MCM of desalinated water from the desali 
nation of about (20) MCM of saline springs now diverted to the Jordan River. Israel will 
explore the possibility of financing the operation and maintenance cost of the supply to 
Jordan of this desalinated water (not including capital cost). Until the desalination facilities 
are operational, and upon the entry into force of the Treaty, Israel will supply Jordan (10) 
MCM of Jordan River water from the same location as in (2.a) above, outside the summer 
period and during dates Jordan selects, subject to the maximum capacity of transmission. 
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3.	 Additional Water 
Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in finding sources for the supply to Jordan of an additional 
quantity of (50) MCM/year of water of drinkable standards. To this end, the Joint Water Com­
mittee will develop, within one year from the entry into force of the Treaty, a plan for the supply 
to Jordan of the above mentioned additional water. This plan will be forwarded to the respective 
governments for discussion and decision. 
4.	 Operation and Maintenance 
a.	 Operation and maintenance of the systems on Israeli territory that supply Jordan with 
water, and their electricity supply, shall be Israel’s responsibility. The operation and mainte­
nance of the new systems that serve only Jordan will be contracted at Jordan’s expense to 
authorities or companies selected by Jordan. 
b.	 Israel will guarantee easy unhindered access of personnel and equipment to such new 
systems for operation and maintenance. This subject will be further detailed in the agree­
ments to be signed between Israel and the authorities or companies selected by Jordan. 
ARTICLE II: STORAGE 
1.	 Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a diversion/storage dam on the Yarmouk River directly 
downstream of the point 121/Adassiya Diversion. The purpose is to improve the diversion effi­
ciency into the King Abdullah Canal of the water allocation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 
and possibly for the diversion of Israel’s allocation of the river water. Other purposes can be 
mutually agreed. 
2.	 Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a system of water storage on the Jordan River, along 
their common boundary, between its confluence with the Yarmouk River and its confluence with 
Tirat Zvi/ Wadi Yabis, in order to implement the provision of paragraph (2.b) of Article I above. 
The storage system can also be made to accommodate more floods; Israel may use up to (3) MCM/ 
year of added storage capacity. 
3.	 Other storage reservoirs can be discussed and agreed upon mutually. 
ARTICLE III: WATER QUALITY AND PROTECTION 
1.	 Israel and Jordan each undertake to protect, within their own jurisdiction, the shared waters of 
the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers, and Arava/Araba groundwater, against any pollution, contami­
nation, harm or unauthorized withdrawals of each other’s allocations. 
2.	 For this purpose, Israel and Jordan will jointly monitor the quality of water along their boundary, 
by use of jointly established monitoring stations to be operated under the guidance of the Joint 
Water Committee. 
3.	 Israel and Jordan will each prohibit the disposal of municipal and industrial wastewater into the 
course of the Yarmouk or the Jordan Rivers before they are treated to standards allowing their 
unrestricted agricultural use. Implementation of this prohibition shall be completed within three 
years from the entry into force of the Treaty. 
4.	 The quality of water supplied from one country to the other at any given location shall be equiva­
lent to the quality of the water used from the same location by the supplying country. 
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5.	 Saline springs currently diverted to the Jordan River are earmarked for desalination within four 
years. Both countries shall cooperate to ensure that the resulting brine will not be disposed of in 
the Jordan River or in any of its tributaries. 
6.	 Israel and Jordan will each protect water systems in its own territory, supplying water to the 
other, against any pollution, contamination, harm or unauthorized withdrawal of each other’s 
allocations. 
ARTICLE IV: GROUNDWATER IN EMEK HA’ARAVA/WADI ARABA 
1.	 In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, some wells drilled and used by Israel along with 
their associated systems fall on the Jordanian side of the borders. These wells and systems are 
under Jordan’s sovereignty. Israel shall retain the use of these wells and systems in the quantity 
and quality detailed an Appendix to this Annex, that shall be jointly prepared by 31st December, 
1994. Neither country shall take, nor cause to be taken, any measure that may appreciably reduce 
the yields of quality of these wells and systems. 
2.	 Throughout the period of Israel’s use of these wells and systems, replacement of any well that 
may fail among them shall be licensed by Jordan in accordance with the laws and regulations 
then in effect. For this purpose, the failed well shall be treated as though it was drilled under 
license from the competent Jordanian authority at the time of its drilling. Israel shall supply 
Jordan with the log of each of the wells and the technical information about it to be kept on 
record. The replacement well shall be connected to the Israeli electricity and water systems. 
3.	 Israel may increase the abstraction rate from wells and systems in Jordan by up to (10) MCM/ 
year above the yields referred to in paragraph 1 above, subject to a determination by the Joint 
Water Committee that this undertaking is hydrogeologically feasible and does not harm existing 
Jordanian uses. Such increase is to be carried out within five years from the entry into force of 
the Treaty. 
4.	 Operation and Maintenance 
a.	 Operation and maintenance of the wells and systems on Jordanian territory that supply 
Israel with water, and their electricity supply shall be Jordan’s responsibility. The operation 
and maintenance of these wells and systems will be contracted at Israel’s expense to authori­
ties or companies selected by Israel. 
b.	 Jordan will guarantee easy unhindered access of personnel and equipment to such wells and 
systems for operation and maintenance. This subject will be further detailed in the agree­
ments to be signed between Jordan and the authorities or companies selected by Israel. 
ARTICLE V: NOTIFICATION AND AGREEMENT 
1.	 Artificial changes in or of the course of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers can only be made by 
mutual agreement. 
2.	 Each country undertakes to notify the other, six months ahead of time, of any intended projects 
which are likely to change the flow of either of the above rivers along their common boundary, 
or the quality of such flow. The subject will be discussed in the Joint Water Committee with the 
aim of preventing harm and mitigating adverse impacts such projects may cause. 
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ARTICLE VI: COOPERATION 
1.	 Israel and Jordan undertake to exchange relevant data on water resources through the Joint 
Water Committee. 
2.	 Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in developing plans for purposes of increasing water supplies 
and improving water use efficiency, within the context of bilateral, regional or international 
cooperation. 
ARTICLE VII: JOINT WATER COMMITTEE 
1.	 For the purpose of the implementation of this Annex, the Parties will establish a Joint Water 
Committee comprised of three members from each country. 
2.	 The Joint Water Committee will, with the approval of the respective governments, specify its 
work procedures, the frequency of its meetings, and the details of its scope of work. The Com­
mittee may invite experts and/or advisors as may be required. 
3.	 The Committee may form, as it deems necessary, a number of specialized sub-committees and 
assign them technical tasks. In this context, it is agreed that these sub-committees will include a 
northern sub- committee and a southern sub-committee, for the management on the ground of 
the mutual water resources in these sectors. 
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Excerpted from the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip (“Oslo II”), signed September 28, 1995 in Taba, Egypt: 
ANNEX III 
PROTOCOL CONCERNING CIVIL AFFAIRS 
ARTICLE 40 
WATER AND SEWAGE 
On the basis of good-will, both sides have reached the following agreement in the sphere of Water 
and Sewage: 
PRINCIPLES 
1.	 Israel recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. These will be negotiated in the 
permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the 
various water resources. 
2.	 Both sides recognize the necessity to develop additional water for various uses. 
3.	 While respecting each side’s powers and responsibilities in the sphere of water and sewage in their 
respective areas, both sides agree to coordinate the management of water and sewage 
resources and systems in the West Bank during the interim period, in accordance with the 
following principles: 
a.	 Maintaining existing quantities of utilization from the resources, taking into consideration 
the quantities of additional water for the Palestinians from the Eastern Aquifer and other 
agreed sources in the West Bank as detailed in this Article. 
b.	 Preventing the deterioration of water quality in water resources. 
c.	 Using the water resources in a manner which will ensure sustainable use in the future, in 
quantity and quality. 
d.	 Adjusting the utilization of the resources according to variable climatological and hydrologi­
cal conditions. 
e.	 Taking all necessary measures to prevent any harm to water resources, including those uti­
lized by the other side. 
f.	 Treating, reusing or properly disposing of all domestic, urban, industrial, and agricultural 
sewage. 
g.	 Existing water and sewage systems shall be operated, maintained and developed in a coordi­
nated manner, as set out in this Article. 
h.	 Each side shall take all necessary measures to prevent any harm to the water and sewage 
systems in their respective areas. 
i.	 Each side shall ensure that the provisions of this Article are applied to all resources and sys­
tems, including those privately owned or operated, in their respective areas. 
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TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY 
4.	 The Israeli side shall transfer to the Palestinian side, and the Palestinian side shall assume, powers 
and responsibilities in the sphere of water and sewage in the West Bank related solely to Palestin­
ians, that are currently held by the military government and its Civil Administration, except for 
the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article. 
5.	 The issue of ownership of water and sewage related infrastructure in the West Bank will be ad­
dressed in the permanent status negotiations. 
ADDITIONAL WATER 
6.	 Both sides have agreed that the future needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank are estimated to 
be between 70 - 80 MCM/year. 
7.	 In this framework, and in order to meet the immediate needs of the Palestinians in fresh water 
for domestic use, both sides recognize the necessity to make available to the Palestinians during 
the interim period a total quantity of 28.6 MCM/year, as detailed below: 
a.	 Israeli Commitment: 
1.	 Additional supply to Hebron and the Bethlehem area, including the construction of the 
required pipeline - 1 MCM/year. 
2.	 Additional supply to Ramallah area - 0.5 MCM/year. 
3.	 Additional supply to an agreed take-off point in the Salfit area - 0.6 MCM/year. 
4.	 Additional supply to the Nablus area - 1 MCM/year. 
5.	 The drilling of an additional well in the Jenin area - 1.4 MCM/year. 
6.	 Additional supply to the Gaza Strip - 5 MCM/year. 
7.	 The capital cost of items (1) and (5) above shall be borne by Israel. 
b.	 Palestinian Responsibility: 
1.	 An additional well in the Nablus area - 2.1 MCM/year. 
2.	 Additional supply to the Hebron, Bethlehem and Ramallah areas from the Eastern 
Aquifer or other agreed sources in the West Bank - 17 MCM/year. 
3.	 A new pipeline to convey the 5 MCM/year from the existing Israeli water system to the 
Gaza Strip. In the future, this quantity will come from desalination in Israel. 
4.	 The connecting pipeline from the Salfit take-off point to Salfit. 
5.	 The connection of the additional well in the Jenin area to the consumers. 
6.	 The remainder of the estimated quantity of the Palestinian needs mentioned in para 
graph 6 above, over the quantities mentioned in this paragraph (41.4 - 51.4 MCM/year), 
shall be developed by the Palestinians from the Eastern Aquifer and other agreed 
sources in the West Bank. The Palestinians will have the right to utilize this amount for 
their needs (domestic and agricultural). 
8.	 The provisions of paragraphs 6-7 above shall not prejudice the provisions of paragraph 1 to this 
Article. 
9.	 Israel shall assist the Council in the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 7 above, 
including the following: 
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a. Making available all relevant data. 
b. Determining the appropriate locations for drilling of wells. 
10. In order to enable the implementation of paragraph 7 above, both sides shall negotiate and final­
ize as soon as possible a Protocol concerning the above projects, in accordance with paragraphs 
18 - 19 below. 
THE JOINT WATER COMMITTEE 
11. In order to implement their undertakings under this Article, the two sides will establish, upon the 
signing of this Agreement, a permanent Joint Water Committee (JWC) for the interim period, 
under the auspices of the CAC. 
12. The function of the JWC shall be to deal with all water and sewage related issues in the West Bank 
including, inter alia: 
a. Coordinated management of water resources. 
b. Coordinated management of water and sewage systems. 
c. Protection of water resources and water and sewage systems. 
d. Exchange of information relating to water and sewage laws and regulations. 
e. Overseeing the operation of the joint supervision and enforcement mechanism. 
f. Resolution of water and sewage related disputes. 
g. Cooperation in the field of water and sewage, as detailed in this Article. 
h. Arrangements for water supply from one side to the other. 
i. Monitoring systems. The existing regulations concerning measurement and monitoring 
shall remain in force until the JWC decides otherwise. 
j. Other issues of mutual interest in the sphere of water and sewage. 
13. The JWC shall be comprised of an equal number of representatives from each side. 
14. All decisions of the JWC shall be reached by consensus, including the agenda, its procedures and 
other matters. 
15. Detailed responsibilities and obligations of the JWC for the implementation of its functions are 
set out in Schedule 8. 
SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM 
16. Both sides recognize the necessity to establish a joint mechanism for supervision over and en­
forcement of their agreements in the field of water and sewage, in the West Bank. 
17. For this purpose, both sides shall establish, upon the signing of this Agreement, Joint Supervision 
and Enforcement Teams (JSET), whose structure, role, and mode of operation is detailed in 
Schedule 9. 
WATER PURCHASES 
18. Both sides have agreed that in the case of purchase of water by one side from the other, the pur­
chaser shall pay the full real cost incurred by the supplier, including the cost of production at the 
source and the conveyance all the way to the point of delivery. Relevant provisions will be in­
cluded in the Protocol referred to in paragraph 19 below. 
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19. The JWC will develop a Protocol relating to all aspects of the supply of water from one side to the 
other, including, inter alia, reliability of supply, quality of supplied water, schedule of delivery 
and off-set of debts. 
MUTUAL COOPERATION 
20. Both sides will cooperate in the field of water and sewage, including, inter alia: 
a.	 Cooperation in the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic 
Cooperation, in accordance with the provisions of Article XI and Annex III of the Declaration 
of  Principles. 
b. Cooperation concerning regional development programs, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article XI and Annex IV of the Declaration of Principles. 
c.	 Cooperation, within the framework of the joint Israeli-Palestinian-American Committee, on 
water production and development related projects agreed upon by the JWC. 
d. Cooperation in the promotion and development of other agreed water-related and sewage-
related joint projects, in existing or future multi-lateral forums. 
e.	 Cooperation in water-related technology transfer, research and development, training, and 
setting of standards. 
f.	 Cooperation in the development of mechanisms for dealing with water-related and sewage 
related natural and man-made emergencies and extreme conditions. 
g. Cooperation in the exchange of available relevant water and sewage data, including: 
1. Measurements and maps related to water resources and uses. 
2. Reports, plans, studies, researches and project documents related to water and sewage. 
3. Data concerning the existing extractions, utilization and estimated potential of the 
Eastern, North-Eastern and Western Aquifers (attached as Schedule 10). 
PROTECTION OF WATER RESOURCES AND WATER AND SEWAGE SYSTEMS 
21. Each side shall take all necessary measures to prevent any harm, pollution, or deterioration of 
water quality of the water resources. 
22. Each side shall take all necessary measures for the physical protection of the water and sewage 
systems in their respective areas. 
23. Each side shall take all necessary measures to prevent any pollution or contamination of the 
water and sewage systems, including those of the other side. 
24. Each side shall reimburse the other for any unauthorized use of or sabotage to water and sewage 
systems situated in the areas under its responsibility which serve the other side. 
THE GAZA STRIP 
25. The existing agreements and arrangements between the sides concerning water resources and 
water and sewage systems in the Gaza Strip shall remain unchanged, as detailed in Schedule 11. 
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SCHEDULE 8 
JOINT WATER COMMITTEE 
Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 15 of this Appendix, the obligations and responsibilities of the 
JWC shall include: 
1.	 Coordinated management of the water resources as detailed hereunder, while maintaining the 
existing utilization from the aquifers as detailed in Schedule 10, and taking into consideration the 
quantities of additional water for the Palestinians as detailed in Article 40. It is understood that 
the above-mentioned Schedule 10 contains average annual quantities, which shall constitute the 
basis and guidelines for the operation and decisions of the JWC: 
a. All licensing and drilling of new wells and the increase of extraction from any water source, 
by either side, shall require the prior approval of the JWC. 
b. All development of water resources and systems, by either side, shall require the prior 
approval of the JWC. 
c. Notwithstanding the provisions of a. and b. above, it is understood that the projects for 
additional water detailed in paragraph 7 of Article 40, are agreed in principle between the 
two sides. Accordingly, only the geo-hydrological and technical details and specifications of 
these projects shall be brought before the JWC for approval prior to the commencement of 
the final design and implementation process. 
d. When conditions, such as climatological or hydrological variability, dictate a reduction or 
enable an increase in the extraction from a resource, the JWC shall determine the changes in 
the extractions and in the resultant supply. These changes will be allocated between the two 
sides by the JWC in accordance with methods and procedures determined by it. 
e. The JWC shall prepare, within three months of the signing of this Agreement, a Schedule to 
be attached to this Agreement, of extraction quotas from the water resources, based on the 
existing licenses and permits. 
The JWC shall update this Schedule on a yearly basis and as otherwise required. 
2.	 Coordinated management of water and sewage systems in the West Bank, as follows: 
a.	 Existing water and sewage systems, which serve the Palestinian population solely, shall be 
operated and maintained by the Palestinian side solely, without interference or obstructions, 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 40. 
b.	 Existing water and sewage systems serving Israelis, shall continue to be operated and main­
tained by the Israeli side solely, without interference or obstructions, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 40. 
c.	 The systems referred to in a and b above shall be defined on Maps to be agreed upon by the 
JWC within three months from the signing of this Agreement. 
d.	 Plans for construction of new water and sewage systems or modification of existing systems 
require the prior approval of the JWC. 
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SCHEDULE 9 
SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM 
Pursuant to Article 40, Paragraph 17 of this Appendix: 
1.	 Both sides shall establish, upon the signing of this Agreement, no less than five Joint Supervision 
and Enforcement Teams (JSETs) for the West Bank, under the control and supervision of the JWC, 
which shall commence operation immediately. 
2.	 Each JSET shall be comprised of no less than two representatives from each side, each side in its 
own vehicle, unless otherwise agreed. The JWC may agree on changes in the number of JSETs and 
their structure. 
3.	 Each side will pay its own costs, as required to carry out all tasks detailed in this Schedule. Com­
mon costs will be shared equally. 
4.	 The JSETs shall operate, in the field, to monitor, supervise and enforce the implementation of 
Article 40 and this Schedule, and to rectify the situation whenever an infringement has been de­
tected, concerning the following: 
a. Extraction from water resources in accordance with the decisions of the JWC, and the
 
Schedule to be prepared by it in accordance with sub- paragraph 1.e of Schedule 8.
 
b.	 Unauthorized connections to the supply systems and unauthorized water uses; 
c.	 Drilling of wells and development of new projects for water supply from all sources; 
d.	 Prevention of contamination and pollution of water resources and systems; 
e. Ensuring the execution of the instructions of the JWC on the operation of monitoring and 
measurement systems; 
f. Operation and maintenance of systems for collection, treatment, disposal and reuse, of
 
domestic and industrial sewage, of urban and agricultural runoff, and of urban and agricul­
tural drainage systems;
 
g.	 The electric and energy systems which provide power to all the above systems; 
h.	 The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for all the above systems; 
i.	 Water and sewage quality analyses carried out in approved laboratories, to ascertain that 
these laboratories operate according to accepted standards and practices, as agreed by the 
JWC. A list of the approved laboratories will be developed by the JWC; 
j.	 Any other task, as instructed by the JWC. 
5.	 Activities of the JSETs shall be in accordance with the following: 
a.	 The JSETs shall be entitled, upon coordination with the relevant DCO, to free, unrestricted 
and secure access to all water and sewage facilities and systems, including those privately 
owned or operated, as required for the fulfillment of their function. 
b.	 All members of the JSET shall be issued identification cards, in Arabic, Hebrew and English 
containing their full names and a photograph. 
c.	 Each JSET will operate in accordance with a regular schedule of site visits, to wells, springs 
and other water sources, water works, and sewage systems, as developed by the JWC. 
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d. In addition, either side may require that a JSET visit a particular water or sewage facility or 
system, in order to ensure that no infringements have occurred. When such a requirement 
has been issued, the JSET shall visit the site in question as soon as possible, and no later 
than within 24 hours. 
e. Upon arrival at a water or sewage facility or system, the JSET shall collect and record all 
relevant data, including photographs as required, and ascertain whether an infringement 
has occurred. In such cases, the JSET shall take all necessary measures to rectify it, and 
reinstate the status quo ante, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. If the 
JSET cannot agree on the actions to be taken, the matter will be referred immediately to the 
two Chairmen of the JWC for decision. 
f. The JSET shall be assisted by the DCOs and other security mechanisms established under 
this Agreement, to enable the JSET to implement its functions. 
g. The JSET shall report its findings and operations to the JWC, using forms which will be 
developed by the JWC. 
SCHEDULE 10 
DATA CONCERNING AQUIFERS 
Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 20 and Schedule 8 paragraph 1 of this Appendix:
 
The existing extractions, utilization and estimated potential of the Eastern, North-Eastern, and
 
Western Aquifers are as follows:
 
Eastern Aquifer:
 
• In the Jordan Valley, 40 MCM to Israeli users, from wells; 
• 24 MCM to Palestinians, from wells; •30 MCM to Palestinians, from springs; 
• 78 MCM remaining quantities to be developed from the Eastern Aquifer; 
• Total = 172 MCM. 
North-Eastern Aquifer: 
• 103 MCM to Israeli users, from the Gilboa and Beisan springs, including from wells; 
• 25 MCM to Palestinian users around Jenin; 
• 17 MCM to Palestinian users from East Nablus springs; 
• Total = 145 MCM. 
Western Aquifer: 
• 340 MCM used within Israel; 
• 20 MCM to Palestinians; 
• 2 MCM to Palestinians, from springs near Nablus; 
• Total = 362 MCM. 
All figures are average annual estimates. 
The total annual recharge is 679 MCM. 
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SCHEDULE 11 
THE GAZA STRIP
 
Pursuant to Article 40, Paragraph 25:
 
1.	 All water and sewage (hereinafter referred to as “water”) systems and resources in the Gaza Strip 
shall be operated, managed and developed (including drilling) by the Council, in a manner that 
shall prevent any harm to the water resources. 
2.	 As an exception to paragraph 1., the existing water systems supplying water to the Settlements 
and the Military Installation Area, and the water systems and resources inside them shall continue 
to be operated and managed by Mekoroth Water Co. 
3.	 All pumping from water resources in the Settlements and the Military Installation Area shall be in 
accordance with existing quantities of drinking water and agricultural water. Without derogating 
from the powers and responsibilities of the Council, the Council shall not adversely affect these 
quantities. Israel shall provide the Council with all data concerning the number of wells in the 
Settlements and the quantities and quality of the water pumped from each well, on a monthly 
basis. 
4.	 Without derogating from the powers and responsibilities of the Council, the Council shall enable 
the supply of water to the Gush Katif settlement area and Kfar Darom settlement by Mekoroth, as 
well as the maintenance by Mekoroth of the water systems supplying these locations. 
5.	 The Council shall pay Mekoroth for the cost of water supplied from Israel and for the real 
expenses incurred in supplying water to the Council. 
6.	 All relations between the Council and Mekoroth shall be dealt with in a commercial agreement. 
7.	 The Council shall take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of all water systems in the 
Gaza Strip. 
8.	 The two sides shall establish a subcommittee to deal with all issues of mutual interest including 
the exchange of all relevant data to the management and operation of the water resources and 
systems and mutual prevention of harm to water resources. 
9.	 The subcommittee shall agree upon its agenda and upon the procedures and manner of its meet­
ings, and may invite experts or advisers as it sees fit. 
 
 
 
 
Toward a Unified Management Regime in the Jordan Basin: The Johnston Plan Revisited 
Sharif S. Elmusa
 
Institute of Palestine Studies, Washington, D.C.
 
ABSTRACT
 
In 1955 an unratified agreement concerning future allocations and joint management of the Jordan River was reached
 
between the Arab riparians and Israel through the meditation of the American special ambassador Eric Johnston. The
 
author argues that this agreement, known as the Johnston Plan, is worth revisiting because it contains the essential
 
ingredients for the resolution of any water conflict, such as provisions for allocations for each riparian and for the
 
establishment of a joint commission. The author analyzes the Johnston Plan in light of current circumstances, assesses
 
its weaknesses, and recommends certain modifications which would make the Plan attractive and feasible for the
 
countries concerned.
 
INTRODUCTION 
The conflict between Israel and the Arabs is not just about his­
tory and legitimacy, but also, of course, about land—perhaps the 
core natural resource of the region. The relative scarcity of water, 
and its importance in determining the value of some of the con­
tested lands, has meant that it has been a site of conflict since the 
very beginnings of the Arab-Israeli feud. Because the main sources 
of the region’s water are shared, any lasting peace between the Arab 
riparians of the basin and Israel will by necessity include agreements 
on water. 
Through such agreements, the Arab riparians will presumably 
work to secure what they see as their fair share of the area’s water 
resources, the bulk of which originate in Arab territory. Israel, on 
the other hand, is downstream of the two main disputed resources, 
the Mountain Aquifer and the Jordan River. The Mountain Aquifer 
is replenished primarily from the West Bank, and the Jordan River 
from Syria and Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, from Jordan. Israel 
and the West Bank contribute minor amounts of drainage area and 
water quantity to the headwaters and to the basin as a whole 
(Elmusa 1997). To compensate for its downstream position, Israel is 
unlikely to withdraw from the Golan Heights, southern Lebanon, 
and the West Bank without making arrangements for access to 
water. It has been the principal user of their waters, accomplished 
through direct or indirect control of the headwaters, i.e., through 
the occupation of the territory that holds them or through the asser­
tion of its military power to halt projects it deemed inimical to its 
water supply. Under peaceful conditions, treaties would have to 
replace this form of control. 
My focus here is on the Jordan River system which courses 
through, whether serially or contiguously (i.e. as a boundary), terri­
tories of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Palestinians, and Israel. Ac­
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cording to international water law, it qualifies as an international 
1 The convention on the law of the non-watercourse common to all five parties.1 
navigational uses of international 
In this paper, I will propose that future allocations and joint watercourses, United Nations General 
Assembly Report of the Sixth Committeemanagement of the Jordan River system be based on the Johnston 
convening as the Working Group of the
Plan (JP). The Johnston Plan is an unratified agreement that was Whole, A/51/869 11 April 1997, defines an 
reached in 1955 between the Arab riparians and Israel through the “international watercourse” as “a 
watercourse, parts of which are situated inmediation of the American special ambassador, Eric Johnston. It 
different states” (Article 2.b).
contains provisions for allocations for each riparian, diversion and 
regulatory schemes, and preliminary proposals for a joint commis- For analyses of the Jordan-Israel water2
sion— all of which are essential ingredients for the resolution of any	 agreement, see Sharif S. Elmusa, The 
Jordan-Israel water agreement: a model orwater conflict. My main interest here is in the allocation provisions, 
an exception? in Eugene Cotran and Chibli 
but the possibilities for unified management will also be indicated. In Mallat, The Arab-Israeli accords: legal 
addition, I will point out the principal weaknesses of the JP and sug- perspectives, 1996. Boston: Kluwer Law 
International: 199-212; and Fredric C. Hof,gest remedies. Whether, and which, riparians would agree to endorse 
The Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers in the 
the JP is anything but certain; I will examine this question by citing Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, Middle East 
Policy No. 4 (Spring 1995): 1-9. See alsotheir individual responses to the JP and their hydrologic interests. 
Shamir, this volume, which includes the
Before delving into the details of my main argument, however, I texts of these agreements. 
must mention the water agreements that have been reached in the 
course of the peace talks so far because of their ramifications for 3 The main arguments of this article were 
made in several chapters of Sharif S.resolving the conflict in the future. The Jordan-Israel peace treaty 
Elmusa, Water conflict: economics, politics,
(October 1994) contained what amounts to a water agreement, and law and the Palestinian-Israeli water 
so have the interim agreements between Israel and the Palestinians.2	 resources, Washington, D.C., Institute for 
Palestine Studies, 1997. The JP has beenThe Jordan-Israel agreement pertains principally to segments of the 
examined in numerous publications,
Jordan River system that the two states immediately share. A full principally: American Friends of the Middle 
accord on the basin would have to include Lebanon, the Palestin- East, The Jordan water problem, Washing­
ton, D.C., 1964; Miriam L. Lowi, Water andians, and Syria. The talks between Israel, on the one hand, and Leba­
power: the politics of a scarce resource in the 
non and Syria, on the other, have all but come to a halt. The Jordan River basin, London: Cambridge 
Palestinian-Israeli treaties contain partial, water-related arrange- Univ. Press, 1993; Thomas Naff and R. C. 
Matson, Water in the Middle East: conflict or
ments for the interim period, or Palestinian self-governing period, cooperation, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
and set out two main agenda items— namely, the equitable utiliza- 1984; Don Peretz, Development of the 
Jordan Valley, Middle East Journal, Vol. 9,tion of joint water resources and their joint management— for the 
No. 4, Autumn, 1995; Samir Saliba, The
“final-status” negotiations between the two sides. These negotiations Jordan River dispute, The Hague: Martinus 
commenced in May 1995, but have made little progress. They are Nijhof, 1968; and Georgiana Stevens, 
Jordan River partition, Stanford, CA:scheduled to conclude on the eve of the year 2000 and to resolve the 
Stanford Univ. Press and Hoover 
major issues of conflict between the two sides, especially borders, Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 
refugees, Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and 1965. 
Gaza, and water. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE JOHNSTON PLAN3 
Eric Johnston undertook his mission in 1953, to resolve the 
then escalating conflict in the Jordan basin between the Arab states 
of the Jordan basin and Israel, but his mission had two broader 
aims as well: (1) to “help Israel get on her feet” (Stevens 1965) 
including (at least tacitly) recognition of Israel by the Arab coun­
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tries through regional cooperation; and (2) to resettle in the Jor­
dan Valley those among the Palestinian refugees who fled to this 
region in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. These aims, I 
believe, critically informed the size of the water allocations that the 
riparians received under the JP. 
The Johnston Plan was the last, but truly not the least, of a 
series of plans for the development of the Jordan basin, starting in 
1920 with the Anglo-French Convention. It should be recalled that 
before World War I, the Jordan basin area was part of the Otto­
man Empire and was not subject to inter-state disputes. In a sense, 
we still are dealing with the consequences of the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire and the break up of the region into individual 
“nation states.” The Anglo-French Convention accorded priority 
of basin water use to Syria, which then included Lebanon and was 
to be made by the League of Nations in 1922 into a French-man­
dated territory. It gave Palestine, which was to fall under Britain’s 
mandate, the residual flow.4 The convention, however, did not 
assign specific quotas or chart a vision for the development of the 
Jordan River basin. 
The first comprehensive survey in the Jordan basin and pro­
posals for its development were contained in the 1939 Ionides 
Plan.5 M.G. Ionides, then British director of development in 
Transjordan, was to my mind the most realistic and farsighted of 
the Jordan River planners. Ionides’s assessment of the available 
water resources in the basin, for example, proved to be more real­
istic than those of John Hays and Walter Lowdermilk, whose fig­
ures turned out to be highly inflated. The inflation resulted from 
their mixing water and politics. The two engineers, Hays and 
Lowdermilk, were hired by the World Zionist Organization, which 
was trying to convince Britain to allow larger numbers of Jews to 
immigrate on the grounds that there was enough water in the 
country to support the numbers advocated by this organization. 
Additionally, Ionides argued that water development should be 
justified on an economic calculus, a view that we have come to 
appreciate recently after the realization that the limited water 
resources have been utilized inefficiently and that they need to be 
managed from the demand side. 
A series of plans followed Ionides’. Two were devised by 
American engineering firms, Charles T. Main and Baker-Harza, at 
the request of the U.S., Jordan and UNRWA (the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency in charge of rendering assistance to the 
Palestinian refugees). In the course of negotiations over the JP, 
these plans served as bases for proposals and counter proposals by 
the Arab riparians and Israel. They included a wealth of hydrologic 
4 	 Patricia Toye, Palestine boundaries, Vol. 3 
London: Archive Editions; published in 
association with the International 
Boundaries Research Unit, Univ. of 
Durham, 1989, 232. 
5  M. G. Ionides, Report on the water resources 
of Transjordan and their development, 
Government of Transjordan, 1939. Highly 
informative excerpts from, and outlines of, 
each of the Jordan basin’s plans, from 
Ionides’s onward, are available in American 
Friends of the Middle East, The Jordan water 
problem. 
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data and competing diversion schemes, estimates of the irrigable 
area and irrigation water requirements in the Jordan basin, and 
water allocations. 
Johnston, unlike the authors of the other plans, was not a techni­
cian drafting his own scheme. Instead, he sought to induce the Arab 
states and Israel to meet midway. His plan, sometimes also known as 
the Unified Plan, is both a synthesis of, and a compromise among, 
previous plans. It succeeded in bringing the positions of the ripar­
ians closer than any of the plans before it did, for, unlike these plans, 
it resulted from “give and take” by the two sides. 
The JP was not formally ratified, although both sides accepted 
the water allocations or quotas de facto. This was because the Arabs 
would not entertain the recognition of Israel that a unified man­
agement regime would entail, without first resolving the Palestin­
ian problem. Yet, although the JP was not ratified, it can be 
thought of, for reasons that will become apparent in the course of 
this text, as having become customary law in the basin, at least for 
Jordan and Israel. 
The JP incorporated provisions and involved discussions of 
proposals germane to the following areas: 
•	 Riparian water quotas, including quantities, basis of 
estimation, priorities of extraction, points of extraction, 
and spatial utilization (in and out of basin boundaries); 
•	 Regulatory works, including diversion canals and dams 
and their location (see Figure 1); 
•	 A joint management body, including international
 
representation.
 
From an academic point of view, the JP has been used, for 
example, for the study of the Functionalist and Realist perspectives 
in international relations (Lowi 1993)  to illustrate the inadequacy 
of the former as an approach to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
But it can also serve as a case study for the Communitarian 
perspective as well. Furthermore, it can amply demonstrate, for 
those who are interested in the “technology-society” relationship, 
how economical and political interests lurk behind what are pre­
sented as purely technical matters, from data to regulatory and 
diversion works. 
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Figure 1 The Johnston Plan. Source: Saliba (1968). 
QUOTAS 
The quotas that were assigned to the four riparians from the 
Jordan River system (the West Bank was then part of Jordan), 
together with recent uses, are exhibited in Figure 2. These figures 
are cited by most scholars, including Israelis, as being those that 
were agreed upon between the Arabs and Israel at the end of 
Johnston’s mission. The overall volume that was to be distributed 
among the riparians was an average of 1,273 million cubic meters 
per year (MCM/y). 
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Country Quota Percent Actual use Percent 
(mcm/y) of total (mcm/y) of total 
Lebanon a 35 3 20 < 2 
Syria b 132 10 200 17 
Israel c 400 31 690 60 
Jordan d 720 56 
East Bank e 505 39 250 22 
West Bank f 215 17 0 0 
TOTAL 1, 287 100 1,160 100 
Figure 2 Actual use versus quotas under the Johnston Plan in the Jordan River Basin. 
The quotas for Israel were largely a residual; that is, Israel would 
not divert them until after the Arab riparians had tapped theirs. 
That meant they were not guaranteed quantities, owing to the fluc­
tuation of rainfall. Assigning Israel a residual was in line with the 
1920 Anglo-French Convention. Yet Israel fared much better under 
the JP than had British-mandated Palestine under the Anglo-French 
Convention. The quotas rewarded Jordan handsomely as well. The 
reason for the generosity of the JP allocations to Israel and Jordan 
undoubtedly lay in its broad goals, namely, “putting Israel on its feet” 
and re-settlement of Palestinian refugees in the Jordan Valley. Lebanon 
and Syria, in contrast, did not fare so well under the JP, although the 
convention had accorded them first priority of use. 
For both Israel and the Arab riparians as a whole, the quotas 
were less than each side had demanded in the course of the negotia­
tions, but Israel was allotted about one-third of the total allocations 
and the three Arab riparians received two-thirds. 
How were the shares determined? They were calculated on the 
basis of the irrigable area within the Jordan basin. Agriculture at that 
time was considered the main vehicle of development and municipal 
and industrial use was still small. 
The quotas—for convenience and economy, one assumes— 
were to be tapped according to the geographical location of the 
riparians on the system (see Figure 1). Lebanon was to get water 
from the al-Hasbani; Syria from Banyas, the upper Jordan, and the 
Yarmuk; Jordan from the Yarmuk, the lower Jordan and the side 
wadis; Israel from the two Lakes (al-Hula and Tiberias) and the 
Yarmuk. So while the aggregate shares did not account for geogra­
phy or natural attributes, the disaggregated did. For example, Israel 
was to get only 25 MCM/y from the Yarmuk and 375 MCM/y from the 
upper Jordan, whereas Jordan was to get 377 MCM/y from the 
  
Sources: 
Based mainly on Ben-Gurion University of the 
Negev and Tahal Consulting Engineering, Israel 
water study for the World Bank, Washington, 
DC,1994; American Friends of the Middle East, 
1964, The Jordan water problem; 1994, 26-7; 
Naff and Matson, 1984, Water in the Middle 
East, 41-42; Naff, 1991, Jordan River: average 
flows, 1985-1990, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Notes: 
a Both quotas and use from the al-Hasbani. 
b 	 Quotas: 90 from the Yarmuk, 22 from the 
Jordan, and 20 from the Banyas; actual use: 
all from the Yarmuk. 
c Quotas: 375 from the Jordan, 25 from the 
Yarmuk; actual use: 550 from the Jordan 
and 70-100 from the Yarmuk. 
d Quotas: 100 from the Jordan, 377 from the 
Yarmuk, and 243 from the western and 
eastern side wadis. 
e Quotas: 297 from the Jordan and the 
Yarmuk and 206 from the side wadis; 
actual use: 130 from the Yarmuk and 120 
from the side wadis. 
f Quotas: 180 from the Jordan and the 
Yarmuk and 35 from the side wadis. 
Percentages do not add up due to rounding. 
  
Yarmuk 100 MCM/y from the lower Jordan, and 243 MCM/y from the 
side wadis. 
One final point regarding the quotas is whether the JP permitted 
Israel to divert water outside the boundaries of the basin to the 
Negev and to the coastal plain, as it eventually did through its Na­
tional Water Carrier (NWC). Some scholars have suggested that the 
Arab negotiators did eventually agree to Israel’s demand for out-of­
basin diversion, but there is no solid evidence to back them (Ameri­
can Friends of the Middle East 1964) The maximum that the Arabs 
might have agreed to was that Israel could only do so after the needs 
within the basin were satisfied. This conjecture makes sense because 
the water quotas were apportioned according to the irrigable areas 
of each riparian within the basin. If Israel was to divert water to 
irrigate land out of the basin, it would have compromised the basis 
6 Mahmoud Riyadh, Israel and the Arabof the allocations, opening the door for each riparian to claim it had 
water in historical perspective, in A. Farid 
large irrigable areas outside the basin and consequently needed and H. Sirriyeh, Israel and Arab water, 
Proceedings of an international symposium,more water than the JP’s allotments. Clearly, compromising the 
Amman, Jordan, February 25-26, 1984;
allocation criterion would have rendered an agreement untenable. London, Ithaca Press, 1985; 12. 
That the Arab countries did not consent to Israel’s out-of-basin 
diversion proposals is confirmed by Mahmud Riyadh, who served 
on the Arab Technical Committee that negotiated with Johnston 
and who subsequently became Egypt’s foreign minister and secre­
tary general of the Arab League. In a 1984 article he wrote: “We 
objected in principle to the use of the Jordan River outside the ba­
sin.”6 Riyadh justified the Arab position on the grounds that inter­
national customary law does not permit such transfer. In any event, 
the legality of Israel’s diversion of Jordan River water out of the 
basin through the NWC remains an open issue, especially when the 
needs of the other riparians within the basin have not been met. 
ENGINEERING WORKS AND JOINT COMMISSION 
In addition to the quotas, the JP had provisions for the engineering 
works that were to be used for harnessing water from the river system 
and regulating its flow. There were also inconclusive discussions regard­
ing the institutional framework for unified management of the basin. 
The JP integrated the diversionary and regulatory works that 
appeared in plans after Ionides’, and largely accommodated the 
Arab riparians’ and Israel’s demands. For Jordan, it suggested the 
diversion of water through two canals, as was originally proposed by 
Ionides. Only the canal on the east side, referred to as the East Ghor 
or King Abdullah Canal, was built; the western diversion, or West 
Ghor Canal, has yet to see the light of day. 
The JP also proposed the construction of the Maqarin dam at the 
confluence of three Yarmuk River tributaries along the Jordanian­
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Syrian border. Its site was first identified in 1951 by M.E. Bunger 
(author of the Bunger Plan), an American technician with the U.S. 
Technical Cooperation Agency (TCA), a forerunner of USAID. It is 
rumored that he spotted the site from an airplane on his way to the 
United States. The dam was to benefit Jordan and Syria with hydro-
power and irrigation water. It would have also allowed the two 
countries to store the Yarmuk River’s water inside their own territo­
ries instead of in Lake Tiberias, as plans supported by Israel at first 
sought to do. Like the West Ghor Canal, the dam was never built. 
But the JP also gave Israel its own diversion scheme in addition to 
the drainage of Lake al-Hula and the contiguous marshlands—key 
Israeli demands. 
Whereas the JP was specific on the quotas and engineering 
works, it did not say much about a unified management commis­
sion for the basin or the types of tasks and responsibilities it would 
undertake. This is a weak element of the JP, which would have to be 
remedied in any future negotiations. It seems that much time was 
spent on getting Israel to accept an international presence, namely 
the U.S. and the United Nations. The U.N. was fully involved in the 
scheme from the beginning through UNRWA, the United Nations 
agency in charge of dispensing assistance to the Palestinian refugees. 
And the U.S., of course, was the mediator and potential financier. 
RESPONSES TO THE JOHNSTON PLAN 
Let us now examine each party’s response to the JP and what this 
might bode for the future. 
OVERALL ARAB RESPONSE 
Johnston was reported to have said that he felt that the parties 
accepted the allocations. But this view is not accepted universally. 
For instance, Mahmud Riyadh stated (Riyadh 1985) that the Arabs 
objected to the quotas, the out-of-basin transfers, and, as we shall see, 
to the use of Lake Tiberias as a storage facility for Yarmuk flood water. 
There was probably no unified Arab position regarding the 
technicalities of the JP, and the disagreements were hidden by the 
Arab opposition to its political side, namely, recognition of Israel 
without a resolution of the refugee problem. 
SYRIA’S RESPONSE
 Syria appears never to have accepted the Johnston Plan. In the 
hydropolitical literature, emphasis has been placed on the political 
aspect of its rejection; it rejected the JP because it meant recognition 
of Israel and provided the means for strengthening Israel’s economy. 
But we must also consider the possibility that Syria was not satisfied 
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with the size of its quota. Syria is the largest contributor to the 
system both in terms of drainage area and flow. While it contributes 
more than 50 percent of the flow (Elmusa 1997), it was allocated 
only 10 percent of the divided flow. Although international water 
law and practice do not suggest that shared water should be distrib­
uted among co-riparians according to their relative contributions, 
upstream riparians generally consider the water originating in their 
territory to be theirs. Furthermore, in the Anglo-French Conven­
tion, Syria was to have priority in harnessing the water of the Jordan 
River system. 
Today, Syria reportedly impounds 70–100 MCM/y more than it 
was allocated in the JP. It impounds the water behind a series of 
small dams built since 1967 on the numerous tributaries of the 
Yarmuk River, apparently using most of the water for irrigation. 
The irrigable area increased from what it was in 1955 because of the 
introduction of drip irrigation, which can accommodate the unfa­
vorable topography of that area, unlike traditional furrow irrigation. 
In any future negotiations, Syria, I would conjecture, could be ex­
pected to demand more water than it was allocated under the JP. 
But Syria may not push its stream position as a basis for allocations 
too far because it is also downstream of its major source of water, 
the Euphrates River. 
Although Syria did not approve the JP, it was keen on building 
the Maqarin dam. It had already signed an agreement for building it 
with Jordan in 1953, before Johnston began his mission. However, 
the two countries could not build the dam without Israel’s approval. 
In 1987, the two countries revived the idea of building the dam, but 
in a nearby location, and dubbed the new proposed structure the 
Wihda (Unity) dam. Ultimately, Israel did not endorse the project, 
and the World Bank, in accordance with its long-standing policy of 
requiring the agreement of the concerned riparians in a situation of 
conflict, did not extend the loan to Jordan which it requested for 
financing this project. Whether the dam will be built or will be 
supplanted by alternative structures remains an open issue.
 On a broader level, it is unclear whether Syria would favor a 
unified management commission for the basin. Generally, 
upstreamers do not seek joint management because it does not 
much promote their water-related interest. If Syria does accede to 
such an enterprise, it perhaps would do so for economic and politi­
cal reasons that transcend water, but would at the same time at­
tempt to obtain water-related concessions. It is up to Jordanian and 
Palestinian diplomacy to persuade Syria to uphold their JP shares. In 
fact, and although this proposition may seem far fetched, it might be 
in the interest of all the downstream riparians, including Israel, to 
On a broader level, it is unclear whether 
Syria would favor a unified manage­
ment commission for the basin. 
Generally, upstreamers do not seek 
joint management because it does not 
much promote their water-related 
interest. If Syria does accede to such an 
enterprise, it perhaps would do so for 
economic and political reasons that 
transcend water, but would at the same 
time attempt to obtain water-related 
concessions. 
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help Syria in the Euphrates basin so that it might reciprocate in the 
Jordan basin. That would be more fruitful as a first step than putting 
forward projects for transporting water via so-called “peace pipe­
lines” from Turkey down to the Jordan basin riparians. 
ISRAEL’S RESPONSE 
At the time of the negotiations, Israel demanded more water 
than it was eventually given by the JP. That, in part, was because 
Israel regarded the Litani River as part of the Jordan basin (Amery 
1993). The idea of diverting water from the Litani to Israel goes back 
to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, when Zionist leaders lobbied 
Britain and France to enclose a segment of the Litani River within 
the boundaries of what would become British-mandated Palestine. 
But the two powers, France and Britain, drew Palestine’s boundaries 
in such a way that the Litani River in its entirety fell within Lebanon 
(See Wolf, this volume). 
Israel actually invoked the JP in 1964 when it was about to inau­
gurate its National Water Carrier (NWC), and when the Arab coun­
tries, in response, decided to divert the headwaters of the Jordan 
through Syria and into Jordan. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was 
reported to have said: “There are commitments in the world to us in 
the wake of the Johnston Plan. The accomplished fact, which was 
created by Johnston, created a certain situation.”7  He also was cited 
as having stated that the JP was “regarded as agreed to from an 
international point of view” (Farid and Sirriyeh 1985). 
For Israel, the JP was without a doubt an achievement, giving it 
one-third of the water of the Jordan River system, even though 
mostly as a residual. Equally important, it secured the acknowledg­
ment of the Arab countries that Israel was a co-riparian, which is 
tantamount to tacit recognition. 
In spite of its endorsement of the Johnston Plan, Israel took ad­
vantage of its post-June 1967 control of the headwaters of the Jordan 
River and drew from the basin quantities in excess of its JP quota. The 
figures I have seen range from 200 to 300 MCM/y, or more than Syria’s 
excess withdrawals. So, while both Israel and Syria have violated the JP 
quotas, Syria did not endorse the plan, whereas Israel acted expediently 
or pragmatically, depending on how one looks at the matter. 
I am not sure what the official Israeli position on the JP is today, 
and how it differs between Labor and Likud. Raphael Eitan, the 
current minister of agriculture, traditionally the official wielding the 
most power in water affairs, reportedly invoked the JP when Jordan 
and Syria began talking about reviving the idea of the Maqarin dam8 
after Jordan grew frustrated with what it saw as Israeli procrastina­
tion on implementing their water agreement. Some of the JP’s 
7 	 Press conference, 11 January 1965. Cited 
in Department of state administrative history 
(DSAH), vol. 1, chapter 4.H.2 (Johnson 
Administration), case no. NLJ 83-223, LBJ 
Library. 
8 The Jerusalem Post, 28 August 1996. 
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provisions also can be sensed in the Israel-Jordan agreement, al­
though the JP was not cited in the text. For example, according to 
the agreement, Israel’s withdrawals from the Yarmuk would be 25 
MCM/y (Elmusa 1996), the same amount as under the JP. 
I have not seen, however, any Israeli officials or publications 
endorse the JP. Moreover, a number of Israeli analysts, Elisha Kally 
and Arnon Soffer for example, have held that the JP has become 
passé owing to the changes that have occurred in the basin, includ­
ing locations of scarcity and surpluses, the technical facilities, the 
political context, technology, winter and summer needs, and popu­
lation growth. This is an arbitrary conclusion. It does not follow 
logically or practically from the changes enumerated by the authors, 
who, at any rate, fail to show how it does. It is self-serving because 
existing uses favor Israel. Furthermore, neither author analyzes the 
implications of the individual changes for the plan, except to conclude 
categorically that a new water sharing regime would have to acknowl­
edge existing uses.9 
True, the conditions for the basin’s riparians have changed since 
the time of the plan, but the shifts have been more or less even for the 
main factors that drive water demand, notably population growth and 
urbanization. For example, Jordan received an influx of refugees from 
the West Bank as a result of the 1967 war and from the Gulf as a result 
of the 1991 Gulf crisis, and Israel received large numbers of Soviet 
immigrants in the late 1980s. Likewise, the Palestinian population has 
risen considerably now that Gaza, by virtue of coming under the 
jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority, has become a riparian of the 
basin. Further, natural population increase in both Jordan and the 
West Bank has been even greater than in Israel, and also quite high in 
Syria. Only Lebanon’s population did not multiply as much as the 
other riparians’ thanks to the war-induced high emigration rates. In 
all, Israel’s population comprised close to 17 percent of the basin’s 
total in 1950 and less than 19 percent in 1992.10 
With respect to a unified water commission, Israel seems to have 
objected to an international presence—the U.N. and the U.S.— 
during the Johnston mission. It is far from certain that Israel would 
welcome U.N. representation in the future, since Israel has been 
chronically at odds with this world body, evident in Israel’s consis­
tent effort to keep the U.N. at bay in the multilateral forums 
spawned by the peace negotiations. On the other hand, Israel could 
conceivably accede to a World Bank presence because this multilat­
eral lending institution could also offer financial incentives for the 
development of the Jordan basin’s water resources. 
A more basic issue, however, is whether Israel would be inter­
ested in unified management at all. On the one hand, it may favor a 
9 Elisha Kally with Gideon Fishelson, Water 
and peace: water resources and the Arab-
Israeli peace process, Westport, CT: 
Praeger, in cooperation with the Armand 
Hammer Fund for Economic Cooperation 
in the Middle East, Tel Aviv Univ, 1993: 33; 
and Arnon Soffer, The relevance of 
Johnston Plan to the reality of 1993 and 
beyond. In Water and peace in the Middle 
East, J. Isaac and H. Shuval, eds., 
Amsterdam: Elsevier; Studies in Environ­
mental Science 58, Proceedings of the First 
Israeli-Palestinian International Academic 
Conference on Water, Zurich, Switzerland, 
10–13 December 1992: 115–16. 
10 The author’s estimate, based on figures 
from United Nations Environment 
Programme, Environmental data report, 
1993-94, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994: 
218-19. The following assumptions were 
made regarding the Palestinian population: 
Gaza was not included in the 1950 
estimate; the West Bank and Gaza’s 
population in 1992 was 2.4 million. 
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series of bilateral agreements with the other Arab riparians. Its 
hydrostrategic position (it shares segments of the Jordan River sys­
tem with each Arab riparian) allows it to do that, whereas none of 
the Arab riparians enjoys this type of position. Such an arrangement 
would place Israel at the hub of the basin’s management. Israel’s 
interest in bilateralism may be buttressed by a reluctance on its part 
to be the only non-Arab member in a five-way commission, for fear 
of being outvoted if a voting system is used in decision making. 
At the least, Israel would probably want to ensure that the deci­
sion making procedures do not allow the Arab riparians, should 
they take a joint stand, to decide on key issues. Whether this fear is 
well-founded is another matter; the history of the dispute suggests 
that the interests or the actions of the Arab riparians have not always 
been harmonious. Still, if the Arab riparians, particularly Syria, 
insist on a multilateral commission, Israel may have to go along. 
Furthermore, if Israel wants finally to be integrated in the region, it 
might not find a multilateral commission highly objectionable. 
JORDAN’S RESPONSE 
On the whole, Jordan favored the JP even when it opposed it on 
political grounds. Jordan’s positive response is understandable. The 
Jordan River is its main water source and the JP granted it enough 
water to irrigate 50,000 ha in the Valley, the principal irrigable area 
in the country. As soon as the Arab world split into competing 
factions during the cold war, Jordan became identified as pro-West­
ern, and signed agreements with the United States to initiate work 
on the East Ghor Canal. The United States itself had conditioned its 
aid to Israel and Jordan for projects in the Valley on their adherence 
to the Johnston Plan. 
In reality, however, Jordan was able to divert only around 250 
MCM/y of its JP share, half from the Yarmuk channel and half from 
the side wadis that feed the Jordan river from its territory. According 
to its water agreement with Israel, Jordan may be able to harness a 
total volume from the basin equal to its JP quota if all the “addi­
tional water” it was allotted under the agreement—as estimated by 
its chief water negotiator, Munther Haddadin—materializes 
(Elmusa 1996). 
Jordan cannot but be apprehensive about re-negotiating the JP 
allocations because it does not have the power to secure the original 
share and it is downstream on both the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers. 
These considerations would also make it interested in being a member 
of a unified commission for the management of the basin’s waters. 
On the whole, Jordan favored the JP 
even when it opposed it on political 
grounds. Jordan’s positive response is 
understandable. The Jordan River is its 
main water source and the JP granted it 
enough water to irrigate 50,000 ha in 
the Valley, the principal irrigable area in 
the country. 
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THE PALESTINIAN RESPONSE 
At the time of the JP, the Palestinians opposed it, but not be­
cause of water shares: they wanted the water, but they wanted it in 
Palestine. The quota that was allocated to Jordan and earmarked for 
the Valley’s Palestinian and Jordanian farmers (the majority Pales­
tinians), was generous—720 MCM/y—of which 477 was from the 
Jordan and Yarmuk channels and 243 from the lateral wadis. The 
Palestinian objection was to the idea of resettlement outside their 
original homes in Palestine. They did not accept the terms of the 
exchange, namely, Palestine for Jordan River water in the Valley. 
In the meantime, Palestinian farmers had diverted small 
amounts of water directly from the river to irrigate farmland in its 
flood plain (the Zawr). In 1964, however, Israel shifted the water of 
the two main saline spring groups that fed Lake Tiberias into the 
lower Jordan River, rendering its water too saline for irrigation. But 
the coup de grace for Palestinian agriculture in the Valley was delivered 
in 1967 when Israel declared the Jordan River a closed military area 
and drove Palestinian farmers off. 
Since the start of peace negotiations, the Palestinian reaction to the 
JP seems to have been mixed, even unclear. They have demanded a 
share of the Jordan River system based on the status of the West Bank 
as a riparian and have invoked the JP on several occasions, especially 
regarding the West Ghor Canal, which they hoped would be used to 
irrigate the Jordan Valley. In this regard, Israel’s retention of the 
Jordan Valley—as many Israeli officials have reiterated—would vitiate 
the status of the West Bank as a riparian of the basin. Some Palestin­
ian analysts, however, have claimed that: “the Revised Johnston Plan, 
which is still in effect today, neglected mention of the Palestinian 
people. Undoubtedly, this is one of the most blatant violations of the 
water rights of a region’s indigenous peoples.”11 
True, the JP did not mention the Palestinians by name and they 
were not negotiators because the West Bank was part of Jordan. 
Nonetheless, one of the JP’s core aims was to resettle Palestinian 
refugees in the Valley through the provision of land and water. 
How much water was the West Bank allocated? A 1992 PLO 
report put the West Bank’s share at 290 MCM/y (220 from the lower 
Jordan and 70 from the Yarmuk). Another report by a group of 
Palestinian water specialists, some of whom are or were members of 
the official negotiating water team, put it at 100 MCM/y, adding, 
without further elaboration, that “a rational allocation” would ac­
cord the Palestinians “at least 200” MCM/y.12  Neither report indicates 
how the figures were arrived at. 
I have proposed instead that the West Bank’s share ought to be 
calculated as a percentage of Jordan’s and in proportion to the 
11 L. Hosh and Jad Isaac, Roots of the water 
conflict in the Middle East, presented at the 
Conference on the Middle East Water 
Crisis: Creative Perspectives and Solutions, 
Univ. of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada, 
8–22 May, 1992. 
12 Task Force of the Water Resources Action 
Program, Palestinian water resources: a rapid 
interdisciplinary sector review and issues 
paper, East Jerusalem: WRAP, 1994, 7. 
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irrigable area on the eastern and western banks of the Jordan Valley, 
as estimated in 1955 by the Chicago-based engineering firm Baker-
Harza. The rationale behind this suggestion is that Jordan’s share 
was allocated according to the water required for that irrigable area 
on both sides of the river. Calculated in this manner, the West 
Bank’s share would be about 215 MCM/y (180 MCM/y from the river 
channel itself and 35 MCM/y from the side wadis). This amount is 
larger than what the Palestinian water specialists cited above re­
garded as “rational division.” One would expect that the Palestinian 
negotiators would be keen on securing that quantity. It would also 
serve the Palestinian interest to take part in a unified management 
regime. In fact, any major revision of the JP is likely to be injurious 
to the Palestinians because they are in an even weaker position than 
Jordan, located in the utmost downstream position of the Jordan 
river system and having no control of any strategic part of it, not to 
speak of their overall meager power resources. 
LEBANON’S RESPONSE 
The Johnston Plan allocated to Lebanon 35 MCM/y, the least of all 
the riparians. This is commensurate not with its contribution to the 
Jordan River system, but with its irrigable area within the basin. 
Lebanon, like the other Arab countries, did not accept the JP in 1955 
on political grounds. I have not seen much about Lebanon’s posi­
tion vis-a-vis the JP in recent years, except for one statement by the 
head of the Litani Commission, in which he demanded water for 
Lebanon from the Jordan basin on the basis of the JP.13  In the final 
analysis, Lebanon’s allocations cannot be reduced further in any 
future negotiations without rendering them meaningless. 
Lebanon, although an upstreamer, would theoretically be willing 
to sit on a unified management commission because it lacks the 
military and economic power to impose solutions of its own and 
might benefit from international assistance to the basin if such aid 
were forthcoming. On the whole, however, Lebanon’s position, as 
in other strategic regional matters, will be influenced by Syria’s. 
FINE-TUNING AND EXTENSION OF THE 
JOHNSTON PLAN 
In its past form, the JP is an incomplete blueprint. It needs 
both extension to encompass new spheres and refinement of the 
allocation formula. For one thing, the plan did not speak to the 
question of water quality and protection. The environment was not 
a big issue at the time, and the JP had provisions, especially drainage 
of Lake al-Hula and the contiguous marshlands, that would be 
Lebanon, although an upstreamer, 
would theoretically be willing to sit on a 
unified management commission 
because it lacks the military and 
economic power to impose solutions of 
its own and might benefit from 
international assistance to the basin if 
such aid were forthcoming. On the 
whole, however, Lebanon’s position, as 
in other strategic regional matters, will 
be influenced by Syria’s. 
13 See interview with Fadi Qumayr, head of 
the Litani Project Commission, Al Hayat, 
December, 1994. 
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highly controversial today from an ecological point of view.14  Yet 
the protection of water quality—which ultimately translates into 
quantity—would have to be a key element in any future accord. This 
issue has also been addressed in the Israel-Jordan water agreement, 
but the scope of the provisions needs to be widened to cover the rest 
of the river system. 
Neither did the JP take into account the historic and ecological 
attributes of the Jordan basin. The basin is central in the history and 
myths of Muslims, Christians, and Jews. It is also a unique natural 
region, especially the Dead Sea. In fact, it is ecologically more perti­
nent to speak of the Dead Sea basin than the Jordan River basin. 
This inland lake is vulnerable to the reduction of the flow from the 
Jordan River, its primary feeder. It has dried up in its southern part 
and could shrink further in the future. Any schemes for the develop­
14 Draining of these two water bodies wasment of the basin, therefore, should consider not only the utilitar­
opposed at the time by Syria on the 
ian, economic uses but the “instream” ecological, aesthetic and grounds that Israel could not act unilaterally 
in an international basin and that some ofhistoric value of the river system and the Dead Sea. 
the drainage canals would fall within the
The JP, moreover, did not specify details regarding the structure DMZ between the two states. 
and tasks of a joint management commission. Aspects of these were 
tackled in the Jordan-Israeli water agreement, but the tasks it named 
are only a fraction of what would be required for a commission 
managing the entire basin. Also, an international presence may be 
helpful at least at the start, especially in light of the rocky experience 
of the Jordan-Israel joint commission. An international party— 
such as the World Bank—can assist technically and financially to 
bridge gaps and resolve outstanding problems. 
Additionally, the Johnston Plan quotas can benefit from refine­
ment. The aggregate allocations, for example, could be broken down 
on a seasonal basis, as was done in the Israel-Jordan water agreement. 
Another improvement would be to state the quotas as percentages, in 
addition to fixed quantities, to account for the variations of rainfall 
and the concomitant water availability in the basin. A third modifi­
cation would be to give Syria a choice between the water it im­
pounds behind dams on the Yarmuk’s tributaries and the water that 
the plan assigned to it from the Banyas and the Jordan rivers. If Syria 
opted for the latter, the dams could still be used to regulate the flow, 
and the downstream riparians would compensate Syria financially 
for this service.
 The foregoing suggestions for improving the JP differ from 
saying that it is passé. They imply that the riparians should build on 
the JP, without discarding its basic allocations. Attempts to renegoti­
ate an entirely new agreement and quotas are likely to be protracted, 
considering the mounting water scarcity in the area. Changing the 
quotas could only come at the expense of the Jordanians and Pales­
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tinians, the two vulnerable downstream riparians. While it may be 
possible to suppress the demands of these two riparians for a time, 
an enduring management regime must be equitable. 
CONCLUSION 
A water agreement in the Jordan basin is key for overall Arab-
Israeli accommodation. In the Jordan River system, such an agree­
ment can be built on the Johnston Plan. The JP is a synthesis of 
previous plans and a compromise between the Arab riparians and 
Israel; it may be said to have functioned as customary law in the 
basin, at least between Israel and Jordan, and by extension the Pales­
tinians. The customary law status of the JP can be applied to the 
Palestinians because it was negotiated when the West Bank was first 
part of Jordan and then fell under Israeli rule. 
The JP would have to be modified to include provisions for 
water quality control and instream value for the river system and the 
Dead Sea, largely absent in the historic JP. It would also have to fine-
tune the quotas to accommodate seasonal uses and supply, as well as 
the water works built by some of the basin states. 
The JP was not ratified in the past mainly because the Arab states 
of the basin would not accept its implicit recognition of Israel before 
resolving the Palestinian question. This condition no longer obtains; 
the Arab states have recognized or are willing to recognize Israel in 
exchange for returning Arab territories seized in 1967. The Palestin­
ian refugee issue is also on the agenda of the final status talks be­
tween Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and its resolution 
depends only partially on water. In other words, only the “technical” 
aspect of the JP has to be re-negotiated. The stumbling block is likely 
to be the quotas, although the agreement on a unified management 
regime could present a formidable challenge as well. 
Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinians—the three vulnerable 
riparians—would be keenly interested in a JP-based agreement. The 
key to an agreement based on the Johnston Plan, however, is in the 
hands of the Israelis and the Syrians—Israel because it is the riparian 
with the greatest power resources in the basin, and Syria because it is 
the utmost upstreamer and the main water contributor to the sur­
face waters of the basin. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Middle East encompasses five ecological domains: (1) the humid highlands and their intermontane valleys, where 
rainfed farming was begun and permanent settlements were first established; (2) the semi-arid steppes, where the lesser 
amount and instability of rainfall made rainfed farming marginal but still provided vegetative resources that could be 
utilized by semi-nomadic pastoralists; (3) the river valleys, where irrigated farming was practiced in the floodplains and 
hydraulic works (including diversion canals and ponding basins) were developed; (4) the seacoasts, where fishing, 
seafaring, and maritime trade were practiced; and (5) the deserts, where a sparse population subsisted by hunting and 
occasional marauding, and eventually by becoming caravaneers conveying products such as herbs and spices overland 
from distant sources to centers of population. In each of these domains, a distinctive culture evolved, characterized by a 
specific set of precepts, beliefs, and rituals based on the deification and worship of the dominant forces of nature whose 
interplay seemed to govern the particular environment. In an exposition more fully elucidated in his forthcoming book 
The natural history of the Bible: an ecological reading of the scriptures, the author hypothesizes that it was the encompass­
ing ecological experience of the ancient Israelites (who shifted from one domain to another in the early course of their 
history) that enabled them to perceive the overarching unity of all nature and therefore to begin worshipping a single 
God. The holistic perception of nature as an integrated domain governed by consistent principles was compatible with, 
and probably contributed to, the much later advent of modern science. 
Much has been said and written in recent decades concerning 
the impact of human societies and their activities on the environ­
ment. Less attention is currently paid to the equally important influ­
ences of specific environments on the evolution of human societies 
and their distinctive cultures. People who live in the artificial envi­
ronment of the city, sheltered from direct exposure to the natural 
elements, find it increasingly difficult to perceive how profoundly 
the ecology of each region must have shaped not only the material 
mode of individual and collective subsistence, but also the mental 
attitudes and spiritual perceptions of tribes and nations. Nowhere is this 
reciprocal influence more clearly apparent than in the Middle East. 
The region called the Middle East encompasses parts of north­
eastern Africa and southwestern Asia. Ecologically, it spans the 
transition between the humid or semi-humid environment of 
southeastern Europe and the extremely arid environment of the 
great desert belt of the Sahara and the Arabian Peninsula reaching to 
the Thar in the Indian subcontinent. Significantly, it was in parts of 
this region that in the wake of the last ice age some ten thousand 
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years ago, humans first made the momentous transition from no­
madic scavenging, hunting, and gathering to regular husbandry of 
crops and livestock. Here they first domesticated plants and animals, 
established villages and cities, built temples and monuments, and 
organized nation states. Here they invented ceramics, metallurgy, 
mathematics, and writing. And here they conceived and enunciated 
universal ethical and religious ideals and codified them into laws. 
The Middle East is, thus, the ancient cultural and spiritual home, 
indeed the birthplace, of Western Civilization. 
The cultural history of the ancient Middle East is not a simple 
story of uniform steady development. Rather, it is an exceedingly 
complex process of fitful progress, beset by repeated crises and 
conflicts, in the course of which disparate societies co-evolved and 
repeatedly clashed. The complexity of that process can be related to 
the inherently variable and unstable environment within which it 
took place. 
The variegated environment of this region consists, rather 
roughly, of five principal domains, each of which gave rise to a 
characteristic culture. The irregular distribution of these domains is 
such that they interlace with one another, thus forcing the cultures 
forming within them to interact continuously, both synergistically 
and antagonistically, in mutual dependence and rivalry. The five 
domains are: the humid highlands, the semiarid steppes, the river 
valleys, the seacoasts, and the deserts. 
The first of these domains, the humid highlands, is the arc of 
upland ranges girding the Fertile Crescent on the northwest, north, 
and northeast (including the mountain ranges of Galilee, Lebanon, 
Taurus, and Zagros). These ranges face into the path of the 
cloud-bearing winds rolling in from the west and northwest, and 
therefore regularly receive a comparative abundance of rainfall. That 
rainfall gave rise to a profuse cover of herbaceous and woody plants, 
among which were native species of grain-bearing grasses and le­
gumes, as well as of fruit-bearing trees and shrubs that provided the 
progenitors of the crops domesticated by the region’s early farmers. 
This is, therefore, the domain of rainfed farming. 
The second domain, namely the semiarid steppes, consists of the 
plains and hills that lie in the rainshadow of the humid highlands. 
Here rainfall is of lesser amount and regularity, so that rainfed farm­
ing is too hazardous to be practiced perennially. However, this do­
main does nevertheless provide vegetative resources which, though 
more sparse than in the humid domain, can be exploited by grazing 
animals. Indeed, this is the subregion wherein sheep and goats and 
other species of livestock were domesticated and herded by tribes of 
semi-nomadic pastoralists. Hence we call this the pastoral domain. 
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The third domain is that of the river valleys located in the semi­
arid and arid zones. These valleys receive the excess waters (runoff) 
flowing from the various catchments of the humid zone. Because 
these flows originate in a different and often distant zone from the 
major river valleys, they are called “exotic.” As such, they tend to be 
seasonally variable, with the flows being most copious during and 
immediately following the distinct rainy seasons. Some centuries 
following the initial domestication of crojƒ in the rainfed domain, 
farmers disaÎvered that they could import the seeds of those crops 
into the riverine domain and grow them successfully along the river 
banks and floodplains after the recession of the annual floods. In 
time, these farmers also learned to exercise greater control over the 
water supplies by diverting water from the natural river courses by 
means of artificial dykes, channels, and ditches. Thus arose the 
“hydraulic civilizations” of the ancient Middle East, which depended 
on irrigated farming for their subsistence. 
The fourth domain, the seacoasts, or the littoral domain, consisted 
of the strips of land and water along the shores of the Mediterranean 
Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Here the terrestrial and the 
marine environments meet and interplay to form a unique ecological 
zone, with a characteristic community of interlinked aquatic and land 
plants and animals. Humans who lived along these coasts tended to 
become fishermen, seafarers, and land-sea traders. Eventually, they 
developed such characteristic pursuits as glass making (using coastal 
sand), and dye making (from near-coasts sea snails). Some settled 
permanently at advantageous sites (such as islands, coves, and estuar­
ies); while others developed a form of maritime nomadism character­
istic of the Mediterranean “Sea Peoples,” who combined coastal 
trading and raiding as means of subsistence. 
The fifth domain was the desert domain, encompassing the vast 
dry lands that occupy the southern tier of the region. Here the sparse 
population continued for a long while to maintain an austere exist­
ence as nomadic hunters, gatherers, and occasional marauders who 
carried out incursions into the adjacent domains. Some also engaged 
in localized farming in isolated oases and others herded ungulents 
over the sparsely vegetated rangelands of the semi-desert. In time, the 
denizens of the desert domesticated the camel, that remarkable animal 
that has long been called the “ship of the desert.” Henceforth, some 
became caravaneers, conveying goods such as medicinal, aromatic, 
and spice plants (along with gems, gums, and silk) from such distant 
sources as southern Arabia, eastern Africa, India, and central Asia to 
the centers of population along the Mediterranean. 
In addition to developing distinctive material cultures, the soci­
eties that evolved in each of the domains also acquired characteristic 
In addition to developing distinctive 
material cultures, the societies that 
evolved in each of the domains also 
acquired characteristic perceptions of 
nature, which expressed themselves in 
specific sets of religious beliefs and 
practices. 
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perceptions of nature, which expressed themselves in specific sets of 
religious beliefs and practices. Their religions were based on recog­
nition and worship of the dominant natural forces that, in effect, 
controlled their lives. And because the landscape of the region is so 
variegated, and the climate so unstable, the ancient inhabitants of 
the Middle East imagined the forces of nature to be in continuous 
conflict. Rainstorms alternated with searing desert winds, drenching 
floods with droughts, periods of plenty with repeated famine, as if 
the elements were at war. Hence, the early polytheistic religions were 
directed toward warding off the evil forces and propitiating the 
beneficent ones in a constant quest to attain a measure of security in 
a world that seemed so inherently unstable. 
Rainfed farming societies coalesced from individual clusters of 
villages in separate valleys to form city-states in which a major city 
served as a center for a hinterland of farming communities. The 
chief gods of these communities were generally the rainstorm gods 
such as Baal, and an earth goddess, often named Astarte. Baal was 
depicted riding the clouds, and at whim or will, spewing forth or 
withholding his beneficence in the form of precipitation upon the 
reclining Mother Earth below, who would then respond with her 
abundant fecundity. The process of life was thus depicted as the 
mating of sky and earth. To elicit it, these societies would practice 
elaborate sacrificial rituals. 
The pastoral societies tended to worship the brute and procre­
ative prowess of dominant male animals, such as bulls or rams. As 
they too depended on seasonal rainfall, they often worshiped a 
combined pantheon of animal gods and rain gods. 
The hydraulic societies appealed to riverine gods, believed to 
control the annual floods. In the case of Egypt, where the connec­
tion between the annual spates of the Nile and its sources in faraway 
Ethiopia was obscure, a popular river god was Hapi, portrayed in 
murals and sculptures as a rotund hermaphrodite with feminine 
breasts and masculine genitals, presumably having powers of 
self-generation. In Mesopotamia, where the threat of soil salination 
by rising groundwater was felt most acutely, the good river god was 
perceived to be countered by the lurking Tiamat, evil goddess of the 
briny subterranean waters. 
The desert people naturally worshiped their own gods, among them 
the all-seeing god of the sun and the god or goddess of the moon, as 
well as the mysterious volcanic mountain gods who dwelt in the bowels 
of the earth and occasionally emerged from caves. These capricious 
gods with their pent-up power could lie dormant for long periods of 
time, only to awaken suddenly and cause the earth to tremble or the 
winds to kick up dust or even bring about a freak downpour. 
The chief gods of these [rainfed 
farming] communities were generally 
the rainstorm gods such as Baal, and an 
earth goddess, often named Astarte. 
….The pastoral societies tended to 
worship the brute and procreative 
prowess of dominant male animals, 
such as bulls or rams. As they too 
depended on seasonal rainfall, they 
often worshiped a combined pantheon 
of animal gods and rain gods….The 
hydraulic societies appealed to riverine 
gods, believed to control the annual 
floods….The desert people naturally 
worshiped their own gods—among 
them the all-seeing god of the sun and 
the god or goddess of the moon, as well 
as the mysterious volcanic mountain 
gods who dwelt in the bowels of the 
earth and occasionally emerged from 
caves.…Finally, the coastal and island 
peoples worshiped the monsters of the 
sea (e.g., Yam and Leviathan), who 
had the power to roil the waters and 
either swallow the ships of the seafarers 
or smash them against the rocky shoals. 
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Finally, the coastal and island peoples worshiped the monsters of 
the sea (e.g., Yam and Leviathan), who had the power to roil the 
waters and either swallow the ships of the seafarers or smash them 
against the rocky shoals. 
The societies in the various domains did not live in exclusive 
isolation. Rather, they were aware of, and influenced by, one 
another’s cultures. The people of each domain often accepted the 
gods of other domains as minor deities alongside their own major 
gods. And when individuals or clans shifted from one domain to a 
neighboring one they generally accepted the supremacy of the gods 
that were relevant to their new domain (even while retaining an 
allegiance to their old gods—at least for a while). 
One particular tribe, namely the Hebrews, appeared to deviate 
from the general pattern. As recorded in their collective diary, trans­
mitted to us as the Hebrew Bible, they began during the early or 
middle part of the second millennium BCE. to traverse each of the 
regions domains. Originating in the eastern riverine domain of 
Mesopotamia, they embarked upon a venture of serial migrations. 
First they moved to the pastoral domain of eastern and southern 
Canaan, where they herded flocks of goats and sheep during the 
time of the Patriarchs. Some time later, in response to a severe and 
prolonged drought, they moved to the western riverine domain of 
Egypt, where—according to the story that remained indelibly im­
printed in their ancestral memory—they sojourned for several gen­
erations. Next they left that domain at the time of the Exodus to 
enter into the desert domain of Sinai and the Negev, where they 
apparently wandered for some forty years. Finally, they emerged 
from the desert domain to reinvade the pastoral domain of southern 
Canaan and even to penetrate the rainfed domain of central and 
northern Canaan. As they entered the latter domains, they evidently 
encountered and clashed with another nation of invaders—the 
Philistines—an offshoot of the Sea Peoples who raided the coastal 
domains of the eastern Mediterranean at about the same time. 
At this point, we offer what is admittedly only a conjecture. It seems 
plausible that the very fact of their inclusive ecological experience en­
abled the Hebrews, uniquely among their contemporaries in the region, 
to first perceive the notion of monotheism. Having sojourned in each of 
the domains and having shifted from one to another, assimilating 
elements of all the region’s cultures, they could begin to coalesce the 
disparate deities into a concept of overarching unity. 
The idea and ideal of a single omnipresent and omnipowerful 
force, a great common denominator unifying the entire realm of 
nature, was a radical departure from the prevailing pluralistic view. 
It could not have been a sudden, unanimous, and irreversible revela-
At this point, we offer what is admit­
tedly only a conjecture. It seems 
plausible that the very fact of their 
inclusive ecological experience enabled 
the Hebrews, uniquely among their 
contemporaries in the region, to first 
perceive the notion of monotheism. 
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tion. Instead, it must have been a painstaking process, first dimly 
perceived by a few and resisted by many and only accepted gradually 
after repeated advocacy by cultural and spiritual leaders in succes­
sive generations. We have abundant evidence of that process in the 
repeated exhortations and castigations by the Hebrew prophets 
against a nation all too prone to revert to the worship of the earlier 
naturalistic gods long seen as separate entities. The concept was even­
tually affirmed and carried forth by both Christianity and the Islam. 
Eventually, however, the unified vision of nature took hold until 
it became the major ideological force that over time—much time— 
transformed the cultural foundation of the entire region, indeed of 
the entire world. Apart from its ritualistic or moralistic dimensions, 
which we associate with the practice of religion per se, achieving this 
unified vision was a precondition for the eventual development of a 
universalist science as a systematic common quest to understand 
nature as an integrated system. 
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Gardens of Eden: Exotic Flora and Fauna in the Ancient Near East 
Karen Polinger Foster 
Yale University 
ABSTRACT 
The idea of the garden began in the ancient Near East, in concert with the origins and development of agriculture, 
urbanism, and imperialism. From the start, exotic flora and fauna played vital roles in the world's earliest transformations 
of the natural environment, creating physical and metaphysical gardens of far-reaching significance. This paper examines 
selected aspects of exotica in Mesopotamia and Egypt, drawing together evidence from art, texts, and archaeology. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since earliest times, exotic flora and fauna have been integral 
components of the idea of the garden. As we cast our thoughts about 
nature and culture back across millennia to the ancient Near East, 
we see botanical and zoological gardens of every era replete with 
exotic plants and animals. There are, for example, the zoological 
firsts, bearing upon their striped and reticulated backs burdens of 
great social and political weight. The nineteenth century witnessed 
such firsts as the African animals brought to Antwerp and Berlin, 
evocatively installed in Egyptianizing pavilions as living testaments 
to colonial expansionism and to the triumph of order over the cha­
otic world (Hoage and Deiss 1996; Spongberg 1990). Then there 
were the first kangaroos in Europe, bred by the Empress Josephine 
in her gardens at Malmaison, as part of the Napoleonic imperialistic 
initiative in natural sciences (Chevallier 1993; Raby 1996). The year 
1751 saw the first rhinoceros in Venice, an encounter for the Age of 
Enlightenment, didactic, and sometimes tiresomely pedantic, as 
shown in a “true portrait” by Pietro Longhi (Held and Posner 1971). 
In 1415, the imperial Chinese court examined its first giraffe (with 
some trepidation, judging from its handler’s expression), as part of 
an ambitious African/Chinese trade agreement (Wilson 1992). 
About 800, the first elephant in northern Europe, one Aboul-Abas 
by name, made its way to Charlemagne, a gift from Harun al-Rashid to 
his counterpart in the West (Croke 1997). The citizens of Athens gath­
ered to gape at their first tiger, presented in 323 BCE by Alexander’s 
general Seleucus as a harbinger of the Hellenistic age (Ives 1996). 
In the ancient Near East, for three thousand years before this 
Alexandrian tiger, exotic plants and animals were of considerable 
interest to royalty and private individuals. Some collected rarities 
out of intellectual curiosity, while others were motivated by poten­
tial economic rewards. Many rulers saw acquisition and display of 
exotic flora and fauna as effective ways to enhance prestige or to 
demonstrate imperial dominion over far-flung lands. Botanical 
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gardens and zoos were often designed so that transplanted species 
could successfully establish themselves in their new environments. 
Specimens of exotic flora and fauna were prized as tribute offerings 
and suitable gifts for royalty. Certain non-native plants and animals 
were needed for the enactment of religious and other ceremonies. 
Finally, the controlled coexistence of exotic and indigenous flora 
and fauna in palatial and urban settings provided a powerful, living 
metaphor for mental maps of a more perfect world—the original 
gardens of Eden. 
The present paper touches on selected aspects of this subject, 
drawn from my on-going, comprehensive investigation of the evi­
dence from Mesopotamia, Egypt, and other areas of the Bronze Age 
world. My research has pursued three principal avenues of inquiry: 
exotica in art, texts, and archaeology. I have gathered over four 
hundred representations of exotic plants, animals, botanical gar­
dens, and zoos. This wealth of artistic material raises the following 
questions, among others: How does the pictorialization of exotica 
demand new artistic solutions, instead of reliance on established 
conventions of rendering? What role does the introduction of ex­
otica play in the stylistic development of narrative and landscape 
art? In what contexts are exotica situated geographically, so they 
serve as reliable maps of the hinterland and frontier? To what extent 
are depictions of exotica based on first-hand observation of species in 
their native habitats? What features of exotica become subsumed into 
a generalized thematic vocabulary denoting the strange or numinous? 
Mesopotamian and Egyptian written sources abound with men­
tion of non-native flora and fauna. My concern with textual mate­
rial focuses on such issues as how exotic characteristics were 
described, the significance of exotica in figurative language, and the 
ways in which texts complement pictorializations, as captions or as 
parallel vehicles for ideological expression. 
The archaeological record provides some evidence for the pres­
ence of exotic flora and fauna in the form of plant and skeletal re­
mains, as well as excavated gardens and enclosures. The ancient 
Near East was home to three crucial, sequential developments in the 
relationship between nature and culture: (1) the domestication of 
plants and animals, and the start of agriculture; (2) the building of 
the world’s earliest cities, with the concomitant first agrarian/urban 
dichotomies; and (3) the rise of the world’s earliest empires and 
colonial powers. Within this context, my particular interest lies in 
defining archaeologically how exotic plants and animals played vital 
roles in the idea of the garden at its very beginnings. 
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EXOTICA IN MESOPOTAMIA 
From nearly every period come Mesopotamian texts or represen­
tations pertaining to exotic fauna. In the Sumerian literary composi­
tion “The Curse of Agade,” for example, the goddess Inanna 
describes the greatness of her city Agade, capital of the Akkadian 
empire ca. 2300 BCE: “Monkeys, mighty elephants, water buffaloes, 
and wonderful animals,” she says, “jostle each other in the public 
squares” (Cooper 1983). In like manner, the royal Palm Court at 
Mari ca. 1800 BCE requested many exotic and rare animals, includ­
ing Elamite cats, bears, and chamois (Wiseman 1983). Their desir­
ability may be gauged by the fact that a chamois born en route to 
Mari was kidnapped by someone, though the mother animal arrived 
safely. Finicky animals like Mediterranean seals and dolphins were 
accompanied by their human handlers, who presumably were under 
strict instructions to see that their charges made it to their destination. 
As for exotic flora, “gardens enhance the pride of the city,” says 
the Neo-Babylonian “Hymn to Ezida,” especially those with unusual 
features (Wiseman 1983). Pleasure gardens and game parks with 
exotic specimens were maintained for king and populace. Several 
Sumerian texts describe how gods journeyed to visit certain temples 
to admire their gardens: Eridu, with its rare fruit trees and carp pools 
and Nippur, with its unusual palms and conifers (al-Fouadi 1969). 
Gardeners trained to care for these rare plants were much esteemed 
and well remunerated. Some exotic flora seem to have supplied the 
needs of perfume industries, temple rituals, and herbal pharmacopeia. 
The most famous Mesopotamian gardens were one of the Seven 
Wonders of the Ancient World, the Hanging Gardens of Babylon. 
According to later sources, the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar (ca. 
600 BCE) ordered artificial knolls, hills, and watercourses planted 
with exotic trees, shrubs, and trailing vines, all this effort so that his 
Median queen might be less homesick for her native mountains 
(Finkel 1988). Unfortunately, there is no archaeological evidence for 
these wondrous gardens. Many reconstructions at various locations 
in Babylon have been proposed, entailing such elements as vaulted 
supports, water wheels, terraces, and aqueducts. A recent study sug­
gests that the Hanging Gardens may not have been at 
Nebuchadnezzar’s Babylon at all, but at Sennacherib’s Nineveh, ca. 
700 BCE, where ingenious devices, forerunners of the Archimedes 
screw, raised water to several garden levels (Dalley 1994). 
The Sumerian hero-king Gilgamesh is associated in symbolically 
important ways with indigenous and exotic flora and fauna. At the 
beginning and end of The Epic of Gilgamesh, he stands on the walls of 
his city Uruk, looking down at its rich gardens, part of his enduring 
legacy (Kovacs 1989). One of the epic’s incidents involves cutting rare 
Mesopotamian and Egyptian written 
sources abound with mention of non­
native flora and fauna.…Pleasure 
gardens and game parks with exotic 
specimens were maintained for king and 
populace. Several Sumerian texts 
describe how gods journeyed to visit 
certain temples to admire their gardens. 
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giant cedars and the dire consequences of that action. In a later epi­
sode, Gilgamesh travels in despair through darkness, searching for 
answers to his questions about death. He emerges into sunlight to find 
a garden of immortal jewels, with lapis lazuli foliage, carnelian fruit, 
and flowering clusters of semiprecious stones. A fictional letter com­
posed centuries later as a school exercise has Gilgamesh request a 
shipment of rarities from an unnamed foreign king: thousands of 
black horses with white stripes, thousands of white horses with black 
stripes, and “anything precious, exotic, which I have never seen” (B. 
R. Foster 1995). 
The Neo-Assyrian kings of the ninth to seventh centuries BCE 
elevated exotic flora and fauna to their greatest positions in the 
Mesopotamian imperialistic program (Aynard 1972; Curtis and Reade 
1995; Reade 1983). During this period, relentless military campaigns 
A recent study suggests that the extended Assyrian power from the Mediterranean to beyond the 
Hanging Gardens may not have been at Zagros Mountains. Much of Assyrian art, especially palace wall reliefs, 
Nebuchadnezzar’s Babylon at all, but at 
was propagandistic, intended to describe and commemorate events in Sennacherib’s Nineveh, ca. 700 BCE, 
distant places. In addition, the reliefs often served to depict plant and where ingenious devices, forerunners of 
animal tribute from foreign lands, as well as their installation in bo- the Archimedes screw, raised water to 
tanical and zoological gardens that were the pride of kings. several garden levels.…Much of 
With Assurnasirpal II’s building of a new palace and administra- Assyrian art, especially palace wall 
reliefs, was propagandistic, intended to tive center at Nimrud in 879 BCE, the acquisition of exotica escalated. 
describe and commemorate events in Living tribute came to Nimrud from every quarter: monkeys, el-
distant places. In addition, the reliefs ephants, bears, rare deer, sea creatures. A major group of reliefs shows 
often served to depict plant and animal 
foreigners carrying luxury goods and prestige items, including a pair tribute from foreign lands, as well as 
of leashed monkeys. The king himself actively sought out unusual their installation in botanical and 
specimens in the course of his military campaigns. As Assurnasirpal zoological gardens that were the pride 
proudly writes, “I collected their herds, and caused them to bring of kings. 
forth their increase. From lands I traveled and hills I traversed, the 
trees and seeds I noticed and collected” (Wiseman 1983). No archaeo­
logical traces remain of what must have been extensive gardens, 
parklands, and animal enclosures at Nimrud. 
Shalmaneser III, successor to Assurbanipal II, continued these 
patterns of acquisition and display, but sought to use exotica in art to 
greater narrative effect (Curtis and Reade 1995). Foreign topography, 
people, plants, and animals appear in more pictorially unified compo­
sitions, which visually confirmed their forcible integration into the 
Assyrian world. The embossed bronze bands made ca. 845 BCE for 
the massive wooden gates of a royal building at Balawat present 
Assyrian military and other enterprises, among them the royal visit to 
the source of the Tigris, or perhaps the Tigris Tunnel. The explorers 
wade through naturalistic grottoes, flares held high above the stream. 
The four sides of the ca. 825 BCE Black Obelisk bear register blocks 
showing tribute brought before Shalmaneser, including “camels 
  
 
     
 
whose backs are doubled,” elephants, simians, and a single-horned 
creature, possibly a hippotamus. As on the Balawat Gate bands, 
exotica receive more sculpturally coherent treatment than they did in 
the essentially linear reliefs of Assurbanipal II. 
A century later, Sargon II (721–705 BCE) founded a new capital 
city at Khorsabad, on the Khosr River north of Nineveh. According 
to his inscriptions, Sargon brought in skilled artists from Assyrian-
held territories to embellish his palace (Curtis and Reade 1995). 
Perhaps due to their influence, the Khorsabad reliefs reflect a more 
sophisticated use of space, in which the Assyrians move with stylistic 
and personal assurance through landscapes rich in exotic flora and 
fauna. On panels depicting timber being transported by water, for 
example, wave and ripple patterns fill entire slabs, with exotic marine 
creatures swimming among the boats. Other scenes show Sargon’s 
royal parks, complete with rare trees, elegant kiosks, and pleasure 
lakes. Assyrian hunting parties form overlapping friezes against a 
dense, controlled background of plants and animals. 
Sargon II’s son and successor was Sennacherib (704–681 BCE), a 
king of exceptional vision. Early in his reign, he established a new 
capital at Nineveh. His “Palace Without Rival” featured rooms and 
courts decorated with sculptured panels unprecedented in their 
quantity and innovative quality (Russell 1991). For the narrative 
scenes, Sennacherib’s artists filled whole slabs, as begun at 
Khorsabad, but here the layered divisions between foreground figures 
and background landscapes often disappear, resulting in more com­
plex spatial and temporal relationships. Sennacherib’s reliefs are the 
first internally consistent representations in Mesopo-tamian art, with 
exotica playing major roles in this development. In many instances, 
as in the marshland conquest scenes, they expand the pictorial field, 
while in others they afford cinemagraphically changing vistas undu­
lating above and below the central narrative sequence, as in the 
throne room program of colossal winged bulls being quarried and 
transported. Not only are exotica rendered highly naturalistically, 
from the reeds bending in the current to the gnarled conifers clinging 
to wind-swept hills, but they also have become indispensible 
signifiers of Assyrian prowess. 
Like his ancestors, Sennacherib used botanical and zoological 
gardens as important components of his reign’s propagandistic mes­
sage. To complement the “Palace Without Rival,” Sennacherib’s 
gardens were novel creations, inspired by the king’s personal interest 
in hydraulics, botany, and animal breeding. As noted above, forerun­
ners of the Archimedes screw brought water to intricately terraced 
gardens. Near Nineveh, Sennacherib reports that he “had a swamp 
made to control the flow of water, planted reeds there, and released 
The Khorsabad reliefs reflect a more 
sophisticated use of space, in which the 
Assyrians move with stylistic and 
personal assurance through landscapes 
rich in exotic flora and fauna. 
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herons, wild pigs, and other animals...the plantations were most 
successful; the herons which came from far away nested, and the pigs 
and others produced young in great numbers” (Wiseman 1983). 
Among the exotic trees in his orchards were ones “bearing wool,” 
apparently a reference to cotton. 
Some of Sennacherib’s gardens still flourished in the reign of his 
grandson, Assurbanipal (668–ca. 631 BCE), whose reliefs at Nineveh 
include views of terraces with vaulted aqueducts, elaborate plantings, 
and pillared kiosks. If the Hanging Gardens were indeed 
Sennacherib’s, these reliefs may afford an idea of their appearance. 
Other panels show Assurbanipal’s own gardens and zoos, as well as 
foreign battles and lion hunts. Assurbanipal’s sculptors seem to have 
been particularly interested in seeking fresh narrative possibilities. 
One is their increasing use of internal sequences as linking devices 
among multi-register panels. We follow, for example, a caged lion as it 
is released, springs forward, and is shot by archers. Another device is 
their insertion of cuneiform captions or epigraphs, especially into 
complex combat scenes filling huge slabs. A third involves their ex­
panded understanding of the crucial importance of negative space in 
creating boundless potential for narrative statements. 
With these artistic means at their disposal, artists could rely less on 
exotica to provide the necessary temporal and spatial frameworks. 
Granted, Assurbanipal’s botanical and zoological scenes contain 
exotica rendered with careful precision—vines twisting about trees, 
stems bending under the weight of lilies, deer trapped in taut nets. Yet 
the sense of situational, propagandistic immediacy is gone, replaced 
by confidence in the greater power of text and compositional manipu­
lation. Historical events brought these developments to an end: fifteen 
years after Assurbanipal, Nineveh fell to the Medes, and the Assyrian 
empire was finished. 
EXOTICA IN EGYPT 
From the fourth millennium on, there was strong Egyptian inter­
est in botanical and zoological life beyond the Nile Valley (Houlihan 
1996; Hugonot 1989). Predynastic slate palettes and ivory handles of 
ca. 3100–2900 BCE depict exotic and fantastic animals, as well as 
living tribute or booty, though it is difficult to evaluate their com­
memorative significance. The earliest definitively historical texts 
pertaining to exotica record Old Kingdom expeditions to the Levant 
to obtain cedar wood. Reliefs from the funerary temple of the Fifth 
Dynasty pharaoh Sahure (ca. 2458–2446 BCE) depict the departure 
and return of such a venture, which also brought Syrian bears to 
Egypt. During the Sixth Dynasty, the young pharaoh Pepi II (ca. 
2246–2152 BCE) requested a dancing dwarf or pygmy from the Afri­
Sennacherib’s reliefs are the first 
internally consistent representations in 
Mesopotamian art, with exotica playing 
major roles in this development…not 
only are exotica rendered highly natural­
istically, from the reeds bending in the 
current to the gnarled conifers clinging 
to wind-swept hills, but they also have 
become indispensible signifiers of 
Assyrian prowess. 
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can land of Yam, for he desired this “more than the gifts of the mine-
land or of Punt” (Lichtheim 1973). Harkhuf, the successful expedition 
commander, included Pepi II’s letter of instructions in his autobio­
graphical tomb inscription. The child-pharaoh was particularly anx­
ious lest this special being, considered more exotic than human, fall 
overboard in the night. 
Middle and New Kingdom pharaohs continued to sponsor the 
collection of exotica, especially as the Egyptian empire expanded south­
ward into Nubia and northward into the Levant. The Eighteenth Dy­
nasty pharaoh Thutmosis III (ca. 1479–1425 BCE), for example, 
conquered Megiddo and washed his weapons in the Euphrates. He 
commemorated one of his Syrian campaigns with a series of wall reliefs 
carved in side chambers near his Festival Hall at Karnak Temple (Beaux 
1990). Nearly three hundred types of exotic plants, animals, and birds 
appear in these “Botanical Garden” reliefs, many of which are artistic 
creations meant to convey the idea of the unusual, even the bizarre, 
rather than any botanical or zoological reality. For that, gardens and 
zoos existed in the vicinity of the royal residences, certainly since the 
Old Kingdom. Those of Thutmosis III perhaps included four remark­
able birds “that laid eggs daily,” the first domestic chickens in Egypt 
(Houlihan 1996). On a Nineteenth Dynasty ostracon, an artist sketched 
a rooster, apparently drawn from life, possibly on a visit to a royal 
menagerie (Houlihan 1996). Rameses II (ca. 1290–1224 BCE) outdid 
Thutmosis III’s exhibition of a large dead rhinoceros with display of a 
live one of prodigious size, whose measurements are given next to its 
representation (Houlihan 1996). At his new city in the Delta, to cite 
another example, the Twentieth Dynasty pharaoh Rameses III (ca. 
1194–1163 BCE) designed a “sacred way, splendid with flowers from all 
countries” (Hugonot 1989). 
In literature, love poetry speaks of exotic trees planted as durable 
tokens of affection in the beloved’s garden (Manniche 1989). Other love 
songs make liberal use of garden imagery, stressing the rich eroticism of 
perfumed flowers, shining pools, and ripening fruit (J. L. Foster 1974). 
Properly cultivated trees were metaphors for model behavior, as seen in 
“The Instruction of Amenemope,” part of a peculiarly Egyptian literary 
genre (Simpson 1973). Yet gardeners themselves suffered poor reputa­
tions, objects of ridicule in caricatures and in “The Satire on the Trades” 
(Parkinson 1991), and targets of indignities to prove their innocence of 
pilfering, as recorded in a Demotic contract of the late first millennium 
BCE (Parker 1940). 
The close Mesopotamian relationship between territorialism and 
exotica is similarly reflected in the tomb paintings and reliefs of numer­
ous high-ranking officials of the New Kingdom. Many of these indi­
viduals seem to have directly participated in imperial activities. 
Nearly three hundred types of exotic 
plants, animals, and birds appear in 
these “Botanical Garden” reliefs, many 
of which are artistic creations meant to 
convey the idea of the unusual, even the 
bizarre, rather than any botanical or 
zoological reality. 
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Amenemhab, for instance, accompanied Thutmosis III to Syria, there 
encountering a herd of elephants: “I engaged the largest which was 
among them. I cut off his hand [trunk] while he was alive” (Davies 
1940). On the lintel of his Theban tomb, Amenemhab fends off a giant 
hyenalike animal in a surreal landscape studded with fantastic plants 
reminiscent of those in the Karnak reliefs of Thutmosis III. The artist 
has supplied the visual counterpart to the narrative of heroic imposition 
of order upon a chaotic, non-Egyptian world. 
Another of Thutmosis III’s henchmen, Amenmose, went to Leba­
non to collect tribute (Wreszinski 1923). His tomb artist emphasized 
the event’s importance by painting it on a separate wall of the tomb. 
The tribute bearers are shown against a screen of cedars whose slender 
trunks are vertical stripes in the venerable Egyptian stylization of papy­
rus thickets, but instead of the expected umbels, here they are topped by 
On the one hand, the exotic cedar ovoid, pointillistic crests. On the one hand, the exotic cedar forests are 
forests are seen to conform to an seen to conform to an ordered, familiar pattern under Egyptian domi­
ordered, familiar pattern under 
nation, while on the other, the skillful inclusion of evocative details Egyptian domination, while on the other, 
provides a particularized backdrop for effective narrative. the skillful inclusion of evocative details 
Geographical orientation of exotic tribute played an important part provides a particularized backdrop for 
in the development of New Kingdom tomb narratives. Representations effective narrative. 
of African flora and fauna appear on southern walls, while Levantine 
plants and animals are painted on northern walls. The tethered proces­
sions include elephants, bears, baboons, leopards, lions, antelopes, and 
monkeys, one of whom hitches a ride on the neck of a giraffe in the 
tomb of Rekhmire, vizier of Upper Egypt under Thutmosis III and 
Amenhotep II (Wilkinson 1983). 
The middle colonnade of the Eighteenth Dynasty pharaoh 
Hatshepsut’s funerary temple at Deir el Bahri, ca. 1450 BCE, contains 
an unusually complete program of wall reliefs depicting exotic flora and 
fauna (Herzog 1968; Kitchen 1971; Smith 1962). The subject is her 
expedition to Punt, probably located on the Horn of Africa, a destina­
tion at least since the Old Kingdom, but never before recorded in im­
ages. Egyptian ships sail southward to Punt on the south wall, while the 
formal announcement of their return is on the north wall. Six registers 
show Punt: its forests inhabited by exotic animals; its domed dwellings 
raised on stilts; its diminutive king and his amply proportioned queen; 
its natural treasures of ebony, frankincense, and myrrh. 
Hatshepsut was justifiably proud of her idea to transplant myrrh 
saplings to Egypt to ensure a local supply of the costly material needed 
for incense and mummification. We observe a full narrative sequence, 
from the young trees carried aboard in Punt to the lush myrrh garden 
thriving in front of the temple at Deir el Bahri. In standard Egyptian 
practice, the trees are planted in rows and columns of pits filled with 
Nile alluvium (Hugonot 1989). Later pharaohs were less fortunate with 
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their myrrh tree importations; perhaps the Puntites realized how com­
petition would affect their market, and cannily cut the tap roots before 
balling them up (Dixon 1969). 
In several important ways, the artists gave new life to Hatshepsut’s 
repeated, propagandistic cliché: “Never was brought the like of this for 
any king who has been since the beginning” (Smith 1962). First, the 
renderings of the Punt exotica are highly naturalistic, implying a mea­
sure of first-hand observation, rather than reliance on the usual Egyp­
tian recourse to hybridism, transference, or copying from 
pattern-books. In addition, the upper registers are wider and longer 
than the bottom ones, in part because the adjoining wall sloped inward 
in the Egyptian batter mode. This creates a subtle interplay between the 
lower village, with its ordered ranks of Egyptians, and the upper forests, 
with their towering trees, exotic animals, and raised huts seemingly lost 
In the “Punt Colonnade,” image and in the foliage. Finally, the Punt exotica appear as sets of curvilinear 
text combine to demonstrate how shapes, a dramatic foil to the rectilinear formality of the Egyptian del­
Hatshepsut’s successful mission 
egation. In the “Punt Colonnade,” image and text combine to demon- transformed the exotic forests of Punt 
strate how Hatshepsut’s successful mission transformed the exotic into the ordered gardens of Egypt. 
forests of Punt into the ordered gardens of Egypt. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This concludes our brief tour of physical and metaphysical gardens 
in the ancient Near East. Neatly enclosed, carefully tended, deliberately 
provided with exotic and indigenous species—these were the original 
Gardens of Eden (Delumeau 1995). It was in just such a garden that 
God planted the two most exotic trees of all: the tree of life, and the tree 
of the knowledge of good and evil. 
REFERENCES 
Aynard, J. M. 1972. Animals in Mesopotamia. In Animals in archaeology, A. H. Brodrick, ed. New York: 
Praeger: 42–68 . 
Beaux, N. 1990. Le Cabinet de curiosités de Thoutmosis III: Plantes et animaux du “Jardin botanique” de 
Karnak. Leuven. Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 36. 
Chevallier, B. 1993. Malmaison: An imperial country house. Antiques 143/4: 572-83. 
Cooper, J. 1983. The curse of Agade. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Croke, V. 1997. The modern ark: the story of zoos, past, present and future. New York: Scribner’s. 
Curtis, J. E. and Reade, J. E. 1995. Art and empire: treasures from Assyria in the British Museum. New York: Abrams. 
Dalley, S. 1994. Nineveh, Babylon and the Hanging Gardens: cuneiform and classical sources reconciled. 
Iraq 56: 45–58. 
Davies, M. 1940. Amenemhab encountering a hyena. Journal of Egyptian Archaeology 26: 82. 
Delumeau, J. 1995. History of paradise: The Garden of Eden in myth and tradition. New York: Continuum Press. 
Dixon, D. M. 1969. The transplantation of punt incense trees in Egypt. Journal of Egyptian Archaeology 55: 55–65. 
 
 
 
 
Finkel, I. J. 1988. The hanging gardens of Babylon. In The seven wonders of the ancient world, P. Clayton and 
M. Price, eds. London: Routledge: 38–58. 
Foster, B. R. 1995. From distant days: myths, tales, and poetry of ancient Mesopotamia. Bethesda, MD: 
CDL Press. 
Foster, J. L. 1974. Love songs of the New Kingdom. New York: Scribner’s. 
al-Fouadi, A. H. 1969. Enki’s journey to Nippur: the journeys of the Gods. Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Held, J. S. and Posner, D. 1971. 17th and 18th century art. New York: Abrams. 
Herzog, R. 1968. Punt. Glückstadt: Deutsche Archäologische Institut in Kairo. 
Hoage, R. J. and W. A. Deiss, eds. 1996. New worlds, new animals: from menagerie to zoological park in the 
nineteenth century. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Houlihan, P. F. 1996. The animal world of the pharaohs. London: Thames and Hudson. 
Hugonot, J.-C. 1989. Le jardin dans l’Egypte ancienne. Frankfurt: Europäische Hochschulschriften 38/27. 
Ives, R. 1996. Of tigers and men: entering the age of extinction. New York: Doubleday. 
Kitchen, K. A. 1971. Punt and how to get there. Orientalia 40: 184–207. 
Kovacs, M. G. 1989. The Epic of Gilgamesh. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Lichtheim, M. 1973. Ancient Egyptian literature. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Manniche, L. 1989. An ancient Egyptian herbal. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 
Parker, R. A. 1940. A late demotic gardening agreement. Journal of Egyptian Archaeology 26: 84–113. 
Parkinson, R. B. 1991. Voices from ancient Egypt: an anthology of Middle Kingdom writings. Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press. 
Raby, P. 1996. Bright paradise: Victorian scientific travellers. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Reade, J. E. 1983. Assyrian sculpture. London: British Museum Press. 
Russell, J. M. 1991. Sennacherib’s Palace Without Rival at Nineveh. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Simpson, W. K. et al. 1973. The literature of ancient Egypt: an anthology of stories, instructions, and poetry. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Smith, W. S. 1962. The land of Punt. Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt 1: 59–60. 
Spongberg, S.A. 1990. A reunion of trees: the discovery of exotic plants and their introduction into North 
American and European landscapes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Wilkinson, C. K. 1983. Egyptian wall painting. New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art. 
Wilson, S. M. 1992. The Emperor’s giraffe. Natural History 101/12: 22, 24–25. 
Wiseman, D. J. 1983. Mesopotamian gardens. Anatolian Studies 33: 137–44. 
Wreszinski, W. 1923. Atlas zur altägyptischen Kulturgeschichte. Leipzig: Neimeyer. 
KAREN POLINGER FOSTER specializes in the art and archaeology of the Aegean Bronze Age, with complementary 
interests in Egypt and Mesopotamia. Her publications include Aegean Faience of the Bronze Age, Minoan Ceramic Relief, 
and numerous articles. The present study forms part of a forthcoming book, Gardens of Eden: exotic flora and fauna in 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the Aegean. 
Karen Polinger Foster, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Yale University, Hall of Graduate 
Studies, 320 York Street, New Haven, CT 06520. Tel: 203. 432. 2944. E-mail: karen.foster@yale.edu 
  
 
     
 
Between Paradise and Political Capital: The Semiotics of Safavid Isfahan 
Heidi A. Walcher 
Yale University 
ABSTRACT 
In the late 16th century the Safavid Shah Abbas I established Isfahan as the capital of his empire. He designed a plan on a 
monumental scale in the garden fields south of the old Saljuq center, which integrated the river Zayendehrud into the 
formation of the new palatial city. The orthogonal intersection of the Chahar Bagh Avenue and the river created a 
chahar bagh (four garden) pattern on the scale of a city, which produced a synthesis between Persian and Islamic 
concepts of paradise, Turkic nomadic traditions of ritual and social uses of gardens, and the principle of a royal capital city. 
The symbolism and figurativeness of Isfahan within the frame of a chahar bagh cannot be completely separated from 
traditional notions of garden and paradise, but goes beyond the allegoric interpretation of religious or mystical refer­
ences to Islamic paradise, bearing distinct iconographic and deliberate political connotations of empire. This paper is 
based on the hermeneutic analysis of Safavid gardens and contrasts traditional interpretations of Persian and Islamic 
gardens along the paradigm of paradise with an expanded definition of the political implications of paradise. 
Have you seen Isfahan, that city like Paradise,
 
That holy cypress, that soul nourishing Eden;
 
That palace of the nation and that throne of government
 
That face of the seven spheres, that eye of the seven lands.1
 
PROLOGUE 
The visual image of Isfahan has been inextricably shaped both by 
its architecture and its royal palace gardens. The city is acclaimed 
for the magnificence and splendor of its architecture, triumphant 
remainders of the Saljuq and Safavid empires. It has inspired gen­
erations of art historians, architects, archaeologists, artists, 
photographers, and tourists. Through city guides and coffee table 
books, Isfahan’s architectural images were reproduced and prolifer­
ated into worldwide photographic effigies,2  through which the 1 Jamal al-Din Isfahani: Divan-i Kamil, ed. Vahid 
Dastgirdi, Tehran, 1320, p. 410.domes and portals of the Safavid mosque Masjid-i Shah, the Masjid-
Didi tu Isfahan ra an shahr-i khold-i Paikar 
i Shaykh Lutf Allah, the large plaza of the Maidan-i Naqsh-i Jahan, An sidr-yi muqqadas, an cadn-i ruh parvar 
the palatial gardens of the Bagh-i Hasht Behesht, the labyrinth of the	 An bargah-i millat va an takhtgah-i dawlat 
An ruy-i haft ’alam an chishm-i haft kishvar.bazaar and the portico of the Saljuq Masjid-i Jami‘ have been pro­
moted as the epitome of Islamic architecture. 
In the latter half of the 20th century the pressure for industrial­
ization in Iran created new concerns, and the development of urban 2 Among the most renowned of these are 
centers brought renewed attention to Isfahan. The acceleration of Wilfried Blunt’s Isfahan, pearl of Persia, and 
Lockhart’s Persian cities, London: Luzac andurban growth and modernization programs under the aegis of the 
Co. Ltd. 1960, and the recent publication
White Revolution, the Shah’s 1960 land reform and industrialization of photographs of Isfahan by Nasrollah 
program, generated studies on urban development, city planning, Kasraian. 
road construction, municipal infrastructure, water supply, sewage 
treatment, and the preservation of historical architecture. 
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The need to combine the city’s historical corporeality with mod­
ern urban development has directed the interests of historical re­
search and archeological investigations toward the background and 
development of individual palaces, mosques, shrines and palatial 
gardens, with less emphasis on their wider urban context or the 
historical and environmental morphogenesis of the Safavid city. 
The strategic location, abundant water supply and fertile land 
facilitated the expansion and development of Isfahan in the 17th 
century on an unprecedented scale. As Safavid capital, Isfahan pro­
vided a synthesis between the complex relations of cultural percep­
tions of land, political expressions of territoriality and royal 
self-representation which were articulated by the symbolic language 
of its gardens and buildings. 
Garden and paradise are two themes which are inextricably 
3  The label of paradise for Isfahan hasattached to Isfahan and recur in associative descriptions as well as 
developed into a standard topos. Carl 
taxonomic distinctions. A closer examination of the layout of Ritter called it “die Paradiesische Stadt” in 
the early 19th century in Die Erdkunde vonSafavid Isfahan shows an internal order, which is structured along 
Asien, vol. VI, G. Reimer, Berlin, 1840, p. 21.
the axial quadripartite pattern of a chahar bagh (literally four gar- The analogy has since proliferated as 
dens) formed by the axes of the river Zayendehrud and the royal Isfahan’s standard epithet. 
avenue Khiaban-i Chahar Bagh. This underlying urban plan or 
composition combined the principles of Turco-Iranian forms of city 
and Perso-Islamic and Timurid patterns of garden. It created a 
dialectic relation between garden and city, based on the implicit 
practical interdependence of the natural environment and the archi­
tectural semiotics of royal political representation. 
The traditional metaphorical interpretation of the Qur’anic or 
Islamic paradise as the quintessential rationale behind Persian gar­
dens is epistemologically insufficient to explain the interactive pat­
terns between the religio-political system and the iconography of a 
garden on the scale of a city. The ostentatious, almost monumental 
layout of the new city suggests that it was not a coincidental pattern 
but deliberately planned by its founder Shah Abbas I (1587-1629). 
Poets and writers consciously chose the metaphor of paradise to 
celebrate Isfahan’s beauty and extol its pre-eminence as imperial 
city. The ubiquitous contemporary insinuations and poetic allusions 
of Safavid gardens to the Garden of Eden as well as the literary com­
parisons of Isfahan as khuld-i barin, the eighth level and uppermost 
tier of paradise, keep them explicitly tied to the idea of paradise.3 
The implicit figurative connotation of Safavid Isfahan’s quadripar­
tite division along the four garden or chahar bagh model cannot be 
wholly separated from common religious notions of paradise either. 
Yet they reach beyond the allegoric interpretation of religious or 
mystical references to Islamic paradise, and bear a distinct political 
idiom. The textual and iconographic hermeneutics of royal Safavid 
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gardens, and of Isfahan specifically, ultimately lead to a synthesis 
between the paradise paradigm applied by traditional interpreta­
tions of Islamic gardens and the political intentions of Safavid archi­
tectural and urban representation. 
THE PROFUSION OF GARDENS AND THE PARADISE 
PARADIGM 
Gardens and their associated cultural and practical principles 
were a major component of the new royal city laid out by Shah 
Abbas I in the late 16th century in the suburban fields between the 
old Saljuq city and the river Zayendehrud. Identified as an Islamic 
dynasty, both in religious and political terms, Qur’anic notions of 
paradise have been understood as both the guiding motive and 
principle behind Safavid gardens. The concept of “Persian garden” 4  For Qur’anic descriptions of paradise see 
in traditional interpretations has become almost synonymous with e.g. surah 3, 16; surah 4, 14, 58, 123; surah 
6, 100; surah 3, 42-48; surah 47,16; surah“Safavid garden.” In their dual Persian and Islamic traditions, the 
55, 63-77; surah 56, 16-35. For a brief
architectural, artistic, and iconographic expression of Safavid gar- discussion of Quranic descriptions of 
dens has conventionally been interpreted as a metaphor of paradise, paradise see: Marianne Barrucand: Gärten 
und gestaltete Landschaft als irdischesreferring to both the Biblical and Qur’anic descriptions for para-
Paradies: Gärten im westlichen Islam, in:
dise.4 The Safavid garden has been seen as the apogee of the artistic Der Islam, vol. 65, no. 2, 1988: 244-246. 
temporal and human construction of the religious metaphysical Biblical concepts of paradise are for 
example the Garden of Eden, Gen. 2, 1-14:paradisiacal garden of Islam.5 The association of garden with para­
profuseness and pleasure, Gen. 13,10;
dise was strongly influenced by the pervasive images and epithets abundance of water, Ez. 47, 1-12; fertility, 
such as Hasht Behesht (the eighth paradise or eight paradises), Bagh- Os. 2, 2-24; celestial journey of Paul, 2 Cor. 
12, 4; eschatological visions, Apc. 2, 7.i Jannat (paradise garden), and Bagh-i Eram (terrestrial paradise), as 
well as evocations and metaphors in their inscriptions, poetry and 5 Giovanni Curatola, for example, wrote, 
mystical traditions. “with the Safavids the Persian garden 
paradise seems to reach its apex.” InWestern writers, especially since the late 18th and 19th century, 
Garden and garden carpets: an open
inspired by contemporary archaeological trends, excavations and the problem, in Environmental design, water and 
neo-classicist trends in Europe, both explored and re-enforced the architecture, ed. A. Petruccioli, Aug. 1984: 
logical sequence of pre-Islamic and Biblical notions of paradise. 92. 
Since Xenophon’s use of the word Paradeisos for the gardens of 6  Xenophon, Oeconcomicus. Paradeisos is 
Cyrus the Great,6 Persian gardens have been inseparably associated derived from the Avestan pairi-daeza, 
meaning fenced in space, garden. For awith their historical Achaemenid precedents, interpreted as terres­
more detailed examination of its etymology
trial allegory of metaphysical, celestial Paradise. Early European and transmission see Fauth: Der Königliche 
travellers and explorers used the texts of Xenophon and other classi- Gärtner, in Persica, no. VIII, 1979: 5–6. 
cal Greek writers as historical and literary reference, which were con­
sulted and re-used by writers and travellers of the 18th and 19th 
century, who produced spirited descriptions of the scents, flowers, 
fruits and nightingales in Persia’s gardens. “Alexander [the Great] is 
written to have seen Cyrus’s tomb in a paradise,” wrote William 
Temple in the 17th century, “so that a paradise among them seems to 
have been a large space of ground, adorned and beautified with all sorts 
of trees, both of fruits and of forest, either cultivated, like gardens, for 
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shades and for walks, with fountains or streams, and all sorts of 
plants usual in the climate and pleasant to the eye, the smell, or the 
taste, or else employed, like our parks for inclosure and harbour of all 
sorts of wild beasts, as well as for the pleasure of riding and walking: 
and so they were of more or less extent, and of differing entertain­
ment, according to the several humours of the princes that ordered 
and inclosed them.” 7 
Traditional metaphorical interpretations of Persian or Islamic 7 William Temple: Upon the gardens of 
gardens have correlated the general orthogonal symmetry to God’s Epicurus, or, of gardening, in the year 1685, 
in: Five miscellaneous essays, ed. Samuelperfection and transcendent purity. The straight lines have been 
Holt Monk, Ann Arbor, University of
seen to represent tawhid, divine unity, and sacred order between Michigan Press, 1963, p. 8. For the trend 
man and nature, in which order and harmony were expressed in and scope in the literary tradition of 
western approaches to garden history, andmathematical regularity and unambiguous geometric patterns. The 
19th and early 20th century uses of the
figure of the chahar bagh has been interpreted to denote the four classics see i.e. Sieveking, Albertus Forbes: 
quarters or directions of the universe. The orthogonal waterways Gardens, ancient and modern. 
have been seen to symbolize the four rivers of Eden;8  the water as 
8  “A river flowed from Eden to water the
the Christian and Muslim symbol of moral and sacred purification, garden. The first is named Pison and this 
the fish as unequivocal symbol of life, the towering cypress trees, winds all through the land of Havilah where 
there is gold. The gold of this country ispointing to the metaphysical after-life, as symbol of death, and 
pure; bdellium and cornelian stone are
lastly, the garden as universal metaphor for the positive and symbi­ found there. The second river is named 
otic relation between man and nature, where water channels give Gihon, and this winds all through the land 
of Cush. The third river is named Tigris,replenishment, green trees render comforting shade, and fruit 
and this flows to the east of Ashur. The 
orchards extend pleasure and nourishment.9 fourth river is the Euphrates.” Genesis 2, 
The paradise paradigm as analytical interpretation for Safavid 10–4. The complete parallel bible, Oxford 
University Press, 1989.gardens has developed into a conventional and strongly established 
topos with few variations or attempts to expand the hermeneutics 9 The most important studies, providing 
of the theorem or to explore the gardens’ shape, function, and symbolic interpretations, and descriptive 
analyses with an emphasis on the internaliconography in their historical context. A great deal of literature has 
sacredness and beauty of Isfahan’s gardens
been produced about the metaphysical and religious interpretations are Hanaway’s “Paradise on Earth: the 
of the physical configuration of Safavid gardens. The general ana- terrestrial garden in Persian literature.” 
Ralph-Pinder Wilson’s “Persian garden:lytical approach to Persian gardens has classified them within their 
Bagh and Chahar Bagh,” in: E. B. 
linear historic epochs, but the interdependence between garden and MacDougall and R. Ettinghausen, (eds.): 
garden landscapes and the historical, cultural and political environ- The Islamic garden, Dumbarton Oaks, 
Washington, 1976; and Donald Wilber’sment which produced them remains understudied. Research on 
Persian Gardens and Garden Pavilions,
Safavid gardens has primarily focused on the separate palatial gar- Charles E. Tuttle, Vermont, Tokyo, 1963. 
dens of Isfahan and others, such as the Bagh-i Fin in Kashan or the The most recent publication on historic 
gardens in Iran rehearses this inseparablelarge garden complex of the Bagh-i Shah at Ashraf and Farahabad 
connection as the book’s leitmotif with the 
along the Caspian coast in Mazandaran. The driving ideas and the title Persian gardens: echoes of paradise. It 
visions of the builders and architects, the meaning of spaces and	 portrays an intense and beautiful visual 
impression of historical Persian gardensarchitecture beyond the conventional and “terrestrial paradise,” and 
within the framework of the paradise 
the gardens’ aesthetic and functional use, however, have been topos. Khansari, Mehdi; Moghtader, M. 
largely neglected. The method of describing the palatial gardens in	 Reza; Yavari, Minouch The Persian garden: 
echoes of paradise, Mage Publishers,an essentially kaleidoscopic juxtaposition, conveying their radiance, 
Washington D.C., 1998. 
sensuality, and aesthetic expression, has not devoted enough atten­
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tion to the historical processes of their development, transforma­
tion, and relation to each other as a formation in a whole city or the 
interaction of the structural and metaphorical concept of garden 
and city, which is particularly evident in Isfahan. 
The flourishing green countenance of Isfahan has earned it the 
designation “city garden,” which has been used in a sensual and 
almost romantic sense.10 In expressly visual descriptions, Safavid 
and Qajar Isfahan has been identified with the “profusion of gar­
dens.” 11 As one of the many travellers of the early 19th century 
described it, “the valleys and plains for many miles around Ispahan, 
are adorned with villages and plantations; and the first view which 
the traveller has on coming from Shirauz, of this great metropolis, is 
from an eminence, about five miles from the city, when it bursts at 
once upon his sight, and is, perhaps, one of the grandest prospects 
in the universe.”12 The European tradition of this description goes 
back to that of early depictions of travel authors like the physician 
and travel-explorer Engelbert Kaempfer (in Isfahan in 1684-85), 
Pietro della Valle (in Isfahan in 1619), Thomas Herbert (1628), Jean 
Chardin (1660s-70s), John Fryer (1677) and others. Without exception 
they invoked the impressive green resplendence after a journey through 
the dry, orche yellow, almost moon-like landscape of central Persia. 
Sir Thomas Herbert, who sojourned in the city at the end of 
Shah Abbas I’s rule, described Isfahan as “the metropolis of the 
Persian monarchy. Yea, the greatest and best built City throughout 
the Orient.” He found that the city’s gardens “challenge our atten­
tion; than for which grandeur and fragor, no City in Asia out-vies 
her. It incloses so many that at some distance from the city, you 
would judge it a Forest; so sweet you would call it a Paradize.”13 
All sides of the city were “beautiful, from the richness of the plain, 
profusion of gardens and the domes and towers of mosques and 
palaces, rearing their heads from amidst verdant groves of poplars, 
sycamores, and cypresses of the most noble size;” reads J. S. 
Buckingham’s description.14 “Nothing can exceed in beauty and 
fertility, the country in the vicinity of Isfahan, and the first appear­
ance of that city is very imposing. All that is noble meets the eye: the 
groves, avenues, and spreading orchards,” wrote Sir John Malcolm a 
few years later.15 The accounts offered a persuasive picture, which 
continues to be invoked by descriptions of Isfahan and its gardens 
today. Providing a sense of drama, they serve mostly as adornment 
to emphasize the extraordinary, without concern for the functional 
synthesis of garden and city expressed by the morphology of Isfahan. 
The general symmetry and linear geometric patterns of Islamic and 
Persian gardens have often been contrasted with the “disorganized” 
and “unstructured” formation of the Islamic city. Although the 
10 Moghtader et. al. Echoes of paradise, p. 69; 
also see Haneda “The Character of 
Urbanization of Isfahan in the Later Safavid 
Period,” Pembroke Papers, 4 (1996), pp. 
369-88, reprinted in: Melville: Safavid Persia, 
p. 375. 
11 By J. S. Buckingham Travels in Assyria, Media, 
and Persia, including a Journey from Baghdad 
by Mount Zagros, to Hamadan, the ancient 
Ecbatana, researches in Ispahan and the 
ruins of Persepolis, 2 vols., Henry Colburn 
and Richard Bentley, 1830, p. 367. 
12 Kinneir, Geographical memoir, p. 112-3. 
13 Herbert Some years travels… pp. 153 and 
158-9. 
14 In Travels in Assyria, vol. I, p. 367. 
15 	 Malcolm Sketches of Persia, London, John
 Murray, 1849, p. 129. 
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ecological and political symbiosis of Islamic suburban gardens and 
cities have been recognized, the innate principles and functions of 
the Islamic city and garden have conventionally been contrasted as 
implicitly antithetical.16 The underlying formal structure of Safavid 
Isfahan incorporated an intentional quadripartite division with an 
inherent relation to the external urban expression of the city. The 
building of the new Safavid palace quarter created a dialectic affilia­
tion between the old urban and new palatial center. Yet the develop­
ment and expansion of the city, without the strict separation of the 
suburban gardens and the districts of the old center by a compact 
city wall, facilitated their gradual convergence. 
Shah Abbas I’s design of Isfahan was a pragmatic scheme, which 
aimed at a calculated synthesis of the practical and symbolic concept 
of garden and city and carried an implicit political dimension. The 
theme of garden was an essential exponent of Isfahan’s Safavid 
morphology and internal rationale, which in its symbolic and politi­
cal expression went beyond the phenotypical appearance. 
HISTORICAL PARAMETERS OF THE SAFAVID CITY 
Isfahan has been an important urban center since its origins as a 
military camp during Sassanian rule. Its enduring geo-strategic 
location, its agricultural advantages, and its facile and abundant 
supply of water from the Zayendehrud, (meaning the life-giving, the 
reviving, as well as the revived), enabled the city to develop into a 
leading metropolis. Isfahan’s strategic position at the center of the 
commercial transit routes from China to the Ottoman empire and 
Europe, and the Persian Gulf to Russia, as well as the dual base of 
both agriculture and commerce, provided the essential pillars for its 
survival as urban center. This position determined the recurrence of 
a historical cycle of decline and prosperity, its repeated rise and fall 
from imperial to provincial capital. 
Historically and architecturally Isfahan is most closely identified 
with the Safavids, but it had also been the political headquarters of 
the Buyids in the 10th and early 11th century, whose tenure, in spite 
of volatile political leadership, represented a period of prosperity for 
the city. Isfahan remained the center and political capital for most of 
Saljuq rule and regained this position five centuries later under the 
Safavids. The borders which outlined the domains of the Great 
Saljuqs placed Isfahan at the core of their empire’s territories. Saljuq 
Isfahan’s commercial and cultural prosperity reached its zenith 
during the reign of Malik Shah (1072-1092), when Isfahan also 
emerged as a leading center of Sunni theology. It was a period of 
internal architectural activity,17 which produced several great royal 
gardens including the Bagh-i Falasan, the Bagh-i Bakr, the Bagh-i 
16 I.e. see Grandval in Moghtader: Echoes of 
paradise, p. 8. 
17 Malik Shah’s vizier Nizam al-Mulk 
established the famous Nizamiyya in the 
quarter of Dardasht. Numerous official and 
private buildings, mosques and parks were 
built, including the Bait al Ma‘ (Water 
House), the Qaleh-yi Shahr, and the Qaleh-yi 
Diz Kuh, the Masjid-i Jami‘ and the Saljuq 
maidan, which after it was transplanted by 
the Safavid city at the turn of the 16th 
century, became known as the Maidan-i 
Kuhneh. 
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Ahmad Siyah, the Bagh-i Dasht-i Gur (Garden of the Wild Donkey’s 
Plain).18 The presence of the Saljuq government was contingent 
upon the economic and cultural prosperity of the city and many of 
the paradigms of Isfahan as a unique city, its geographical advantages, 
its fertility, its beauty, its sophistication, its tradition as a chief center 
of learning, culture and trade. Its famous epithet nisf-i jahan, meaning 
half the world, date to its position and aspirations as capital under 
Saljuq rule. 
During Mongol rule Isfahan remained an influential city and 
commercial center, but it regained its political pre-eminence only 
with the Safavids. In the 17th century, at the height of Safavid 
territorial domination, the empire stretched from Mesopotamia, 
Gorjestan and Daghestan along the Qaraqum desert to the 
Sulaymaniya Mountains in the east. Its territory replicated the geo­
political order of the Saljuqs, again placing Isfahan at the center of 
the empire’s crossroads. By moving his court and the seat of 
government from Qazvin to Isfahan in 1597–98 Shah Abbas I 
(1587–1629) re-enforced Isfahan’s geographical advantages and its 
commercial importance by making it the political capital of his 
empire. The scope of historicaal memory and presence of Saljuq 
records at the time of the Safavids has not been sufficiently docu­
mented but there is some association with the historical precedence 
and the role of Saljuq Isfahan in the 12th century. Iskandar Beg 
Munshi cited Kamal al-Din’s eulogy of the Saljuq capital in praise of 
the architectural achievements of Abbas the Great in the early 17th 
century: “Isfahan is flourishing and the people happy, nobody has a 
recollection of an epoch like this.”19 
Shah Abbas I himself designed and planned the new city, south 
of the old Saljuq center, laying the new bazaar and royal quarter on 
the existing urban and suburban landscape.20  There is only vague 
information about the landscape of pre-Safavid Isfahan, but earlier 
gardens had existed outside the central Saljuq city and the palace 
grounds of the Bagh-i Naqsh-i Jahan and a dawlatkhaneh located 
there were known since the 15th century.21  Although there re­
mained a certain dichotomy between the old and the new city, by 
the late 17th century, the Safavid quarter seemed to have coopted 
the old city physically as well as economically and politically. The 
Safavid city both engulfed the historic Saljuq district and through 
the junction of the bazaar and the Maidan-i Shah connected the new 
commercial and political center. The rapid growth of the city, the 
influx of human resources and money, the architectural expansion, 
as well as the introduction of artistic and political culture under 
Safavid rule thoroughly transformed the urban landscape. Shah 
Abbas’ monumental layout of Isfahan, its architectural countenance 
18 E.G. Browne. pp. 567-610; and 849-887; in: 
The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1902, 
p. 597. (Summary of Mafarrukhi’s Kitab-i 
Mahasin-i Isfahan.) Also see Honarfar 
Lotfollah: Ganjineh, p 57. For a list of names 
of other historic gardens see Alireza 
Aryanpour: Pashuhesh dar Shenakht-i 
Baghhay-yi Iran, p. 42. 
19 Isfahan huram ast va mardum shad In chinin 
‘ahd kasi nadarad yad. Munshi, Tarikh, p. 
545. 
20 Abbas I’s transferral of the new city away 
from the old Saljuq center is distinctly 
shown in Quiring-Zoche: Isfahan im 15. und 
16. Jahrhundert, p. 200. Also see Mashashi 
Haneda, schematic reprint of Seyyed Riza 
Khan’s 1923-4 map in: “The Character of 
Urbanization of Isfahan in the Later Safavid 
Period,” Pembroke Papers, 4 (1996) 369-88, 
reprinted in Melville, Safavid Persia, pp. 
369-387. 
21 The Venetian traveller Michelle Membré in 
the autumn of 1540 noted the beauty, the 
fine drinking water, and “many waters and 
gardens” outside the city, which he had still 
found enclosed by a mud wall. Membré, 
Michelle: Mission to the Lord Sophy of Persia, 
1539-1542, transl. by A.H. Morton, School 
of Oriental and African Studies, 1993, p. 
47. Also see Rosemarie Quiring Zoche: 
Isfahan im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert, pp. 36, 
62 and 75. To the four gardens built by 
Malik Shah in Isfahan, see Mafarrukhi, al 
Mufaddal ibn Sad: Kitab-i Mahasin-i Isfahan, 
Matbu‘at-i Majlis, Tehran 1993. 
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with his and his successors’ palaces, mosques, bazaars, and extensive 
gardens within and without the city determined the physical and 
architectural profile by which Isfahan still continues to be identified 
at the dawn of the 21st century. Isfahan has acquired the title of 
‘Safavid city’ and “anything that was to survive,” as phrased by 
Bagher Shirazi, “was covered by Safavid color and forms.”22  As he 
points out, the Arabs, Buyids and Saljuqs who successively ruled the 
city had done the same, but none of their building and restructuring 
of Isfahan was as profound as that of the Safavids. 
THE CHAHAR BAGH AND THE SEMIOTICS OF THE 
CAPITAL CITY 
The physical layout of the post-Saljuq city was devised by Shah 
Abbas I with a “preconceived master plan.”23  Iskandar Beg Munshi 
reported that Abbas I, in the spring of 1598-97, after spending the 
winter in Isfahan, decided to implement the building plans for the 
city. He began with the building of the quarter of the Bagh-i Naqsh-i 
Jahan. After eighteen years the architects, engineers, builders, artist 
and craftsmen had completed the “sublime” buildings and gardens 
of the Naqsh-i Jahan, which were part of the shah’s very own plan.24 
A closer examination of Abbas the Great’s ground plan of 
Isfahan south of the old Saljuq center reveals a transposition of the 
intersecting pattern of the walled Persian garden, with its clear 
quadripartite formation, the orthogonally intersecting water canals 
and an octagonal pool at the center of the channels’ intersection.25 
Outlining the orientation of the royal city, the Zayendehrud created 
natural east west axis, crossed by the Chahar Bagh Avenue, which 
was divided by the shah jub, the main canal in its center and 
stretched from north to south. The direction of the Chahar Bagh 
Avenue with the center and sideway jubs, or water channels, was in 
this way used for the conscious re-construction of the quadripartite 
Persian chahar bagh on the scale of a city. It crossed the 
Zayendehrud over the Allahverdi Khan Bridge,26  reaching from the 
Darb-i Dawlat, the gate of the royal precinct of the Bagh-i Naqsh-i 
Jahan, to the south side of the Zayendehrud as far as the garden of 
Abbasabad on the foot of the mountains, south of the city.27  Albert 
de Mendelslo, who with Olearius was in Isfahan in 1637 under 
auspices of the Duke of Holstein’s mission, described the 
“Tsarbagh” as the “King’s Garden,” which was divided by the 
Zayendehrud “so that it seems to make four Gardens of it.”28 
Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716), who lived in Isfahan during the 
rule of Shah Suleyman for nearly two years also referred to this 
motive. “The royal avenue Chahar Bagh, i.e. four gardens,” he ex­
plained, “derived its name from the fact that in conjunction with the 
22 Bagher Shirazi “Isfahan, the Old: Isfahan the 
New,” in: Iranian Studies, vol. 7, part II, no. 
3-4, 1974, p. 589. 
23 Bagher Shirazi, p. 588. 
24 Munshi 1955, pp. 544-545. Of the process 
of Abbas I’s gradual move from Qazvin to 
Isfahan see Roemer 1974, p. 306-331 and 
Quiring-Zoche 1980, pp. 105-6. On the 
interdependence between the old section 
of the Saljuq city and the new Safavid part 
see Bagher Shirazi, ibid. 
25 On the structure and layout of Persian 
cities see Bonine 1979, pp. 208-224. 
Bonine emphasizes the functional aspect 
and technical necessity for irrigation of city 
structures. For a classification of the various 
types of gardens which have been generally 
subsumed under the model of chahar bagh, 
see Mahvash Alemi “Il Giardino Persiano: 
Tipi e Modelli,” in A. Petruccioli (ed.)1994; 
idem: “Royal Gardens of the Safavid 
Period,” in Petruccioli (ed.) 1997. Alemi 
questioned the view that the chahar bagh 
pattern manifests a strictly geometic 
quadripartite formation of gardens. 
Emphasizing the asymmetric elements in 
garden plans, she rejects the stereotyped 
symmetry and rigid axialities, concluding 
that the chahar bagh pattern does not 
correspond to a four part plan (Alemi 1986). 
26Today it is mostly referred to as Si-u-se-pul. 
By contemporaries it was also called Pul-i 
Chihil Chishmeh or simply Pul-i Chahar Bagh. 
See Fryer, p. 296. Also see Honarfar 
Lotfollah Ganjineh, pp. 487–488. 
27 Munshi, p. 544. The garden was later 
known as the Bagh-i Hizar Jarib. Shahab 
Katouzian argues that the perpendicular 
axis between the Chahar Bagh and the 
Zayendehrud creates the synthesis 
between city and garden, the city’s design 
being “based on the garden itself.” “The 
Sense of Palace in Persian Gardens,” in 
Environmental Design, Rome, 1 and 2, 1986, 
p. 47. 
28 de Mendelslo 1662, p. 331. 
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transverse intersecting river it partitioned the terrain into four gar­
den areas. It begins behind the royal residence and stretches south­
west in a straight and projecting line to the front side mansion and 
burgeoning Residence Hizar Jarib.”29  The layout of Isfahan itself 
embodied, hence, a garden with its implicit symbolism of the four 
realms of the universe, the metaphorical space of the king’s domain. 
The Khiaban-i Chahar Bagh was one of the most acclaimed urban 
structures of the time. It was understood as the central axis through 
which the palatial city garden was articulated.30  In his contemporary 
account Munshi particularly extolled the uniqueness of the Chahar 
Bagh Avenue. Kaempfer, too, emphasized the Chahar Bagh as the 
pivot of the city’s layout. Like Herbert, who found the Chahar Bagh 
“remarkable in that abundance of green, broad, spreading, Chenor 
trees, yielding shade, and incomparable order and beauty,” 
Kaempfer was impressed by the extraordinary size and height of the 
plane trees, which by the time he lived in Isfahan were about sixty 
years old, their luxuriant branches casting shade over the street, by 
forming a green portico or Taq sabz over the Avenue.31 
In a brief paper about urban modernization and expansion, 
Baqher Shirazi emphasized the historic geographic premises of the 
Safavid construction of Isfahan. “For the first time in its history,” he 
noted, “Isfahan received two quite distinct orthogonal axes of ex­
pansion: the natural east-west axis (the river Zayendehrud) was 
augmented by the artificial north-south axis (Chahar Bagh).” The 
existing old commercial center of Isfahan circumscribed the expan­
sion of the new urban midpoint. To secure access to the first draw of 
irrigation water, the dawlatkhaneh, had to be situated south, closer 
to the banks of the river, and further west, toward the upstream 
direction of the Zayendehrud. While the growth and expansion of 
the Safavid city shifted the center away from the existing commercial 
town, causing the decline and decay of some of the old quarters, it 
overgrew and converged with the pre-Safavid city. Shirazi argued 
that the “main organic linear center,” of the city persisted and the 
axes of the Zayendehrud and the Chahar Bagh Avenue remained 
chiefly the axes of the royal quarter: “nevertheless, they determined 
the total extension of the city in the centuries to come. The artificial 
north-south axis passed over the river on one of the most noble city 
elements,” the Allahverdi Khan bridge.32  The physical development 
of the city took place within the topographic delineation of Abbas 
the Great’s city plan. “The implementation of the plan whose north-
south extension was about six kilometers in length,” recounted 
Shirazi, “imposed its geometric order on the immediately bordering 
new quarters, like Abbasabad and Julfa, while the expansion of other 
29 Kaempfer: Aemontitatum, Fasc. I, p. 172. It is 
quite possible that Kaempfer simply used de 
Mendelslo’s explanation. The Safavid sources 
do not comment on the etymology of the 
name, for which the European literal 
tradition makes only a tenuous proof. 
Pinder-Wilson (1885) is cautious about the 
principle mentioned by Mendelslo and 
Kaempfer. MacDonald Kinneir thought the 
avenue’s name being based on its structure, 
“so called from its connecting the upper and 
lower Chahar Baug, [...], which runs from the 
royal square to the foot of the mountains.” 
Kinneir, Geographical Memoir, p. 112. Most 
architectural accounts and garden studies, 
however, ascribed its name to the four 
vineyards which Abbas I supposedly had to 
buy when he built the avenue. This was 
advocated by Curzon, Persia, vol. II. p. 38. 
Iskandar Beg Munshi mention’s that four 
gardens were laid out at each side of the 
street. He does not indicate that these four 
gardens gave the street its name. Savory in 
the annotation of his translation of Munshi 
claims that this was the origin of the name. 
Munshi: Tarikh, p. 544, Savory: History, p. 724. 
30 Porter 1994, p. 26. 
31 Kaempfer: Aemoenitatum, Fasc. II, p. 287. 
Herbert, Some years Travels, p. 159 and Fasc. I, 
p. 173. 
32 Not the Pul-i Khaju as he wrote, which was 
the bridge connecting the Chahar Bagh 
Avenue. Bagher Shirazi, ibid., pp. 588–589. 
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quarters followed the organic growth of the old town and only 
picked up the direction of the plan.”33 
Safavid gardens are considered the pinnacle of Persian garden 
culture, but are distinctly influenced by the tradition of their histori­
cal antecedents. The form and function of Timurid gardens, which 
were used for military encampments and as sites for political and 
social activities, clearly recur in Safavid gardens.34  Shah Abbas was 
born in Herat in 1571 where he lived until succeeding to the throne. 
The ground plan of Herat, whose urban profile had been extensively 
shaped during Timurid suzerainty, was divided into a very distinct 
quadripartite pattern. The Deccan city Hyderabad, which was 
planned in 1589 by Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah ten years before 
Abbas I’s move to Isfahan, was based on an axial quadripartite pat­
tern and founded on the garden suburb of Golkonda.35  Shah Abbas 
I may not have seen Hyderabad, but he was definitely familiar with 
the idiom of the design of Herat. Terry Allan has argued that the 
“axial arrangement of the pavilions and gardens” west of the 
Maidan-i Shah was “derived directly from the organization of 
Timurid gardens.” It was in the new city of Shah Abbas’ Isfahan and 
the gardens of Babur’s Kabul “that the memory of Timurid Herat 
lived on most vividly.”36 
There has been a conspicuous correlation between the construc­
tion of grand gardens and territorial expansion; Timur began to 
build the gardens at Samarkand as he increased his territorial con­
trol. The Mughal shah Akbar (1556-1605) constructed large gardens 
at the height of his rule, and Abbas the Great began to design and 
build his capital after ten years of continuous military confronta­
tions with the Ottomans.37  The growth of Isfahan as Dar al-Saltaneh 
(Abode of Royal Government or Kingship) of Abbas I went hand in 
hand with vital internal military reforms, leading to the lasting 
subversion of the Turcoman military aristocracy and the expansion 
of Safavid frontiers. Between 1596-98 he incorporated the vassal 
states of Mazandaran, Lahijan and Rasht and, in 1592, Gilan. In 
1598-99, a year after making Isfahan the seat of government, Shah 
Abbas reconquered Herat and Mashad from the Uzbeks and ex­
panded to Balkh, Marv, and Astarabad. In 1010/1601 he annexed 
Bahrain. In 1013/1603-04 he went to war with the Ottomans, in 
defiance of the humiliating 1590 peace agreement, and repossessed 
Azerbaijan, Nakhchievan, Erivan, with a major victory over the 
Ottoman troops in Tabriz. Further campaigns in 1607-08 restored 
Shirvan and Gorjestan under Iranian control. The territorial expan­
sion and consolidation took place concomitantly to the increasing 
centralization of the political administration which made Isfahan the 
symbol of the rise of Safavid Iran.38 
33 Shirazi, ibid., pp. 588–589. 
34 E.g. Wilber1979, pp. 127–134. 
35 Hyderabad was also called Bhagyanagar, 
which is generally believed to be derived 
from the shah’s concubine, a Hindu dancer 
called Bhagamati. Another explanation is 
that the original name was Baghnagar, 
meaning the City of Gardens, for which 
however contemporary documents do not 
exist. The axes of Hyderabad, like in 
Isfahan, were laid out from E-W and N-S. 
See Shah Manzoor Alam: Hyderabad-
Secunderabad, pp. 23. Also see Annemarie 
Schimmel: Deciphering the signs of God: a 
phenomenological approach to Islam, 
Edinburgh University Press, 1994, p. 78. For 
a schematic map of Herat see Nieder­
mayer and Diez: Afghanistan, Leipzig, 1924, 
which is reprinted in Gaube: Iranian cities, 
p. 45. Gaube argued in Isfahan “the new 
urbanistic concept introduced in Samar­
qand and Herat found its fulfillment.” Ibid. 
p. 62. To both cities also see: Petruccioli: “Il 
Giardino come anticipazione dell città. 
Stoire parallele,” in Petruccioli: Il Giardino, 
pp. 99-101. 
36Terry Allan Timurid Herat, Ludwig Reichert 
Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1983, p. 55. 
37 See Roemer Persien auf dem Weg in die 
Neuzeit, pp. 310-312. Before the rise of 
Herat, Timur had named the quarters 
around Samarkand Sultaniyya, Shiraz, 
Bagdad, Dimashq, and Misr (for Cario) to 
indicate the supreme position of Samar­
kand as supreme city of his empire. see: 
Barthold “Herat unter Husein Baiqara,” in 
Abhandlungen für die Kunde des 
Morgenlandes, XXII, 8, p. 11. 
38 “Symbol des Aufstiegs,” as Roemer put it, 
in Persien auf dem Weg, p. 319. 
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Shah Abbas’ decision to transfer his seat of government to the 
former Saljuq capital and re-develop the city was based on strategic, 
economic, and political considerations, as well as his personal liking 
of the city’s climate; beyond this, it was an implicit reflection of his 
expansionist territorial goals and desire to create a specifically 
Safavid capital.39 The relation between territoriality and royal gar­
dens has been discussed in the context of Timurid and early Mughal 
gardens, which functioned as basis for conquest, the contention for 
a consolidated empire, places of exercise of power, and military and 
cultural domination.40 
The reconstruction of Isfahan according to Abbas I’s plan shows 
comparable intentions. The consolidation of his territorial ambi­
tions, his growing political and military hegemony, the centraliza­
tion of the empire’s administration, and the avowal of the Safavid 
doctrine of kingship as the Shadow of God on Earth, Zill al-allah fi 
al-arz, were epitomized in his plans of the city of Isfahan. The fact 
that the bridge, which connects the lower with the upper Chahar 
Bagh Avenue, was built by and carries the name of Allahverdi Khan, 
the sepahsalar, (commander in chief), contains a clear reference to 
the territorial and hegemonic connotation of the city’s design. 
As has been pointed out by the many architectural studies, the 
Maidan-i Shah created and represented the spatial and physical 
nexus of the bazaar, the religious establishment and the govern­
ment.41 Most travelers have drawn attention to its commercial 
function, describing the many tents of fruit and vegetable sellers. 
Kaempfer recounted that in the 1680s the spaces of the lower floors 
around the four sides of the square’s gallery were occupied by crafts­
men and traders, while the upper floors were divided into small 
rooms for lodging which were also rented to foreigners, visitors and 
occasionally prostitutes.42 Reports by later travellers about soldiers 
being housed on the rooms of the upper gallery alongside the 
square, and the para-military polo games, chawqan, played and 
practiced on the Maidan at the time of Abbas I, seem to indicate that 
in addition to its commercial and public use it also had a military 
function.43  Its titles Maidan-i Naqsh-i Jahan or Jahan Nameh, in­
sinuate an expansionist perspective which confirms the semiotics of 
power and conquest behind the architectural structure of the city. 
It has been argued that Abbas I was essentially an “itinerant” 
ruler and the concept of capital city as “permanent center for gov­
ernment and administration did not apply to this phase of the 
Safavid state.”44 The success of his military and political objectives 
could not have been predicted in 1006/1597-98. Nonetheless he 
seemed clearly intent on creating Isfahan as his political headquar­
ters and royal capital of a consolidated Safavid empire. The city and 
39 Isfahan had serious strategic advantages. It 
was closer to the eastern borders and the 
Persian Gulf than Qazvin or Tabriz and it 
was still close enough to the western 
frontiers, which occupied by Ottoman 
troops. Hafez Farmayan stresses the origin 
and tradition of Isfahan as an old Iranian 
city, and choosing Isfahan has capital was 
also sign of the Iranization of Abbas I’s 
regime. Farmayan, Hafez F. The Beginnings 
of Modernization in Iran: The policies and 
Reforms of Shah Abbas I 1587-1629, Middle 
East Center: Salt Lake City: Utah, 1969. 
40 See e.g. James Wescoat “Babur and the 
Timurid Chahar Bagh, Use and Meaning,” 
in: Environmental Design, Mughal Architec­
ture, Pomp and Ceremonies, 9th year, no. 
11; and idem, “Gardens vs. Citadels: The 
Territorial Context of Early Mughal 
Gardens, in MacDougal Garden History. 
41 See Haneda “The Urbanisation,” in Melville 
Safavid Persia, p. 3. 
42 Kaempfer Aemonitatum, p. 170. Iskandar 
Beg Munshi describes the rooms along the 
Maidan as chahar bazar-i Naqsh-i Jahan or 
as khanat-i havali-yi Naqsh-i Jahan Munshi: 
Tarikh, pp. 830 and 836. Savory has simply 
translated them as “shops;” History, pp. 
1037 and 1044. 
43 See Kaempfer’s drawing of the Maidan 
where cannons and armament are spread 
out in front of the Ali Qapu and tents of 
small scale traders are set up only in front 
of the Quisarieh; Aemonitatum, between pp. 
170 and 171. Showing the military use 
even more distinct is the drawing by 
Hofstedt van Ess, reprinted by Alemi, in Il 
Giardino, p. 52. 
44Charles Melville “The Itineraries of Shah 
Abbas I,” pp. 11-26, cited in Susan Babaie 
Safavid Palaces, p. 44. 
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 the political administration grew despite the shah’s repeated ab­
sences from the city on military campaigns. The grand scale of 
Isfahan’s plan, his restorations of the existing bazaar and pragmatic 
efforts to invigorate the commercial life as well as the permanent 
establishment of the royal administration, all belay his intention of 
laying the groundwork for a capital city on a long term basis. Sir 
Thomas Herbert who witnessed its shape after the development of 
almost thirty years, compared its rise as capital and symbol of 
Safavid hegemony with the imperial supremacy of ancient royal 
palace cities like Babylon, Tauris, Persepolis and Nineveh. In a bulky 
eulogy he deliberated the city’s idiom of power. 
“[...] Now royall Abas rules, Spahawn must rise. 
(Where Kings affect, there most men cast their eyes, 
There flock the people:) ‘tis his power not thine 
Which hath eclipst their light, to make thee shine. 
Then use thy fortune so, that none from thence 
May with thy fall, or grudge they eminence.”45 
The Chahar Bagh Avenue, which formed the central axis of 
Abbas I’s city plan, was lined with thirty gardens along its sides. It 
posed as the urban representation of the Safavid states’ administra­
tive and military backbone. “The vast expanse of territory which is 
divided into four areas by the intersection of the street and the 
river,” explained Kaempfer, “is partitioned by walls into thirty gar­
dens.” “Shah Abbas the Great [...] has not only personally chosen 
the position of the palace complex and demarcated the extension of 
the city,” explained Kaempfer, “but furthermore, was also supposed 
to have determined the size and the design of the described gardens, 
attuned to the surrounding terrain.”46  He was awestruck by the 
beauty of the small domiciles, surrounded by wide and unblemished 
walkways, trees, flowers, and clear water pools.47  These gardens were 
given to the chief officials courts, who also had the first right to 
channel water for irrigation into their gardens.48  Under Shah 
Sulayman’s rule (1666-1694) they continued along the Khiaban-i 
Chahar Bagh after the four royal gardens, including the Bagh-i 
Khargah, the Bagh-i Hasht Behesht, the Bagh-i Musaman and the 
Bagh-i Takht. The owners of these gardens along the Avenue were 
the shah’s chief officials, among them, the Sufidar Bashi (com­
mander of the Safavid order), the Qullar Bashi (commander of the 
royal guard), Qurchi Bashi (commander of the cavalry), and the ˆ 
(quartermaster general).49 Between the four royal gardens and the 
river were seven societal lots, including the Takiyyeh-yi Ni’matullah 
and the Takiyyeh-yi Haidar.50 
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45Thomas Herbert Some Years Travel, p. 153. 
46 Kaempfer Aemontitatum, Fasc. I, p. 198. 
Also see Honarfar, Ganjineh, p.479-493. 
Also see Baqer Shirazi ibid., p. 589. Masashi 
Haneda argues that it is not certain 
whether there were special quarters for 
the Jews and Indians. See “Urbanization of 
Isfahan,” in Melville: Safavid, p. 386. 
47Kaempfer Aemoenitatum Exoticarum: 
Politico-Physico Medicarum, Fasc. I, pp. 
173–174. 
48 See Fryer A New Account, pp. 240 and 296. 
49See Kaempfer’s drawing of the Bagh-i 
Naqsh-i Jahan, and the Chahar Bagh 
Avenue, which shows all thirty gardens 
with the names of their owners. Reprinted 
from the Sloane collection of the British 
Library, in Mahvash Alemi “Gardens of the 
Safavid Period,” in Petruccioli, Gardens in 
the Time of the Great Muslim Empires, pp. 
82 and 83. 
50 Isfahan, like most Safavid cities, was divided 
into two zones between the order of the 
Ne‘matollahis who controlled the eastern 
part of the city and held the Takkieh on 
the eastern side of the Chahar Bagh, and 
the Haydaris who commanded the 
quarters roughly along the west of the 
Chahar Bagh Avenue, and held the Takkieh 
on the western line of gardens. See Ansari: 
Tarikh-i Isfahan, pp. 97-98. For a general 
discussion about the background of the 
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Kaempfer also pointed to a historical continuity of which Abbas 
I, if not deliberately imitating it, must have been aware. “With the 
planning of the Chahar Bagh,” expounded Kaempfer, “he was said 
to have directed the delineation with his own hands, which he 
proved himself as real and laudable descendant of the great Cyrus, 
who as may be read in Xenophon, took the design of gardens as a 
kingly occupation and who not seldomly planted plants and mea­
sured the rows of trees also with his own hands.”51  Thus, the city’s 
internal rationale as well as its external representation states a direct 
link between kingship and the creation of gardens. The practical act 
of the shah himself mapping, planning and planting a tract of land is 
also expression of the royal control and ownership of territory.52 
The Safavid garden and the city of Isfahan as a large example of 
such, had definite functional, symbolic, and aesthetic links to the 
Safavid state. The van of the royal garden was usually created by a 
palace, which was the governing point of the garden’s structure. The 
palace and the garden created an organic unit with a gradual pro­
gression from the interior of the palace through a transitional 
narthex (ivan or talar) which is both part of the palace and the 
outdoors, leading into and also connecting the garden to the build­
ing. Akin to the classical palatial garden, the urban space devised by 
Abbas I through the crossing of the Chahar Bagh Avenue and the 
Zayendehrud was presided over by the royal quarter and 
dawlatkhaneh, the Bagh-i Naqsh-i Jahan on the northern end, and 
overseen by the Bagh-i Hizar Jarib on the southern end. It created the 
same relation between the central palace and government quarter and 
the city as existed between a palace and its surrounding garden, in 
which the palace constitutes the head and the focus of the system. 
The architectural iconography of royal gardens, as much as it 
provided a space for pleasure and enjoyment, also articulated the 
domination over nature, including the control of land and water, 
the source of life and prosperity sine qua non. Traditional interpreta­
tions understood the use of water in pools and fountains as the 
obvious symbol of life. In the context of a more pragmatic rendition 
the use and display of water, and in the case of Isfahan the river as 
part of the city’s chahar bagh pattern, recognizes the eternal interde­
pendence of the organic relationship between the river, the city, and 
the surrounding country side and is a statement of the absolute 
royal guardianship over life and property. 
Shah Abbas I had gradually turned most of the lands in Isfahan 
and its surroundings from mamalik (state lands) into khasseh prop­
erty (land and estates owned by the crown). Rather than a reflection 
of the mere religious-metaphysical relation to nature, Safavid royal 
gardens, and Isfahan as a royal garden on the scale of a city, are a 
Haydari and Ne‘mati division see Hossein 
Mirjafari: “The Haydari and Ne‘mati 
Conflicts in Iran” in Iranian Studies, vol XII, 
1979, pp. 135–162. Kaempfer mentions 
that Shah Sulayman was a follower of the 
Haydaris. 
51 Kaempfer Aemontitatum, Fasc. I, p. 198. 
Iskander Beg Munshi does not mention the 
Achaemenids, but he does compare the 
Safavid gardens and palaces of Isfahan to 
Sassanian palaces, Tarikh, p. 545. For 
discussion of the image and role of 
Khavarnaq in Iranian epic literature see 
Renard: Islam and the Heroic Image, pp. 173 
and 175. 
52 Also see: Wescoat, “Picturing an Early 
Mughal Garden,” in: Asian Art, fall 1989, p. 
76. 
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 reflection of the socio-political aspects of the division, control, 
organization of land ownership and cultural production. 
Isfahanis were always proud of the exceptional fecundity of Isfahan’s 
earth, its bounteous river and good climate. The surviving notion of 
Isfahan being a place with special benison has its roots in Saljuq times. It 
was believed that Isfahan was at the center of the “fourth clime”, which 
in the system of Ptolemaic cosmology was considered the best of the 
earth’s seven astrological belts, each of which was presided over by a 
planet.53 The location of Isfahan in this world system has been used to 
explain its outstanding fertility, and has played an important role in the 
justification of its eminence as a city and the attribution of its paradisia­
cal qualities. The city’s epithet nisf-i jahan (half the world) as well as the 
name Bagh-i Naqsh-i Jahan (Garden of the World’s Picture) of the 
palace complex, offers the notion of Isfahan at the center of the empire, 
and the world in imperial and religious terms. This suggests that Shah 
Abbas positioned his capital in a deliberate competitive self-definition 
with the world. The semiotics of the location and architecture implies a 
political, cultural as well as religious hegemony. Under Safavid patron­
age Isfahan developed into the foremost center of Shi’ite theology and 
orthodoxy in the Islamic world. Iskander Beg Munshi notes that Abbas 
I built the Masjid-i Shah intending to surpass the Masjid-i Aqsa in 
Jerusalem and the Ka’ba in Mecca, which is a clear statement of ambi­
tions beyond the local or regional. 
The quadripartite delineation of Safavid Isfahan also denoted the 
hierarchical order of the cosmos, pointing to the position of the world 
and the shah within it. The city was at once the creation and the reflec­
tion of the king’s domain. Abbas I’s conception of Isfahan perpetuated 
the function of garden as an allegoric and symbolic political order on 
multiple levels. It centered in the internal space of palace courtyards and 
from there expanded to the level of the walled palace and government 
gardens of the Bagh-i Naqsh-i Jahan, to the next level of the city with its 
axial center from where it extended to the level of the province, and 
after that to the expanse of the empire’s domains. This pattern may be 
interpreted as perpetuating further from the territory of the empire, 
encompassing the realm of the globe and reaching from there to the 
metaphysical world of the universe to the seven spheres of heaven, to 
the ‘arsh, the throne or seat of God.54 
The palaces and gardens of the later Safavids like the Hasht Behesht, 
the Aineh Khaneh, Shah Sultan Hussayn’s garden of Farahabad, were 
mainly extensions to this fundamental structure. They reflected greater 
ostentation and a panoply of royal self-representation with a stronger 
emphasis on pleasure and enjoyment as opposed to the articulation of 
political and territorial aspirations, which is discernible in the earlier 
gardens, palaces and mosques of Shah Abbas I. 
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53 See “Account of a rare manuscript History 
of Isfahan,” described by E.G. Browne in: 
The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1902, 
pp. 414 and 419. Also see Hamdallah 
Mustawfi al-Qazvini Nuhzat al Qulub, transl. 
by Guy Le Strange, E.J. Brill, Leyden, 1919, 
pp. 55. For discussion of the theme of 
Iranian cosmology in literature see Renard 
Islam and the Heroic Image, pp. 79–80. 
54See the diagram of J. Wescoat in “Gardens 
versus Citadels: The Territorial Context of 
Early Mughal Gardens,” in MacDougall, 
Garden history, issues, approaches, methods, 
p. 347. John Renard pointed out how in 
the literary epic sira of Antar ibn Shaddad, 
“the hero’s adventures unfold in a 
quadripartite world, each quarter of which 
constitutes the realm of an integral 
monarchy. The four realms are Byzantium; 
Sassanian Persia, with its capital at 
Ctesiophon, (Mada’in); the region of Hind 
and Sind [...]; and what one might call 
`greater Ethiopia.’” Renard, Islam and the 
Heroic Image, p. 169–70. 
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EPILOGUE: THE POLITICAL CIRCLE OF PARADISE 
The figurativeness of Safavid Isfahan conveyed a pervading sense 
of a leading city, as cultural, political, religious and imperial center 
and the exclusive domain of the shah. The motives of political and 
dynastic self-representation in Shah Abbas’ layout of Isfahan and the 
iconographic as well as textual references to paradise remain inextri­
cably attached to Isfahan. Contemporaries consistently applied the 
metaphor of khuld-i barin or khuld-i paikar to the city. Rustam al-
Hukama, chronicler and native of Isfahan, left no doubt that when 
Aqa Muhammad Khan Qajar conquered Isfahan at the end of the 
18th century it was a city equal to the highest paradise, khold-i barin, 
despite the destruction caused by the tribal and civil wars of the 18th 
century. Yet, he not only intended to praise Isfahan’s beauty and 
express his liking of its open and metropolitan spirit but also to 
underscore its political stature and superiority.55 
In his research and publications about Mughal gardens, James 
Wescoat argues that Mughal gardens expressed a “denotation but 
not connotation of Islamic Paradise,” that is, they “achieved the 
form, but not the meaning of paradise gardens.”56  This subtle but 
crucial distinction applies to Safavid royal gardens as well. 
Aesthetically, Safavid gardens, like Mughal gardens, incorporated 
clear references to the pictorial imagery of Qur’anic paradise, but 
the builders’ semiotic intent had also pragmatic goals with roots in 
the profane world, which was largely disinterested in the eschat­
ologic implications of a metaphysical paradise in its essentially reli­
gious or theological meaning. Further readings of Safavid theo­
logical, scientific, and philosophical texts may yield more precise 
insights into the contemporary weltbild and the implications of 
cosmological models on political legitimacy as well as the relation­
ship between paradise and political hierarchy. 
Aside from the Bagh-i Hasht Behesht (The Garden of the Eighth 
Paradise) the names of the early palatial gardens laid out by Abbas 
the Great carry largely political-secular connotations which invoke 
size, status, and often their function, like the Bagh-i Abbasabad or 
Hizar Jarib (The Thriving Domain of Abbas or Garden of a Thou­
sand Acres), Bagh-i Naqsh-i Jahan (Garden of the World’s Picture), 
Bagh-i Takht (Garden of the Throne), Bagh-i Khargah (Garden of 
the Donkey), and those of simple ownership or cultivated fruit.57 
Persian Islamic gardens have developed in a dialectic cycle of 
pre-Islamic Persian garden traditions and Islamic and Qur’anic 
notions of paradise, which derived their imagery of paradise from 
contemporary pre-Islamic and Persian traditions. The forms of Pre-
Islamic Persian gardens have roots in the antecedent garden structures 
of Mesopotamian and Egyptian gardens and probably absorbed 
55 Muhammad Hashim Asif, Rustam al-
Hukama Rustam al-Tawarikh, ed. 
Muhammad Mushir, Intisharat-i Amir Kabir, 
Tehran, 1352, p. 454. 
56 James Wescoat “ From the Gardens of the 
Qur`an to the Gardens of Lahore,” in 
Landscape Research, 20 (1) 1995, pp. 
19-25. 
57 The Bagh-i Hasht Behesht was only built in 
1670, by Shah Sulayman (1667–1694). 
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major structural, functional and aesthetic patterns from Assyrian 
Gardens of the 8th century BC.58  The Safavids created a Shi’ite state 
and orthodoxy, whose theological system provided a direct basis of 
political legitimacy. At the same time, there are evident pre-Islamic 
Iranian traditions which surface in Safavid notions of divine king­
ship, with direct implications for politics and statehood. The 
Qur’anic or Islamic paradise as connection between both is not 
implausible, as Qur’anic images of paradise have roots in the pre-
Islamic Persian and Mesopotamian traditions of worldly gardens. 
The concept of chahar bagh in the Safavid city garden of Isfahan 
thus has links to the metaphysical divine order of political power, 
which the Safavids deliberately insinuated. 
The two interpretations, political-functional and metaphysical-
sacred or theological, are not necessarily contradictory. If 16th and 
17th century royal Persian gardens are analyzed as representative of 
royalty, reflection of kingship and territorial control, the theological 
aspect or divine inspiration of Safavid kingship has again a metaphysical 
and theological aspect, albiet with political consequences. 
The allusions the Qur’an in Safavid gardens were less a reflection 
of the theological and eschatological meaning of the Qur’anic para­
dise. In the case of Isfahan, the chahar bagh pattern staged a nexus of 
pre-Islamic Iranian traditions of divine kingship and Shi’ite con­
cepts of legitimacy. Safavid gardens, and Isfahan as a grand royal 
garden on the scale of a city, had very strong elements of regal self-
representation. It was an expression of royalty, power, and a state­
ment of political sovereignty as it was innately linked to the rise and 
fall of the Safavid empire. Its symbolism combined worldly political 
power with the theological mandate of monarchical authority, 
through which the Safavids aimed to balance divine kingship and 
Shi’ite legitimacy. This is based in the metaphysical world, where 
paradise is the domain or abode of God, the absolute and ultimate 
source of might and authority. 
The form of the classical Persian garden was a deliberate leitmotif 
in Shah Abbas’ location of the capital and the outline of the new 
part of the city. The organization of Safavid Isfahan represented a 
space of political consolidation, the epitome of centralization, ex­
pression of dynastic legitimacy and the primary center of exercise of 
power and territorial control. Isfahan was thus the quintessential 
royal garden and not only the geographic but also the allegoric 
midpoint of the Safavid empire, the Maqarr al-saltaneh, the royal 
city and residence of the shah, the highest abode of paradise, the 
definitive source and center of power. 
58 On the influence of Achaemenid and 
Sassanian Gardens see R. Pechère “Etudes 
sur les Jardins Iraniens,” in Les Jardins de 
l’Islam: Compte Rendu du 2`eme colloque 
International sur la Protection et la 
Restauration des Jardins Historique Organisé 
par l’Icomos et l’Ifla, Granada 1973, pp. 19­
25; David Stronach “Paterres and Stone 
Watercourses at Pasargadae: Notes on the 
Achaemenid Contribution to Garden 
Design,” Journal of Garden History (special 
edition of “Site and Sight in the Garden, ed. 
by E. Kryder-Reid and D.F. Ruggles,) 1993. 
See also Mahvash Alemi “Der Persische 
Garten: Typen und Modelle,” in Der 
Islamische Garten, Architektur, Natur, 
Landschaft, ed. Attilio Petruccioli, Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1995, pp. 39 and 
41. Most important to the discussion of the 
relationship between kingship and garden 
during the Acheamenids and Sassanians is 
the article of W. Fauth “Der Königliche 
Gärtner” in Persica, no. VIII, 179, pp. 1–53. 
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Rethinking the Islamic Garden 
Attilio Petruccioli 
Islamic Environmental Design Research Centre, Como, Italy 
ABSTRACT 
A broader inquiry into the relationship among the garden’s form, structure and meaning should aim to address 
two crucial issues: (1) the need for common ground in research which will organize the field and foster future scholarly 
work and (2) the importance of laying out an analytic method capable of shedding new light on the garden’s formative 
process and in informing new urban development. This paper underscores how the garden has always played a crucial 
role in any anthropic process. It examines how the structural relationships among its components reflect other forms 
of settlement, such as the encampment, the royal palace, the city as an image of the king, and finally, the larger 
landscape. It suggests a new direction for further study based on two axioms: that there is a substantial continuity 
between different cultures in their appropriation of space, and that there are pertinent methodologies to retrace the 
garden’s evolution. 
PULLING THREADS 
The wonders of Harun al-Rashid’s garden described in A Thousand 
and One Nights have never existed. They were fictional hyperbole. But 
not everything is poetry and imagination. The renowned description 
recalls many gardens in Dar al-Islam from Samarra to Granada, Lahore, 
and Isfahan. Rather than depicting a single garden, it portrays an atti­
tude toward the environment shared by the entire Islamic world: the 
taming and glorification of nature enclosed within four walls, juxta­
posed with the hostile wilds of the outside world. 
What is left of it? What is the impact of this philosophy in today’s 
world? The first question has been answered by a vast scholarly body of 
work which can be seen as a collective effort to gather the information 
necessary to address the second, and more important issue. 
Attention within European culture to the Islamic garden began in 
the 17th century, as part of a general discovery of the East. “The taste for 
Oriental culture and Islamic imagery, already present during the ro­
coco,” writes Paolo Portoghesi, “suddenly erupts in Europe. The new 
fascination for the exotic symbolized the emancipation from an aca­
demic classicism, the inspiration of which had, by then, almost com­
pletely dried up.” The Islamic garden was one of the most seductive 
symbols of the new, exotic world—the place where the novel taste for 
space and decoration was most freely expressed. 
Its influence can be seen in the Moorish decorations of Villa 
Torlonia, in Villa Melzi’s casino, in the landscaping of the Stibbert 
garden in Florence and, most strikingly, in the Sezincote villa and 
in the Royal Pavilion of Brighton, England. By the 19th century, the 
infatuation with Islamic culture had become a glamorous fashion: it 
was extensively exhibited in World Fairs, chosen as the “official” archi­
tectural style of thermal resorts, and eagerly showed off first by the 
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bourgeoisie and then by the masses. Its influence continued through­
out the 19th and into the beginning of the 20th century, before the 
Modern Movement’s disenchantment with it and its final oblivion. 
Alas, much of this oriental contagion was born out of pure excite­
ment for the new and unknown, based on a few exotic-looking objects 
and the enchanting, passionate accounts of travelers upon their return 
from the East. As a result, the Islam portrayed in Europe was merely an 
enthusiastic reinterpretation of a culture heavily filtered by the mer­
chants of the time. 
The first pragmatic studies on the Islamic garden didn’t attract 
much attention. They came as late as the first quarter of the 20th cen­
tury, produced by two researchers to whom much is owed for the diffu­
sion in Europe of the history and form of the Islamic garden. C. M. 
Villiers-Stuart analyzed all Mughal gardens, although still captured by 
their exotic atmosphere and botanical species rather than by their spa­
tial and structural layout; her romantic portrayal of ornate details was 
more reminiscent of Gertrude Jekyll’s Garden Ornament (1918) and less 
of a methodological study. A more substantial contribution was offered 
by Die Indische Garten (1923) by the Baroness M. L. Gothein, who had 
already authored Geschichte der Gartenkunst (1913). For the first time, 
the Indian garden was studied as a structural whole within a specific 
context, examining it as a product of Indo-Muslim culture. 
Overall, these two works laid the foundation for further Islamic 
garden studies. They were all the more precious for witnessing and 
reporting information at a time when the Civil Service, with great effi­
ciency but mediocre preparation, restored Mughal gardens according to 
romantic models rather than according to original features. Also, at that 
time the possibility of unlimited substitutions of plants and trees had 
drastically complicated any botanical research on the original species. 
More than in architecture, where wounds and transformations can’t 
mislead an expert eye, the original character of a garden can be erased: 
drastic changes often occurred in only one generation’s time, com­
pletely altering previous forms and meaning. Scientific studies on veg­
etal fossils and seeds, or on the chemical composition of the terrain (like 
the ones undertaken in Pompeii) are still far from a reality in the Islamic 
world. In the end, the original literature, the iconographic archives and 
the survey of ruins have got to carry the day themselves.1 
Scholarly interest in the Islamic garden has somehow revived in 
recent years, along with the passion for European gardens, and Italian 
gardens in particular. In the 1970s, however, the Islamic garden was still 
considered to be of marginal importance. Its study still showed a gen­
eral lack of method. In The landscape of man (1972), S. Jellicoe dedi­
cated a few superficial paragraphs to it; N. T. Newton (Design of the 
land, 1971) wrote two brief chapters on the Andalusian garden as part 
By the 19th century, the infatuation with 
Islamic culture had become a glamorous 
fashion....Alas, much of this oriental 
contagion was born out of pure 
excitement for the new and unknown, 
based on a few exotic-looking objects 
and the enchanting, passionate 
accounts of travelers upon their return 
from the East. As a result, the Islam 
portrayed in Europe was merely an 
enthusiastic reinterpretation of a culture 
heavily filtered by the merchants of the 
time…more than in architecture, where 
wounds and transformations can’t 
mislead an expert eye, the original 
character of a garden can be erased: 
drastic changes often occurred in only 
one generation’s time, completely 
altering previous forms and meaning. 
1 However, accurate philological research 
can achieve unexpected results, such as 
Parpagliolo Shepard’s identification and 
philological reconstruction of the Babur 
garden in Kabul (1972). 
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of a general historical introduction; F. Fariello’s Architettura dei Giardini 
(1967) didn’t reach any further. 
A second generation of British scholars (Crowe and Haywood, J. 
Lehrman, E. B. Moynihan, D. Wilber, and many others) gets the credit 
for finally doing the dog’s job: an unprecedented systematic survey, 
catalogue, and database of Islamic gardens existing to date, although 
many publications lack graphic evidence and, perhaps consequently, a 
careful spatial analysis. We had to wait until 1988 for the renowned 
work co-authored by C. Moore, W. J. Mitchell, and W. Turbull, Jr. to 
have an interdisciplinary reading of the most famous gardens and their 
underlying design ideas—a research approach of great nourishment 
and crucial importance. 
However, it seems that, apart from scholarly research, we are slip­
ping back to 19th-century World Fair trends: today the Islamic garden, 
However, it seems that, apart from perhaps less than Islamic architecture and decoration, is adopted as an 
scholarly research, we are slipping back easy model of an artificial pan-Islamism, centrifuging all forms and 
to l9th-century World Fair trends: today 
meanings within Dar al-Islam, and scattering them around the world the Islamic garden, perhaps less than 
with modern mass-media nonchalance. On one side, this process is Islamic architecture and decoration, is 
made easy by the eclectic character of Islamic art, since the laws of Islam adopted as an easy model of an 
discipline daily life but avoid any strict regulation on art and architec- artificial pan-Islamism, centrifuging all 
ture. Its art almost always joins sophisticated concepts with a vernacular forms and meanings within Dar al-
Islam, and scattering them around the tradition that, through a blend of craftsmanship’s variations-on-a­
world with modern mass-media theme and popular fantasy, cannot help but be eclectic. On the other 
nonchalance.side, Islamic art has never produced a precise code like Classical archi­
tecture, nor suddenly shifted taste, style, or fashion. Rather, it has always 
preferred to elaborate on its universal but multifaceted grammar, vary­
ing it by minimal changes and adjustments over time. 
All these elements further complicate research. In approaching a 
complex theme such as the Islamic garden, one of the first discoveries is 
that the idea of unity within diversity is, in reality, multilayered over 
centuries of seemingly unimportant mutations. The Islamic Garden, 
then, or gardens of the Islamic world? We can start addressing the 
question by outlining the archetypes belonging to three different pre-
Islamic roots: the Arab, the Persian, and the Turkish—three concepts of 
nature, and consequently of space. 
In Arab geographers’ and travelers’ reports, we note their excite­
ment about tame and well-ordered nature, but also their lack of enthu­
siasm for the wilds. Locus amoenus coincides with locus ferax. But 
pleasure is possible only through contrast: if green gardens stand for 
paradise, hell wears the yellow sand of the desert. The concept of space 
in a culture evolved from the desert is by necessity based on protecting 
living space, thus transforming the enclosure into an archetypal sign of 
distinction—not only separation—between the nomadic and the seden­
tary, between oasis and desert, irrigated and arid land. There can be no 
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dialogue between the two: the enclosure almost becomes a fortress 
under constant attack from the desert’s symbolism-thirst, death, and 
evil spirits. Sheltered by high walls, the Arab can enjoy the perfumes 
and colors of his paradise in solitary sensual pleasure. 
The pursuit of order in the Arab garden is taken to the extreme in 
Persia. Here a biaxial symmetry—although a third zenithal axis is 
always implied—is the means of drawing earth and cosmos together. 
Everything is organized according to this principle: the layout of archi­
tectural elements, the hierarchical organization of decorative symbols, 
even the practice of gardening. Sophisticated and passive, the Persian 
garden is a place for contemplation: “Persians don’t walk in gardens as 
we do, but look at them from one viewpoint only,” writes the 16th­
century traveler and merchant Jean Chardin. Excluding the hectic 
commercial city by a well-defined enclosure, the geometrical order 
simul- taneously materializes and fosters the dreaming and making 
of love. 
The Turkish world, settled in the high plains, is inspired by the 
wide open space of the prairies: a landscape to explore rather than 
contemplate. The garden becomes a resting spot in a never-ending 
journey. Its types and techniques, foreign to the nomadic world, had 
been imported from nearby Iran. The fundamental difference be­
tween the Arabs and the Turks can be exemplified by their opposite 
relationship between dwelling and garden—the first based on the 
introverted patio-house with the garden in the center, the second based 
on the hall between two gardens, open toward them on both sides. 
Things were already intricate enough, but history shuffled the 
cards even more. The three different cultures influenced each other 
in a way apparently impossible to retrace. In the Abassid period, the 
Persians extended their domain to the whole Mediterranean, all the 
way to Gibraltar. After 1453, the Turks started dominating the same 
sea, as still evidenced by the periphery of Algiers and Istanbul, and by 
the Dalmatian coast of the Republic of Venice. On the other side, 
they met Iranian culture and, at the time of the Timurids, merged the 
static and centripetal conception of Iranian space not only with 
Turkish wide open spaces, but also with its dynamics and centrifugal 
exploration. What can we say when this synthesis met the Indian world, 
where the sense of time depended on agricultural seasons, and where 
traditional architecture had long been born in symbiosis with nature? 
In approaching such a complex problem, it seemed legitimate to 
establish general classes in order to group phenomena. But this call for 
order led scholars to overgeneralize. Grimal’s subdivision into park-
garden and courtyard-garden, the first deriving from the Persians and 
the second from the Romans, is too generic not to be true, but can’t be 
applied much further.2 The classification suggested by M. Moynihan in 
The concept of space in a culture 
evolved from the desert is by necessity 
based on protecting living space, thus 
transforming the enclosure into an 
archetypal sign of distinction—not only 
separation—between the nomadic and 
the sedentary, between oasis and 
desert, irrigated and arid land. 
The pursuit of order in the Arab garden 
is taken to the extreme in Persia. Here 
a biaxial symmetry—although a third 
zenithal axis is always implied— 
is the means of drawing earth and 
cosmos together. 
The Turkish world, settled in the high 
plains, is inspired by the wide open 
space of the prairies: a landscape to 
explore rather than contemplate. The 
garden becomes a resting spot in a 
never-ending journey. 
2 	 Both types almost always coexist, starting 
from the Samarra palaces to the imperial 
cities of Morocco. The second one often 
prevails, as for example in Grenada, but we 
can argue for the possible disappearance of 
the first type, especially during the great 
territorial transformations of the 19th 
century. 
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tomb-garden, palace-garden, and delight-garden is ambiguous and 
incomplete, the first group being the only one featuring specific charac­
teristics.3 On the contrary, although limited to a much smaller geo­
graphical area, M. Alemi’s method seems more promising: he identified 
physical structures behaving according to specific rules under the poetic 
names of pairidaeza, khiaban-i cahar bagh, bagh-i takht, etc. 
Along the lines of this last example, it seems valid to pursue a line of 
research capable of shedding new light on the evolution and structural 
organization of Islamic gardens. This study might start from a general 
inquiry into its perpetual, tangible traces: the mutual, never-ending 
relationship between garden and urban form. 
GARDEN IN CITY FORM 
The Islamic garden has always been an area of research essen­
tially pursued by art historians. The obvious consequence is that it 
has been considered a specific, self-contained entity removed from 
its context—its surroundings, the city, and the environment. Along 
the same lines, reading the spatial qualities and structural layout of 
the garden, as well as the design ideas underlying it, cannot focus on 
the garden solely as an object, but ought to reach out beyond its 
boundaries to seek a larger set of relationships, a richer palimpsest 
where agriculture, garden, encampment, city, and territory recur­
sively and mutually influence one another. 
A 1984 conference in Genzano, Rome, entitled “The Garden as 
City, the City as Garden,” started looking at the topic from that 
viewpoint. Among many examples from other cultures, the impact 
of orchards’ patterns on urban morphology, or the influence of the 
garden on medieval city-building—considered an ideal urban labo­
ratory for building with minimal means and methods—suggested 
how an interdisciplinary approach could widen the perspective of 
previous studies. 
The structural relationship between the garden and its context 
should be analyzed from all possible viewpoints, both physical (at all 
scales, from the environment to the city) and metaphorical or alle­
gorical (the relationship between the garden and the city as an image 
of the king). 
THE GARDEN AND POWER 
Despite regional differences, Islamic anthropic processes behave 
according to the same rules underlying governing the culture: on 
one side, religious imagery and hierarchy; on the other side, the 
necessity (and vanity) of expressing the power of the dominator. 
3 	 This type is characterized by a mausoleum 
located at the intersection of a simple or 
composite caharbagh, although the Taj 
Mahal in Agra is the most famous 
exception to the rule. 
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A famous article by Begley on the Taj-Mahal 4 demonstrates how 
emblems of power were an everyday Mughal obsession, and shows 
that the equation between architectural forms and celestial prototypes 
(always viewed in terms of the celebration of the deified image of the 
king) was the real spur to any architectural enterprise. What could not 
be stated by the orthodox Muslim, vicar of Allah, was left to the meta­
phor of stone. Playing continually on the ambiguity between Divine 
Throne and royal throne (an unbridled vanity) transformed tombs 
and monuments into symbols of glory and called for the laying out of 
gardens, replicas of the Qur’anic paradise, to exalt the figure of the 
holy demiurge. 
The royal city is based on three recurrent key themes: first, gardens 
and palaces, merged together as places of heterodox pleasure; second, 
the importance of the court ceremonial; and third, the vast and com­
plex system of gardens and palaces, sometimes taking the form of a 
labyrinth as if to express the idea of the king’s divine and quasi-
magical isolation. 
The world of the garden persists both in the royal palace and in 
the city. It endures through the structural relationship between garden 
and encampment, and by the bottom-up procession from the monu­
mental entrance located at the lower level to the enclosure of the royal 
palace at the very top (as in the darbar of Agra). In the city, it persists 
in the pre-existent pattern of fields and orchards, as well as by the ever 
sought-after relationship between the garden and the city as an image 
of the king. The latter is best exemplified by the plan of the city of 
Hyderabad in the Deccan, founded by Sultan Quli Qutb Shah in 1591 
on the banks of the river Musi with a cross-shaped plan designed by a 
Persian architect: as a response to an ideological program which pre­
scribed the creation of a replica of the Paradise of the Qur’an, the 
archetypal form of the Persian garden (a vegetal metaphor for heaven) 
appeared as the most adequate solution. 
In fact, besides the function of retreat from reality and protection 
from wild nature, the Islamic garden has generally aimed to represent, 
in more or less explicit form, the religious paradise. To complicate the 
play on imagery and metaphor, it also offers an allegorical sequence 
for the exaltation of royal power. Despite the difference between 
western and eastern Islam, the theme was always the same: in Spain 
and in Maghreb, the Sultan, vicar of God, exploited the association 
between the garden-of-paradise and garden-of-the-king as the aulic 
representation of their authority. In the east, in the Hellenistic tradi­
tion, conferring divine nature on the emperor transforms the garden 
into a royal hall for the theophany of the king. In both cases, the 
garden is the favorite symbol for the omnipotence of the king. 
Despite regional differences, Islamic 
anthropic processes behave according 
to the same rules underlying governing 
the culture: on one side, religious 
imagery and hierarchy; on the other 
side, the necessity (and vanity) of 
expressing the power of the dominator. 
4  See W. Begley, The myth of the Taj-Mahal 
and a new theory of its symbolic meaning, 
in Art Bulletin, March 1979, pp. 7–37. 
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But it is in Kashmir that the relationship between garden and city 
as image of the king is not only confirmed, but extended to the scale 
of the territory. Around Srinagar, Jahangir and his son Shahjahan 
started transforming the environment in order to mark their territory. 
It is significant how small the architectural intervention was com­
pared to the great production of gardens which spawned, according to 
the sources, no fewer than seven hundred throughout the valley. The 
“royal enclosure” of Kashmir, then, becomes a systematic grand 
oeuvre of redesign of the landscape–an organic attempt to glorify the 
sacred image of the king. “The garden is the place of illusions where 
the king is venerated and where all proofs (though completely imagi­
nary) of his infinite power have accumulated.”5 In these gardens, 
existent water sources are channeled and converge to pass under the 
throne where the king sits as the “distillate of the emanation of the 
Divine Being; a ray of sunshine illuminating the Universe; the subject 
of the book of perfection; the repository of all virtues.”6
 In Shalimar Bagh, for instance, the first terrace after the entrance 
built by Jahangir in 1619, dominated by a telar (a pavilion sheltering 
the throne), was the place reserved for the darbar (the public audi­
ence, the representation of the divine origin of the king) where the 
characteristic theatrical attitude of the Mughals prescribed a precise 
role for all. “When the king sits on the throne, all those present shall 
prostrate themselves and then remain standing in the place assigned 
on the basis of their rank, their arms crossed, receiving the light from 
the Divine Countenance... The firstborn prince shall be at a distance 
of one to four gaz from the throne... the second-born... sits a distance 
of three to twelve.”7 The diwan was decorated for the occasion, and 
illuminated for the king’s solar and lunar birthdays, during various 
religious festivals, as well as to celebrate military victories. 
On these occasions, the scenic venue was extended beyond the 
garden to embrace the entire lake. The second and third terraces are 
two typical caharbagh, completed by Shahjahan after 1630. The first is 
the private garden: again, according to a Kashmiri ritual, the king sits 
in the center of a square pool of water marked at its corners by four 
monumental plane trees. The second is the caharbagh of the zahane, 
featuring the magnificent Black Pavilion. A torrent, diverted into the 
garden, is a broad channel measuring six meters across, majestically 
flowing among plane trees and chenar (Platanus Orientalis). The 
enclosures of the terraces of Shalimar represent the correct layout for 
the performance of daily court life, based on a rigorous ritual yet 
extremely flexible in the use of space. It represents a model subjected 
to infinite variations and reinterpretations according to the same 
underlying principle. 
Despite the difference between western 
and eastern Islam, the theme was 
always the same: in Spain and in 
Maghreb, the Sultan, vicar of God, 
exploited the association between the 
garden-of-paradise and garden-of-the­
king as the aulic representation of their 
authority. 
5 Grimal, Jardin des Hommes, Jardin des Rois, 
in Traverses, 5/6, 1976, pp. 71-72. 
6 Abu’l Fazl 1877–86, vol. 1, p. 18. 
7 Abu’l Fazl 1877–86, vol. 1, p. 18. 
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GARDEN AND ENCAMPMENT 
Garden and landscape interrelate through the intermediary form of 
the encampment. In this way they establish a fundamental relationship 
bound to affect, either consciously or unconsciously, the other acts of 
appropriation and settlement in the same territory. 
The link between garden and encampment derives from the ex­
traordinary mobility of the court, dictated by the need to strengthen the 
royal image throughout the country, control the political behavior of 
the population, and discourage possible sources of rebellion. But there 
were many other occasions for moving the court in grand style, from 
military campaigns to hunting parties and pilgrimages, as well as sea­
sonal movements toward milder climates. 
It is clear that the organization of the royal camp, required the highest 
level of administrative and logistic ability. The easiest and fastest way to 
settle in was to refer directly to established ways to lay out, organize, and 
subdivide areas. The natural way to do it was to rely on archetypal forms 
of appropriation of the environment in a way that were simultaneously 
capable of taming nature and expressing the hierarchy of the court. 
Within this set of parameters, the archetype per excellentia was the gar­
den, because traditionally it addressed both issues. In fact in Mughal 
culture, according to the Timurid tradition, the garden combined the 
functions of contemplation and state ritual. It was also a place for feasts 
and receptions, fitting for celebrating the apotheosis of the King of Kings. 
The description of a camp given by Abu’1 Fazl demonstrates the 
existence of a close functional relationship between the layout of the 
camp (derived from the garden) and that of the royal palace, in a blend 
of nomadic and sedentary culture. The world of the tent persists, how­
ever, in the forms of masonry architecture, the juxtaposition of courts 
and buildings, the pavilions, skylines, the mouldings and other decora­
tive details, to the extent of justifying for the opulent palaces of the 
Mughals the description of “a camp in stone.”8 
How does the archetype of the garden evolve into palaces and new 
cities? And how can we retrace the process? Shalimar Bagh, for example, 
on the east coast of lake Dal, is a garden to discover step by step, one 
enclosure after the other. It is a royal garden. Typologically it refers to a 
scheme that, almost without exception, aligns in sequence the public 
ambits (diwan-i ‘am), the semi-public ones reserved to the king and his 
court intimates (diwan-i khass), and the private ones (harem). This 
scheme is repeated in all palaces, and has a clear origin in the model of 
the Timurid encampment not only in its spatial layout, but also in its 
architecture and in the nomenclature directly taken from the tents. Even 
more strikingly, metaphor and reality often exchanged roles: in the long 
summer seasons, the garden’s lawns became the ideal campground for 
the royal tents, decorated with red drapery, the symbol of the crown. 
Garden and landscape interrelate 
through the intermediary form of the 
encampment. In this way they establish 
a fundamental relationship bound to 
affect, either consciously or uncon­
sciously, the other acts of appropriation 
and settlement in the same territory. 
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GARDEN AND URBAN DESIGN 
The idea of the Oriental city as a puzzle of cramped houses 
around a maze of narrow streets and cul-de-sacs, surrounded by an 
indecent periphery oppressed by deafening traffic, is a misleading 
one. Before the transformation brought about by a fairly recent 
immigration process, Islamic cities had always been portrayed as a 
unique blend of nature and human settlement. Low building density 
was maintained in order to preserve a strong relationship with 
greenery. Vegetation prevailed. Even in the humblest house, the 
courtyard left room for a tree. Wide green spaces functioning as 
food reserves, orchards, and flower gardens formed a green belt 
between the city center and the walls. With the usual prosaic empha­
sis, European travelers described fabulous green oases for cities: 
Pietro della Valle saw Istanbul and Teheran as garden cities—the first 
dominated by cypresses, the other by plane trees; the Spanish ambas­
sador Clavijo portrayed Samarkand as “... such an abundance of 
gardens and vineyards that when a traveler comes within sight thereof, 
all he sees is a great mass of greenery with the city in the center.”9 
Of course, emphasizing the symbiotic relationship between 
gardens and buildings in the urban fabric is almost trite. However, 
far from being either urban decoration or functional green lung, the 
garden has always played a generative role in city form. It seems of 
crucial importance to bring up the structural relationship between 
the two, where “structure” is viewed as an organic relationship of 
elements behaving according to a set of rules. 
Ever since the last century, instead of interpreting tortuous lanes 
and cul de sacs as an impenetrable blend of the exotic, the unhealthy, 
and the horrid, a few scholars perceived the Islamic city in a totally 
different light, namely, as an extremely rational construction. In 
1898, Shetalov remarked that the roads of Yazd, Iran, were traced 
according to a precise orthogonal scheme. The cities of Sabzavar, 
Kerman, Ardekan and, more confusedly, Tabas, were following the 
same principle. Along the same lines, Bonine noted how the urban 
grid of Mehrir (not far from Yazd) continued straight out of town 
toward the hills to the southeast. Although street networks were 
later interrupted by cul de sacs, the urban grid derived directly from 
the agricultural fabric, whose orthogonal pattern was generated by 
the cheapest and simplest irrigation technique: water was channeled 
at the base of the hills, then diverted to the arable area thus generat­
ing long rectangular lots (kort).10 
Thus we can deduce that the morphology of Persian towns is 
linked to the development of a settlement (the original urban 
nucleus) within an irrigated agricultural system. In fact, we can note 
how the roads issuing from the urban gates of Yazd continued the 
The idea of the Oriental city as a puzzle 
of cramped houses around a maze of 
narrow streets and cul-de-sacs, 
surrounded by an indecent periphery 
oppressed by deafening traffic, is a 
misleading one. 
8 See Petruccioli 1987, and in particular the 
first chapter. 
9 Translated from R. Gonzales De Clavijo, 
1403–406 (1990). 
10 See M. Bonine, The Morphogenesis of 
Iranian Cities, in Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, LXII, 9, 1979. 
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urban alignments and trajectories without any deviation induced by 
the need to link nearby towns or landmarks. The extramural fabric 
of fields, orchards and gardens, then, becomes an integral part of the 
city: it constitutes its original parcel. The relationship is taken to the 
extreme (and the axiom is best evidenced) in the urban huertas of 
Spain, and in the kitchen-gardens of suburban Maghreb.11 The list of 
examples could be much longer, one for all the widespread urban 
plans conceived according to existent irrigation channels, or those 
cities whose survival literally depends on the constant flow of under­
ground canals, as in the foggara of Gourara. 12 
In the so-called “Classical Islamic” period, before the devastating 
invasion of the Ilkhanids, the royal city developed through a serial 
repetition of large monumental complexes laid out according to the 
above-mentioned regular grid of agricultural origin: at the begin­
ning, palaces were punctual elements within an endless sequence of 
square and rectangular gardens. We can distinguish three main 
variants: 1) gardens straddling a central thoroughfare, often con­
tinuing or slightly deviating from the axis of symmetry of the resi­
dential areas (i.e., the Balkuwara Palace in Samarra); 2) more 
seldom, gardens aligned in sequence (Ghaznavide of Lashkari 
Bazaar); and 3) an uninterrupted collage of gardens, adjoining lin­
early or perpendicularly according to simple symmetries (i.e., in the 
Alhambra, the Courts of the Myrtle and of the Lions, and the 
Garden of Linfaraja and of the Partal). 
Even after the Ilkhanid invasion of 1256, marking the end of the 
unity of Islam, the reappropriation of the territory in the image of 
the new emperor didn’t destroy former fabrics, but reinterpreted the 
existent structural palimpsest of gardens and cities. The Persian 
caharbagh archetype-a square with four sides, four quadrants, four 
canals and four axes of symmetry-responded adequately to the 
renewed demand for centrality as symbol of power. Later on, the 
Tamerlane dynasty took up the same principle: the layout of the 
capital Herat is a square recalling a gigantic qual’e (fortified farm), 
with four gates giving access to four straight roads splitting the city 
in four sectors. Herat may be considered the culmination of experi­
mentation with city form (further exemplified by Merw, Termez 
and Shahr-i Sabz,13 and the reference for all following urban devel­
opments in the Deccan of India, ending with the layout of 
Shahjahanabad (Old Delhi) in 1638.14 
But one of the most enlightening processes can be observed in 
the urban design of the Mughals after the invasion of Northern 
India (1526). The garden and the camp were the only forms avail­
able to the Mughals when they started redesigning Indian cities in 
the semblance of the new royal image. Refusing to adapt to the 
11 See Petruccioli 1985, in particular the 
chapter Ambiente, acqua, agricoltura. 
12 For a detailed study of the hydraulic 
systems of Saharan oases, see Laureano 
1988. 
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existing fabric and the torrid Indian climate, they created exclusive 
settlements for themselves. Instinctively, design layouts were drawn 
from the garden. Neglecting the Indo-Muslim city of Agra on the 
right bank of the river, Babur decided to settle on the opposite side, 
building a regular pattern of gardens in the manner of those of 
Lahore and Dholpur, stretching for more than a kilometer, in which 
the idea of “monumentality” and “representation” of the new order 
was entrusted to the high, continuous stone plinth along the river. 
This pattern ended up establishing a framework for future urban 
development: Babur’s successors strengthened the previous Mughal 
fabric by building the Red Fort and the Taj-Mahal, and further 
pursued the design of gardens along both banks of the Yamuna,15 
among which the outstanding example is the tomb-garden of 
I’tirnad-al Dawla. Furthermore, starting from the second half of the 
16th century, the Mughal “gardens of delights” progressively turned 
to marble and sandstone palaces, rigorously retaining the order, 
rhythm and ratios of pre-existent gardens, the typical forms of the 
original pavilions, the hierarchical arrangement of the enclosures 
(baradari) and, despite the decrease of greenery, all the garden fur­
nishings—fountains, pools, canals, and chadar. 
GARDEN AND TERRITORY 
To approach the relationship between garden and territory in the 
Islamic world, we may once more consider the Mughal gardens of 
Kashmir. They allow us to draw a more precise set of inferences, 
because the geographic isolation of Kashmir favored the mainte­
nance of the same cultural archetypes over a long period of time. 
Thus, the Kashmiri garden represents a relatively uncorrupted typo­
logical process, one that allows us to draw similar deductions in 
more complex cultures. 
“Kashmir is the garden of eternal spring, a safe (haven) for the 
palace of the King,”16 wrote Jahangir about his trip to Srinagar. But 
what does that really mean? What can we infer from this apparently 
simple statement? First of all, reading between the lines, we can note 
how a one-line epithet blends together different, seemingly incom­
patible scales, and how their metaphors depict a set of peculiar 
spatial relationships: the 170 x 60 km valley of Kashmir becomes a 
single “garden,” one of eternal flourishing beauty; then, it suddenly 
becomes one with the strong, opposite imagery of the safe haven, 
merging a vast valley and the architecture of a royal palace into a 
whole-a seemingly all-inclusive organic system. Analyzing the to­
pography and spatial layout of its anthropic elements, we can note 
how Kashmir was to Hindu eyes a ksetra—a complex hierarchical 
system of holy places linked by pilgrimage circuits (yatra).17 The 
13 See Pugacenkova 1978, which gives a 
diagram of the city’s quadripartite layout. 
14 On Herat see Gaube 1979; Brandenburg 
1977; Samizay 1989. 
15 See Memoires of Zehir-ed-din Muhammad 
Babur (1826, 1921). The chronology of the 
gardens along the left bank is still an open 
debate. Ebba Koch disagrees, for example, 
that the present Ram Bagh is of the Babur 
period. See Koch 1986, Notes on the 
Painted and Sculptured Decoration of Nur 
Jahan’s Pavilions in the Ram Bagh at Agra, 
in Facets of Indian Art 1986. The same 
conclusion is reached, after stylistic analysis, 
for the Zahara Bagh: see Koch 1986, The 
Zahara Bagh (Bagh-i Jahanara) at Agra, in 
Environmental Design, 2, 1986: 3-37. 
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whole Indian subcontinent is structured according to a hierarchy of 
similar landmarks, within which ritual movement generates a hier­
archy of pilgrimages to specific places. India is covered by a meshed 
pattern of these revered sites and the roads necessary to reach them, 
a pattern further subdivided into secondary systems according to a 
precise religious hierarchy. Everything, from the larger scale (the 
four corners of the continent) to the smaller subsystem (the single 
city) is structurally configured according to ritual movement and 
symmetrical references. Within such a system, the smaller unit 
always reflects the principle of the larger scale as an all-inclusive 
religious and cultural unity. 
Returning to our example, the smaller unit—the city of 
Srinagar—is situated in such a way that the surrounding topography 
simultaneously suggests and strengthens the holiness of the place. 
Thus it is a matter of individuating the “sacred area” around 
Srinagar—those significant points that define its lines.18 The ideal 
line connecting temples, linga, villages, orchards, vineyards, water 
sources, sanctuaries, gardens and tombs, defines the lines of this 
sacred space. Surprisingly, this line does not coincide with the ridges 
of the mountains overlooking the Fhelum valley, but marks the edge 
of the cultivated land, separating the artificial world of orchards, 
vineyards, floating gardens, and canals from swamps and forests. 
Mountains, then, are not the ideal walls of the king’s haven! After 
all, it is not a coincidence that, in Brahman art, the ksetra is always 
represented as an enclosed garden. 
The lines mainly contain an aquatic world. “The Gods approach 
the places which contain water and gardens,” says the Bhavisya 
Purana (I.CXXX, 10).” The Gods reside close to the forests, rivers 
and mountains, streams and in the cities which are full of gardens” 
(I.CXXX, 15). In the 7th century Kadambari of Banabhatt, we find a 
description of a garden-palace featuring various devices for the 
collection and transportation of water, and pools for bathing. In the 
Rajatarangini, Kalhana mentions a garden founded by the king 
Jaysingh in 1150 in Kashmir (VII, 3360). Although we can’t prove 
the existence in pre-Islamic times of formal gardens based on water 
sources instead of simple forests and lawns, everything seems to 
confirm it. We can imagine a continuous sequence of different 
gardens blending with the pattern of agricultural fields and or­
chards, sometimes floating on the lake to ultimately express a per­
fect synthesis of water and agriculture. Gardens, then, embody and 
foster that synthesis at the same time. They can be taken as the crys­
tallization of the structural organization of that particular culture. 
Extending our overview beyond Kashmir, the gardens of Persia, 
Central Asia, and India—supported by a philological reading of 
16 Nur ad-Din Muhammad Jahangir, Tucak-i 
Jahangiri, A. Beveridge, ed. (New Delhi: 
1968, translated by A. Rogers), pp. 143–144. 
17 A scientific, although partial reconstruction 
of Srinagar’s tirtha has been attempted by 
Stein 1899. Abu’l Fazl’Allami, the bio­
grapher of Mughal emperor Akbar, lists 
in the valley 45 shrines dedicated to 
Mahadeva, 64 to Vishnu, 3 to Brabama, 
and 22 to Durga; in 700 places he notes 
carvings of snakes as objects of devotion. 
See Abu’l Fazl’Allami, The Ain-i Akbari, 
translated by H.S. Jarret (Delhi, Oriental 
Books, 1978), vol. 2, p. 352. Also, 250 plans 
representing tirtha are kept in the Srinagar 
Museum, originally belonging to a manu­
script by Pandit Sahibram, who died in 
1872. 
18 This is also common to the Islamic world, 
as for example in the Haram around the 
Mecca; or to Western countries, as in the 
sacred hills around Varese, Italy. 
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their miniature representations—suggest a general process based on 
a progressive metamorphosis of water from a dynamic to a static 
state and, similarly, from open to enclosed form in the relationship 
of garden to environment. The formative process of the typical 
garden shows the prevalence of a hierarchy based on the longitudi­
nal axis, marked by a waterline, which evolved from a marginal 
position (such as in Bagh-i Fin of Kashan) to an increasingly promi­
nent location (as in the Babur garden in Kabul, where a line of water 
runs through fourteen terraces). As in the scenes portrayed in min­
iature paintings, in reality the original short perspective of the 
caharbagh is progressively extended, until it reaches outside the 
enclosure to include part of the surrounding landscape.19 
Thus, the changing nature of the garden progressively marked a 
crossover from an idea of nature closed within the abstract scheme of 
the caharbagh to an organic representation of the relation between the 
garden and the landscape itself. Babur, founder of the Mughal dynasty, 
aimed to provide the territory with equidistant points of sojourn and 
recreation at Dholpur, Agra, Fathpur Sikri and even Sheikhupura, close 
to the site of the Panipat battle: the system was constructed through 
environmental-scale gardens connected by a welter of roads and hy­
draulic infrastructures which his successors ceaselessly strengthened and 
added to. The final aim was always the same: to gaze on the impossible 
model of a single great garden as large as the whole Empire.20 
Symmetry, simplicity, metaphor: a simple canvas of design elements 
blending landscape and formal gardens pervades the entire modeling of 
the environment in the encampment, the palace, and the city. We have 
already discussed how palaces, having been turned into the administra­
tive centers of a bureaucratic empire, were conceived in their layout as 
gardens through the intermediary stage of the royal encampment. These 
palaces further built up the structural grid, growing out of all propor­
tion so as to house services, ministries, and the increasingly more com­
plex activities of representation. But it is only in the valley of Kashmir, 
again, that the Mughal dynasty reached the goal of integrating the 
design of the garden into a larger territorial structure. 
To conclude, Mughal geometric order ascends in a territorial 
grid capable of reaching beyond the regional scale. Similarly, the 
concept of the oasis of the Arab world projects the idea of enclo­
sure to the scale of the whole territory. The Indian subcontinent 
has always been an incomplete system of hydraulic infrastructure 
and street networks, as well as services and gardens for the stop­
overs in the king’s journeys, where each garden was itself a small-
scale territory furrowed by canals and tree-lined paths—a constant 
set of relationships that has shaped the territory of today. 
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19 In reality, the process is more complex. 
The garden comprises in itself a blend of 
different schemes, such as the double 
caharbagh witb a central axis cutting 
tbrough three terraces in the Shalimar of 
Lahore, or tbe deliberate acceleration of 
the water or abrupt level changes 
according to the existent topography, as in 
Kabul or in Kashmir. Also, we shouldn’t 
forget how tbe tomb-garden, by far the 
most conservative type, persists until the 
18th century with the same archetypal 
features. 
20 This territorial framework, based on an 
infrastructure system extended to all 
regions of the Empire, was homogeneous 
in theory but discontinuous in practice. The 
provincial governors vied with each other 
to endow the network witb caravanserai 
and resting places, to dig wells, plant 
gardens, shade main roads by planting 
endless lines of trees, and cross water 
courses by building bold stone bridges. An 
example of Mughal megalomania is the 
khiyaban, the great national boulevards. It 
seems that the idea of creating shady 
roads-a continuous oasis for tbe repose 
and protection of travelers, or a linear 
pergola at the scale of the whole nation-
came to Jahangir. But kbiyaban existed at 
Samarkand, Qazvir, Tabriz, etc., albeit at a 
local scale. Royal caravanserai (padshahi 
seray) with a garden where the court could 
camp out, existed along all the main routes 
of the Empire. See R. Ch. Kak, Antiquities 
of Bhimbar and Rajauri, in Memoires of the 
Archaeological Survey of India (Calcutta: 
1923: 14. 
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TOWARD INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH 
The relationships among garden, encampment, palace, and finally 
city and territory as the image of the king, open up new insights into the 
study, still in its infancy, of Islamic town planning. The outline above 
argues that, throughout Islam, a crucial aspect of the Islamic garden is 
the complex set of relationships it establishes at various scales, and how 
it serves as the basis for all human developments. The garden-territory 
nexus, then, may be seen not only as an aesthetic but, on the contrary, 
as a complex anthropic reality. 
The numerous studies done by geographers, among them the fun­
damental work of Xavier de Planhol on anthropized landscapes, of 
Lambton on agriculture in Iran, of Sauvaigo on Mediterranean agricul­
ture, and of Bisson on the oases as production areas, have always 
skimmed the theme of the garden. In an essay of at least fifteen years 
ago—Dar al Islam, Architetture nel Territorio dei Paesi Islamici— 
I tried in my turn to link Islamic settlements with the extraordinary 
infrastructures realized by those cultures for irrigation and agriculture. I 
also aimed to demonstrate how those functional works had much in 
common with the garden, aesthetics aside. In that same book, the envi­
ronment is deliberately left aside (or seldom brought up) in order to 
focus on a narrower set of relationships. As the former arguments tried 
to evidence, it deserves a much more ample space. The field remains 
open for efficient ways to tackle the subject. 
In approaching such a complex problem, it seems legitimate to 
establish certain categories in which to group single phenomena in 
homogenous classes, to define a chronological order, to examine their 
variants and how they affected the original categories. Furthermore, 
synchronic variants will class the differences introduced by the single 
designer within the general category. The analysis of these variants and 
their evolution will be referred to herein as the “typological process” whose 
aim is to retrace the crucial links between the garden and other forms of 
anthropic appropriation of the environment. 
The multi-layered world of Islam seems to allow this approach only 
by cultural region. On the other hand, typological process may be an 
effcient way to undertake a study of the complex influences absorbed by 
Islamic cultures. For example, consider the city of Samarra, Iraq, capital 
of the Abassid empire from 836 until 892. A boundless city of enormous 
linear extension (a 35-km strip along the Tigris)21 for the exclusive use 
of the Caliph, Samarra is a juxtaposition of Palatine cities according to 
typological schemes of various cultural matrixes, such as the Roman, 
Hellenistic, Byzantine, Sasanian, and Umayyad, dilated to the territorial 
scale. Typological analysis may show how this extraordinary case is far 
from being unique, and provide the methodological tools for retracing 
its apparently impenetrable evolution based on what exists today. 
The outline above argues that, through­
out Islam, a crucial aspect of the Islamic 
garden is the complex set of relation­
ships it establishes at various scales, and 
how it serves as the basis for all human 
developments. The garden-territory 
nexus, then, may be seen not only as an 
aesthetic but, on the contrary, as a 
complex anthropic reality. 
21 On Samarra see J.M. Rogers, Samarra. 
A study in medieval town planning, in The 
Islamic City, A.H. Hourani and S.M. Stern, 
eds. London: Cassirer, 1970), and 
T. al-Janabi, Islamic archaeology in Iraq:
 
recent excavations at Samarra, in World
 
Archaeology, XIV, 1983: 305–327.
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We can lay out a typological approach keeping in mind three funda­
mental issues: the meaning of type, the search for unity within the 
complexity of Islam, and finally the garden as the aesthetic distillate of 
agriculture. 
We can define “type” as the ensemble of characteristics and tecton­
ics that are common to a set of buildings, cities, and gardens in a precise 
geographical area and a precise period of time. But type, according to 
Saverio Muratori, is also a generative action a priori: it already exists in 
the subconscious of the designer, and it is an integral part of collective 
imagery, thus anticipating the act of building. In the entire Islamic 
world there is an archetypal form that has become almost synonymous 
with the Islamic garden, namely, the Chahar bagh, a system composed 
of two perpendicular axes intersecting and defining four equal quad­
rants sometimes featuring a monumental landmark (see Walcher, this 
22 This is demonstrated by the recurrentvolume, for a discussion of Chahar bagh as manifested in the Safavid 
ending in -pur, -mar, -khot in villages’
capital of Isfahan). It is not important to argue about the origin of the names; -sar, -nambal, -nag in the names of 
form so much as to underline its universality, and start engaging in	 lakes and swamps; -kul and -khan in the 
names of rivers and torrents.research on the process of its evolution. 
Typological research could start from regional cultures and expand 
its overview to the whole Islamic world, as a consequence of the overlap 
between sacred topography in Hindu and Muslim cultures. In fact, we 
can argue that the appropriation of territory by the Islamic dynasties 
from Shams al-Din to Akbar occurred through a ritual refoundation 
based on the simple resacralization of venerated places and water 
sources. Thus, in spite of cultural and religious differences, there is a 
substantial continuity between Hindu and Muslim dynasties, as proved 
in the territorial management of the valley of Kashmir. Continuity, in 
any case, is confirmed by the toponymy, conserving an unmistakably 
Sanskrit origin.22 
The garden is often regarded as a manifestation of refined beauty 
and intricate symbolism—essentially as an object. In reality, it is but the 
aesthetic distillate of an agricultural civilization, always playing a deci­
sive role in any anthropic process. Of the three axioms, this last one, 
because of the continuity of its evolution in all cultures, may be the 
starting point for future interdisciplinary research. 
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Section IV: Marine Environments 
Middle Eastern Marine Environments: An Overview of Anthropogenic Impacts 
Menakhem Ben-Yami 
Fisheries Development and Management Adviser 
ABSTRACT 
The seas that surround the lands of the Middle East have been significantly affected over the last century by human 
activities, including fishing, coastal engineering projects, and pollution from municipal, industrial, agricultural, and shipping 
sources. The impacts of these activities are only likely to increase in the future. Without coordinated, cooperative efforts 
by the nations involved, the seas of the Middle East are threatened with catastrophic change. 
INTRODUCTION 
The marine areas of the Middle East include four major basins: 
the Levant Basin (i.e., the Southeast Mediterranean); the Red Sea; 
the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Oman (which are 
more or less contiguous); and the Persian Gulf. Problems associated 
with anthropogenic change have increasingly affected the marine 
environments of the Middle East just as they have the world’s other 
seas, but Middle Eastern seas also have to contend with problems 
and issues that are peculiar to, or especially acute in, the region. 
Among these features are:
 •	 the Suez Canal, with its dense ship traffic and the huge
 
amounts of crude oil, fuels, and petro-chemicals that are
 
transported through all Middle East marine areas;
 
•	 biological issues specific to the two semi-enclosed basins of
 
the region (i.e., the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf) including
 
such special tropical biotopes as coral reefs; and
 
•	 inadequate regional and sub-regional cooperation in envi­
ronmental matters, due to historical, political, and cultural
 
reasons.
 
Numerous studies describe the changes in marine environments 
that have occurred throughout the Middle East during the past few 
decades (Ben-Tuvia 1985; Ben-Yami and Glaser 1974; Caddy 1993b; 
Caddy and Oliver 1996; Golik and Goldsmith 1986; Inman and 
Jenkins 1984; Nir 1989; Vadiya and Shenuda 1985). These changes 
include pollution and eutrophication as well as the side effects of 
certain engineering projects. 
The main environmental problems in Middle Eastern marine 
environments today are: 
•	 Pollution originating from municipal, industrial, and agri­
cultural sources in densely populated areas with high popu­
lation growth rates, e.g., in the southeastern Mediterranean;
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•	 Coastal erosion and other effects of engineering
 
projects;
 
•	 The question of fisheries sustainability; 
•	 Conservation of marine and coastal biotopes and 
endangered species, as well as biota migration through the 
Suez Canal; 
•	 Oil spills; 
•	 Pollution due to shipping. 
MUNICIPAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND AGRICULTURAL 
EFFLUENTS 
These effluents, which are the most common and significant 
sources of marine pollution, often contain a wide variety of nutri­
ents, untreated bio-wastes including bacteria and viruses, and pesti­
cides and other toxins including heavy metals and assorted 
chemicals. They are on occasion abnormally acidic or basic relative 
to the marine environment that they enter. These effluents may 
trigger physical and/or chemical processes, including both those 
inherent in the existing marine ecosystem as well as those that can 
only happen in the presence of pollution. For example, certain efflu­
ents may result in the synergistic creation or transformation of 
poisonous materials and/or the re-accumulation of contaminants, 
with unpredictable and accumulative consequences, to which some 
species may be more sensitive than others (Patin 1992). 
Areas particularly affected by this sort of pollution can be found 
along the coasts of Israel and Gaza, the Nile Delta, the Gulfs of 
Aqaba and Oman, and the Persian Gulf. The situation is exacerbated 
by the fact that certain industrial interests, both from within the 
region and without, are often looking for locales where anti-pollu­
tion legislation is either weak or un-enforced in order to establish 
production facilities that would not be permitted under more strin­
gent anti-pollution regimes (or would face high-cost investment in 
environment-friendly technology). 
MARINE AND COASTAL FISH FARMING 
Coastal and marine fish farms produce primarily organic waste, 
which can be especially detrimental to the ecosystems of semi-en­
closed bays and inlets. Coastal fish farm effluents are mainly nutri­
ents, but may also include misapplied chemicals (Berg and 
Lavilla-Pitogo 1996). Marine cage farms also produce effluents, 
although these are more readily dispersed because of their offshore 
location. In addition to waste feed and fish feces, marine cage farms 
may also introduce such undesirable elements as residual antibiotics 
and chemicals from disease and parasite treatments. Marine fish 
Certain effluents may result in the 
synergistic creation or transformation of 
poisonous materials and/or the re-
accumulation of contaminants, with 
unpredictable and accumulative 
consequences, which some species may 
be more sensitive to than others (Patin 
1992). 
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farming development in the Red Sea (Shehadeh and Feidi 1996) may 
lead to environmental damage, especially of coral reefs, if sites and 
culture practices are not chosen with care. 
HOSTILITIES 
Oil pollution, whether from accidents or hostilities, has so far 
occurred mainly in the Persian Gulf, where the world’s most dra­
matic oil spill resulted from intentional Iraqi releases during the 
1991 Gulf War. The Iraqis spilled an estimated eleven million barrels 
of crude oil into the Gulf, which spread quickly and affected hun­
dreds of kilometers of coastline, mainly in Saudi Arabia. Cleaning 
efforts recovered an estimated 13% of the total. Contrary to a num­
ber of pessimistic forecasts, the Gulf environment managed to re­
bound rapidly from this disaster. Experience with this and other 
spills seems to indicate that warm, tropical marine ecosystems en­
able more rapid and effective decomposition of oil pollution than 
more temperate ecosystems, thanks in large part to intense solar 
radiation and the action of oil-degrading bacteria. 
FISHERIES 
Fisheries play an important economic role in the Middle East, 
especially in the countries of the southern Arabian Peninsula and in 
Egypt (see Feidi, this volume). Although some of these resources are 
currently under pressure from excessive fishing and other anthropo­
genic factors, none of them are currently considered seriously over­
exploited (Caddy and Oliver 1996; Feidi 1996; Sanders and Morgan 
1989). Since most of the fish stocks straddle the waters of more than 
one country, international and regional fishery management has an 
important role to play. In the semi-enclosed Mediterranean, fisher­
ies have increasingly been affected by the combined effect of inten­
sive fishing activities and persisting enrichment (eutrophication) 
due to runoff of nutrients and other polluting agents. Coastal pollu­
tion and the resulting eutrophication are playing a paradoxical role 
with respect to fisheries in oligotrophic seas (i.e. seas that are poor 
in nutrients and of low primary production). Although pollution is 
generally seen as something to avoid, the stable and even growing 
Mediterranean fish landings can only be explained in terms of man-
made enrichment of its waters. This enrichment seems to be com­
pensating for the reduction of nutrients that were once supplied by 
the Nile River but that were halted after the 1964 construction of the 
Aswan High Dam. Apparently, anthropogenic eutrophication is the 
main cause of the increasing landings in Mediterranean fisheries 
(Caddy 1993b, 1996). The sardine fishery offers a case in point. 
The Gulf’s experience with this and 
other spills seems to indicate that warm, 
tropical marine ecosystems are able to 
deal more quickly and effectively with oil 
pollution than more temperate 
ecosystems, thanks in large part to 
intense solar radiation and the action of 
oil-degrading bacteria. 
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Prior to the construction of the Aswan High Dam, this fishery pro­
duced 18,000 to 25,000 T/yr off the Nile Delta. After 1964, this fish­
ery collapsed to 550 T in 1966. Since the 1980s, however, sardine and 
other small pelagic catches in Egypt’s Mediterranean waters have 
rebounded to about 50% of the pre-Aswan period. Catches of some 
demersal fish have also grown significantly. These and other yield 
increases appear to be a result of anthropogenic enrichment rather 
than of the inadequate fisheries management that characterizes the 
region. Still, the relationship between eutrophication and fisheries 
should concern all Mediterranean countries, particularly in view of 
the ecological calamity that befell the Black Sea fisheries in early 
1990s, which evidently was triggered and fed by man-made pollu­
tion, resulting in eutrophication, combined with a devastating intru­
sion of an exotic predatory comb-jelly (Zaitsev 1993; Caddy 1993; 
Ben-Yami 1994). 
TOURISM DEVELOPMENT 
Expansion of the tourist industry, as in the case of the recent 
rapid development along the coasts of the Gulf of Aqaba/Eilat, is 
quite a separate issue. Inadequate planning of tourist infrastructure, 
especially large hotels, can put severe strains on existing sewage 
treatment and disposal systems that were originally established to 
serve much smaller populations. 
In semi-enclosed marine basins, all projects involving massive 
increase of the density of coastal population, whether permanent or 
transient, should be looked upon as components of one combined 
system. One way to assess eventual combined damage and at the 
same time to set limits on proposed tourism development is: (a) to 
assess the existing contribution to marine pollution in terms of 
person/day/pollution factors; (b) to assess the maximum sustainable 
pollution capacity throughout the affected marine area (approxi­
mate pollution carrying capacity (GESAMP 1986; Krom and Cohen 
1991)); (c) to determine the additional number of person-days that 
the ecosystem affected can sustain without permanent damage to 
coral reefs, water clarity, etc., taking into consideration the existing and 
additional (planned) means of sewage treatment; and (d) upon such 
determination, to allow additional population in the various projects. 
In areas such as the Gulf of Aqaba, this integrated approach 
would call for international cooperation, which has, of course, not 
always been easy for Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. 
Although pollution is generally seen as 
something to avoid, the stable and even 
growing Mediterranean fish landings 
can only be explained in terms of man-
made enrichment of its waters. This 
enrichment seems to be compensating 
for the reduction of nutrients that were 
once supplied by the Nile River but that 
were halted after the 1964 construction 
of the Aswan High Dam…still, the 
relationship between eutrophication and 
fisheries should concern all Mediterra­
nean countries, particularly in view of 
the ecological calamity that befell the 
Black Sea fisheries in early 1990s, 
which evidently was triggered and fed by 
man-made pollution, resulting in 
eutrophication, combined with a 
devastating intrusion of an exotic 
predatory comb-jelly. 
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CORALS 
In the Middle East marine environment, corals still abound and 
thrive. Coral reefs are sensitive biotopes, vulnerable not only to 
anthropogenic but also to natural stressors. Pollution (of any kind) 
and coral piracy can bring about, directly or indirectly, the degrada­
tion or death of a reef. Dead coral reefs are often found covered with 
sponge growth or algal turf, while multi-species bleaching of coral 
reefs, recently reported from the southern Persian Gulf (Dr. Roger 
Uwate—private communication), is the result of breakdown of the 
symbiosis between the corals and Zooxanthellae algae. Coral bleach­
ing has been ascribed to several factors, most often to warming of 
the sea water. Seasonal floods carrying sediment that deposits on 
coral reefs are another natural cause for reef degradation. It remains 
to be seen whether proposed marine reserves will serve as an effec­
tive means for saving coral reefs (Russ 1996). 
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MARINE POLLUTION 
In seas with low natural productivity, such as the Red Sea and 
the Mediterranean, eutrophication may initially enhance marine 
organism populations, but it may also later lead to major environ­
mental damage and even to collapse of whole ecosystems. Pollution 
may reduce biodiversity and cause harmful genetic changes, espe­
cially in the sensitive ecosystems of coral reefs in the Red Sea/Indian 
Ocean system and the brackish and hypersaline lagoons in Egypt. 
Algal and medusae blooms linked to pollution may reduce water 
clarity and threaten other marine organisms as well as the tourist 
and recreational industry in coastal areas, such as the Levant Basin 
and along the shores of the Sinai Peninsula. Another danger from 
pollution is the concentration of heavy metals or other toxic sub­
stances in seafood. Special attention must be paid to the presence of 
such contaminants as mercury and cadmium in the run-off from 
existing and developing industries in the region (Enserink et al. 
1991; Simpson 1981; Talbot 1989; Nogawa 1984). Countries of the 
Middle East have a joint interest in protecting their waters from 
pollution, in particular from non-biodegradable contaminants. 
Cooperative regulation and enforcement on the part of the littoral 
states would benefit the environmental health of the Middle East’s 
marine basins (i.e., eastern Mediterranean; Red Sea; Gulf of Aden, 
Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman; and the Persian Gulf). The Persian 
Gulf in particular is ecologically vulnerable to the actions of its 
littoral states as well as the riparians of the Tigris-Euphrates river 
basin whose waters flow into the Gulf. 
Pollution of any kind and coral piracy 
can bring about, directly or indirectly, 
the degradation or death of a reef… 
Coral bleaching has been ascribed to 
several factors, most often to warming 
of the sea water. Seasonal floods 
carrying sediment that overlays coral 
reefs is another natural cause for reefs 
degradation. It remains to be seen 
whether proposed marine reserves 
would be an effective means for saving 
coral reefs.…Pollution may reduce bio­
diversity and cause harmful genetic 
changes, especially in the sensitive 
ecosystems of coral reefs in the Red 
Sea/Indian Ocean system and the 
brakish and hypersaline lagoons in 
Egypt. 
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MIGRATION, BIODIVERSITY, AND EXOTIC SPECIES 
In some areas of the Middle East, native marine life faces not 
only exposure to pollution and destruction of feeding and breeding 
habitats, but also the added risks of competition due to intentional 
or accidental introductions of exotic organisms. Examples of this 
include diseases and their carriers, such as the new Noda virus which 
is the cause of viral encephalopathy in seabass, a fish cultured in the 
area, or the viruses that have been plaguing shrimp farms in south­
ern Asia. Introductions and immigrations of exotic wild and farmed 
species may affect biodiversity in the marine ecosystem. Indeed, this 
phenomenon has long been an issue in the Mediterranean, where 
numerous migrants from the Red Sea have been continually settling 
in the Levant Basin in niches occupied by native species (Golani, this 
volume; Ben-Tuvia 1978, 1985; Ben-Yami and Glaser 1974; Golani 
and Ben-Tuvia 1989). More recently, for example, in the Gulf of 
Aqaba, the Mediterranean gilthead seabream raised by Israeli cage 
farmers in Eilat have already found their way into the wild. 
COASTAL CONSTRUCTION 
Coastal and other marine construction is often detrimental to 
the coastline, low delta areas, and in-shore biotopes, both in biologi­
cal and physical terms. Too often the damage done by such con­
struction could easily have been predicted and avoided. Unfortu­
nately, steadily increasing real estate values in heavily populated 
coastal areas have often led developers to disregard the environmen­
tal costs of their work. 
Additionally, engineering projects influencing the flow of major 
rivers may lead to ecological damage of the marine environment 
downstream, as in the Nile Delta-Suez Canal area and below the 
Shatt al-Arab (Inman and Jenkins 1984; Vadiya and Shenuda 1985). 
Especially conspicuous has been the coastal erosion in Egypt in the 
wake of the Aswan High Dam construction. 
Poorly planned harbors, marinas, and similar projects, both 
already completed and still in the planning stage, have become or 
may yet become ecological calamities. In Israel, these include the 
Ashdod harbor and the marina at Herzlia. Also, the coast of Gaza is 
already heavily eroded due to the rather small structures existing 
there (Golik and Goldsmith 1986). Any major construction, such as 
a deepwater harbor, especially if based on sea walls or breakwaters 
protruding seawards, would certainly substantially accelerate the 
coastal erosion, endangering not just the beaches, but also coastal 
roads and residential areas (Nir 1989). Such at-risk sites may in fact be 
developed by innovative, alternative solutions, such as offshore har­
bors connected with the coast by bridges allowing free flow of water. 
In some areas of the Middle East, the 
native marine life faces not only 
exposure to pollution and destruction of 
feeding and breeding habitats, but also 
the added risks of competition due to 
intentional or accidental introductions of 
exotic organisms.…Unfortunately, 
steadily increasing real estate values in 
heavily populated coastal areas have 
often led developers to disregard the 
environmental costs of their work.… 
Additionally, engineering projects 
influencing the flow of major rivers may 
lead to ecological damage of the marine 
environment downstream.…Especially 
conspicuous has been the coastal 
erosion in Egypt in the wake of the 
Aswan High Dam construction. 
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SHIPPING 
Pollution generated by shipping, notably oil tankers, (particu­
larly along the shipping lines leading to and from the Suez Canal, 
the Straits of Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Oman, and Shatt al-Arab) 
contaminates both the sea and coastlines. This pollution is partly 
caused by the flushing of ships’ bilges and oil and fuel tanks at sea, 
and partly by jettisoned waste and litter, some of which is practically 
indestructible plastic (Golik and Gertner 1989). Much of this pollu­
tion arrives at beaches in the form of tar-like products and as ordi­
nary garbage. Frequently, marine animals may swallow plastic bags 
and other containers or fasteners, while others may become en­
tangled in this waste with potentially fatal consequences. The Suez 
Canal alone carries some 20,000 vessels that transport about 14 % of 
the world’s trade. This includes 2,500 oil tankers. The average 
amount of crude oil passing daily through the Suez Canal is ap­
proximately 800,000 barrels. The Canal has been deepened recently 
to 17.5 meters, which makes it navigable by all but the largest oil 
tankers. The load of the oil traffic on the Canal seems, however, to 
be subsiding owing to increased use of the Suez-Mediterranean 
Pipeline (SUMED) and to a lesser degree the Trans-Israel Pipeline 
(TIP). Because the oil to and from these pipelines is carried by ships, 
the transfer of oil into and out of the pipelines may in fact increase 
the risk of spills. 
Apart from Persian Gulf oil, the crude-oil load of the Suez Canal 
also derives from local production which is centered on the Gulf of 
Suez basin. Further development of oil refineries and petro-chemi­
cal industries has been projected in Egypt. 
FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS AND COASTAL ZONE 
MANAGEMENT 
In all areas, but especially in enclosed and semi-enclosed bays, 
gulfs, and lagoons, there is a need for “preventive” research and 
surveys. One objective for research is the assessment of their capac­
ity to absorb waste originating from human activities (GESAMP 
1986), with special attention to heavy metals and other toxic sub­
stances. This research should include the water at all levels, the 
sediments, and the flora and fauna (Caddy 1993). Routine monitor­
ing and regular scientific research represent an essential condition 
for rational decision-making and should be introduced in all marine 
areas to prevent unpleasant surprises, including environmental 
effects due to global warming (Everett 1995) and ozone depletion 
(Baker 1991) on especially sensitive ecosystems. 
At the same time we should bear in mind the widely discussed 
limitations of environmental sciences, both in terms of the reliability 
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Poorly planned harbors, marinas, and 
similar projects, both already completed 
and still in the planning stage, have 
become or may yet become ecological 
calamities. In Israel, these include the 
Ashdod harbor and the marina at 
Herzlia.…Pollution generated by 
shipping, notably oil tankers, contami­
nates both the sea and coastlines. This 
pollution is partly caused by the flushing 
of ships’ bilges and oil and fuel tanks at 
sea, and partly by jettisoned waste and 
litter, some of which is practically 
indestructible plastic.…The load of the 
oil traffic on the Canal seems, however, 
to be subsiding owing to increased use 
of the Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline 
(SUMED) and to a lesser degree the 
Trans-Israel Pipeline (TIP). Because the 
oil to and from these pipelines is carried 
by ships, the transfer of oil into and out 
of the pipelines may in fact increase the 
risk of spills. 
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of environmental capacity assessments (Krom and Cohen 1991) and 
forecasting of the influence of natural and man-caused changes on 
whole ecosystems and their separate components. 
Undoubtedly, the world-wide movement toward integrated 
coastal zones management (ICZM), which appears increasingly 
essential in view of the multiple users of coastal waters, beaches, and 
related resources, will also arrive in the Middle East. Coastal devel­
opment and protection are largely a national issue related to envi­
ronmental degradation of shores, including coastal lakes and 
lagoons, mangrove areas, beaches, and coral reefs. This issue may 
become international where major coastal construction projects in 
one country may cause beach degradation in another, or where 
pollution originating in one country is contaminating beaches and 
inshore waters of its neighbors. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the high rate of population growth, industrial and 
tourism development, and crude oil production and transportation, 
problems in the marine environment of the Middle East will in­
creasingly require national attention and international cooperation 
among neighboring countries. In some areas, such as the Persian 
Gulf, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the southeastern Mediterranean, whole 
marine ecosystems may collapse without such cooperation. Efforts 
toward the establishment or reinforcement of such cooperation 
must continue despite the often tense political situations in many of 
these regions. 
Routine monitoring and regular 
scientific research represent an 
essential condition for rational decision-
making and should be introduced in all 
marine areas to prevent unpleasant 
surprises, including environmental 
effects due to global warming and 
ozone depletion, especially on sensitive 
ecosystems. 
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Impact of Red Sea Fish Migrants through the Suez Canal on the Aquatic Environment of the 
Eastern Mediterranean 
Daniel Golani 
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
ABSTRACT 
The invasion of Red Sea organisms through the Suez Canal, known as “Lessepsian migration” (after Ferdinand de 
Lesseps, the Frenchman who directed the canal’s construction), has profoundly modified the ecosystem of the Eastern 
Mediterranean. This migration, the result of major man-made changes in the area, has given us a unique opportunity to 
study the process of invasion and colonization by tropical biota of a sub-tropical region populated by temperate biota. 
The present research on Lessepsian fish focuses on three major areas: 1) identifying the characteristics distinguishing 
colonizer species from closely related non-colonizer species in the Red Sea; 2) assessing the colonizer populations’ 
responses to the new environmental conditions; and 3) studying the impact of the Lessepsian migration on the Eastern 
Mediterranean ecosystem. 
INTRODUCTION 
No zoogeographic marine area of the world has been affected 
more by man-made changes than the eastern Mediterranean. Two The opening of the Canal in 1869 has 
major projects have heavily influenced the Levantine marine ecosys- zoogeographic and ecological ramifica­
tem: the construction of the Suez Canal, completed in 1869, and, to tions far beyond those envisioned by its 
designers, who only intended to provide a lesser extent, the Aswan High Dam. The dam, which became fully 
a quick trade route from Europe to operational in 1964, resulted in the cessation of fluvial sedimenta-
India and the Far East. 
tion and nutrients to the Mediterranean, leading to a sharp decrease 
in fish populations, mainly sardines (Aleem 1972); as a result, the 
Egyptian purse seine fishing industry today takes only 10% of the 
pre-dam catch. The Suez Canal, however, has had an even more 
significant and lasting impact. 
The opening of the Canal in 1869 has had zoogeographic and 
ecological ramifications far beyond those envisioned by its design­
ers, who only intended to provide a quick trade route from Europe 
to India and the Far East. Stretching from Port Said in the north, the 
Suez Canal continues southward for 162.5 km, crossing Lake 
Timsah and the Bitter Lakes on its way to the city of Suez and the 
Gulf of Suez. For most of its length, the canal is quite narrow, only 
200–300 m, and very shallow, 10–15 m. The canal connects two 
major bodies of water, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, which 
differ fundamentally both faunistically and hydrographically. The 
main abiotic difference between the two regions is the temperature 
regime, which is stable in the tropical Red Sea but experiences wide 
fluctuations in the subtropical Mediterranean. The fauna of the Red 
Sea is of tropical Indo-Pacific origin, while that of the Mediterra­
nean is mainly of temperate Atlantic origin. In the wake of the 
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opening of the Suez Canal, each sea was exposed to invasion of 
organisms from the other sea. However, the vast majority of migra­
tional movement has been from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. 
This influx of biota from the Red Sea into the Mediterranean has 
been termed “Lessepsian migration” (Por 1978), in recognition of 
Ferdinand de Lesseps, the engineer and spirit behind the creation of 
the Suez Canal. The minor migration in the opposite direction is 
known as “Anti-Lessepsian migration.” This phenomenon encom­
passes all major taxa. It is interesting to note that in all studied taxa, 
the percentage of Lessepsian migrants in the Levant is quite high: 
7.1% of Polychaeta (Ben-Eliyahu 1995); 22.9% of decapod crusta­
ceans (Galil 1992); 9.4% of Mollusca (Barash 1992) and 13.2% of 
fish (Golani 1996). Among all taxa, the study of fish is advantageous, 
since their taxonomy is well known and, due to their commercial 
importance, constant information on quantitative and qualitative 
changes of migrant and native populations is available through the 
local fisheries (Golani and Ben-Tuvia 1995). 
The phenomenon of Lessepsian migration provides a unique 
opportunity to investigate, on a large scale, processes of migration, 
invasion and colonization, processes which usually occur over a 
geological time scale. 
Lessepsian fish research commenced shortly after the opening of 
the Suez Canal, with the monitoring of fish species in the canal itself 
(Keller 1882; Tillier 1902). Until the late 1970s, the vast majority of 
studies were limited to reporting new arrivals and creating invento­
ries of migrant species (Ben-Tuvia 1966, 1978). In the 1980s and 
1990s, a wider approach has been taken, emphasizing quantitative 
and qualitative ecological analyses (Ben-Tuvia 1985; Golani and 
Ben-Tuvia 1995). The present research on Lessepsian fish focuses on 
three major areas: 
•	 identifying the characteristics distinguishing colonizer 
species from closely related non-colonizer species in the 
Red Sea; 
•	 assessing the colonizer populations’ responses to the new 
environmental conditions; and 
•	 studying the impact of the Lessepsian migration on the 
Eastern Mediterranean ecosystem. 
WHAT IS A SUCCESSFUL LESSEPSIAN FISH MIGRANT? 
It has been observed in many taxa that some species have a high 
dispersal and colonization ability while other closely related species 
with similar ecological requirements do not. In the Red Sea, there 
are a number of fish families with several species, of whom only 
a few have established populations in the Mediterranean. 
The fauna of the Red Sea is of tropical 
Indo-Pacific origin, while that of the 
Mediterranean is mainly of temperate 
Atlantic origin. In the wake of the 
opening of the Suez Canal, each sea was 
exposed to invasion of organisms from 
the other sea. 
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For example, there are 14 Goatfish (Mullidae) species in the Red Sea 
(Goren and Dor 1994), but only two, Upeneus moluccensis and U. 
pori, have migrated to the Mediterranean. Similarly, there are 15 
species of Squirrelfishes (Holocentridae) in the Red Sea but only one 
colonizer in the Mediterranean, namely, Sargocentron rubrum. 
The question of how to distinguish a potential colonizer was first 
approached by Elton (1958). In the mid 1960s, Baker and Stebbins 
(1965) and MacArthur and Wilson (1967) were among the first to 
study this problem in a multidisciplinary manner. In the Red Sea, 
their approach was utilized in the study of mollusc migrants (Lavee 
1983; Lavee and Ritte 1994). Selander and Kaufman (1973) noted 
that there are great differences between invertebrates and fish con­
cerning their response to changes in the environment. In the current 
study, criteria which distinguish the successful colonizer were exam­
ined in four critical areas. The goatfish family (Mullidae) was the 
subject of this multidisciplinary approach. The four factors chosen for 
examining the correlation to successful colonization were:
 •	 genetic variability;
 •	 breadth of trophic niche;
 •	 life history strategy; and
 •	 relative importance in the fish assemblage in the source site 
(Red Sea). 
GENETIC VARIABILITY 
Since the conditions in the target area differ from those prevail­
ing in the source area, the colonizer must respond rapidly to 
changes encountered in order to establish a sustainable population. 
Theoretically, an adequate response to the new selective pressure 
demands high genetic variability, so that within the given wide 
genetic repertoire, the appropriate genotype can be found, become 
dominant, and thus lead to successful adaptation. Five non-colo­
nizer species of Mullidae, Mulloides flavolineatus, Parupeneus 
forsskali, P. rubescens, P. macronema and Upeneus subvittatus, were 
compared to two mullid colonizers, Upeneus moluccensis and U. 
pori. Genetic variability was tested by electrophoretic examination of 
allozymes; the results revealed no correlation between genetic vari­
ability and success in colonization (Golani and Ritte 1993). These 
results confirm the general findings of Gray (1986) and Barrett and 
Richardson (1986). However, Parsons (1983) claimed that examina­
tion of specific allozymes responsible for adaptation to new environ­
mental conditions and facilitating success in colonization would 
reveal differences between colonizers and non-colonizers. 
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TROPHIC NICHE BREADTH 
The theoretical basis for examination of this factor resembles 
that for the previous factor, genetic variability, namely, that species 
which feed on a wide variety of food types (termed “generalist 
feeders”) will be better potential colonizers. Species with a narrow 
trophic niche breadth (“specialist feeders”) are less likely to find 
appropriate food in the new area. The feeding habits of three non-
colonizer mullids, Mulloides flavolineatus, Parupeneus forsskali and 
P. rubescens, were compared to that of the colonizer Upeneus pori 
(Ben-Eliahu and Golani 1990). No correlation was found between 
trophic niche breadth and success in colonization. 
LIFE HISTORY STRATEGY 
This factor is defined as the sum total of demographic features 
that determine the species’ fitness. MacArthur and Wilson (1967) 
developed a model, by which a continuum of life history strategy is 
determined. One end of the continuum represents the “r-strate­
gist,” which is characterized by rapid growth rate and a high repro­
ductive potential (which is expressed by a high intrinsic rate of 
increase, early sexual maturity, small body size, a short longevity 
and usually only one reproductive season). On the other end is the 
“K-strategist,” which is characterized by the opposite features. 
MacArthur and Wilson (1967) and Safriel and Ritte (1980) pre­
dicted that r-strategists would be better colonizers. Their reasoning 
was based on the hypothesis that smaller populations have greater 
probability of random extinction. Since the pioneer group of in­
vaders is usually small, not more than a few individuals, the invad­
ers must have the ability for rapid population growth in order to 
avoid extinction. Moreover, in the case of invaders who perceive 
their new environment as unpredictable in contrast to the source 
environment to which they have been long adapted, the invaders 
are prone to ecological catastrophes that are liable to decrease their 
population, leaving a very small number of individuals. 
The association between life history strategy and success in 
colonization has been studied also in the family Mullidae. Table 1 
summarizes demographic data on goatfishes in the source area of 
the Red Sea, obtained by Golani (1988) and others. From the data 
it can be concluded that the two colonizer species are indeed 
“r-strategists” as compared to the non-colonizers. However, Golani 
(1988) postulated that in the particular case of the eastern Mediter­
ranean, which is a heterogeneous ecosystem as compared to the 
Red Sea, the r-strategists had an advantage in colonizing this un­
predictable environment. Therefore, r-strategists are not necessarily 
In the case of invaders who perceive 
their new environment as unpredictable, 
in contrast to their source environment 
to which they have been long adapted, 
the invaders are prone to ecological 
catastrophes that are liable to decrease 
their population, leaving a very small 
number of individuals. 
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always better universal colonists. For example, the rivers of North 
America are dominated by typical K-strategist (mainly Cich lidae) 
colonizers (Stauffer 1984). 
Relative importance in fish assemblage in source site
 It is evident that, in order for colonization to be successful, there 
must be some similarity between the environmental conditions of 
the source habitat and that of the target habitat. This overlap must 
be within the range of tolerance of the colonizer. Golani and Ben-
Tuvia (1989) showed that the habitat in the eastern Mediterranean 
that is the most prone to Lessepsian colonization is shallow sandy or 
muddy substrates. The closest equivalent to this Mediterranean 
habitat in the Red Sea is the sandy shore. Examination of the fish 
assemblage in the Red Sea sandy shore revealed that the dominant 
species in this assemblage were Lessepsian migrants, who inhabited 
this habitat throughout all their life stages (Golani 1993 a). It was 
therefore concluded that dominance in the equivalent source habitat 
constitutes pre-adaptation to success in colonization of the Eastern 
Mediterranean by Lessepsian fish migrants. 
Table 1 Some demographic data of colonizing and non-colonizing goatfishes (Mullidae) from the Red Sea and other native sites. 
COLONIZERS NON-COLONIZERS 
U. mol. U. pori M. fla. M. van. P. for. P. hep. 
Spawning season Apr.- Dec.a Mar.-Apr. Mar.-Aug. May-Sep.c  —  — 
Size at benthic 
45.0b 27.2 50.0 — 50.0  — settlement (mm, SL) 
Age at first reproduction 
12b 9  36  — 24  —  (month) 
Size at first reproduction 
104b 61 130 — 115  — (mm, SL) 
Maximum attainable size 
170b 135 328c 363c 230 444e (mm, SL) 
Growth rate coefficient 0.303b 0.663 0.213c 0.160c 0.261d 0.208e 
a - Southern Red Sea (Ben-Tuvia 1968) b - Hong Kong (Lee 1974) c - Gulf of Aqaba (Wahbeh 1992) 
d - “ “ (Wahbeh and Ajiad 1985) e - “ “ (Al-Absy and Ajiad 1988) 
U. mol. = Upeneus moluccenis, U. pori = Upeneus pori, M. fla. = Mulloides flavolineatus, M. van = Mulloides vanicolensis, P. for. = 
Parupeneus forsskali, P. hep. = Parupeneus heptacanthus. 
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RESPONSE TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENT 
Once the colonizers have established a population in the target 
area, they are presumably isolated from their source population and 
are exposed to new selective pressures which may result in pheno­
typic and genotypic changes in the new population (Parsons 1982). 
In order to test this hypothesis, a comparison was made between the 
source and target populations. Golani (1990) compared specimens 
from the source (Red Sea) and target (Eastern Mediterranean) 
populations of seven species of Lessepsian migrants. In most species, 
the spawning season was shortened in the Mediterranean, presum­
ably due to the constraints of the colder temperature regime. In 
some species, changes were noted in some meristic counts, namely, 
number of dorsal and anal rays, number of lateral line scales and 
number of vertebrae. All these changes have been attributed to the 
prevailing temperature during spawning season (Golani 1990; also 
see Lindsey 1988). 
Golani and Ritte (1993) compared allozymes of source and target 
populations of two Lessepsian fish migrants, Upeneus moluccensis and 
U. pori. No discernible genetic differences were found. It should be 
noted that this method of allozyme analysis is rather crude and is not 
sufficiently sensitive to discern small alterations. Current techniques 
such as DNA sequencing are able to detect minute changes and it is in 
this direction that research should progress. 
Diet adaptations were studied in several species of Lessepsian 
migrants. As anticipated, the feeding habits of colonizers remained 
generally similar to those of the mother population. Some small dif­
ferences were noted; for example, Upeneus pori feeds in the Mediterra­
nean upon a wider size range of prey. The algal composition of the 
diet of the two rabbitfish, Siganus luridus and S. rivulatus, was altered 
in the Mediterranean. However, lack of quantitative data on trophic 
resources in both the source and target areas prohibits a determination 
of whether these changes are the result of selectivity or availability. 
IMPACT OF LESSEPSIAN MIGRANTS ON THE EASTERN 
MEDITERRANEAN 
A total of 54 Lessepsian fish species have been recorded to date 
(Golani 1996), representing 37 families, of which 13 are new to the 
Mediterranean (Table 2). Out of these 37 families, 25 are repre­
sented by only one species; 8 by two species; three families by three 
species and one family (Clupeidae) by four species. The Lessepsian 
fish species constitute 13.2% of the total number of ichthyofauna in 
the Levant. These species have a qualitative and quantitative impor­
tance beyond their percentage in the composition of the local ich­
thyofauna; more than half of the species have become common in 
Almost half of the catch of trawl fishery 
in the Mediterranean coast of Israel can 
be attributed to Lessepsian migrant 
species. 
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Figure 1 Cumulative count of Lessepsian migrant species as a function of the year of first record. 
the eastern Mediterranean and at least 18 species contribute to the 
local fishery. Almost half of the catch of trawl fishery in the Mediter­
ranean coast of Israel consists of Lessepsian migrant species (Golani 
and Ben-Tuvia 1995). It is difficult to determine precisely the per­
centage of Lessepsian migrants in the catch of other fishing meth­
ods, but it is estimated to be considerable. 
There is a clear east-west gradient in the distribution of Lessep­
sian migrant species in the Mediterranean. There are 54 Lessepsian 
migrant fish species along the Levantine coast. This number gradu­
ally decreases along the gradient westward, up to the coasts of Tu­
nisia and Sicily. Thirty Lessepsian migrant fish species inhabit the 
southern coast of Turkey and 32 inhabit the Mediterranean coast of 
Egypt. Only four Lessepsian species have been found along the 
southern coast of Italy, and no Lessepsian species have been found 
in the western basin of the Mediterranean. 
From Table 2 and Figure 1, a clear correlation can be seen be­
tween the year of first record of individual Lessepsian migrant spe­
cies in the Mediterranean and each species’ current abundance along 
the Mediterranean coast of Israel. In general, those species that 
appeared earlier are currently more abundant. Although date of first 
record is not identical with the actual first arrival of a Lessepsian 
species to the Mediterranean, it is reasonable to assume that the 
chance of a species being collected and recorded increases with 
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Table 2 List of Lessepsian fish migrants. * - new family to the Mediterranean; IP - inshore-pelagic, M - muddy, P - pelagic, R - rocky, S - sandy, 
V - vegetation; Abundance: + - rare, ++ - prevalent, +++ - common; 1st Year of Record - year of first record in the Mediterranean; 
BS - beach seine, N - trammel and gill nets, PS - purse seine, T - trawl. 
Family Species Habitat Abundance 1st Year of Record Commercial 
DASYATIDAE Himantura uarnak S&M ++ 1955 T 
CLUPEIDAE Dussumieria acuta PS +++ 1953 IP 
Etrumeus teres P +++ 1963 PS 
Herklotsichthys punctatus IP +++ 1976 PS 
Spratelloides delicatulus IP + 1978 — 
CONGRIDAE Rhynchoconger trewavasae M + 1993 — 
MURAENESOCIDAE* Muraenesox cinereus M + 1982 — 
SYNODONTIDAE Saurida undosquamis S&M +++ 1953 T 
EXOCOETIDAE Paraexocoetus mento P ++ 1935 PS 
BELONIDAE Tylosurus choram P + 1963 — 
HEMIRAMPHIDAE Hemiramphus far P +++ 1927 PS 
Hyporhamphus affinis P + 1967 — 
ATHERINIDAE Atherinomorus lacunosus IP +++ 1902 — 
HOLOCENTRIDAE* Sargocentron rubrum R +++ 1947 N 
SCORPAENIDAE Pterois miles R + 1992 — 
PLATYCEPHALIDAE* Papilloculiceps longiceps S + 1990 — 
Platycephalus indicus S ++ 1953 — 
Sorsogona prionota S + 1947 — 
SERRANIDAE Epinephelus coioides R + 1969 — 
Epinephelus malabaricus R + 1969 — 
TERAPONIDAE* Pelates quadrilineatus S ++ 1970 — 
Terapon puta S ++ 1976 — 
APOGONIDAE Apogon nigripinnis R +++ 1947 — 
SILLAGINIDAE* Sillago sihama S +++ 1977 PS 
RACHYCENTRIDAE* Rachycentron canadum P + 1986 — 
CARANGIDAE Alepes djedaba S&IP +++ 1927 BS&PS 
LEIOGNATHIDAE* Leiognathus klunzingeri M +++ 1931 — 
LUTJANIDAE* Lutjanus argentimaculatus R + 1977 — 
MULLIDAE Upeneus moluccensis S&M +++ 1947 — 
Upeneus pori S&M +++ 1950 T 
HAEMULIDAE Pomadasys stridens S ++ 1969 — 
SPARIDAE Crenidens crenidens S&V ++ 1970 N 
Rhabdosargus haffara S ++ 1992 — 
PEMPHERIDAE* Pempheris vanicolensis R +++ 1979 — 
MUGILIDAE Liza carinata S&IP +++ 1971 BS&PS 
SPHYRAENIDAE Sphyraena chrysotaenia P +++ 1930 T&PS 
Sphyraena flavicauda P + 1992 — 
LABRIDAE Pteragogus pelycus S + 1992 — 
BLENNIDAE Petroscirtes ancylodon S + 1989 — 
GOBIIDAE Monishia ochetica S ++ 1927 — 
Oxyurichthys papuensis S +++ 1983 — 
Silhouetta aegyptia S ++ 1991 — 
CALLIONYMIDAE Callionymus filamentosus S +++ 1953 — 
SIGANIDAE* Siganus luridus V +++ 1964 N 
Siganus rivulatus V +++ 1927 N&PS 
SCOMBRIDAE Rastrelliger kanagurta P + 1971 — 
Scomberomorus commerson P +++ 1935 N&PS 
CYNOGLOSSIDAE Cynoglossus sinusarabici S ++ 1953 — 
MONACANTHIDAE* Stephanolepis diaspros R&V +++ 1927 — 
OSTRACIIDAE* Tetrosomus gibbosus S&V + 1988 — 
TETRAODONTIDAE Lagocephalus spadiceus S +++ 1953 — 
Lagocephalus suezensis S +++ 1977 — 
Torquigener flavimaculosus S + 1987 — 
DIODONTIDAE* Chilomycterus spilostylus S + 1993 — 
 
 
  
population growth upon arrival to the target area. Therefore, date of 
first record may be used as a baseline for initiation of a species’ 
colonization. There are several explanations for this correlation. 
First, the longer the time elapsed since colonization, the better the 
opportunity to establish large, flourishing populations; in addition, 
the species may have undergone further adaptation to the new habi­
tat during these years. Second, these species may have had a superior 
colonization and competitive ability that allowed them to arrive first 
into the Mediterranean and closely thereafter establish a population. 
Another explanation may be that the increase in ichthyological 
studies in the last few decades has revealed more first records, some 
of which may represent abortive colonization events which would 
not have been detected prior to the use of intensive research meth­
ods. It is interesting to note that the vast majority of species re­
corded since 1970 have been rare (see Figure 1); however, five 
species (Herklotsichthys punctatus, Sillago sihama, Pempheris 
vanicolensis, Oxyurichthys papuensis, and Lagocephalus suezensis) 
recorded in the late 1970s are very common in the eastern Mediter­
ranean. There is no obvious common feature between these five 
species, yet together they constitute an exception to the pattern of 
gradual building of population size. 
The success of Lessepsian migrant fish species in colonization of 
the Eastern Mediterranean has often been explained as the exploita­
tion of unsaturated niches. For example, the success of the two 
herbivore siganids Siganus luridus and S. rivulatus was attributed to 
their entering temperate waters of the Mediterranean where there 
were scarcely any herbivores (Lundberg and Golani 1995). Similarly, 
the lack of nocturnal species facilitated the success of the coloniza­
tion of three nocturnal Lessepsian migrants: Sargocentron rubrum, 
Apogon nigripinnis and Pempheris vanicolensis (Golani and Diamant 
1991). One might conclude that penetration and colonization 
should be easier for species whose families have no or very few rep­
resentatives in the target area; conversely, one might assume that 
species whose families are well represented by species in the target 
area would have a high resistance to confamilial colonization. Figure 
2 offers four categories according to the percentages that the 
Lessepsian migrants represent among all species in a particular 
family in the Levant, as well as the composition of each category by 
the number of species in each family. In thirteen families, all species 
are Lessepsian migrants and in another eleven families, 50% or more 
are Lessepsian migrants. However, there are thirteen other Lessep­
sian migrant species which have succeeded in penetrating and colo­
nizing the Mediterranean, despite many indigenous confamilial 
species already inhabiting the Mediterranean. 
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Figure 2	 Percentage of Lessepsian migrant species in their families in the Mediterranean, 
with further breakdown according to the number of Lassepsian species per family. 
There are very few studies which directly investigate the impact 
of Lessepsian migrants on the autochtonous species. The difficulty 
lies mainly in the lack of information available from the period prior 
to invasion. The method of investigating this relationship should be 
the study of the ecological requirements of closely related species 
(Ben-Yami and Glaser 1974). Such an investigation was conducted 
by Golani (1994) on Goatfishes (Mullidae), in which there are two 
migrant species, Upeneus moluccensis and U. pori, and two indig­
enous Mediterranean species, Mullus barbatus and Mullus 
surmuletus. A similar study (Golani 1993b) was conducted on 
Lizardfishes (Synodontidae,) which has a single Lessepsian migrant, 
Saurida undosquamis, and an indigenous species, Synodus saurus. 
The family Sphyraenidae was also studied (unpublished material). 
In all three families, the feeding habits of the colonizers and the local 
species were remarkably similar and niche partitioning was presum­
ably accomplished along bathymetric axes. Among the goatfishes 
(Mullidae), the colonizer species occupied a shallower sector, while 
an opposite trend was observed among the lizardfish (Synodon­
tidae). It is difficult to determine whether the colonizers displaced 
the local species or whether the latter occupied the same bathymet­
ric niche prior to its confamilial’s colonization. An examination of 
the bathymetric distribution of local species in those areas where 
colonizers have not penetrated will be of no avail in determining this 
question, since there are many other environmental factors which 
on one hand may be affecting the local species and on the other 
hand may be preventing the entrance of colonizer species. 
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It is important to note that no local species has disappeared since 
the study of Lessepsian migration. Nevertheless, there are two cases 
which deserve further study. The indigenous meager Argyrosomus 
regius was once one of the most common commercial species in 
Israel. Since the 1980s this species has almost completely disap­
peared in local catches, while simultaneously, the Lessepsian migrant 
narrow-barred Spanish mackerel Scomberomorus commerson has 
dramatically increased its population. Both species are piscivores 
and may utilize a similar niche. Similarly, the Lessepsian dragonet 
Callionymus filamentosus is one of the most common by-catch spe­
cies in local fisheries. The other three confamilial indigenous species, 
who also occupy a similar shallow habitat, have almost disappeared 
from local catch. The only indigenous dragonet still being collected is 
Synchiropus phaeton, which inhabits much deeper waters (150–300 m). 
REFERENCES 
Al-Absy, A. and A. Ajiad. 1988. The morphology, biometry, weight-length relationship and growth of the 
goatfish Parupeneus cinnabarinus (Cuvier & Valenciennes) in the Gulf of Aqaba, Red Sea. Arab Gulf: 
Scient. Res. Agric. Biol. Sci. B6 (2): 265-273. 
Aleem, A. A. 1972. Effect of river outflow management on marine life. Marine Biology 15: 200-208.
 
Baker, H. G. and G. L. Stebbins, eds. 1965. The genetics of colonizing species. Academic Press. New York: 588.
 
Barash, A. and Z. Danin. 1992. Annotated list of Mediterranean molluscs of Israel and Sinai. Jerusalem:
 
The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities. 
Barrett, S. C. H. and B. J. Richardson. 1986. Genetic attributes of invading species. In: Ecology of biological 
invasions, ed. by R. H. Groes and J. J. Burton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 21-23. 
Ben-Eliahu, M. N. 1995. A list of Polychaeta along the Levant Coast. Haasiana, Newsletter of the Natural 
History Collection, Hebrew University 1: 78–89. 
Ben Eliahu, M. N. and D. Golani. 1990. Polychaetes (Annelida) in the gut contents of goatfishes (Mullidae), 
with new polychaete records for the Mediterranean coast of Israel and the Gulf of Elat (Red Sea). 
Marine Ecology 11: 193-205. 
Ben-Tuvia, A. 1966. Red Sea fishes recently found in the Mediterranean. Copeia 1966: 254–275.
 
________ 1968. Report on the fisheries investigations of the Israel South Red Sea expedition, 1962. Bulletin
 
of Sea Fisheries Res. Stn., Haifa. 
________ 1978. Immigration of fishes through the Suez Canal. Fishery Bulletin 76: 249–255. 
________ 1985. The impact of the Lessepsian (Suez Canal) fish migration on the eastern Mediterranean 
ecosystem. In Mediterranean marine ecosystems, ed. by M. Moraitou-Apostolopoulo, and V. Kiortsis. 
New York: Plenum Press: 367–375. 
Ben-Yami, M. and T. Glaser. 1974. The invasion of Saurida undosquamis (Richardson) into the Levant 
Basin—an example of biological effect of interoceanic canal. Fishery Bulletin 72: 359–373. 
Elton, C. S. 1958. The ecology of invasions by animals and plants. London: Methuen & Co. 
Galil, B. 1992. Eritrean decapods in the Levant: biogeography in motion. Bulletin of the Institute of 
Oceanography. Monaco 9: 115–123. 
  

     
 
Golani, D. 1988. Aspects of colonization of two Red Sea species, the Goldband Goatfish (Upeneus 
moluccensis) and the Brownband Goatfish (U. asymmetricus), migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. Ph. D. 
thesis, The Hebrew Univ. Jerusalem. 124+V pp. (Hebrew with English summary). 
________ 1990. Environmental-induced meristic changes in Lessepsian fish migrants, a comparison of 
source and colonizing populations. Bulletin of the Institute of Oceanography. Monaco 7: 143–152. 
________ 1993a. The sandy shore of the Red Sea—launching pad for Lessepsian (Suez Canal) migrants fish 
colonizers of the eastern Mediterranean. Journal of Biogeography. 20: 579–585. 
________ 1993b. The biology of the Red Sea migrant, Saurida undosquamis, in the Mediterranean and 
comparison with the indigenous confamilial Synodus saurus (Teleostei: Synodontidae). Hydrobiologia 
271: 109–117. 
________ 1994. Niche separation between colonizing and indigenous goatfish (Mullidae) along the Medi­
terranean coast of Israel. Journal of Fish Biology 45: 503–513. 
________ 1996. The marine ichthyofauna of the eastern Levant—history, inventory and characterization. 
Israel Journal of Zoology 42: 15–55. 
________ and A. Ben-Tuvia. 1985. The biology of the Indo-Pacific squirrelfish, Sargocentron rubrum 
(Forsskål), a Suez Canal migrant to the eastern Mediterranean. Journal of Fish Biology 27: 249–258. 
________ and A. Ben-Tuvia. 1989. Characterization of Lessepsian (Suez Canal) fish migrants. In 
Environmental quality and ecosystem stability, ed. by E. Spanier, Y. Steinberger, and M. Luria, Vol. IV. 
Jerusalem. B. ISEEQS Pub: 235–243. 
________ and A. Ben-Tuvia. 1995. Lessepsian migration and the Mediterranean fisheries of Israel. In 
Conditions of the world’s aquatic habits, Proceedings of the World Fishery Congress Theme 1, ed. by N. B. 
Armantrout. New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Pub. Co. Pvt. Ltd: 279–289. 
________ and A. Diamant, 1991. Biology of the Pempheris vanicolensis (Cuvier and Valenciennes) a 
Lessepsian migrant in the Mediterranean with comparison with the original Red Sea population. 
Journal of Fish Biology 38: 819–827. 
________ and U. Ritte. 1993. The association between genetic variability and successful colonization in 
fishes. Proceedings of the Meeting of the Fishery Society of the British Isles. Conway, Wales. (Abstract). 
Goren, M. and M. Dor, 1994. CLOFRES II. An update checklist of the Fish of the Red Sea. Israel Academy 
of Sciences, Human. & Interuniversity Institute of Marine Sciences. Elat.: 120. 
Gray, A.J. 1986. Do invading species have definable genetic characteristics? Phil. Trans. R. Soc Lond. Ser. B. 
314: 655–674. 
Keller, C. 1882. Die Fauna im Suez-Kanal und die Diffusion der Mediterranen und Erythräiscen Tierwelt. 
Neue Denkschriften der allgemeinen schweizerischen Gesellschaft für die gesammten Naturwissenschaften, 
Zürich (Ser. 3) 28: 1–39. 
Lindsey, C. C. 1988. Factor controlling meristic variation. In: Fish physiology, ed. by W.S. Hoar and D.J. 
Randall, XI B. New York: Academic Press: 197–274. 
Lundberg, B. and D. Golani. 1995. Diet adaptation of Lessepsian migrant Rabbitfishes, Siganus luridus and 
S. rivulatus, to the algal resources of the Mediterranean coast of Israel. Marine Ecology 16: 73–89. 
Lavee, D. 1983. Genetic variability and colonization in two species of Indo-Pacific mussels. Ph.D. thesis, 
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem. 92 +V pp. (in Hebrew with English summary). 
Lavee, D. and U. Ritte. 1994. Genetic variability and success in colonization in two intertidal mussels. In: 
Genetic and evolution of aquatic organisms, ed. by A. R. Beaumont. Chapman & Hall: 168–176. 
Lee, C. K. C. 1974. The reproductive, growth and survival of Upeneus moluccensis (Bleeker) in relation to 
the commercial fishing in Hong Kong. Hong Kong Fishery Bulletin 4: 17–32. 
 
 
  
 
MacArthur, R. H. and E. D. Wilson. 1967. The theory of island biogeography. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press: 203. 
Parsons, P. A. 1982. Adaptive strategies of colonizing animal species. Biology Review 57: 117–248. 
________ 1983. The evolutionary biology of colonization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 262. 
Por, F. D. 1978. Lessepsian migration: the influx of Red Sea biota into the Mediterranean by way of the 
Suez Canal. Ecological studies. Berlin: Springer-Verlag: 23: 228. 
Safriel, U. and U. Ritte. 1980. Criteria for the identification of potential colonizers. Biol. Linn. Soc. Lond. 13: 
187–297. 
Selander, R. K. and D. W. Kaufman. 1973. Genetic variability and strategies of adaptation in animals. Pro­
ceedings of the National Academy of Science U.S.A. 70: 1975–1977. 
Stauffer, J. R. 1984. Colonization theory relative to introduced populations. In: Distribution biology and 
management of exotic fishes, ed. by W. R. Courtenay and J.R. Stauffer. Baltimore: John Hopkins Univer­
sity Press: 8–12. 
Tillier, J. B. 1902. La Canal de Suez et sa faune ichthyologique. Mem. Soc. Zool. Fr. 15: 279–318. 
Wahbeh, M. I. 1992. Aspects of reproduction biology and growth of two species of goatfishes (Mullidae) 
from Aqaba, Red Sea. Senckenbergiana maritima 22 (3/6): 255–264. 
Wahbeh, M. I. and A. Ajiad. 1985. Reproductive biology and growth of the goatfish. Parupeneus barberinus 
(Lacepede), in Aqaba, Jordan. Journal of Fish Biology 26: 583–590. 
DANIEL GOLANI received his Ph.D. in Zoology from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1988. Since 1977 he has 
taught icthyology at Hebrew University and has been Curator of the Fish Collection at the University’s Zoological 
Museum. In 1992 Dr. Golani was appointed Scientific Advisor to the Fisheries Department of Israel’s Ministry of 
Agriculture. He is on the editorial board of the Israeli Journal of Aquaculture and the Editor of the Fisheries Department’s 
Annual Statistical Report. 
Daniel Golani, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel, Tel: 972-2-566804. 
E-mail: dgolani@shum.cc.huji.ac.il 
  

    
 
Fisheries Development in the Arab World 
Izzat H. Feidi 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
Rome, Italy 
ABSTRACT 
Arab fisheries resources, including the coastal waters of the Arab states, inland waters, and aquaculture potential, are an 
important sector for development. If rationally and scientifically exploited, fisheries could play a role in meeting increased 
food demand, and in activating the economies of the region, possibly surpassing oil exploitation by being a renewable 
and self-replenishing resource. 
INTRODUCTION 
Marine waters border the Arab countries on all sides: the Ara­
bian Gulf on the east, the Atlantic Ocean on the west, the Mediterra­
nean Sea on the north, and the Indian Ocean on the south. In 
addition to these, the Red Sea and various gulfs, rivers—mainly the 
Nile, the Tigris, and the Euphrates—and the natural and man-made 
lakes constituting inland water resources afford the Arab countries 
very important potential for fisheries. The Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) expands Arab marine waters to rich international fishing 
grounds. Engaging in aquaculture activities in marine and inland wa­
ters, as well as better exploitation of the available fisheries resources, 
would create a more sound and more beneficial fishery industry. It 
could become one of the main pillars of Arab economic activities, of no NOTE: The designations employed and 
less importance, in some countries, than the fishery industry in the presentation of material in this publication do 
not imply the expression of opinion of theeconomy of major fishing nations such as Japan and Norway. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the
Prior to the discovery of oil in some Arab states, fish had tradi- United Nations concerning the legal status of 
tionally been an important source of animal protein, particularly any country, territory, city or area, or of its 
authorities, or concerning the delimitation of itsalong the coastal areas. Increasing incomes from oil, providing 
frontiers or boundaries. 
higher purchasing power, made other protein sources available, 
causing diversification of protein intake and reducing fish consump­
tion. In recent years, however, due to various economic and social 
reasons, demand for fish and its consumption in fresh or processed 
form have risen to some degree. On the whole, consumers have 
begun to turn to cheaper foods, often consuming traditionally un­
marketable fish products, developing new uses for fish by either 
diversifying preparation methods or accepting imported products 
previously unknown locally. 
Fish marketing opportunities are increasingly opening up in the 
Arab states. Such an increase in the demand for fish products may 
be met either from better exploitation of fisheries resources or 
through the importation of quantities that may not be obtained 
from local sources. 
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Fishing and fisheries contribute more than any other animal pro­
duction activity to protein intake in most of the developing regions of 
the world, including most of the Arab states, and are important for 
the food security of many coastal populations. By all accounts, many 
wild marine and freshwater resources are on the decline. 
THE ISSUE OF FISHERIES GLOBALLY 
In past decades the rapid growth of the exploitation of fisheries 
resources has taken its toll: during the 1950s and 1960s, the global 
catch from commercial fishing grew three times faster than the 
world population. Production growth was slower afterwards; cur­
rently, as global fishery production (catch and aquaculture) averages 
100 million tons (MT) per year (113 MT in 1995, a record so far), per 
capita supplies are on the decline. These trends have an obvious 
impact on prices: during the last decade seafood prices have risen 
almost 4%/yr on average, rendering a traditionally inexpensive 
source of protein much less accessible to the poor. 
Blame for the depletion of aquatic resources has been placed 
mostly on two factors: 
•	 The development of excess fishing capacity with respect to 
existing fish stocks and their natural growth rates; and 
•	 the deteriorating condition of fish stocks due to the pollution 
of sensitive aquatic systems, both freshwater and marine. 
Small-scale fisheries in developing countries have generally 
played a minor role beyond their communities, although the pres­
sure of growing local demand has occasionally contributed to the 
over-exploitation of coastal waters. 
The development of fishing capacity has taken place mostly in 
the large-scale (industrial) and medium-scale fishing sub-sectors. 
Since the early days of international development assistance, the 
main objective of fisheries development projects has been to in­
crease fishing efficiency and income levels through motorizing 
boats, improving gear, and in harbor development and other infra­
structure facilities. The sector and its manpower have grown, draw­
ing workers from rural to urban areas. 
At the same time, large numbers of small-scale fishermen have 
had no access to that assistance, finding it increasingly difficult to 
survive in an overexploited environment. From this perspective, the 
crisis of fisheries has been a crisis of livelihoods. 
The implications go far beyond dwindling fish stocks available to 
small-scale fishermen. Globally, fishing provides the main source of 
income for about 100 million fishermen and their families, the 
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majority of them among the world’s poorest. They are among the 
one billion people—nearly a fifth of the global population—for 
whom fish is the main source of animal protein. The scarcity of 
fisheries resources is leading to clashes between neighbors as fishing 
fleets stray across maritime borders after depleting stocks in their 
own waters. 
It is estimated that 85% of the world’s fish harvest is still caught 
in the wild, although the practice has reached the limits of sustain­
ability in many areas. This, in part, is because the means of exploita­
tion have become so efficient. Fishing fleets use sonar, radar, aircraft 
and satellites to track shoals. Winches and motors and drift nets 
typically trap more than 18 tons of fish. This enables trawlers to 
increase not only catches but the by-catches—species that are netted 
but are unwanted and consequently discarded. 
The issue of discards is a very disturbing one since it results in a 
very large wastage of fisheries resources . FAO estimates that 18–39 MT 
of fish per year may be discarded at sea to catch about 50 MT of fish 
suitable for human consumption. 
PRESENT STATUS OF ARAB FISHERIES 
FISHERIES BOUNDARIES 
The geographical boundaries of the Marine Statistical Areas as 
classified by FAO place Arab waters in the following areas: 
AREA 34: East Central Atlantic, Mauritania, and Morocco 
The most dominant fisheries of Area 34 consist mainly of rich 
resources of hake, crustaceans (shrimps and lobsters), cephalopods 
(octopus, cuttlefish, and squid), small pelagics (sardines, mackerels), 
and tunas (big-eye and yellowfin). Rich demersal resources are also 
present. This area is the largest contributor to Arab fish landings. 
AREA 37: Mediterranean Sea, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, 
Egypt, Gaza (Palestine), Lebanon, and Syria 
Area 37 is generally considered medium to poor with regard to 
fish productivity. The western parts of this area have small pelagics, 
with its main fishery consisting mostly of sardines and anchovy, as 
well as a modest population of demersal species. The central parts, 
while rich in demersal and small pelagic species, suffer from 
over-fishing in such areas as the Gulf of Gabes in Tunisia, for ex­
ample, while other waters bordering Libya are under-exploited. 
The eastern portions consist of poorer fisheries fished by much 
smaller boats than those of the central and western portions. Pales­
tinian fisheries off Gaza have in recent years dropped from about 
The issue of discards is a very 
disturbing one since it results in a very 
large wastage of fisheries resources . 
FAO estimates that 18–39 MT of fish 
per year may be discarded at sea to 
catch about 50 MT of fish suitable for 
human consumption. 
 
 
  
4,000 T/y to about 1,000 T/y as a result of the reduction of the fishing 
limits from 20 km to 12 km from the shore. This has also caused the 
reduction of the number of fishermen from 13,000 in 1980s to the 
current estimate of some 1,500 or so. 
Area 51: North Western Indian Ocean, Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, 
Somalia, Yemen, Comoros, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman 
Area 51 is an extremely varied area consisting of the Red Sea, the 
North Arabian Sea, several gulfs, and the northern parts of the In­
dian Ocean. The Red Sea is considered of poor productivity (outside 
of the Gulf of Suez, which is actually over-fished) and its fisheries 
resources consist of quantities of small pelagics, jack, and some 
demersal and crustacean resources. The fisheries of the Arabian Gulf 
and Gulf of Oman are modest in their production of small pelagics, 
demersal species and crustaceans. Some areas, especially in the Gulf 
of Oman and the north Arabian Sea, could withstand further exploi­
tation of their resources. Only the shrimp resources are highly ex­
ploited. The Gulf of Aden is considered a fish-rich area and is 
underexploited, the fisheries consisting of mostly small pelagics 
(sardines and anchovy) and several high-value demersal species. 
Crustaceans resources and cephalopods are also available and could 
withstand further exploitation. The unexploited resource of meso­
pelagic fish in the Gulf of Aden as well as in the Gulf of Oman, 
estimated to be not less than 1.5 - 2 MT, is another resource which 
offers potential. Finally, the southern part of Area 51, waters border­
ing Somalia, is considered rich in small pelagics (sardines) as well as 
a good resources of demersal species, tunas and crustaceans. 
In addition to the traditional and conventional fisheries, a wide 
variety of seafoods, such as abalone, bivalves, crabs, sea cucumbers, 
jelly fish, sea-unicorn and sea turtles, are available in Arab waters. It 
is possible that some of these species may be nationally exploited for 
export purposes once the expertise for their processing and market­
ing becomes available, as long as the harvest of endangered species is 
still strictly prohibited. 
The coastlines of the Arab states total 23,000 km, and span a 
continental shelf area of 608,000 km2. Inland waters are estimated to 
have an area of about 7.2 million hectares of marshes, water reser­
voirs, rivers and lakes. 
Latest FAO fisheries statistics on the Arab world indicate that in 
1995 fish production from marine and inland waters including 
aquaculture was 2 MT or about 1.8 % of global catches. The 1994 fish 
landings from all sources were 1.9 MT amounting to 1.7% of the 
world catch of 109 million tons, i.e., a rise in landings of about 1.1 % 
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Figure 1 Fish Production of Arab states from 1990-95. Source: FISHDAB. 
from all sources over the period of 1990–1995. 
Marine and inland catches over a period of six years have fluctu­
ated slightly but maintained an increasing trend (see Figure 1). 
With regard to the contribution of aquaculture to Arab fisheries 
resources in both marine and fresh waters in 1995 the total produc­
tion reached 69,000 MT. Aquaculture is a relatively new source of fish 
in the Arab states but has made significant progress since 1984 in­
creasing by about 68% in roughly a decade. It is significant to note 
that the practice of aquaculture in Egypt, Iraq and Syria for many 
years has been contingent upon the availability of fresh water. In 
recent years, aquaculture has been initiated in several countries 
where fresh water is very scarce, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and United Arab Emirates (Figure 1). 
CLASSIFICATION OF FISHERIES RESOURCES 
Fisheries resources may be classified into four main areas: 
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The introduction in the mid-1970s of Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs) and the adoption in 1982 of the United Nations Convention 
of the Law of the Sea provided a new framework for the manage­
ment of marine resources. The new legal regime of the oceans gave 
coastal states rights and responsibilities for the management and use 
of fishery resources within their EEZs. However, many coastal states, 
including several Arab countries, continue to face serious challenges, 
lacking experience and financial and physical resources to achieve greater 
benefits from the fisheries within their EEZs. 
Subsequently, the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI), at its 
Nineteenth Session in 1991, called for the development of new 
concepts which would lead to responsible, sustainable fisheries. As a 
result, the International Conference on Responsible Fishing, held in 
1992 in Mexico, requested FAO to prepare an international Code of 
Conduct to address these issues. The outcome of this Conference 
was an important contribution to the 1992 United Nations Confer­
ence on Environment and Development (UNCED), particularly 
Agenda 21. Afterwards, the United Nations Conference on Strad­
dling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was convened, 
to which FAO provided important technical back-up. In November 
1993, the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the 
High Seas was adopted. 
As a result of these developments, the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries, adopted in October 1995 by the FAO Confer­
ence, provided a necessary framework for national and international 
efforts to insure sustainable exploitation of aquatic living resources 
in harmony with environmental management activities. It has also 
brought about a significant change in the conditions under which 
fisheries are carried out on a world wide basis. The extent of na­
tional EEZs and the nature of jurisdiction claimed differ from coun­
try to country, but in the majority of cases the zone extends 200 
nautical miles offshore and in all cases jurisdiction over fishery 
resources is included. 
All Arab states, albeit in ranging degrees, may have access to 
fisheries resources in their EEZs. However, it is not yet clear what 
benefits the Arab states can gain from fish resources available in 
their EEZs. The only extension of jurisdiction by Arab states of 
possible benefits to their fisheries is in the fishing areas of the coun­
tries bordering the east central Atlantic Ocean (Mauritania and 
Morocco) and the northwest Indian Ocean (Oman, Yemen and 
Somalia). However, although extension of jurisdiction by these 
countries over the fish resources in their EEZs provides an opportu­
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nity for more effective development and national management of 
fisheries based on the stocks available, realization of that opportu­
nity depends on the solution of a number of difficult problems. 
MARINE FISHERIES 
The fisheries of the Arab Middle East and North Africa are 
quite heterogenous as a result of wide geographical spread. They 
may be classified into two broad categories based on vessel size, 
gear types and species targeted. 
HIGH SEAS (OFFSHORE) FISHERIES 
In large fish-producing countries such as Morocco and 
Mauritania, the category is characterized by a large modern mecha­
nized fleets with vessels equipped with freezing, storage and other 
facilities capable of up to three months of operation at sea at a 
stretch. These vessels operate beyond the 20 mile fishing zone and 
their catches are almost exclusively destined for export. This is 
capital intensive activity requiring large investment, often beyond 
the reach of most private local fishermen. It is an export-oriented 
sub-sector of high-value species, such as cuttlefish, octopus, squid, 
shrimp and tuna. The fleets operating in this fishery are largely 
fleets from Spain and Portugal operating in most instances under 
license or joint ventures. Their catches are of high value, but they 
are not, in most cases, reported as catches of the countries border­
ing the waters where fishing operations take place.
 COASTAL FISHERIES 
Within this category, two sub-groups are usually considered: 
intermediate and small scale (artisanal) fisheries. 
Intermediate Fisheries 
This sub-group is characterized by vessels of 25 meters or less, 
operating up to 20 miles off shore, mostly targeting pelagic species, 
sardines and mackerels in particular. Because an important pro­
portion of the production of this category goes to canning and, to a 
lesser extent, fish meal and fish oil industries, they are sometimes 
referred to as “industrial fisheries.” The average share of these 
fisheries is 15–20%. 
Small Scale Fisheries 
This sub-group is characterized by a fleet of small motorized 
boats, 5–6 m in length, of small catching capacities equipped with 
various kinds of traditional fishing gear. Fishermen composing this 
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group are scattered all along the coastlines of Arab states. Their 
numbers are high and much of their fishing is subsistence fishing for 
local markets, families and clans. The official statistics of their catches 
are not recorded systematically and therefore lack reliability. The 
species they target are mostly demersal, near shore species and crus­
taceans (mainly shrimps) where they exist. The average share of 
coastal fisheries in the Arab world fish landings has been estimated 
at 80-85%. 
Inland Fisheries 
Inland fisheries resources are those landed from the various 
inland water bodies, which are estimated to cover about 1.5 million 
km2. The major states where these are available are Egypt, Sudan, 
Iraq and Syria. These include lakes, rivers, marsh lands, swamps, 
reservoirs, and natural and man-made lakes. The lakes in the Egyp­
tian Delta region are the main fish production water bodies in addi­
tion to Lake Nasser in the south, Lake Qarun, and the River Nile. In 
Sudan, the main inland fisheries are in the Blue and White Niles in 
addition to the main stem of the Nile. Iraq’s main fisheries are lo­
cated on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers as well as some man-made 
reservoirs. Other rivers with smaller size fisheries exist in Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Mauritania. 
Most of the inland fisheries in the Arab states are characterized 
by subsistence fishing to meet immediate food supply needs of 
populations living in the vicinity of the water bodies. Any excess to 
their food needs is sold to the local markets. The major problems 
facing these rivers are: 
•	 reduced volumes from upstream diversions and flood 
control; and 
•	 compromised water quality from pollution. 
Aquaculture 
Aquaculture’s global importance grows each year because of 
population growth and the fact that the natural fisheries resources 
may have reached their maximum sustainable yield. The Arab world 
is no exception. Many states with freshwater resources, such as 
Egypt, Sudan, Iraq and Syria, have practiced aquaculture for many 
years. Other countries where freshwater is scarce are engaging in 
mariculture activities, farming fish along their coastlines (such as in 
Tunisia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain). The U.A.E. 
and Oman have also established research centres with the aim of 
developing mariculture in their waters. 
In 1995, fish from aquaculture reached a production level of 
68,000 MT, 4% of total fish catches in the Arab region, valued at about 
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$300 million. Production in 1984 was only about 22,000 MT valued at 
only $59 million. The 1995 level represents an increase of 67% in 
quantity and 95% in value (Figure 1). 
The main species farmed are those indigenous species which are 
popularly accepted in the individual Arab countries. In Egypt and 
Sudan Tilapia is farmed and is also being introduced for farming in 
Saudi Arabia where Egyptian and Sudanese minorities live. Grou­
pers and rabbitfish are farmed in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and U.A.E.), 
and shrimp farming has been attempted along the Egyptian coast of 
the Red Sea. There are also experimental projects aimed at develop­
ing the commercial cage farming of sea bass and sea bream in Egypt, 
begun in 1990 in Port Said in the east and Mersa Metrouh on the 
Mediterranean coast in the west. When research studies on fish 
farming become feasible, and as the technologies and know-how 
become readily available, fish from aquaculture production is ex­
pected to expand substantially. 
With a coastline stretching for about 23,000 km, the Arab region 
offers considerable possibilities for fish farming both in inland and 
marine waters. It remains to be seen, however, whether aquaculture 
production of fish will substantially increase fish supply in the re­
gion and significantly reduce either the supply/demand gap or de­
pendence on imports. 
FISH CONSUMPTION AND PREFERENCES 
Average per capita fish consumption in the Arab world in 1995 
was about 6.6 kg, compared with the world average of about 13 kg/y. 
Per capita fish consumption among the Arab countries is highest 
in the United Arab Emirates (51.1 kg/y) followed by Oman (36.7 kg/y) 
Bahrain (16.93 kg/y) Mauritania (16.6 kg/y) Qatar (16.5 kg/y) and 
Morocco (15.4 kg/y). All other Arab states are well below the inter­
national average, with some as low as less than 1 kg/year, as in Leba­
non and Syria. 
Fish consumption in the region as a whole has some distinctive 
characteristics: 
•	 Fish consumption is highest in coastal countries where fish 
are comparatively abundant, the population is low, and fish 
represent an important part of the national diet. 
•	 All other Arab states generally have a low consumption rate. 
This is mainly due to low production levels, high populations, 
and shortage of hard currencies to import fish as a supplement 
to local supplies. The coastal areas in several such countries have 
very high consumption levels, e.g., Somalia and Yemen, but 
remote inland populations may consume negligible amounts. 
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•	 Fish consumption patterns have changed somewhat in 
some of the countries having a substantial foreign labor 
population, notably the oil-producing countries. This is due 
to the increased import of non-traditional species to satisfy 
new consumer demands, the introduction of new fish 
preparation methods, changes in eating habits, and innova­
tions in product forms. 
The list of preferred locally produced seafood species includes 
shrimp, lobster and cuttlefish, caught mostly in the waters surround­
ing the Arabian Peninsula and Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. 
However, as local market demand in the region is limited, such spe­
cies are largely exported due to their high international market prices. 
Generally, fish consumption is affected by conditions and sys­
tems of marketing, distribution, and transport and, to a minor 
extent, by tribal, traditional, and social attitudes. Fish consumption 
thus presents a complex pattern, ranging greatly between countries 
and within different areas in the same country or subregion. 
FISH RESOURCES POTENTIAL 
The fisheries statistics of FAO indicate that total fish catches 
from all Arab sources during 1995 was about 2 MT. However, fishery 
statistics issued by the Arab Organization for Agricultural Develop­
ment (AOAD) indicate that Arab fish landings in the same year were 
10% higher. The discrepancy in reported figures implies that statis­
tics require harmonization in order to arrive at a more reliable and 
accurate database. 
However, considering the potential of all the marine waters that 
border the Arab states, it is believed that the marine fish total caught 
from Arab waters is higher than that which is actually reported. This 
assumption is made on the belief that there are many foreign fishing 
vessels operating, legally or illegally, in Arab fish-rich waters such as 
those off Morocco, Mauritania, Somalia, and Yemen, and the catches 
made are not recorded as catches from these waters. These catches are 
estimated to be about 1-2 MT. In other words, actual fish landings from 
Arab marine resources may be in the range of 3-4 MT per annum. 
In the absence of strict surveillance, monitoring, and control of 
the fisheries resources of the fish-rich countries, it is difficult to 
substantiate and document the actual fish volumes caught from 
Arab waters. It is well known that there are several joint ventures 
between Arab states and foreign companies, but the extent and volume 
of their actual operations are not publicly known or documented. 
The 1993–94 negotiations between Morocco and the European 
Union (EU) over fishing rights in Moroccan waters offer a case in 
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point. During the negotiations European fleets did not operate in 
Moroccan waters. Catches by the local fishermen jumped to a record 
high of 40 MT/d during May-November 1995. Morocco’s territorial 
waters have an abundance of sardines, mackerel, squid, octopus, 
tuna, hake seabream, and shrimp. Moroccan fishermen feel that the 
foreign fleets are a threat to their domestic resources and feel they 
can better exploit their own fisheries themselves. During negotia­
tions, the coastal fleet was catching up to five MT/d, which is still 
only half the record of the seventies (possibly due to the effects of 
indiscriminate over-fishing by the foreign fleets) but above the one 
MT/d maximum catch during the presence of foreign fleets. 
Morocco, in its consideration of the future beyond the year 2000 
when the renewed agreement with the EU expires, has embarked on 
an investment plan to reshape its fishing industry. It has earmarked 
over $200 million to upgrade installations industry-wide as part of a 
long-term goal to exploit its rich waters without foreign interven­
tion. The fisheries authorities’ objective for the year 2000 is to 
achieve yield on an annual sustainable basis ranging from 1.5 to 2.5 
million tons. Production objectives are 1.5 MT/y, up from the 1994 
production of 752,000 MT/y, and 846,000 MT/y in 1995. The Moroc­
can authorities are also establishing another fisheries research centre 
and imposing longer fish conservation periods to protect the stocks. 
The rehabilitation of several ports and fleet servicing facilities are 
part of the upgrading process. 
FISH TRADE 
TRADE TRENDS 
Although the collection and dissemination of fishery statistics 
has generally improved over the last few years in several Arab coun­
tries, information on fish trade within each country is still not suffi­
cient. For example, it is not well established how much of the total 
fish production is marketed. Subsistence fishing is practiced to a 
considerable extent in the region, especially in the countries border­
ing the Arabian Peninsula and along the shores of inland lakes and 
rivers, especially in Iraq and Egypt. Therefore, it is assumed that a 
considerable portion of total production is consumed by the fisher­
men and their families. 
Marine catches constituted about 84% of total catches in 1995. 
Quantities not consumed locally by the coastal population are 
mostly cured and exported. In the last few years, foreign fish and 
fishery products have also been exported. These exports should not 
be interpreted as a genuine surplus as there is probably a strong 
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potential demand for fish in the interior, which in some countries 
lacks accessibility due to poor communications and transportation. 
Exports in 1995 are mostly attributed to expanded fishing activi­
ties off the coast of Mauritania (14% of the total) possibly by foreign 
fleets and trans-shipment of foreign fish. Morocco has also shown a 
substantial increase in canned fish product exports (61% of the total). 
Most countries of the region are importers of some quantity of 
fish. Egypt is the largest importer (28% of the total) followed by Saudi 
Arabia (25% of the total). Apart from the imports to Egypt, other 
major import items include canned and foreign products and some 
high-value fish preparations (especially for the Gulf countries). 
It might be expected that the Arab region would be a net ex­
porter of fish and fishery products. However, when excluding Mo-
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Figure 2 Imports and exports of fish and fishery products of select Arab states as a function of time, broken down by weight and monetary value. 
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rocco and Mauritania, the total for other countries classifies them as 
net importers. It should also be noted that the exports from 
Mauritania are predominantly small pelagic species caught mostly 
by foreign fishing vessels off the territorial waters and similar fish 
species caught and canned by Morocco. Exports by other exporting 
countries are mainly high valued demersal species, crustaceans and 
cephalopod species, mostly for export outside the region (Figure 3). 
TRADE CONSTRAINTS 
Shortage of dependable information on demand and supply, 
prices and price fluctuations, as well as buyers and sellers in most of 
the countries, has been a major factor adversely affecting the growth 
of Arab trade in fish and fishery products. Coupled with this is the 
dearth of technical know-how and trained manpower, together with 
inadequate infrastructure. Attempts at product development, prod­
uct and market diversification and value addition have been quite 
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limited in scope and results, in spite of improvements in 
recent years. 
Lack of regular and direct flights linking the production and 
consumption centres both within and outside the Arab world has 
restricted trade in fresh fish, while irregular shipping facilities ham­
per smooth flow of frozen fish from one port to another. Moreover, 
though some of the countries in the Arab world are among the 
richest in the world, there are also several countries that are not so 
fortunate. This has resulted in insufficient communication facilities 
even between neighbors. Due to such problems, the share of intra­
regional trade in fish and fishery products in the total import-export 
trade within the Arab region is also quite negligible. 
Another trade constraint is associated with canned small 
pelagics, a major export item. It is estimated that the GCC countries 
together consume between 25,000 and 30,000 MT of canned fishery 
products per annum. Despite the growing demand, a major share of 
these imports are not from Arab exporters of the same commodities. 
At times, countries such as Tunisia and Morocco are stuck with 
quantities of canned products for want of buyers. Moreover, the 
installed capacity utilization in these two countries is quite low, 
often due to lack of orders. In some Arab countries, the general 
pattern of trade linking producers to buyers is based exclusively on a 
few traditional products, depending on a few traditional buyers and 
sellers. In other countries, where there is a wish to diversify prod­
ucts, enter new markets and increase trade, producers and proces­
sors suffer from acute lack of up-to-date information on such vital 
matters as product requirements and specifications, the required 
processing technology, quality standards, current prices, and mar­
keting opportunities and trends, all of which leads to the misapplica­
tion of production capacity, loss of potential profits, loss of foreign 
exchange, and reduced employment opportunities. 
MAJOR TRADE MARKETS 
The Arab world is most likely to continue to be a major importer 
of fish and fishery products in the years to come. This is in spite of 
the efforts made to increase indigenous production. Some of the 
items available in this region, such as cephalopods, crustaceans, 
molluscs and high-value demand species, will have to be exported to 
markets elsewhere due either to little domestic demand or the quest 
for hard currency earnings. 
The major importer among of the Arab states is Egypt, with 
129,000 T valued at $79 million imported in 1995 or 46% of all Arab 
fish imports. Egyptian imports are mostly frozen small pelagic spe­
cies of sardines and mackerels which are consumed by the low in­
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come section of the population at subsidized rates. The next major 
market is the six GCC states, which as a combined market area 
imported a total of 89.3 thousand tons valued at $153.7 million and 
in 1995 led by Saudi Arabia as the main importer of the GCC states 
and second from the Arab countries (Figure 2). 
Irrespective of the varying size of markets and the corresponding 
levels in quantity and value of imports, the consumption pattern as 
well as marketing channels in the GCC states have many things in 
common. All the GCC countries are characterized by close socioeco­
nomic and linguistic links as well as population growth trends. With 
the implementation of a free trade area and free movement of na­
tionals, funds and goods, and the liberalization of wholesaling and 
other marketing activities, the importers, distributors, and wholesal­
ers, in general, have benefited immensely. 
The average expatriate population in the GCC countries is esti­
mated at 45% of the total population. Consumer preferences among 
the expatriates is very often different from that of the nationals. 
Thus, fish and fishery products imports fall into two categories: 
chilled/fresh fish, as well as canned and dried products preferred by 
the native population and items like frozen fish in demand among 
the expatriates. 
With regard to exports, the major Arab exporter is Morocco, 
with exports totalling 233,900 MT in 1995 or 61% of total exports, 
valued at $786.5 million. Most of these exports are canned small 
pelagic fish species to markets in Europe, some of which are re­
exported to the Arab markets. Mauritania is the second largest ex­
porter, with 55,000 MT, or 14%, valued at $167.3 million. The main 
exports are cephalopods, Japan being the most important importer. 
Also Italy, Spain, France and Germany are importers of Mauritanian 
demersal fish species. African countries import small pelagic species 
from Mauritania. 
ROLE OF INFOSAMAK CENTRE IN DEVELOPING ARAB 
FISH TRADE 
One of the most visible impediments to enhancing inter-regional 
trade in fish and fishery products and consequently a better exploi­
tation of Arab fisheries is the fact that this sector has not in the past 
been given the priority it deserves in some of the Arab countries. 
The Centre for Marketing Information and Advisory Services for 
Fishery Products in the Arab Region (INFOSAMAK), which was 
established in Bahrain in 1986 as a link in the FAO worldwide Fish 
Marketing Information Network, has played a major role in provid­
ing fish trade promotional services. 
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INFOSAMAK services help raise the level of awareness and 
importance of the sector. Inter-country trade has benefited in both 
value and quantity by the information made available by 
INFOSAMAK. The market information service is an efficient and 
productive mechanism for fish trade information and collation. 
With respect to market promotion, the ability of INFOSAMAK to 
match buyers and sellers has been productive. 
Investment opportunities in the field of Arab fisheries has also 
been one of INFOSAMAK’s promotion and identification services. 
It undertook pre-feasibility studies on behalf of investors which led 
to the strengthening of contacts with Arab national and regional 
institutions and organizations who are potential investors in the 
fisheries sub-sector. 
INFOSAMAK has proven to be an important regional service 
and an active participant in the Arab international fish marketing 
sub-sector. Its establishment has boosted the development of the 
Arab fish trade. 
DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 
Total fish landings attributed to the Arab states from marine and 
inland resources have stagnated during the last few years at about 
1.7 MT/y. Aquaculture, a newly developed resource, added about 
60,000 MT in 1993. Although an increase in production from capture 
fisheries is possible and will probably occur in response to intensi­
fied fisheries activities, it is very unlikely to keep pace with popula­
tion growth if the most sought-after and most easily caught fish are 
to be maintained as supply to the local domestic markets. The chal­
lenge here is organizing and stimulating production from fish re­
sources so that per capita supply of fish as food does not decline. 
In order to meet this challenge, proper management of available 
resources is required by the fisheries authorities in the Arab states. 
Maintaining efficient measures of monitoring and controlling these 
resources is essential. When applied properly and effectively, these 
measures could mitigate the effects associated with over-fishing of 
the major fisheries resources. The measures include building the 
capability to enforce laws against poaching in the territorial waters 
and high seas under national jurisdiction, banning fishing methods 
which are a threat to the resources, and finding a balance in the 
multi-purpose use of coastal resources to ensure a sustainable and 
optimum supply of fish. (Coastal fisheries at present provide Arab 
states with over 85% of their fish landings). In other words, the stock-
damaging experience of the “shrimp-rush” of the 1960s in the Ara­
bian Gulf by foreign fleets should not be allowed to take place again. 
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In aquaculture, the challenge here lies in the fact that it has not 
yet fully taken hold in the Arab states. In order to sufficiently de­
velop aquaculture, governments and research institutions concerned 
will need to increase and improve research that could be applied 
inland and along the coastlines. Involvement of the private sector 
and industry to identify research needs and priorities is essential. 
Research in aquaculture must address improvements in technolo­
gies, contribute to a reduction in the cost of production, and con­
sider the increasing need to ensure that aquaculture is environmen­
tally safe and that farming indigenous and popularly-demanded 
species as well as possible introducing new species can be achieved 
without endangering the local ecology. 
Fisheries statistics is another challenge that needs to be met. Much 
of the recorded data and information on the sector is incomplete, 
inconsistent, and outdated. Concerted efforts are needed to improve 
and develop the methods of data compilation, documentation, and 
analysis which are essential to making proper management decisions. 
Provision of upgraded data should be the responsibility of all con­
cerned governments in the region, to optimize appropriate exchanges 
of economic, commercial, and biological data. 
Training and upgrading of the fisheries workforce poses another 
serious challenge to the development of the fisheries sector. Training 
on the various aspects of fisheries management administration and 
technology is required. Attention should also be given to the 
strengthening and establishment of fisheries training institutions. 
This challenge will prove to be an essential contribution and, in 
some cases, has already had a major impact on a country’s fisheries 
development. When fisheries resources have a human resource base 
adequate for supporting more efficient national exploitation and 
increasing that exploitation, the result is better job opportunities for 
those who receive training. Experience has shown that a national 
institution designed to meet national scientific training needs can 
make a bigger contribution than a regional institution, which can­
not satisfy all the different needs of the various countries of the 
region. Regional training institutions would be effective, however, if 
established in a region where the countries involved have common 
fisheries resources, similar experiences, and homogeneity in the 
exploitation of their fisheries, as exists in the GCC countries. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Arab states’ fisheries sector can be a much better contributor 
to the economic development of the Arab countries and could pro­
vide increased benefits to the Arab peoples. Enhancing fisheries 
production would increase food supplies to help avert shortages in 
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animal protein, give support to food security measures, and reduce 
imports (which are a drain on hard currencies). It could open job 
opportunities to rural and urban populations, raise the standard of 
living of small-scale fishermen, and develop rural areas and fishing 
communities. Furthermore, with increased and enhanced fisheries 
activities, fisheries industries would improve the utilisation of fish 
landings, develop value-added products, and promote marketing, 
distribution, and inter- and intra-regional trade. 
However, to embark on such activities, considerable improve­
ments to the sector have to be implemented. These improvements 
require initiatives by the governments of the region to give higher 
priority in their national development plans to their fisheries sector. 
Public investment in fisheries infrastructure and services has to be 
increased to create an encouraging environment for potential pri­
vate investors. Fisheries research must be encouraged in marine and 
inland fisheries and aquaculture in order to bring about better man­
agement of resources including measures for resource conservation. 
The new internationally recognized Code of Conduct for Respon­
sible Fishing is an opportunity which the Arab states may seize upon 
in order to achieve increased benefits from their own resources. 
There are various challenges to the Arab states which have to be 
met in order to achieve the desired results. Fisheries should not by any 
means be considered a side- or marginal activity and should be given 
sufficient support and protection measures to allow the gradual 
growth and development. Fisheries development is, by its very nature, 
a long term activity, and development projects or programmes often 
require considerable time until they start to bear fruit. 
In the past few years marine fisheries in many areas, Arab waters 
included, have achieved their maximum sustainable yield. However, 
future concentration of development should be in the rational ex­
ploitation of some marine areas offshore and in the EEZs, as well as 
in maximizing benefits from joint ventures with foreign fishing 
fleets by negotiating better terms. Furthermore, the small-scale 
fisheries sector should have greater emphasis, and aquaculture, in 
fresh and marine waters, should be a major growth area. 
Finally, it cannot be over-emphasized that, for the Arab states, 
fisheries are vital for the food security and economic livelihood of a 
major portion of the population. Fisheries productivity and renew-
ability are dependent on both high-quality management and a high 
quality natural environment. Therefore, better management of 
currently over-exploited stocks, cautious utilization of under- or 
non-harvested marine and fresh water resources, expansion of 
acquaculture, and improvements in post-harvest utilization are 
prerequisites for the development of Arab fisheries. 
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ABSTRACT 
Historically, about half the oil transported through the global marine environment has come through the Arabian Gulf 
and the annual input of oil to the gulf’s marine environment is skewed toward sources connected with marine transport. 
As a case study, we assess the damages from an oil spill caused by a collision between the crude oil tankers Baynuna and 
the Seki on 30 March 1994. The collision released approximately 16,000 metric tons (MT) of light Iranian crude oil into 
the coastal waters of the Emirate of Fujairah, United Arab Emirates. Under the sponsorship of the Government of 
Fujairah, we analyze the effects on commercial fisheries and marine environment of Fujairah resulting from the spill. This 
analysis was the first comprehensive natural resource damage assessment conducted in this area. The major difficulty was 
to establish the economic damages associated with the environmental contamination and fisheries declines. We adapt an 
established compensation schedule to the UAE situation. Information on the amount and type of oil spilled, the amount of 
oil recovered, the season, the habitats oiled, the resources exposed, and the sensitivity of the resources is then used to 
establish the economic value of losses associated with environmental contamination and fisheries decline. 
INTRODUCTION 
Oil currently supplies about 40% of the world’s energy, and 
recent estimates suggest that the Middle East has over 65% of 
world’s petroleum reserves (World Resources Institute 1996). The 
countries bordering the Arabian Gulf produce almost 6 billion 
barrels (bbl) or 798 million metric tons (MT) of oil a year, about 27% 
of the world’s production in 1993 (World Resources Institute 1996). 
Historically, about half of the oil transported through the global 
marine environment has come through the Arabian Gulf (Gupta 
et al. 1993). 
Besides the dramatic and well-publicized catastrophic oil spills, a 
substantial amount of oil enters the marine and coastal waters of the 
Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman from a variety of other sources: 
ballast water discharges, fueling spills, platform blowouts, pipeline 
leaks, and spills from tanker and barge accidents. Natural seeps also 
constitute a significant contribution. 
Little information is available on the magnitudes of inputs from 
these more routine sources, and what estimates are available differ 
by orders of magnitude (e.g., Oostdam 1980; Linden 1990; Sorkoh 
1992; Literathy 1993; Price 1993). Transported oil constitutes a 
more significant source in the Gulf than in other parts of the world 
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because of this region’s importance as a shipping route to the West 
(Sheppard et al. 1992; Price 1993). For example, an estimated 
400,000 to 750,000 mt of ballast water and other oily water dis­
charges from tanker and ship traffic enter Gulf waters annually 
(Linden 1990; Price 1993). A single pipeline spill in Kuwait released 
over 15,000 bbl (about 2 000 MT) to marine waters (Linden 1990). 
Assuming a tanker spill equivalent to the Seki oil spill occurs every 
four years, the annual oil input is 4,000 MT from tanker accidents. 
About 14 tanker accidents of various kinds occur annually in the 
Arabian Gulf and at least 13% of these release oil (Linden 1990). For 
comparison, spills released about half a million bbl (67,000 MT) 
during the Iraq-Iran War (Price 1993). The world’s largest oil spill 
occurred during the 1991 Gulf War and released 3.81 to 8.1 million 
bbl (500,000 to 1,100,000 MT) into the northern Arabian Gulf (Sauer 
et al. 1993). 
Tankers carry oil from the Arabian Gulf, with 20,000 to 35,000 
individual tanker passages per year through the Strait of Hormuz 
(Price 1993). Hundreds of tankers can be seen anchored off Fujairah 
on the East Coast of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) awaiting 
passage into the Arabian Gulf. In this area on 30 March 1994, two 
tankers, the Baynuna and Seki, collided, and the Seki released about 
16,000 MT of light Iranian crude oil into the coastal waters of the 
Emirate of Fujairah. Spills such as this differ from chronic releases in 
that a large amount of oil contaminates a limited area in a short 
time period. This acute contamination is certainly more discernible 
and its effects, while difficult to demonstrate, are certainly made 
more evident through the acute toxicity of high oil concentrations 
and through the increased attention given them compared to the 
chronic exposures. 
This paper treats the Seki oil spill as a case study to draw some 
lessons for both science and policy concerning the assessment of 
damages from such spills. Before reviewing the events of Seki and 
discussing the results of our assessment of spill damages, we offer 
some background on the region’s environment. 
THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT OF THE GULF REGION 
The waters of the Arabian Gulf have several unique features, 
described well in Sheppard et al. (1992) and concisely in Sheppard 
(1993). First, this geologically young region has an enclosed shallow 
sea with a low flushing rate (i.e., 3 to 5.5 years). Second, although 
the climate is arid, there is a marked seasonality with hot summers 
and cool winters. Heating and chilling events are common. Third, 
the excess of evaporation over rainfall leads to high salinity. Salinity, 
especially in the southern part of the Gulf, is often above 40 points 
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per thousand (PPT) and may reach to 70 PPT in embayments. 
Fourth, with most of the Gulf less than 60 m deep (and therefore 
within the photic zone), benthic production contributes strongly to 
the high biological productivity reported for the Arabian Gulf. 
The region’s climate subjects its living marine resources to high 
natural stressors (Sheppard 1993). The reef areas of the Gulf can 
experience temperature maxima approaching 36 °C and seasonal 
differences ranging up to 25 °C. Many species are living at the limits 
of their tolerances to temperature and salinity. This situation has led 
to questions of whether the biota of the region may be more vulner­
able or more resistant to pollutants, or are some mixture of vulner­
able and resistant species. Fish kills following shamals (cold winter 
winds) and red tides and coral bleaching following temperature 
extremes are examples of consequences of such natural stressors. 
The reef areas of the Gulf can experi-The region’s high temperatures and high concentrations of oil­
ence temperature maxima approaching degrading microbes also produce a strong weathering environment 
36 °C and seasonal differences ranging 
for spilled oil. Much of the volatile and more toxic components of up to 25°C. Many species are living at 
oil spilled in the region evaporate within hours (h) or days. Indeed, the limits of their tolerances to tempera-
about half of the oil spilled in tropical waters is expected to disap- ture and salinity. This situation has led 
pear within 24 h (Gupta et al. 1993). After the first 24 h, oil disperses to questions of whether the biota of the 
through a variety of physical and chemical processes and also begins region may be more vulnerable or more 
resistant to pollutants, or are some to degrade. Ultimately, oil that is not degraded can remain as as-
mixture of vulnerable and resistant phaltic layers within beach sediments or become tar balls. For ex-
species.ample, studies of beaches contaminated during the Gulf War Oil 
Spill also found relict asphalt pavements derived from the Nowruz 
oil spill in 1983 (Hayes et al. 1993). Tar balls can be found com­
monly on the Gulf’s sea surface (Gupta et al. 1993), sometimes at 
depth (Gupta et al. 1993) and on many, if not most, gulf beaches 
(Price et al. 1987; Badawy and Al-Harthy 1991; Sheppard et al. 
1992). Despite this strong weathering environment, oil that is se­
questered in certain environment compartments can remain rela­
tively unweathered. Recently, Randolph et al. (1997) found beach 
sediments heavily contaminated during the Gulf War Oil Spill were 
still toxic to amphipods some 30 months after the spill (Randolph 
et al. 1997). 
The region’s critical habitats are well described by Sheppard et al. 
(1992), and the list in Table 1 is expanded from Price et al. (1993). Here 
as elsewhere, critical coastal habitats are often also the ones vulnerable 
to oil and other disturbances. While Price (1993) lists oil pollution as 
potentially degrading to the Gulf’s coastal habitats, he considers 
coastal infilling and development as potentially more destructive. 
The important living resources of the Gulf include fisheries, 
birds, sea turtles (both green and hawksbill), and dugongs 
(sea cows) (Price et al. 1993). The region’s oil and gas are of course 
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Table 1 Critical coastal habitats in the Persian/Arabian Gulf (expanded from Price et al. 1993) 
HABITATS IMPORTANCE AND COMMENTS 
Mangroves Nursery area for fish and shellfish 
Direct food for dugong, sea turtles, some urchins and fish; indirect food for
Seagrasses 
many other marine species; nursery area for fish and shellfish, especially shrimp 
Principally patch reefs; true coral cays around offshore islands; food and shelter
Coral areas 
for resources supporting artisanal/commercial fisheries 
Tidal flats Major energy and nutrient input to marine system 
Tidal flats w/algae mats Habitat with most injury from 1991 Gulf War oil spills 
Rocky reef fisheries Food and shelter for resources supporting artisanal/commercial fisheries 
Carbonate rock platforms 
Nursery areas for shrimp and pearl oyster spat 
with microalgae 
the major non-living resource, but increasingly important is clean 
seawater for desalination. During the Gulf War, substantial effort 
was directed at preventing oil from reaching the intakes of desalina­
tion plants. In July, 1997, diesel fuel spilled from a grounded barge 
in Sharjah, UAE entered the intake of a desalination plant, contami­
nating the water supply of an estimated half million people. 
FUJAIRAH AND ENVIRONS 
The spill environment is Fujairah, which contains most of the 
eastern UAE coastline bordering the Gulf of Oman. The Gulf of 
Oman is just south of the Strait of Hormuz, and seawater from both 
the Arabian Sea to the south and the Arabian Gulf to the north 
circulates through it. The shoreline north of the port of Fujairah is 
characterized by coarse- and fine-grained sandy beaches inter­
spersed by rocky headlands and occasional mixed sand and cobble 
shores, with occasional boulders. Bedrock outcrops of sedimentary 
rocks are common in several locations, particularly in the lower 
intertidal zone. The tidal range (vertical distance between mean high 
and low tide) along the Fujairah coast is about 2 m. Depending on 
the slope of the shore, the intertidal zone (the area between the 
mean high and low tide lines) may be anywhere between a few 
meters to more than 200 m wide. The shallow nearshore area con­
tains mixed substrates. Rocky reefs and coral reefs are common 
throughout the area. 
The coastal and offshore waters of Fujairah support a rich and 
diverse fish fauna, including many species of reef-associated fish, 
seasonally abundant large pelagic species, and small schooling fish 
(Sheppard et al. 1992). These fish support moderate to large local 
commercial and artisanal fisheries of substantial economic value to 
the people of Fujairah. These fisheries are based in several fishing 
ports along the east coast of the UAE. Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (MAF) statistics indicate that 1993 fish landings along the 
The coastal and offshore waters of 
Fujairah support a rich and diverse fish 
fauna, including many species of reef-
associated fish, seasonally abundant 
large pelagic species, and small 
schooling fish 
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east coast of the UAE totaled ~29,300 MT, with a value of 
227,577,000 Dirhams (about $62 million). 
These shallow coastal waters support abundant marine life, 
particularly in association with coral reefs. Small nearshore islands 
are important habitats for marine birds and sea turtles. There is a 
growing tourist industry based on the warm, sunny climate, sandy 
beaches, and nearshore reefs of Fujairah. All these natural resources 
and the commercial interests they support were adversely impacted 
by the Seki oil spill. 
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SEKI OIL SPILL 
On the evening of 30 March 1994, the crude oil tanker, Seki, fully 
loaded with Iranian light and heavy crude oils, was moving slowly 
south-southwest about 9.6 km off the port of Fujairah, UAE. The 
Baynuna, moving in ballast, attempted to pass in front but instead 
collided with the Seki. The bow of the Baynuna penetrated to a 
depth of 6 to 7 m into the Seki’s No. 1 port cargo tank, which con­
tained a light Iranian crude oil (American Petroleum Institute [API] 
gravity 33.9 at 60 °F). 
An estimated total of 16,000 MT (~18.7 million liters [L]) of 
crude oil escaped. Booms deployed around the Seki failed to contain 
the oil, and the oil slick spread away from the vessel, initially carried 
offshore by winds. However, on 2 April, the winds changed, and oil 
began drifting in a northwesterly direction toward the coast north of 
the port of Fujairah. On 2 April, large amounts of oil came ashore 
on the Fujairahan coast between Lu’lu’iyah and Rul Dibba (Figure 
1). Approximately 30 km of coastline from about Al Bidhiya north­
ward to about Ras Dibba were oiled initially. However, oil washing 
off the shore with each tide tended to be driven northward by the 
prevailing winds, oiling additional shoreline. Some of the coastline 
of the Musadam peninsula of Oman, north of Fujairah, was also 
oiled. Booms deployed across the entrance to the fishing ports of 
Dibba Fujairah and Dibba Sharjah prevented many but not all the 
slicks from entering the ports themselves. 
The spill response was organized and managed by the Fujairah 
Port Authority. Small skimmers were deployed shortly after the spill 
to recover oil from the sea surface. Approximately 813,600 L of oil 
was recovered (about 4% of the amount spilled). Cleanup of oil on 
the shore was initiated in early April by local contractors. However, 
efforts were halted after it was learned that the oil had penetrated 
deeply into the sandy shoreline sediments. Cleanup resumed in late 
August and continued until the end of the year. The cleanup con­
tractors from Saudi Arabia and France removed an estimated 10,000 
cubic meters (m3) of oil-contaminated sediments for offsite disposal. 
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Figure 1 Map of the spill region. 
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
There is general agreement the Seki spill caused substantial harm 
to the marine environment and natural resources of the UAE’s East 
Coast. A large number of damage claims for business interruption 
and losses were filed against the potentially responsible parties on 
behalf of the people of Fujairah. However, these business loss claims 
did not cover all the injuries sustained by natural resources and the 
people of Fujairah who depend on the resources for a livelihood. 
Commercial fisheries in nearshore waters are important to the 
economy of the Emirate of Fujairah, which sponsored our assess­
ment of the damages to its fisheries and marine environment result­
ing from the spill. 
Our assessment principally involved: 
•	 determination of the extent to which resources of concern 
(e.g., commercial and artisanal fishery resources) were 
exposed to the spilled oil; 
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•	 determination of the extent to which the resources or 
resource uses sustained injury (i.e., reduced fishery catch) 
as a result of exposure to the spilled oil; 
•	 determination of the extent to which the resources and 
resource uses recovered over time; and 
•	 economic valuation of the injured resources or resource uses. 
In July 1995, at the request of the Government of Fujairah, the 
Battelle Memorial Institute performed a preliminary study to deter­
mine whether additional scientific investigations would facilitate an 
improved assessment of the effects of the Seki oil spill. Battelle’s 
feasibility report (Neff et al. 1995) indicated that there was evidence 
of environmental degradation along more than 30 kilometers (km) 
of shoreline and of localized degradation in shallow subtidal areas 
attributable to the spill. Also, data available from the MAF at the 
time indicated that decreased fish catch rates were evident and 
strongly associated with the spill. To assess more fully the potential 
exposure of fish and the extent and implications of the decreased 
catch rates, Battelle recommended the chemical analysis of archived 
beach, subtidal sediment, and fish samples, and more detailed examina­
tion of fisheries information. 
This subsequent more detailed assessment (Pearson et al. 1996) 
was also sponsored by the Government of Fujairah and included an 
exposure assessment, an injury assessment, and an economic evalua­
tion. The Exposure Assessment documented the exposure of marine 
habitats and bottom fish from fishery areas along the coast of 
Fujairah to crude oil from the Seki. The injury assessment included a 
quantitative description of the reduction of fish catches from fishing 
ports in the spill area relative to reference areas. Information gath­
ered by interviews with east coast fishermen and fish landings data 
from the MAF were evaluated. MAF data on market price and sales 
were also examined. An analysis of marine climate examined pos­
sible alternative explanations for fishery declines. The damages 
assessment used information from the exposure and injury assess­
ments to establish economic damages. 
EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT 
The exposure assessment consisted of several interrelated itera­
tive steps which accomplished the following: 
•	 confirmation of the release of oil from a known source; 
•	 identification of the exposure pathways from the source to 
resources at risk; and 
•	 demonstration that the resources at risk and their environment 
actually were exposed to the released oil or to its byproducts. 
, -  . 
 
There is general agreement the Seki 
spill caused substantial harm to the 
marine environment and natural 
resources of the UAE’s East Coast. A 
large number of damage claims for 
business interruption and losses were 
filed against the potentially responsible 
parties on behalf of the people of 
Fujairah. However, these business loss 
claims did not cover all the injuries 
sustained by natural resources and the 
people of Fujairah who depend on the 
resources for a livelihood. 
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The major results were as follows: 
Clearly, the Seki released a substantial amount of oil that subse­
quently contaminated the marine environment of Fujairah. The 
observations of International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, 
Ltd. (ITOPF), Centre de Documentation de Recherche et d’Exper­
imentation sur les Pollutions Accidentelles des Eaux (CEDRE), U.S. 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and 
Wimpey Environmental confirmed that a substantial amount of 
crude oil was released from the tanker Seki following its collision 
with the Baynuna on 30 March 1994. A large amount of the spilled 
oil reached and contaminated the shoreline of Fujairah (CEDRE 
1994; Wimpey Environmental 1994a, b). 
The results of Battelle’s chemical fingerprinting analysis (Sauer et 
al. 1993; Sauer and Uhler 1994) of shoreline and offshore sediments 
in April and May 1994 confirmed that the shoreline and offshore 
sediments were contaminated with crude oil, the source of which 
was unequivocally identified as the Seki. Some samples contained oil 
from other sources. The Seki oil persisted in the marine environ­
ment for at least 19 months after the spill. 
The fisheries resources were exposed to Seki oil at the time of the 
spill. Fish samples collected by trap from the oil spill path off Ras 
Dibba a few days after the spill were moderately to heavily contami­
nated (42 to 478 parts per billion [ppb] total polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons [PAHs]) with crude oil residues analytically linked to 
the Seki. With a large majority of the samples having tissue burdens 
of PAHs above 100 ppb, the evidence for recent high exposure of 
demersal bottom-dwelling fish is strong. The observed levels were 
high compared to other spills (Pearson et al. 1996). 
Some PAH exposure of fisheries resources was detectable 19 
months after the spill, but its lower magnitude suggested that recov­
ery from contamination was occurring. Nineteen fish samples col­
lected by traps from spill path areas and a reference area off the 
Fujairahan coast in November 1995 contained much reduced con­
centrations of total PAHs (4 to 32 ppb). Concentrations were high­
est in tissues of fish from Al-Ghais Station 2, south of Ras Dibba, an 
area of heavy contamination during the spill. Concentrations were 
higher in fish from the other two oil spill path stations than in fish 
from the reference station off Fujairah City. 
Other evidence of continuing exposure was equivocal. Analyses 
of the P-450 enzyme and 7-ethoxy resorufin O-deethylase (EROD) 
activity in the fish samples collected by traps in November 1995 
showed slightly elevated levels at all stations. These levels suggested 
recent exposure of demersal fish along the Fujairah coast to 
contaminants that induce the enzyme activity. Without more 
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information, including an adequate baseline, further interpretation 
of the enzyme data beyond a general indication of recent exposure 
was not possible. 
EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT DISCUSSION 
The observation of subtidal oil and the confirmation that it 
derived from the Seki was unexpected. After the Gulf War oil spill, 
subtidal oil contamination was observed by Michel et al. (1993), 
who found no evidence of sinking oil and argued for a mechanism 
in which oil stranded on beaches sorbed to particles that sank when 
subsequently eroded from the beaches. A similar mechanism for the 
transport of Seki oil into subtidal areas is plausible. 
Bottom-living fish from the spill path were exposed to and be­
came contaminated with crude oil from the Seki shortly after the 
spill. Some fish from the most heavily contaminated area of the spill 
path may still have been slightly contaminated 19 months after the 
spill. However, limited sampling did not allow estimation of the full 
extent of exposure and contamination. 
INJURY ASSESSMENT 
Our injury assessment focused primarily on commercial fisheries 
resources. The examination of fisheries information included inter­
views with fishermen, analysis of the MAF landings data, and analy­
sis of the MAF market data. In addition, an analysis of the marine 
climate was performed to examine alternative hypotheses for the 
declines in fish catch rates. 
FUJAIRAHAN FISHERIES 
East coast fishermen deploy a combination of gear types and 
change those combinations seasonally as the target species change. 
Fujairahan fishermen in small outboard boats (tarrads) use nets 
(drift and set), traps (gargurs), and hook-and-line to capture pelagic 
and demersal fish. Larger diesel-powered dhows (lanshs) deploy 
primarily traps for demersal fish, but do some net and hook-and­
line fishing for pelagic and demersal species. Lanshs usually fish 
deeper waters than tarrads. In the winter and early spring, shore-
based tarrads also engage in a beach seine fishery for sardines 
(Sardinella spp. and Stolephorus spp.), which are sun-dried for fertil­
izer and export. Demersal fish species account for approximately 
40% of the landings along the East Coast of the UAE. However, 
pelagic migratory species are generally the most valuable fish har­
vested, in terms of unit value per fish, along the Fujairahan coast. 
Fishing occurs year-round, with the largest landings in the winter 
and spring, and the smallest landings in July and August each year. 
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During the spill, a fishing ban was declared that caused fisher­
men to lose from 20 to 40 days of fishing. At the time of the spill, the 
sardine fishery had already concluded. Upon return to fishing, fish­
ermen targeted pelagic and demersal fish. 
FISHERMEN INTERVIEWS 
Information from fishermen concerned changes in catch rates, 
fishing grounds, and/or gear selection during and after the spill. We 
were most interested in the success that fishermen experienced after 
they returned to fishing when the ban was lifted. In November 1995, we 
interviewed fishermen and boat owners in focus group settings in the 
ports of Fujairah, Dibba, Kalba, Khor Kalba, Dibba Hosn, and Dadnah. 
The major results of the interviews were as follows: 
•	 It is incorrect to assume that fishermen only fish off the 
coast near their home port. Most fishermen fish along the 
entire UAE East Coast. 
•	 All fishermen reported that they were affected by the spill to 
some extent, mainly due to loss of catch. 
•	 Fishermen reported that fish stocks were reduced, and that 
only recently (after almost two years), they appear to be 
recovering in diversity, but not yet in quantity. 
•	 Fishermen in some areas, such as Dibba Hosn, Dibba 
Fujairah, and Dadnah, which received heavy oil contamina­
tion, reported that decreased catches were continuing and 
that oil or tar still occurred on their traps. 
According to the fishermen interviewed, market prices at 
Fujairah were reduced for 6 months to one year after the spill, due 
mainly to public reluctance to buy fish from the east coast that were 
believed to be contaminated. The market recovered, and several 
fishermen believed that market price fluctuations in November 1995 
were within pre-spill range. 
ANALYSIS OF FISHERIES LANDINGS DATA 
We examined the catch records to assess whether any change in 
fishing success occurred after the spill. Our analysis focused on the 
fishing success or catch rate once the fishermen returned to fishing, 
rather than on the number of days of lost fishing resulting from the 
fishing ban. The rationale for such focus is that while lost fishing 
days were already claimed as direct damages, the effects of the spill on 
fishing success and the fisheries resource had not yet been examined. 
The fish landing records showed that the fishing strategies differ 
among the ports and by season within each port. Pelagic species are 
seasonally abundant and are generally targeted with specific gear 
types in the fall and winter months. This pursuit of pelagic fish can 
According to the fishermen interviewed, 
market prices at Fujairah were reduced 
for 6 months to one year after the spill, 
due mainly to public reluctance to buy 
fish from the east coast that were 
believed to be contaminated. 
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lead to some high catches at particular times and ports. There is also 
a basic fishing strategy conducted year-round at several ports that 
employs a mixture of traps and handlines. This strategy produces 
mostly demersal fish with some specific species of pelagic fish. Khor 
Kalba, an unoiled port, and Dibba Hosn and Dibba Fujairah, oiled 
ports, target demersal fish with traps. Our analysis examined the 
pelagic and demersal fish groups separately. 
The analysis of fish landings yielded the following findings: 
Catch patterns, in particular at Khor Kalba and Fujairah fishing 
port, did not show a significant change in the catch rate (kg/boat/ 
trip) for pelagic species (Table 2). 
Patterns in the catch rates for demersal species did show an 
abrupt and substantial decrease at oiled area ports of Dibba Hosn 
and Dibba Fujairah in April and May 1994 that was not seen at 
unoiled area ports of Khor Kalba or Fujairah. For Dibba Hosn, the 
monthly mean catch rates for demersal fish fell from 128 kg/boat/ 
trip in the pre-spill period to 22 kg/boat/trip in April and May 1994 
(Table 2). After September 1994, the demersal fish catch rate at 
Dibba Hosn was 51 kg/boat/trip. (This post-spill average may have 
been an underestimate, because the dataset for Dibba Hosn lacks 
data for the winter months when the highest demersal and other 
catches are normally expected.) 
The decrease in catch rates of total species and demersal species 
at Dibba Hosn in April and May 1994 were about 63% and 83%, 
respectively, of their average rate at Dibba Hosn before the spill. For 
Dibba Fujairah, catch rates for total species and demersal species in 
May 1994 decreased by about 80% and 77%, respectively. 
The catch rates for Dibba Hosn appear to have recovered by fall 
1994, but because there are no data available to us from Dibba Fujairah 
after May 1994, we cannot say when the catch rates there recovered. 
Table 2	 Catch rates at Khor Kalba and Dibba Hosn in the Emirate of Fujairah, and 
indicators of statistical significance. 
Pre-spill During spill Post-spill 
F statistic P-value
(kg/boat/trip) (kg/boat/trip) (kg/boat/trip) 
KHOR KALBA (unoiled) 
Total species minus small pelagic 295 56 144 3.4 0.062
 
Pelagic species 93 14 40 2.0 0.166
 
Demersal species 152 33 69 3.2 0.072
 
Demersal and mixed species 186 40 96 3.0 0.085
 
DIBBA HOSN (oiled) 
Total species minus small pelagic 262 36 95 3.7 0.074
 
Pelagic species 115 14 36 2.9 0.115
 
Demersal species 128 22 51 5.6 0.030
 
Demersal and mixed species 136 22 52 5.7 0.029
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ANALYSIS OF MARKET DATA 
From data on the prices (Dirhams/kg) and quantities (kg) of fish 
sold in the Fujairah fish market, several findings were evident: 
•	 In the two months (April and May) immediately following 
the spill, the average daily quantities of fish sold in the 
Fujairah market decreased for all categories except for shark 
and mollusks/crustaceans. 
•	 The quantities sold in the market appear to have recovered 
in September 1994, but not fully to pre-spill conditions. 
•	 Market prices showed little fluctuation when grouped by 
species classes. 
Average daily total market value, the summed products of the 
prices and the quantities sold for all species, fell in the two months 
following the spill. Because the prices did not change substantially, 
the reduction in total market value was likely a function of the de­
crease in quantity rather than a decrease in price. 
The fishermen reported that prices were reduced immediately 
following the spill, but this information was not supported by the 
analysis of data from the Fujairah market. 
From these data, it is not clear whether the decrease in quantity 
of fish sold in the market was due to the fishing ban, reduced catch 
rates, the perception that fishing would not be worthwhile, or some 
combination of these elements. 
OCEAN CLIMATE ANALYSIS 
We examined available physical oceanographic data to deter­
mine whether there was any evidence that special ocean climate 
changes occurred at the time of the spill that could confound inter­
pretation of the fisheries data. The data used came from two 
sources: 1) The Global Temperature-Salinity Pilot Project (GTSPP) 
database and 2) the Comprehensive Ocean-Atmosphere Data Set 
(COADS) Release 1a. The monthly mean sea surface temperature 
for all 6 years of the GTSPP data and the COADS long-term means 
and standard deviations demonstrated that the year 1994 did not 
significantly deviate from the long-term regional means. Based on 
the analyzed data, the Gulf of Oman did not show significant devia­
tions from the long-term average oceanographic climate for the 
region in and around the time of the spill. 
INJURY ASSESSMENT DISCUSSION 
The decreased catches, especially for the bottom-dwelling fish, 
were strongly associated with the Seki spill. The catch rates were not 
only abruptly and substantially low at ports in the spill area immedi-
Based on the analyzed data, the Gulf of 
Oman did not show significant devia­
tions from the long-term average 
oceanographic climate for the region in 
and around the time of the spill. 
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ately after the spill, but were also decreased compared with other 
ports with similar fishing strategies outside of the spill area. 
Attributing the decreased catches to the Seki oil spill is reason­
able. As mentioned by MacAlister, Elliott, and Partners (1995), such 
abrupt change is unlikely to be a seasonal change, which would have 
been more gradual. Further, recovery occurred by the fall of the year 
the spill occurred. Such rapid recovery is consistent with a decreas­
ing exposure and argues strongly against overfishing as the cause of 
the decreased catch rates. There is no evidence of a dramatic change 
in ocean climate during or after the spill; therefore, major oceano­
graphic changes were not likely to be involved. Moreover, the find­
ing that the pelagic catch rates showed little change associated with 
the spill also argues against a change in ocean climate as a cause of 
the decreased rates. Although a change in fishing grounds could 
1 These concentrations do not refer to totalhave led to decreased catch per unit effort, the fishermen reported 
organic carbon (TOC) but instead to a 
no change in their grounds. Instead, they continued to fish over mixture of mono- and diaromatic organics 
intended to mimic the high solubilitybroad areas of the east coast. 
components of Prudhoe Bay crude oil. See
The spill events could have led to the decreased catches in several Martin et al. (1992). 
ways. The reduced catch could have been a result of reduced num­
bers of traps and nets from lost gear. As an alternative or in addition 
to decreased amounts of gear deployed, the gear could have been 
functioning less effectively. The fishing strategy most clearly affected 
was that employing traps and handlines, both of which use bait. 
Decreased effectiveness of baited gear could have been due to de­
creased response of the fish to the bait, or to decreased numbers of 
fish due to avoidance of “oiled” areas. Decreased chemosensory 
responses in fish and shellfish in the presence of oil and avoidance of 
oil-contaminated sediment by commercial fish and shellfish have 
both been experimentally demonstrated (Weber et al. 1981; Pearson 
et al. 1981, 1984; Pinto et al. 1984; Martin et al. 1992). The work of 
Martin et al. (1992) is noteworthy, because their conclusions are 
based on a field experiment in which salmon homing, which re­
quires the salmon’s sensing the odor of homestream water, was 
transiently disrupted at hydrocarbon concentrations between 1 and 
10 ppb.1 Although it is not known which of these alternatives led to 
the decreased catches, all are plausible, and all were derived from the 
spill events. 
A consistent story emerged from the fishermen and the landing 
reports, even though there were some discrepancies between them. 
Both the market data and the fish landings data indicated that there 
were fewer fish caught and sold in the two months immediately 
following the spill. Demersal fish were the component of the catch 
with both observed contamination and a clear decrease in number. 
Further, the fishermen in some areas, such as Dadnah, which were 
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not sampled for the MAF landings records, continued to report 
decreased catches and the existence of oil or tar on their traps. At­
tributing the decreased catches to the spill is reasonable, given the 
observations, but the available data were too limited in amount and 
kind to give more than a rough indication of the extent of the effects 
on the fishermen. 
While the available catch rate and economic data suggested that 
decreased catch rates encountered upon return to fishing resulted in 
losses in net revenue to an “average” fisherman operating in the two 
months following the spill, we do not know how many fishermen 
actually suffered such an effect. Also, because the MAF landings data 
are a sampling of a portion of the fishermen from only some of the 
ports, we have no data to extrapolate the effect of the decreased 
catches to all the potentially affected fishermen. Another approach to 
estimate the monetary damages derived from injury to the fisheries 
was needed. 
ECONOMIC DAMAGES ASSESSMENT OF FISHERIES AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL INJURIES BY THE COMPENSATION 
SCHEDULE APPROACH 
To estimate the economic value of the injuries (i.e. damages) 
from the Seki oil spill to the fisheries and marine environment of the 
UAE East Coast, we used procedures based on the Washington State 
Marine Oil Spill Compensation Schedule (Geselbracht and Logan 
1993; Washington Administrative Code Chapters 173-183), and 
applied them to the circumstances of the spill and to the UAE envi­
ronment. The Washington schedule was developed to estimate 
comprehensive environmental damages when actual data on injuries 
are sparse and cannot be obtained without inordinate expense, when 
restoration of the resources is not technically feasible (and thus 
cannot be used to estimate monetary damages), or when data gaps 
or other circumstances do not permit adequate compensation to the 
resource trustees. All of these conditions applied in the case of the 
Seki spill. The schedule approach was thus well-suited to the Seki oil 
spill situation, where there was clear evidence of widespread con­
tamination of the marine environment and of effects on marine 
resources, especially fisheries, but incomplete data on the distribu­
tion of oil among habitats and ecosystem components, and inad­
equate data to determine the full extent of fisheries injuries and their 
linkage to economic effects. Moreover, using the schedule enables 
estimation of damages not only for the obvious injuries to commer­
cial fisheries, for example, but also for those to other environmental 
components that we were not able to study directly. 
While the available catch rate and 
economic data suggested that decreased 
catch rates encountered upon return to 
fishing resulted in losses in net revenue to 
an “average” fisherman operating in the 
two months following the spill, we do not 
know how many fishermen actually 
suffered such an effect. 
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The Washington schedule requires as inputs: 
•	 the amount and characteristics of the oil spilled that deter­
mine the severity of effects,
 
•	 the resources exposed and their sensitivity, and 
•	 the actions taken by the spiller—primarily, recovery of the
 
oil (Geselbracht and Logan 1993).
 
The schedule applies general and expert knowledge of the re­
sources and oil characteristics to arrive at coefficients between $1 
and $50/gal of oil. Coefficients for a series of ecosystem components 
are multiplied by the number of gallons spilled, and the products are 
summed to give a total comprehensive environmental damage as­
sessment. We derived coefficients for habitat, commercial fisheries, 
sea turtles, marine birds, and environmentally-based recreation 
following the compensation schedule approach and using expert 
knowledge of UAE marine fisheries and environment. The result of 
this effort was a total comprehensive damage assessment that was 
distinct from other damages resulting from business interruption 
and other disruptions and costs. We believe this assessment to be the 
first of its kind in the Gulf Region. 
ECONOMIC DAMAGES ASSESSMENT METHODS 
The Compensation Schedule has two main components: re­
source vulnerability scores and oil effects scores (Geselbracht and 
Logan 1993; Washington Administrative Code Chapter 173-183). 
Geselbracht and Logan (1993) provided resource vulnerability rank­
ing formulas for seven ecosystem components: habitat, marine 
birds, marine fisheries, shellfish, salmon, marine mammals, and 
recreation. We did not develop scores for shellfish, salmon, and 
marine mammals. The shellfish caught in the UAE are primarily 
crabs and mollusks captured in traps along with demersal fish. Be­
cause the shellfish are caught with the demersal fish and because no 
effect was evident on shellfish, we elected not to develop a separate 
scoring for shellfish. Because there are no salmon and marine mam­
mals are of low occurrence off the east coast of the UAE, we did not 
develop scores for those categories. 
The evidence discussed in previous sections made it clear that 
contamination and degradation of both intertidal and subtidal 
habitats had occurred and that there were impacts on fisheries and 
fisheries resources beyond interrupted fishing or gear loss. The 
formulas provided by Geselbracht and Logan (1993) were used to 
score habitat and commercial fisheries. Because sea turtles occur as 
juveniles feeding along the coast in the spill area, and because turtle 
mortalities were observed during the spill, we developed a formula 
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modified from the marine mammal formula of Geselbracht and 
Logan (1993) and applied that formula to estimate damages for 
marine turtles. Because marine turtles are endangered and protected 
by law in the UAE, we followed Geselbracht and Logan (1993) in 
multiplying the score for the sea turtles by a factor of 1.5. This en­
dangered species factor was applied only to the score for turtles. 
Because marine birds are often one of the most heavily impacted 
ecosystem components during an oil spill, we used the formula of 
Geselbracht and Logan (1993) to assign a score for them. Since the 
beaches and reefs of the east coast provide opportunities for recre­
ation that would be obviously impaired by oil contamination, we 
used the approach described in Geselbracht and Logan (1993) to 
develop a formula specific to the affected areas. This recreation score 
compensates for the impact of oil contamination on the recreational 
potential of the environment in the oiled area, and is separate from 
and in addition to specific economic losses suffered through busi­
ness interruption (e.g., cancelled reservations). 
Using the Washington Schedule we calculated damages for the 
Seki spill. The schedule requires the scores to be assigned based on 
seasonal values, and we assigned scores for the spring season based on 
the early spring occurrence of the spill. Input values for vulnerability 
scoring range from 5 (most sensitive or most important) to 1 (least 
sensitive or least important) and were derived by a group of scientists 
with oil spill and UAE experience. For example, because weathering of 
oil is higher in the UAE than Washington state, the persistence scores 
used were lower than those that would have been assigned for Wash­
ington. Also, a highly valuable habitat, such as mangrove stands, was 
assigned a score of 5 because of its high biological productivity and its 
role as nursery and feeding grounds for fish and other wildlife. Using 
tables for the nonlinear relationship between raw and scaled scores, 
the raw scores produced by applying the formulas to the input values 
were scaled to provide a final score between 1 and 5. 
The habitat types used in scoring were derived from data pre­
sented in the Wimpey Report (Wimpey Environmental 1994a) and 
are specific to the Seki spill area. To obtain the distribution of oil 
among the habitats, we assumed that the oil was distributed among 
the intertidal habitats in proportion to their observed occurrence in 
the spill area, as presented by Wimpey Environmental (1994a). For 
the distribution of oil among the subtidal habitats, we assumed that 
the oil was evenly split between hard and soft substrata, and among 
the hard substrata evenly split between coral and rocky reef habitats. 
Without data from a systematic subtidal survey, this assumption is 
the most conservative. Although there was clear evidence that oil 
reached the subtidal habitats, the precise extent of subtidal oiling 
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was not known. Consequently, we used two scenarios in estimating 
the damages. The first scenario assumed that 15% of the spilled oil 
reached the subtidal habitats, and the second assumed that 25% did. 
Based on evidence from other spills and the oil characteristics, we 
doubt that more than 25% of the spilled oil reached subtidal habi­
tats. Local expert knowledge was used to develop values for the 
importance of the habitat and other inputs. 
For marine fisheries, we developed scores for small pelagic, 
pelagic, and demersal fish, because these three groups showed clear 
differences in seasonal abundances, stock conditions, oil sensitivi­
ties, and importance to fisheries and the environment. The scores 
for the three groups were then combined into one composite score 
for marine fisheries. 
For each recreational category, we estimated the proportion of 
Depending on the assumptions coast where recreation could occur and derived an attribute score 
concerning the amount of oil reaching for that activity. The products of the coastline length and attribute 
the subtidal habitats, the estimates for 
scores were then summed and scaled to fall between 1 and 5 for the the total comprehensive environmental 
final vulnerability score. damages for habitat, commercial 
Following Geselbracht and Logan (1993), oil effects rankings fisheries, sea turtles, marine birds, and 
were developed for three aspects of injury: 1) acute toxicity, 2) me- marine-based recreation ranged 
chanical injury, and 3) persistence. Using the API gravity for light between $48,680,946 and 
$48,930,581.Iranian crude oil of 33.84 and following Geselbracht and Logan 
(1993) and Washington Administrative Code Chapters 173-183, we 
assigned an acute toxicity ranking of 2 (out of 5), a mechanical 
injury ranking of 3, and a persistence ranking of 3. The amount of 
oil spilled was assumed to be 4,949,952 US gal (~18.7 million L), 
and the amount recovered, 214,935 US gal (~814,000 L). 
The calculation of damages followed the formula of Geselbracht 
and Logan (1993). For each resource, the vulnerability scores, the oil 
effects scores, and the number of gallons spilled (less the number of 
gallons recovered) were multiplied according to the formula. The 
total environmental damages were then calculated as the sum of the 
damages for the five components: habitat, marine fisheries, marine, 
turtles, marine birds, and recreation. 
ECONOMIC DAMAGES ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
Depending on the assumptions concerning the amount of oil 
reaching the subtidal habitats, the estimates for the total compre­
hensive environmental damages for habitat, commercial fisheries, 
sea turtles, marine birds, and marine-based recreation ranged be­
tween $48,680,946 and $48,930,581 (Table 3). 
Habitat injury had estimated damages of $5,393,505, assuming 
that 15% of the oil reached the subtidal and $5,643,140, assuming 
25% reached the subtidal (Table 3). The difference in damages 
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Table 3	 Summary of environmental damages from the Seki spill as calculated by the Marine 
Oil Spill Compensation Schedule, assuming different amounts of oil reaching 
subtidal habitats (Pearson et al. 1996). 
Category 15% reaching subtidal 25% reaching subtidal 
Habitat $5,393,505 $5,643,140 
Marine fisheries $15,665,931 $15,665,931 
Marine turtles $10,718,795 $10,718,795 
Marine birds $9,482,011 $9,482,011 
Recreation $7,420,704 $7,420,704 
TOTAL $48,680,946 $48,930,581 
between the two scenarios for the amount of oil reaching the 
subtidal habitats was less than 1% of the total comprehensive dam­
ages. About 49% of the intertidal zone of the coastline affected by 
spill was rocky, whereas the remainder was primarily sandy. Highly 
valued and oil-sensitive habitats, such as mangroves and mud flats, were 
not found in the oil spill area. If such valued habitats had been oiled, the 
damages for habitat injury would have been substantially higher. 
The category with the largest estimated damages was marine 
fisheries (Table 3). Based largely on their seasonal presence, relative 
commercial importance, and other factors, the demersal fish had the 
highest vulnerability, followed by the pelagic, and then by the small 
pelagic. Because of their threatened and endangered status, marine 
turtles had estimated damages in the vicinity of $11 million (Table 3). 
Had the spill affected the turtle breeding areas, the estimated dam­
ages would have again been higher. Had the turtles not been endan­
gered, the estimated damages would have been about one-third 
lower. The marine bird and environmentally-based recreation dam­
ages were estimated to be $9.4 million and $7.4 million, respectively. 
ECONOMIC DAMAGES ASSESSMENT DISCUSSION 
The application of the Compensation Schedule provided an 
estimate of the total comprehensive environmental damages for five 
natural resource services known to be contaminated and affected by 
oil from the Seki oil spill. It enabled the estimation of damages in a 
situation in which clear evidence of contamination and of effects on 
the environment and fisheries existed, but in which the data to link 
oiling and environmental effects to their economic value losses were 
inadequate or incomplete. 
The results of the schedule approach were consistent with the 
observed effects and prevailing values. For example, marine fisheries 
had the highest estimated damages and were resources with clear 
The category with the largest estimated 
damages was marine fisheries (Table 3). 
Based largely on their seasonal pres­
ence, relative commercial importance, 
and other factors, the demersal fish had 
the highest vulnerability, followed by the 
pelagic, and then by the small pelagic. 
Because of their threatened and 
endangered status, marine turtles had 
estimated damages in the vicinity of 
$11 million. 
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effects and high value (Table 3). The fisheries damages estimate was 
about one quarter of the annual value of the east coast fisheries. 
Marine turtles had high estimated damages because of their threat­
ened status. Damages for habitat injury were lower than expected. 
However, these estimated damages were reasonable in hindsight 
because Seki oil did not reach the most sensitive or most important 
habitats, such as the mangrove stands in Khor Kalba to the south of 
the spill area. 
There is still some uncertainty about the estimate of habitat 
damages, because we do not know the proportion of spilled oil that 
reached the subtidal habitats. Seki oil did reach the subtidal, but 
without a systematic survey of sediment contamination, we know 
neither the amount that reached the subtidal nor its distribution 
there. However, even a high-end estimate of 25% of the oil’s reach-
Lessons can be drawn from the Seki oiling the subtidal only increases the estimated damages by about 
spill for both science and policy concern­$250,000 (Table 3). The marine fisheries damages overshadow those 
ing oil spill damage assessments. The 
for habitat injuries. first is that although the assessment was 
hampered by incomplete data, the 
compensation methodology worked to CONCLUSION 
produce damage estimates that are, in Lessons can be drawn from the Seki oil spill for both science and 
our opinion, reasonable. policy concerning oil spill damage assessments. The first is that 
although the assessment was hampered by incomplete data, the 
compensation methodology worked to produce damage estimates 
that are, in our opinion, reasonable. Fingerprinting analysis proved 
successful and necessary for demonstrating the contamination of the 
marine environment by Seki oil and exposure of demersal fish. The 
fisheries data provided strong evidence for the occurrence of effects 
but, while adequate for the management purposes for which the 
fisheries data are routinely collected, did not enable estimation of 
the full spatial or temporal extent of fisheries effects. The linkage of 
the fisheries effects to their economic damages could probably not 
have been made without an approach similar to the one we took. 
Similarly, the linkage of contamination of the coastal habitats to 
economic damages could not have been possible without the com­
pensation schedule approach. 
To improve the compensation schedule approach in the Arabian 
Gulf and Gulf of Oman, we recommend that the coastal habitats be 
classified and mapped in detail. The emerging Geographical Informa­
tion Systems (GIS) is ideal for such a task. We believe that an oil spill 
compensation procedure developed in more detail for the region would 
enable rapid calculation of damages without large or time-consuming 
studies. Such a schedule is appealing from several policy perspectives, 
and its more frequent and widespread use would enhance its value as a 
deterrent to less than full attention to oil spill prevention. 
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Global Climate Variations Over the Past 250 Years: Relationships with the Middle East 
Michael E. Mann 
Raymond S. Bradley 
Department of Geosciences, University of Massachusetts 
ABSTRACT 
We analyze recent global temperature reconstructions over several centuries in time based on calibrations of tempera­
ture patterns against global networks of long instrumental and “proxy” data (natural archives such as ice cores, corals, 
and tree rings), focusing on long-term climatic variations in the Middle East. The pattern of global warming of the past 
century does not show a strong influence in this region. Instead, patterns of natural low-frequency variability appear to 
dominate the region. One of these patterns is associated with the well-known “North Atlantic Oscillation” and leads to 
changes on interannual and decadal timescales. Another distinct pattern appears to relate to influences of low-frequency 
variability in the North Atlantic ocean circulation and overlying atmosphere circulation, and describes changes that are 
predominantly multidecadal in timescale. This latter pattern is especially important in predicting possible climate change 
scenarios in future decades in this region. 
INTRODUCTION 
Documenting the patterns of large-scale climate variability dur­
ing the past several centuries is important to understanding the 
significance of long-terms trends and low-frequency variations in 
the global climate. Once such large-scale patterns of variability are 
established and statistically verified, they can provide a context for 
understanding the variations present in particular regions of the 
globe, including those regions of importance in the history of hu­
man civilization. Unfortunately, there is no instrumental climate 
data available on the century and longer timescales of interest in this 
context. However, widespread networks of high-resolution proxy 
climate indicators and the few very long instrumental and historical 
climate indicators available several centuries back can be combined 
into a global “multiproxy” network that can potentially be used to 
describe annual global temperature patterns during past centuries. 
Here we analyze climatic variability back to the mid-18th century 
based on the multiproxy-reconstructed global surface temperature 
patterns of Mann et al. (1997a). We focus here on the variations in 
the Middle East region and its relationship with larger-scale patterns 
of climate variability. We can thus examine in detail the relationship 
between Middle Eastern climate and global climatic variations sev­
eral centuries back in time. 
DATA 
The reconstructed surface temperature patterns of Mann et al. 
(1997) are based on the multivariate calibration of globally distrib­
uted annual resolution proxy climate indicator network. The net­
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work includes (see Figure 1, left) the collection of annual resolution 
dendroclimatic, ice core, ice melt, and long historical records used 
by Bradley and Jones (1992) combined with other coral (Lough 
1991; Quinn et al. 1993; Dunbar et al. 1994), dendroclimatic (Jacoby 
and D’arrigo 1989, 1990; Briffa et al. 1992), and long instrumental 
(Jones and Bradley 1992) records. The available instrumental 
records are formed into annual mean anomalies relative to the 1902­
1980 reference period, and gridded onto a 5 degree by 5 degree grid, 
consistent with the instrumental gridpoint data described below. 
This provides 11 temperature gridpoint records, 12 precipitation 
gridpoint records, and 3 station surface pressure gridpoint records 
dating back to 1820 or earlier. 
Figure 1	 Data used in this study. (left) Distribution of annual resolution proxy indicators used in this study. Dendroclimatic reconstructions are 
indicated by “tree” symbols, ice core/ice melt proxies by “star” symbols, coral records by “C” symbols. Long historical records and 
instrumental “gridpoints” series (see text) are shown by squares (temperature), or diamonds (precipitation or surface pressure). All 58 
sites (62 records) available back to 1820 are shown, with records dating back to at least 1820 (red), 1800 (blue-green), 1750 (green), 
1600 (blue), and 1400 (black) shown with different colors. Certain sites (e.g., Quelccaya ice core) provide multiple proxy indictors (e.g., 
multiple nearby cores, and both d 18o isotope data and ice accumulation). (right) Distribution of the (1082) nearly continuous available 
land air/sea surface temperature gridpoint data available from 1902 onward indicated by shading. The blue squares indicate the subset 
of 219 gridpoints with nearly continuous records extending back to 1854 that are used for verification. Northern Hemisphere (NH) 
and global (GLB) mean temperature are estimated as areally-weighted (i.e., cosine latitude) averages over the Northern hemisphere 
and global domains respectively. A Middle Eastern (“MNET”) surface temperature index is constructed from the gridpoints available 
over the large-rectangular box shown in that region. 
The instrumental temperature anomaly data (Figure 1, right) 
used to train the proxy dataset span the interval 1902-1993 and are 
taken from a gridded combined land air and sea surface temperature 
dataset of Jones and Briffa (1992). Although there are notable spatial 
gaps, this network covers significant enough portions of the globe to 
estimate a global mean (“GLB”) temperature, and enough of the 
Northern hemisphere and of the extreme eastern equatorial Pacific 
to construct highly faithful estimates of both the Northern Hemi­
sphere mean (“NH”) temperature series, as well as certain indices of 
particular importance (e.g., the “NINO3” index important in the 
context of the El Niño phenomenon). A box including all gridpoints 
in the region 30N to 50N latitude, 20E to 40E longitude is used to 
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construct a Middle Eastern (“MNET”) temperature index. An in­
strumental estimate of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) taken 
from Hurrell (1995) is also made use of in our analysis. 
MULTIPROXY CALIBRATION 
Multiproxy networks appear to provide the greatest opportunity 
for large-scale climate reconstruction (Bradley and Jones 1993; 
Hughes and Diaz 1995) and climate signal detection (Mann et al. 
1995; Barnett et al. 1996). While limitations (e.g., dating errors) in 
the individual proxy indicators must be carefully accounted for in 
constructing an appropriate multiproxy network (see Mann et al. 
1997a), the mutual information contained in a widely distributed set 
of independent climatic indicators can more faithfully capture the 
consistent climate signal that is present, reducing the compromising 
effects of biases and weaknesses in the individual indicators. 
The reconstructions of which we make use (Mann et al. 1997a) 
are based on a calibration of such a multiproxy network against 
widespread instrumental surface temperature data of the 20th cen­
tury. Multivariate statistical calibration approaches have previously 
been applied to proxy climate data for local or regional climate 
reconstruction, particularly in the field of dendroclimatology (see 
e.g., Fritts et al. 1971; Cook et al. 1994). Related statistical methods 
have more recently been applied to the problem of interpolating 
sparse early instrumental climate observations through training 
them against the dominant large-scale patterns of variability isolated 
in shorter, but more widespread recent climate fields (Kaplan et al. 
1997). Our approach to long-term climate pattern reconstruction 
combines these traditionally distinct applications. We first decom­
pose the instrumental training data into its dominant patterns of 
variability, and subsequently perform a multivariate calibration of 
the climate proxy indicators against the time histories of these dif­
ferent patterns. In doing so we make a number of important as­
sumptions. We assume (1) that the indicators in our multiproxy 
trainee network are linearly related to one or more of the instru­
mental training patterns. In the relatively unlikely event that a proxy 
indictor represents a truly local climatic phenomenon which is 
uncorrelated with larger-scale climatic variations, or represents a 
highly non-linear response to climatic variations, this assumption 
will not be satisfied. We further assume (2) that a relatively sparse 
but widely distributed sampling of long proxy and instrumental 
records may nonetheless sample most of the relatively small number 
of degrees of freedom in climatic patterns at interannual and longer 
timescales. Regions not directly represented in the trainee network 
may nonetheless be indirectly represented through teleconnections 
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with regions that are. Finally, we assume (3) that the patterns of vari­
ability captured by the multiproxy network have analogs in the pat­
terns we resolve in the shorter instrumental data. This latter assump­
tion represents a fairly weak “stationarity” requirement—we don’t 
require that the climate itself be stationary. In fact, we expect that 
some sizeable trends in the climate may be resolved by our recon­
structions. We do, however, assume that the basic spatial patterns of 
variation that the climate has exhibited during the past several centu­
ries are similar to those by which it has varied during the past century. 
Studies of instrumental surface temperature patterns suggest that such 
a form of stationarity holds up at least on multi-decadal timescales, 
during the past century (Kaplan et al 1997). The statistical cross-
validation exercises we describe later provide the best evidence that 
these key underlying assumptions are reasonable. 
We isolate the dominant patterns of the instrumental surface 
temperature data through principal component analysis (PCA) 
(Preisendorffer 1989). PCA provides a natural smoothing of the 
temperature field in terms of a small number of dominant patterns 
of variability “empirical eigenvectors” that describe 20th century 
temperature variations. Each of these eigenvectors is associated with 
a characteristic spatial pattern or “Empirical Orthogonal Function” 
(EOF) and its characteristic evolution in time, or “principal compo­
nent” (PC). The first 5 eigenvectors describe a fraction (ß = 0.27, or 
27%) of the total multivariate variance (“MULT”) in the raw data, 
90% of GLB, 85% of NH, 67% of NINO3, and 76% of the detrended 
(“DETR”), interannual-to-multi-decadal timescale variability in 
NH. The first 40 eigenvectors, for comparison, describe nearly all of 
the GLB and NH annual mean variance, about 90% of the NINO3 
annual mean variance, and 73% of MULT. The rank of the eigenvec­
tors orders the fraction of variance they describe in the standardized 
data (1=12%. 2=6.5%, 3=5%, 4=4%, 5=3.5%). The first eigenvector 
describes a modest 12% of the full spatiotemporal variance in the 
dataset, but a majority of variance in GLB (88%) and NH (73%) 
estimated temperatures. This eigenvector is associated with the 
significant global warming trend of the past century. The second 
eigenvector describes 8% of the multivariate data variance, and is 
associated with much of the ENSO-scale variability, describing 40% 
of the variance in the NINO3 index. This eigenvector exhibits a 
modest negative trend. The third eigenvector describes much of the 
traditional NAO pattern (verified through correlation analyses 
described later), with opposed centers of warm and cold anomalies 
in and neighboring the North Atlantic. The fifth eigenvector is 
associated with variability centered in the Atlantic basin exhibiting 
significant multi-decadal variability (see Kushnir 1994; Mann and 
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Park 1994,1996). Figure 2 shows the EOFs for eigenvectors 1, 2, 3 
and 5. (The verification exercises described briefly below and in 
detail in Mann et al. (1997a) indicate that the fourth eigenvector can 
not be skillfully resolved by the present multiproxy network). The 
associated PCs are shown along with their reconstructed counter­
parts (“RPC”s) below. Note that both EOFs 3 and 5 have large pro­
jections in the Middle East. Indeed, as discussed below, these two 
independent patterns compete for influence on Middle Eastern 
temperature variations. 
As described in detail by Mann et al. (1997a), we calibrate the 
multiproxy data network against these empirical eigenvectors at 
annual mean resolution during the training (1902-1980) interval. 
This multivariate calibration provides a transfer function that can be 
applied to the multiproxy network to reconstruct temperature pat­
terns before the calibration interval on an annual basis, with a spa­
tial coverage dictated only by the spatial extent of the instrumental 
training data. The statistical skill of the temperature reconstructions 
is established through independent cross-validation or “verification” 
exercises. Verification statistics were determined based on two 
Figure 2 EOFs of the leading eigenvectors (#’s 1,2,3,5) of the global temperature data from 1902-1980 retained in the analysis. The EOFs are 
renormalized to remove the areal weighting factor which tends to diminish the amplitudes of the pattern at higher latitudes. 
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distinct verification datasets described by Mann et al. (1997a). Here 
we will discuss the results from one of these verification datasets, the 
sparse subset of the gridded data (M’ = 219 gridpoints) for which 
independent values are available from 1854-1901 (see Figure 1, 
right). NH and GLB verification statistics are computed, as is the 
multivariate (“MULT”) gridpoint level verification statistic. 
A sequence of multiproxy calibration experiments were per­
formed in which progressively lower rank eigenvectors are retained. 
Sensitivity to the exclusion of certain intermediate rank eigenvectors 
was also investigated. While calibration described variance increases 
monotonically with increased retained eigenvectors, an optimal 
subset of eigenvectors can be isolated which maximizes the verifica­
tion described variance. In this study, that subset corresponds to 
only a handful of the highest ranked eigenvectors. We also test the 
network for sensitivity to the inclusion or elimination of particular 
trainee data (e.g., instrumental records, the Northern treeline 
dendroclimatic indicators of North America, and tropical coral 
records). The technical results and details regarding calibration/ 
verification are described by Mann et al. (1997). These experiments 
demonstrate that the multiproxy network appears able to capture 
much of the variance that can potentially be described by the mod­
est retained set of eigenvectors generated by cross-validation exer­
cises. Although more widespread proxy data are available, the 
network used here is intentionally sparse, illustrating the principle 
that skillful pattern reconstruction can be performed with a rela­
tively sparse trainee network. More widespread proxy networks 
should allow an increasingly large number of eigenvectors to be 
skillfully retained, and a consequently increased fraction of de­
scribed variance. The patterns of calibration and verification ß for 
the full reconstructed patterns are shown in Figure 3. 
In Figure 4, we show the comparison of the raw and reconstuct­
ed MNET temperature index during the 1902-1980 calibration 
interval. The match is excellent, with a correlation of r = 0.5 between 
the raw and reconstructed series (r2 = 0.25) and a value of ß = 0.17 
for described variance. Note that the values for this coarse-averaged 
regional index are better than for the individual gridpoints making 
up the index because of the large-scale optimality of our EOF-based 
reconstruction approach. Although the 1854-1901 verification 
dataset poorly samples the rectangular region used to construct the 
MNET index, the verification ß values for the gridpoints which are 
present are with one exception statistically significant at the 99% 
level, albeit negative—the impact of quality problems with the in­
strumental data themselves before the 20th century is unknown and 
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Figure 3 Spatial patterns of calibration (left, based on 1902-1980 data), and verification ß (right, based on 1854-1901 data) (bottom). Values that 
are insignificant at the 99% level are shown in gray, while negative, but 99% significant values are shown in yellow, and significant positive 
values are shown in two shades of red. 
may artificially degrade the apparent skill of the reconstructions. 
We thus believe the reconstructed MNET index to be quite faithful. 
TEMPERATURE RECONSTRUCTIONS 
The reconstructions discussed below are derived from the opti­
mal eigenvector subsets for the period 1760-1980 as described by 
Mann et al. (1997a), reconstructed with EOF #s 1,2,3,5. To illustrate 
the effectiveness of the proxy pattern reconstruction procedure, we 
show as an example (Figure 5) the raw, EOF-filtered, and recon­
structed temperature patterns for a year during the calibration inter­
val (1941). 
It is clear that the proxy network in this example is capable of 
resolving much of the structure that is resolved by the 4 EOFs them­
selves used in calibration. Figure 6 shows the 4 reconstructed princi-
Figure 4 Comparison of raw and proxy-reconstructed MNET index during the 1902-1980 
calibration interval. 
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Figure 5	 Comparison of the proxy-based spatial reconstructions of the anomaly pattern for 
1941 vs. the raw data. based on (upper left) raw and (bottom) proxy-recon­
structed data. Anomalies (relative to 1902-1980 climatology) are indicated by color 
scale, with lighter shading corresponding to warm anomalies and darker shading to 
cold anomalies. Noteworthy is a warm event in the tropical Pacific, and presumably 
associated teleconnections over the Pacific/ North American sector, as well as 
substantial cool anomalies over Eurasia. The major features of this year are 
captured, albeit highly “smoothed” by the filtering of the pattern by the small 
number of EOFs (#s 1,2,3,5) used in the reconstruction procedure. The 
comparison of the multiproxy reconstruction with the equivalently eigenvector-
filtered raw pattern (the “target” for reconstruction) is excellent. during the 1902­
1980 calibration interval. 
pal components (“RPCs”) #s 1, 2, 3, and 5 (the associated spatial 
patterns were shown in Figure 2). 
The positive trend in RPC 1 during the 20th century is clearly 
exceptional in the context of the long-term variability in the associ­
ated pattern, and indeed describes much of the unprecedented 
warming trend evident in the NH reconstruction. Equally interest­
ing is the negative trend in RPC 2 during the past century which is 
also anomalous in the context of the longer-term evolution of the 
associated pattern. The recent negative trend is associated with the 
modest long-term cooling trend in the eastern tropical Pacific (su­
perimposed on warming associated with the pattern of eigenvector 
#1) which may be a modulating negative feedback of global warming 
(Cane et al. 1997). The third eigenvector exhibits much of the NAO 
signature in the data. The fifth eigenvector exhibits notable 
multi-decadal variability throughout both the modern and pre­
calibration interval, associated with the wavelike trend of warming 
and subsequent cooling of the North Atlantic this century that has 
been discussed elsewhere (Kushnir 1994; Mann et al. 1994, 1996; 
Schlesinger and Ramankutty 1994) and longer-term multi-decadal 
oscillations in that region detected in a previous analysis of proxy 
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climate networks (Mann et al. 1995). This variability may be associ­
ated with ocean-atmosphere processes related to the North Atlantic 
thermohaline circulation (Delworth et al. 1993, 1997). Table 1 
shows the correlations between the MNET index, the NAO, and the 
four reconstructed principal components of this study. 
Middle Eastern climate is known to have a significant relation­
ship with NAO on inter-annual timescales (see Cullen and 
Demenocal 1997). This is certainly substantiated in Table 1. How­
ever, of particular interest here are the patterns of variation influ­
encing the region on longer timescales as well. The correlations also 
show that a distinct pattern of variation associated with EOF 5 has 
considerable influence on Middle Eastern temperature. The long­
term trend in the reconstructed NH series exhibits a a general period 
of coolness through 1850, and warming thereafter. In Figure 7, we 
show the reconstructed NH series along with the MNET index. 
Although there are some broad similarities, MNET does not track 
NH on the longer timescales. In particular, the marked NH warming 
of the 20th century is not evident in the MNET index, although 
there is multi-decadal variability as described below. This difference 
appears to be associated with multi-decadal cool periods in the 
Middle East associated with the pronounced multi-decadal varia­
tions in RPC 5. These variations favor negative temperature anoma­
lies in MNET during the early and late 20th century, offsetting times 
at which the global warming trend and its weak projection onto the 
region was most rapidly accelerating. 
A comparison of the power spectra (Figure 8) of the MNET 
series, RPCs 3 and 5, and the NAO provides considerable insight 
into the natural of the patterns of variability influencing Middle East 
temperatures on different timescales. 
Table 1	 Correlations of RPCs with NAO and MNET indices over two 
different periods of time during the reconstructed 1760-1980 
time interval. 
RPC r(NAO) 
1864-1980 
r(MNET) 
1760-1980 
r(MNET) 
1 -0.28 0.26 0.28 
2 -0.06 -0.30 -0.18 
3 0.41 -0.63 -0.68 
4 -0.09 -0.32 -0.26 
Figure 6	 Reconstructed Principle Compo­
nents (“RPCs”) 1, 2, 3, 5 used in the 
climatic reconstructions. 
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Figure 7	 Reconstructed Northern Hemisphere mean (NHEM) temperature series along with 
reconstructed MNET index. 
It is evident that the MNET temperature index exhibits en­
hanced power (which is statistically significant) in the “multi­
decadal” frequency range of f = 0.01-0.02 cycles/year (50-100 years 
period) as well in the decadal f = 0.05-0.1 (10-20 years period) fre­
quency range. These spectral peaks are most pronounced in the 
longer 1760-1980 data interval. This is distinct from the behavior of 
the NAO which, although displaying a secular peak during the past 
century (i.e., a near-zero frequency trend isolated in the above fig­
ure), does not exhibit significant decadal or multi-decadal spectral 
peaks. The long-term multi-decadal variability is a robust feature of 
the North Atlantic climate (Mann et al. 1995) which appears unre­
lated to the NAO, and in fact nearly orthogonal to it, probably asso­
ciated with the response of atmosphere to multi-decadal changes in 
surface heating by the ocean (Kushnir 1993; Mann and Park 1994, 
1996). These multi-decadal variations appear to be associated with a 
stochastically-excited eigenmode of the coupled ocean-atmosphere 
system (Delworth et al. 1993; 1997). This relationship is also shown 
in Figure 9. The multi-decadal variations in MNET have a close 
relationship with intervals during which the RPC 5 (associated with 
the pattern EOF 5) favors warming (negative) or cooling (positive) 
in the Middle East. In contrast, the inter-annual/decadal variations 
in MNET have a closer relationship with episodes during which the 
RPC 3 associated with NAO-like pattern EOF 3 favors warming 
(negative) or cooling (positive) in the region. 
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Figure 8 Power spectra for (upper left) reconstructed Middle/Near Eastern “MNET” 
temperature index, (upper right) NAO index, and (bottom) RPCs 3 and 5. The 
spectra are based on the multitaper method, with best red noise median power 
levels and 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels (dashed) lines estimated by the 
robust method of Mann and Lees (1996). 
In Figure 10, we show some example patterns for different re­
constructed years. 
The warm MNET year 1760 appears to have been associated with 
a particularly prominent NAO-type pattern superimposed on the 
otherwise cool multi-decadal period. 1783, a strong El Niño year 
(Quinn and Neal 1992) exhibits, by contrast, a prominent negative 
MNET temperature anomaly. A (weaker) negative MNET anomaly 
is also observed during the very strong (Quinn and Neal 1992) El 
Niño year 1878 shown. Analysis of ENSO variability in these recon­
structions is discussed in more detail elsewhere (Mann et al. 1997b). 
The pattern of 1816 shows anomalous cooling throughout much of 
the globe (even relative to this generally cold decade) but with a 
quadrupole pattern of warmth near southern Greenland and the 
Middle East, and enhanced cold in the eastern United States and 
Europe. This latter pattern is indeed consistent with the anomalous 
atmospheric circulation associated with the North Atlantic Oscilla­
tion (NAO) pattern observed in empirical (Kelly et al. 1996) and 
model-based studies (Kirshner 1995) of the atmospheric response to 
volcanic forcing. This latter pattern is evident in neither the follow­
ing nor preceding year, and is likely associated with the large 
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Figure 9	 (left) RPC 5 along with MNET index, filtered on multi-decadal timescales (40 year lowpass) and (right) RPC 3 along with MNET index, 
filtered on interannual timescales (5 year lowpass). 
Tambora eruption of April 1815 both in terms of the hemispheric 
coldness and the superimposed NAO-like pattern. 
CONCLUSIONS 
With the large-scale temperature reconstructions that we have 
available over the past couple of centuries, we are able to document 
the importance of at least two distinct patterns on the climate of the 
Middle East. One of these patterns is associated with the North 
Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and dominated by inter-annual and 
decadal timescales. The other pattern is distinct from the NAO and 
more consistent with the atmospheric response to multi-decadal 
oceanic variations (Delworth et al 1993; Kushnir 1994; Mann and 
Park 1996). This suggests that patterns not easily resolvable in the 
short instrumental record (in particular, patterns distinct from the 
NAO) may be of increasing relative importance on progressively 
longer timescales, and are important to understanding climatic 
variations in the Middle East on multi-decadal and longer 
timescales. As increasingly larger numbers of high quality proxy 
reconstructions become available in diverse regions of the globe, it 
will be possible to assimilate a more globally representative 
multiproxy data network. Given the high level of skill possible in 
large-scale reconstruction back to 1450 with the somewhat sparse 
network of the present study, there is reason to believe that it may 
soon be possible to reconstruct much of the spatio-temporal 
variability of the global climate back over the last 500 to 1000 years. 
With such reconstructions in hand, we will be able to document 
more confidently the climatic variations in the Middle East during 
 
 
    
the past millennium. Such reconstructions should be useful for 
understanding changes in human land use and patterns of civiliza­
tion in that region on longer timescales. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Helpful discussions with Mark Cane, Ed Cook, and Alexey 
Kaplan are gratefully acknowledged, as are the comments of two 
anonymous reviewers. We thank Gordon Jacoby, Lonnie Thomp­
son, Judith Lean, Rosanne D’Arrigo and other paleoclimate re­
searchers who have made available to us several of the data series 
used in this study, and we are grateful to Frank Keimig for technical 
assistance. This work was supported by the National Science Foun­
dation (R.S.B and M.E.M) and the Department of Energy (R.S.B. 
and M.E.M.). M.E.M. acknowledges support through the Alexander 
Hollaender Distinguished Postdoctoral Research Fellowship pro­
gram of the Department of Energy. 
Figure 10	 Reconstructed large-scale temperature patterns for (i) 1760, (ii) 1783, (iii) 1816, (iv) 1878. Middle Eastern box used to compute MNET 
index is shown. The color scale indicates regions which exceed (either positively or negatively) the threshold indicated. The zero baseline 
is defined by the 1902-1980 climatological mean for each gridpoint. 
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Rapid Population Growth and the Fertility Policies of the Arab Countries of the Middle East 
and North Africa 
Onn Winckler 
University of Haifa 
ABSTRACT 
The population of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has increased rapidly over the course of the 20th 
century. During the 70 years between 1914 and 1994, the region's total population has grown by nearly a factor of five, 
largely as a result of natural rates of increase in indigenous populations (with the notable exceptions of Israel and the 
Gulf states, whose population increases are generally attributable to migration). Population growth rates among many of 
the nations of the region are presently among the highest worldwide. Despite family planning measures undertaken in 
many MENA countries, continued population growth remains the most critical socioeconomic problem in the region as 
governments struggle to support their growing populations with inadequate resources. This paper argues that only the 
continued reduction of fertility levels, combined with massive shifts of financial resources away from the military toward 
socioeconomic development, will avert wide-scale human and environmental hardship in the region. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last hundred years, the global population has more 
than tripled, growing from 1.7 billion at the turn of the 20th century 
to nearly 5.75 billion in 1995 (Durand 1977; United Nations Demo­
graphic Yearbook–1995). This rate of increase is far higher than has 
ever before been witnessed in human history. 
Over time, the global population has undergone a “demographic 
transition” which can be generally divided into three stages. The first 
stage lasted from the beginnings of human civilization until the 
middle of the 19th century, a period characterized by high crude 
birth rates (over 40 per 1,000) and high total fertility rates (over six). 
Nevertheless, because mortality levels were also high during this 
period, natural increase rates of the world’s population were gener­
ally quite low (and sometimes even negative during periods of star­
vation and epidemic disease). 
In the developed West, the second stage of the demographic 
transition began in the middle of the 19th century (with the devel­
oping world following between 30-80 years later), as improved 
sanitation, preventive medicine, and nutrition resulted in vastly 
reduced mortality rates and significant increases in life expectancy. 
All of these developments were a result of the Industrial Revolution 
and thus occurred only in western countries. The decline in death 
rates was not followed immediately by a decrease in fertility levels, 
however, and the growing gap between high fertility rates and falling 
death rates led to a sharp increase in population growth as com­
pared with past centuries. 
In industrialized countries, a third stage of demographic transi­
tion began in the early 20th century, characterized by declining 
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fertility rates caused by the forces of modernization. During the past 
two decades, falling birth rates have converged with low death rates 
to generate rates of natural increase approaching zero in many of the 
developed countries (Todaro 1990; Caldwell and Caldwell 1982; 
Lutz 1994). By 1995, in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ger­
many, for example, the natural increase rates of the population were 
0.2%, 0%, and -0.1%, respectively (UNICEF 1997). 
Most of the world’s countries, however, including those of the 
Middle East, have not yet reached the third stage of demographic 
transition. These developing countries have been the main contribu­
tors to rapid global population growth over the last two generations. 
By 1994, only a fifth of the world’s population was living in regions 
classified as industrialized. However, during recent years, there have 
been strong indications of a worldwide fertility decline, even in sub-
Saharan Africa, which appears to be the last region to begin the third 
stage of the demographic transition (Lutz 1994). 
As in other developing areas, the Middle East has witnessed rapid 
population increases in the 20th century, especially from the late 
1950s onward (see Figure 1). The total population of the Middle 
East and North Africa (including Iran and Turkey) increased from 
roughly 68 million in 1914 (Issawi 1982) to more than 340 million 
in 1994 (World Bank 1996; ESCWA 1995), a fourfold increase dur­
ing a period of only 80 years. The reason for such a dramatic in­
crease is not migration, as has been the case in North America, for 
example, but instead the growth of natural increase rates in the 
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Figure 1 Population of select Arab countries as a function of time. 
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indigenous populations over the last two generations, which are 
considered to be among the highest worldwide. 
The vast majority of the Middle East population is Muslim (pri­
marily Sunni), but there are numerous other religious groups, in­
cluding Christians, Alawis (concentrated in Turkey and Syria), Jews 
(almost all in Israel), and Druze (present in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, 
and Jordan). The most prominent ethnic group in the Middle East 
are the Arabs, representing about half of the total population of the 
region (including Iran and Turkey, but not including North Africa). 
Among the remainder, 25% are Turks, 12% Persians, 7% Kurds, 2% 
Jews, and 4% an amalgam of smaller ethnic groups, such as Arme­
nians and Baluch (Omran and Roudi 1993; Weeks 1988). 
This chapter is explicitly concerned with population growth in 
the Arab Middle East. Demographic trends and their socioeconomic 
implications among the Arab populations of Israel, the West Bank, 
and the Gaza Strip will not be taken up here. It is nonetheless im­
portant to note population growth patterns in Israel. According to 
official Israeli figures, by 1996 the total population of Israel (exclud­
ing the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip but 
including its Jewish Israeli residents) was 5.76 million, among which 
4.64 million were Jews and 1.12 million were Arab and others, as 
compared with 3.9 million and 875,100, respectively, in 1990. The 
growth of the Jewish population in Israel during this period is cen­
trally a result of large-scale migration from the former Soviet Union 
and Ethiopia, amounting to nearly 600,000 Jewish immigrants to 
Israel between 1990 and 1996, whereas the growth of the Arab and 
other populations is more attributable to natural growth (Israel, 
Statistical Abstract–1997). 
The objectives of this paper are threefold: first, to examine the 
causes and effects of high natural increase rates in the Arab Middle 
East; second, to investigate government policy in reaction to the de­
mographic changes in the region; and third, to analyze demographic 
projections for the future and their socioeconomic implications. 
REGIONAL BACKGROUND AND THE NATURAL 
INCREASE OF THE MIDDLE EAST POPULATION 
Crude birth rates, which were very high at the beginning of 
recorded history (about 45 per 1,000 inhabitants), remained so 
through the 1970s. In 1980, the crude birth rate was 38 in Egypt, 46 
in Syria and Saudi Arabia, and 47 in Jordan. Only in the last decade 
has there been evidence of a reduction in crude birth rates. In 1994, 
the crude birth rate was estimated to be 29 in Egypt, 33 in Jordan, 
and 26 in Tunisia. However, in some countries in the region, even 
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during the first half of the 1990s, fertility rates have continued to be 
very high, mainly in the oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf, 
as a result of the pro-natalist policies adopted by the regional re­
gimes. However, even in these countries, there was some reduction 
in fertility levels during the past decade due to drastic improvement 
in the education of women as well as increases in their labor force 
participation (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 Crude birth rate, crude death rate, net population increase and total fertility rate for selected Arab countries as a function of time. 
By 1995, according to UNICEF, the average crude birth rate in 
the Middle East and North Africa region was 33 per 1,000, as com­
pared with 48 in 1960 (UNICEF 1997). Crude death rates, which 
were very high in the 18th century (about 42-44 per 1,000 inhabit­
ants), began to decrease during the 19th century, especially from the 
1850s onward, dropping to approximately 33 by the end of the 19th 
century. During the 20th century, crude death rates declined even 
more rapidly, dropping by 1995 to 7 per 1,000, as compared with 21 
in 1960 (UNICEF 1997). 
There are several reasons for the marked reduction in crude 
death rates in the Middle East over the last two centuries. Initially, 
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Figure 3	 Infant mortality in select Arab countries as a function of time. 
the decrease was a result of the elimination of starvation and epi­
demics. At the end of the 19th century and throughout the 20th 
century, the further reduction is attributed primarily to improve­
ments in medical care, both in quantity and quality. During the 
second half of the 20th century, the rise in the standard of living has 
also been responsible (Gilbar 1990). 
The result of this increasing gap between crude birth and death 
rates has been the growth in natural population increase throughout 
the Arab Middle East.The average natural increase rate in the region 
tripled from 1% to 3% in some countries over the course of the 
current century. By 1995, the natural increase rate in the Middle 
East and North Africa region generally was 2.6%, resulting in a net 
population increase of 9 million annually and a doubling of the 
population every 26.6 years (see Table 1). 
This general trend has prevailed in most developing countries 
globally during the last two generations. However, while in most of 
the other developing areas the crude birth and fertility rates started 
to decrease during the late 1960s and early 1970s, in many Middle 
Eastern countries high crude birth and fertility rates have continued 
even into the 1990s. The “demographic revolution” of the Middle 
East was, more than anything else, a revolution in crude death rates. 
The drop in crude death rates in the region has been in part a 
function of marked reductions in infant (0-1) and child (1-5) 
  
Table 1	 Relation between relative change 
per year and doubling time. Source: 
Joel E. Cohen, How many people 
can the Earth support?, Norton: 
New York, 1995. p.27. 
Relative change Estimated 
per year (%) doubling time (y) 
0.1 693.0 
0.5 138.6 
1.0 69.3 
1.5 46.2 
2.0 34.7 
2.5 27.7 
3.0 23.1 
4.0 17.3 
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Figure 4 Life Expectancy in Selected Arab Countries in the Middle East, 1960-1994. 
mortality rates. Average infant mortality rates in most of the Middle 
East dropped from 170-230 per 1,000 live births (U.N. ESCWA 
1988), during the 1950s to 158 in Egypt, 96 in Syria, 90 in Jordan, 
146 in Saudi Arabia, and only 49 in Kuwait in 1970. During the 
1970s and the 1980s, this trend continued, particularly among the 
oil-exporting countries of the Persian/Arabian Gulf. By 1994, the 
infant mortality rate was estimated to be only 25 in Saudi Arabia,16 
in Kuwait, and 24 in Bahrain. The other Arab countries of the 
Middle East also reached relatively low rates of infant mortality, 
including 30 in Syria and 33 in Jordan in 1994 (see Figure 3). Simi­
larly, the under-five mortality rate also fell very sharply.The average 
under-five mortality rate in the Middle East and North Africa region 
dropped from 244 per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 64 per 1,000 live 
births in 1995 (UNICEF 1997). A second factor contributing to the 
crude death rate decline has been a dramatic increase in the life 
expectancy, also attributable to advances in medical care and general 
improvements in the standard of living. In Egypt, life expectancy 
increased from 46 years in 1960 to 68 years in 1994 and in Syria, 
from 50 in 1960 to 70 in 1994. In the Gulf, the increase in the aver­
age life expectancy was even more marked than in the other Middle 
Eastern countries (see Figure 4; see also Hill 1981). 
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ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF 
NATURAL INCREASE IN THE “OVERPOPULATED” 
COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST 
Many of the Middle Eastern countries are “overpopulated,” 
which is to say that the ratio between the population and the avail­
able resources is so high as to limit economic development. For 
example: although the total population in Saudi Arabia is almost 
four times higher than Jordan’s, Saudi Arabia is not deemed “over­
populated” because of its vast oil resources. Jordan, lacking substan­
tial natural and economic resources, is considered overpopulated. 
The most important consequence of the high natural increase 
rates among the Arab population of the Middle East during the last 
two generations has been the creation of a wide base of the age 
pyramid. In 1960, 51% of the total population was below the age of 
15 in Egypt (Egypt, Statistical Yearbook, 1952-96), and 46% in Syria 
(U.N., Demographic Yearbook-1970), 46% in Jordan (ESCWA 1992). 
A quarter century later, those percentages grew to 51% in Egypt in 
1986 (Egypt, Statistical Yearbook-1952-96), and 49% in Syria in 1990 
(Syria, Statistical Abstract-1990), 49% in Saudi Arabia in 1992 
(ESCWA 1993), and 48% in Kuwait in 1988 (ESCWA 1992). In the 
developed West and Far East, such percentages are typically at least a 
factor of two lower, with only 20% of the population in France 
below the age of 15 in 1990, for example. (U.N. Demographic Year­
book-1990). 
The high percentage of the young in the developing countries 
has led to very low crude economic activity rates, due to the rela­
tively low percentages of the working age (15-64) population within 
the total population and the tendency of women not to work outside 
the home. The percentage was 28% in Egypt in 1986 (ILO, Yearbook 
of Labour Statistics-1992), 24% in Jordan in 1991 (ILO, Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics-1994:) and 18% in Kuwait in 1985 (Looney 1994). 
Again, in developed countries, such rates tend to be a factor of two 
higher, as the result of both larger percentages of the population in 
the working age group and high percentages of working women. In 
1993, the economic activity rate was 53% in Japan, 50% in Hong 
Kong, and 49% in the United Kingdom (ILO, Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics-1994). Thus, the ratio between breadwinners and those 
being supported is 1:2 in the developed countries, as compared with 
1: 4 or even 1: 4.5 in most countries of the Arab Middle East. 
Children and teenagers are large consumers of public services, 
such as health care and education, while their productive contribu­
tion is marginal. In many countries of the Arab Middle East, where 
public services are largely free of charge, or are heavily subsidized, 
the high percentage of the young people has far-reaching conse­
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quences and a substantial negative impact on economic growth, 
particularly in the non-oil-exporting countries. 
An additional problem of high population growth rates has been 
that growth in the labor force has outpaced economic growth and 
the creation of new work opportunities, causing an increase in un­
employment and underemployment. In Egypt, for example, during 
the second half of the 1980s, approximately 400,000 people were 
entering the labor force every year (Egypt, Statistical Yearbook-1952­
92), of whom 292,000 were graduates of universities and colleges 
(al-Ahram, April 12, 1990). Since it was beyond the capacity of the 
Egyptian economy to create hundreds of thousands of new work 
opportunities on an annual basis, unemployment rates increased 
very rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s, despite large scale migra­
tion of Egyptian workers to the oil-exporting countries of the Gulf 
and Libya after the “oil boom” of October 1973. The Egyptian un­
employed numbered approximately 175,000 in 1960 but swelled to 
one million in 1982 and reached as high as two million in 1988 – an 
unemployment rate of some 15% in that particular year (al-
Musawwar, June 30, 1989). 
In order to mitigate these high unemployment rates, Egyptian 
authorities increased available work opportunities by absorbing 
large numbers of employees into the governmental bureaucracy, 
service sectors, and other publicly-owned companies. Subsequent 
reductions in unemployment were not sustained over the long term 
and inefficiency within governmental services in the long run in­
creased substantially. 
Such unemployment and underemployment patterns are not 
unique to Egypt, but prevail in other Middle Eastern and North 
African countries as well. During the late 1980s, official figures 
placed the Tunisian unemployment rate at 14% in 1989, but unoffi­
cial estimates were substantially higher (25%), and higher still 
(40%) for the youngest working age population category (18-26) 
(EIU, Country Profile-Tunisia, 1989/90). In Algeria, unemployment 
grew from approximately 16% in 1984 to almost 23% in 1989 (EIU, 
Country Profile-Algeria, 1991/92). 
In Jordan, during the 1970s and the early 1980s, the unemploy­
ment rates were among the lowest in the entire Arab Middle East. By 
the mid-1970s, Jordan had obtained almost full employment for its 
citizens, and in 1976 the unemployment rate in the Kingdom was 
less than 2% (Hammouda 1980) – an unusual statistic for a non-oil 
exporting country at the time. The central explanation for this 
phenomemon was the migration of hundreds of thousands of Jorda­
nian workers to the Gulf, mainly to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This 
massive labor force export actually caused a manpower shortage in 
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Jordan, bringing about a counter-migration to Jordan primarily 
from Egypt and Syria (Winckler 1997). 
However, as a result of King Hussein of Jordan’s support of Iraq 
during the Gulf War of 1990-91, about 350,000 Jordanians and 
Palestinians returned to Jordan, mainly from Kuwait (MEED, 
August 14, 1992). The Jordanian labor market consequently 
changed dramatically, and by October 1991, the official unemploy­
ment rate rose to approximately 23%,with unofficial estimates plac­
ing the statistic closer to 35% (Jordan Times, October 14, 1991). This 
placed Jordan among the countries with the highest unemployment 
rates in the region. 
An additional negative consequence of the rapid population 
growth patterns has been increasing pressure on natural resources, 
with the most obvious being a steady decline in the relationship 
between population, on the one hand, and water and cultivable 
lands, on the other hand. In Egypt, for example, cropped area per 
capita decreased by more than 40% during the years 1952-88 
(Winckler 1992). A similar trend is also seen in Syria, where the 
cropped area per capita dropped during the years 1960-94, despite a 
nearly 40% increase in total cultivated area, as a result of a massive 
population growth over that period (Syria, Statistical Abstracts-1960, 
1995). Similar trends are also evident in Jordan and in most of the 
other countries in the region. 
Today, in Jordan (as in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel), the 
demand for water already far exceeds the supply, and the gap is 
widening steadily. According to the Water Authority of Jordan, total 
annual water demand in the Kingdom was 900 MCM but total annual 
supply was roughly 550 MCM in 1990. By the year 2000, annual water 
demand in the Kingdom is projected to rise to 1,600 MCM, but sup­
ply is unlikely to surpass 700 MCM (MEED, May 28, 1993). In Egypt, 
the steep increase of water allocations for domestic use in parallel to 
the rapid population growth has caused a steady reduction in the 
water available for agriculture, while in other parts of the region, 
water continues to be devoted to irrigation with municipal consum­
ers experiencing increasing shortages and higher prices. In general, 
however, water for municipal consumption has led to a growing 
food gap all over the Middle East, a region that was a net agricultural 
exporter until the beginning of the 1950s. (See Allan, Shamir, 
Elmusa, this volume). 
Egypt, which was a net agricultural exporter only two genera­
tions ago, has become one of the largest food importers worldwide. 
By the end of the 1980s, total food imports to Egypt amounted to $4 
billion and constituted one of the major factors responsible for the 
large deficit in the Egyptian balance of trade, which was $7.5 billion 
An additional negative consequence of 
the rapid population growth patterns 
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in the 1988/89 fiscal year (MEED, June 8, 1990). Jordan also became 
a net food importer as a result of rapid population growth and the 
increasing shortage of water for agricultural purposes. By 1987, net 
food imports to Jordan amounted to $359.5 million and increased 
to $487 million in 1991 (EIU, Country Profile-Jordan, 1993/94). 
Similar trends are apparent in Algeria, where the rate of cereal im­
ports increased from 29% of total domestic cereal consumption 
during the years 1970-73 to 65% on average during the years 1979­
82, staying at that level throughout the 1980s (EIU, Country Profile-
Algeria, 1991/92; ESCWA and FAO 1993). 
Urbanization in many developing countries began around the 
1940s. While in the industrialized countries the “pull” factor (to­
ward the cities and their economic opportunities) dominated, in 
developing countries the “push” factor (away from rural areas and 
their poverty) was responsible for the massive rural-to-urban shift. 
In addition, while in the industrialized countries the urbanization 
process was gradual and continuous over more than a century and 
half, in developing countries (including those of the Middle East) it 
has been a very rapid process, occurring over less than two genera­
tions (Saad Eddin 1974, 1985; see Figure 4). The rate of urbanization 
in the Middle East has risen faster over recent decades than in any 
other region in the world, and is likely to continue in the coming 
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decade as well. The Middle East’s urban population rose from 28% 
in 1950 to 47% in 1980, and is likely to reach almost 60% by the year 
2000 (Symarsky 1988). 
As a result of this rapid urbanization, the larger cities in the 
region have been forced to absorb a large number of the rural mi­
grants and have experienced a doubling of the urbanized area in a 
process of relatively uncontrolled sprawl. Urban expansion has far 
outpaced the capacity of governments to adequately integrate and 
service these new areas. Throughout the overpopulated Middle 
Eastern countries, there is a chronic shortage of housing, which has 
led to rising housing prices in the major Middle Eastern cities. This 
shortage has also brought about an increase in the construction of 
informal dwelling units, the most well-known of which is “the City 
of the Dead,” the old cemeteries of Cairo. 
Moreover, since the major cities in the Middle East are located 
near central water sources, their expansion has been at the expense 
of the cultivated lands. This phenomenon is particularly apparent in 
Cairo, where many villages have been swallowed by urban sprawl. 
Due to urban expansion, the total cultivated area of Egypt did not 
grow between 1952 and the mid-1980s, despite the construction of 
the High Dam in Aswan and massive projects to expand cultivated 
area (The Egyptian Gazette, May 10, 1985). Similar trends are appar­
ent in Syria and Jordan. 
FERTILITY POLICIES AMONG THE ARAB COUNTRIES OF 
THE MIDDLE EAST 
Generally speaking, it can be said that all Middle Eastern coun­
tries are trying to influence the level of the crude birth and fertility 
rates of their citizens. However, the motivations for intervention 
differ. In general, the Arab countries of the Middle East can be di­
vided into three main groups according to their reproductive poli­
cies during the second half of the 20th century. 
The first group, comprised of Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, has 
put national family planning programs into effect as a result of the 
acute intensity of the resource pressures resulting from the over­
population syndrome (Gilbar 1997). 
The second group, consisting of Syria and Jordan, does not 
suffer from pressures as acute as those in the first group. While the 
Syrian and Jordanian governments do consider the high fertility 
rates an obstacle to socioeconomic development, neither has a de­
clared family planning policy. The authorities of these countries are 
attempting to bring about reductions in population growth through 
indirect means, particularly via improvements in women’s educa­
tion and employment opportunities. 
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The third group includes countries whose governments are 
attempting to increase, or at least preserve, their current high fertil­
ity rates. This group is made up of the oil-exporting countries of the 
Gulf. The small national populations of these countries relative to 
their political aspirations and economic needs have led their govern­
ments to adopt pro-natalist policies following the “oil boom” of 
October 1973. Their purpose has been to rapidly increase the num­
ber of nationals so as to reduce the proportion of foreigners in the 
short run and to diminish labor scarcity and foreign worker demand 
in the long run. 
DECLARED ANTI-NATALIST POLICIES: THE EXAMPLES 
OF EGYPT AND TUNISIA 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, many leaders in developing 
countries, including those in the Middle East, saw a blessing in rapid 
population growth and made no attempt to limit it. Instead, they 
adopted pro-natalist policies based on the idea that a large nation is 
a strong nation (Baer 1973). 
However, during the late 1950s and into the 1960s, leaders in 
these same countries awakened to the link between rapid population 
growth and the socioeconomic problems which had begun to sur­
face, and understood that their only solution was the reduction of the 
natural increase rates of their population (Symonds and Carder 1973). 
The Free Officers in Egypt became aware of the population prob­
lem in their country shortly after the July 1952 revolution. They 
thought, however, that widespread socioeconomic development 
would gradually bring about a decline in fertility levels without 
direct intervention, particularly as a result of the education of wo­
men and improvements in living standards. The results of the 1960 
census proved the approach to be a misguided one, indicating only 
that most of the economic development that had been achieved 
until that point was likely to be counterbalanced by the burden of 
supporting the exploding population. In any case, it was only in 
1966 that the Egyptian government established the Higher Council for 
Family Planning, and in August of that year it was announced that 
2,850 family planning clinics were operating throughout the country. 
The Egyptian authorities adopted the “direct-supply” approach to 
family planning, which was the common approach among interna­
tional organizations active in the field at the time. The theory was that 
the population was anxious to reduce its fertility rate but lacked the 
contraceptive methods needed to do so. By providing birth control 
along with instructions for its use, the aim of fertility reduction would 
be achieved. A similar approach was adopted by Tunisia, which was 
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the first Arab country to adopt a declared family planning policy in 
1964 (Gilbar 1997; Faour 1989; World Bank 1985). 
However, during the 1970s, and especially following the 1974 World 
Population Conference in Bucharest, this approach was changed to 
emphasize not only the availability of contraception but also the likeli­
hood of its use. The governments of the participating nations decided 
that in order to increase the rate of contraceptive use, they would have 
to affect changes in traditional social norms, and that family planning 
objectives could only be achieved in the context of broader socioeco­
nomic development plans. 
In accordance with the new strategy, Egypt adopted a new family 
planning policy in 1973. Its aims were to bring about a substantial 
reduction in crude birth rates by (1) raising the educational level of the 
entire population, though particularly among women; (2) increasing 
employment opportunities for women so as to boost the rate of labor 
force participation; (3) enhancing agricultural mechanization in order 
to diminish the need for children as cheap labor; (4) increasing indus­
trialization; (5) reducing infant mortality; (6) strengthening social 
security; and (7) improving family planning services (Gallagher 1981; 
Stycos et al. 1982). 
The Tunisian government altered its reproductive policy in a 
similar fashion in the mid-1970s, folding family planning into the 
framework of comprehensive socioeconomic development initiatives 
aimed mainly at improving the status of women (Stubbs 1980; U.N., 
Department of International Economic and Social Affairs 1990; Inter­
national Planned Parenthood Federation-Middle East and North 
Africa Region 1981; and Hill 1976). In 1987, the Tunisians added 
economic incentives, issuing allowances to employees supporting 
families with no more than four children and with amounts decreas­
ing with the addition of each newborn. A year later, the allowances 
were limited to families with three children (Faour 1989; U.N., 
Department of International Economic and Social Affairs 1990). 
Increasingly, the mass media have been utilized in Egypt to promote 
the lowering of fertility levels. During the past two decades, numerous 
articles by well-known journalists have highlighted the issue, and direct 
appeals by political leaders have appeared in the newspapers to increase 
public awareness. At the same time, the Egyptian government is actively 
expanding the network of family planning services, and making consid­
erable effort to obtain the support of prominent religious leaders. Con­
firmation by the religious leaders that family planning does not 
contradict the tenets of Islam is considered by all an essential require­
ment for the success of national family planning programs (Gilbar 
1997). Indeed, fatwas (religious decrees) and interviews with religious 
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leaders have appeared in the Egyptian newspapers on a regular basis 
(see, for example, al-Ahram, February 7, October 22, 1989; April 20, 
1990). 
UNDECLARED ANTI-NATALIST POLICIES: THE 
EXAMPLES OF SYRIA AND JORDAN 
While the countries included in the first group started to take 
anti-natalist steps from the mid-1960s onward, the countries in the 
second group initiated undeclared anti-natalist measures much 
later, in the mid-1970s in the case of Syria and only in the early 
1980s in the case of Jordan. 
Until the mid-1970s, the Syrian government did not advocate a 
family planning policy; instead, it strove to increase fertility rates by 
providing financial benefits to large families and forbidding the 
promotion, distribution, or use of birth control methods (Habbab 
1974), largely out of the conviction that the Syrian population was 
small in comparison with the economic needs and political aspira­
tions of the country. 
However, at the beginning of the 1970s, especially after the re­
sults of the 1970 census became known, the attitude of the Syrian 
authorities toward family planning and the rate of population 
growth began to change. This was primarily due to the emergence of 
social and economic problems whose origin lay in the high birth and 
fertility rates, including a reduced rate of labor force participation, 
an increase in public spending on food subsidies and imports, and 
growth in costs for subsidized health care and education (Syria, 
CBS, 1973). 
The change in the Syrian approach was gradual and did not 
lead initially to an overall national family planning policy. In 1974, 
the Family Branch of the Ministry of Health was established in 
order to coordinate activities in reproductive policy within the 
framework of the mother and child clinics that had been operating 
in Syria since the 1950s. In February of 1974, the Syrian Family 
Planning Association, headed by the Minister of Health, was estab­
lished with the objectives of (1) improving health care for both 
mothers and children; (2) supplying contraceptives and providing 
training on their proper use; and (3) conducting research in the 
area of family planning and other demographic subfields (Habbab 
1974; al-Ba’th April 28, 1974; ESCWA 1992; Population Division of 
the UN and UNFPA 1980). 
During this period, the Syrian authorities consistently stressed 
the close connection between family planning activities and the 
health of mothers and children, as well as the socioeconomic condi­
tion of the family. The change in the authorities’ attitude towards 
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family planning was also reflected in the Syrian mass media, which is 
under strict governmental control. Since the late 1970s and the early 
1980s, the Syrian press has published reports and articles about the 
rapid population growth and its socioeconomic consequences not 
only on the national level, but also on the individual family level, 
thus underlining the need to implement family planning measures 
(see, for example, Tishrin, August 23, September 6, and October 20­
21, 1982; December 7, 1983; January 22, 1984; and October 30, 
1985). 
A turning point occured in 1987 in the natalist policy of the 
Syrian government. The subsidies given to large families were can-
celled, and the Ministry of Health began to appeal directly through 
the mass media to young families to adopt family planning practices. 
At the same time, the range of activities of the Family Planning 
Association was expanded (ESCWA 1992) and conferences on de­
mographic issues and family planning were convened with increas­
ing frequency (Zisser 1994). As in Egypt, endorsements of official 
religious figures were sought (Tishrin, April 10, 1994). 
Among the Arab countries of the Middle East, Jordan was one of 
the latest to take anti-natalist steps, beginning only in the early 
1980s. This is surprising, since demographic pressures are consider­
ably greater in Jordan than in Syria, for example, which began its 
anti-natalist agenda at least a decade earlier. The explanation, as we 
have discussed, is that during the “oil decade” (1973-82) nearly 40% 
of the Jordanian work force was employed outside the Kingdom, 
living in the Gulf along with their families. Thus, until the early 
1980s and the return of large numbers of Jordanian workers and their 
accompanying family members from the oil-exporting countries, the 
demographic pressures remained below the surface, and Jordanian 
authorities were not forced to deal with the population problem. 
The marked decline in oil prices in 1986-87 caused not only a 
massive reduction in workers’ remittances (which until then had 
constituted the main source of foreign exchange in the Kingdom) 
but also a sharp decrease in foreign aid from the wealthy Arab oil-
exporting countries. This caused experts in the areas of demography 
and economics to advocate a reduction in fertility rates by adopting 
open population policies in order to maintain the high rates of 
economic growth (Jordan Times, June 18, 1992; May 5, 1993). 
The return of 350,000 Jordanians and Palestinians from the Gulf 
states at the end of 1990 and the first half of 1991, which created 
even greater pressures on employment, housing, and public services, 
sparked an acceleration of family planning measures instituted 
earlier. However, as in Syria, most of these steps were indirect and 
concentrated mainly in the improvement in women’s educational 
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and expansion of women’s employment opportunities outside the 
home. In addition, the Jordanian government began subsidizing the 
Jordanian Family Planning Association and established family plan­
ning services in public clinics and hospitals (Warren et al, 1990; 
Badran 1992). However, in contrast to the clinics in Egypt, those in 
Jordan did not actively encourage the use of contraceptives, but rather 
provided information and guidance only to individuals requesting 
assistance with family planning. 
Finally, the explicit statements of political leaders promoting 
family planning, such as those offered by President Mubarak in 
Egypt, are effectively absent in Syria and Jordan. 
PRO-NATALIST POLICIES: THE EXAMPLE OF THE 
GULF STATES 
Since the early 1970s, measures have been taken by the Gulf oil-
exporting countries whose aim is to increase fertility rates among 
their national populations. 
The strictest policy, adopted by the Saudi government partly as a 
result of the disappointingly small numbers of Saudi nationals re­
ported in the 1974 population census, was that contraceptives were 
pronounced to be contrary to the teaching of Islam, and their im­
port was banned in the spring of 1975 (Hill 1976; Allman 1978; 
ESCWA 1992). 
Another measure was government-initiated housing develop­
ment. In all of the Gulf oil-exporting countries, albeit with some 
local differences, governments began to sell housing at-cost, pro­
vided plots of land for building, and offered long-term loans for 
housing at very low interest (Al-Najjar 1993). The Qatari govern­
ment, for example, built housing projects whose buyers were re­
quired to pay back only 60% of the cost over a period of 20-25 
years (Nafi 1983). 
The encouragement of early marriage is a measure that has come 
to be accepted as the norm among the Gulf oil-exporting countries. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the Kuwaiti government has 
granted a marriage allowance of 2,000 Kuwaiti Dinar (KD) to na­
tionals marrying for the first time, with an additional 1,000 KD 
offered as a soft loan. This allowance was designed to compensate 
men for the expenses incurred by the custom of mahr (bride’s gift), 
which the groom is expected to offer to the bride’s father (U.N. 
Department of International Economic and Social Affairs 1988a; 
ESCWA 1992). 
Despite the severe damage to the Kuwaiti economy as a result of 
the Iraqi invasion, a substantial increase in the marriage grant to 
Kuwaiti nationals was approved by the Council of Ministers at the 
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beginning of 1992. According to this decision, eligible Kuwaiti males 
were entitled to receive $14,000 (half as a grant and half as a loan) 
for their marriage to Kuwaiti women, amounting to twice the previ­
ous sum. The reason for the increase, according to the Kuwaiti 
Minister of Finance, was “to encourage Kuwaiti youths to 
marry”(Gulf States Newsletter, April 6, 1992). The Saudi authorities 
adopted a similar policy in 1982 (UN, Department of International 
Economic and Social Affairs 1990). 
Although the full subsidies provided for education (including 
books, clothing, etc.) from the first grade through the university 
level, is generally considered to be admirable social policy, it none­
theless constitutes an implicit incentive to produce larger families. 
EVALUATION OF THE FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS 
The aforementioned pro-natalist measures were, without a 
doubt, effective in increasing or at least maintaining fertility rates in 
the Gulf oil-exporting countries. During the last 25 years, the na­
tional populations of these countries have risen at among the high­
est rates in the world. By 1994, the total national populations of the 
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries numbered 16.3 million 
(ESCWA 1995a), as compared with barely than 6 million in 1975 
(Winckler 1997). 
In all of the countries implementing declared anti-natalist poli­
cies, there has been an impressive decline in the fertility rates, espe­
cially over the last 15 years. In Egypt, the crude birth rate decreased 
from 43 per 1,000 in 1960 to 29 in 1994, and in Tunisia, from 49 to 
26 during the same period. In the countries which operate unde­
clared anti-natalist policies, there has also been a substantial reduc­
tion in the fertility rates. In Jordan, for example, crude birth rates 
dropped from 47 in 1960 to 33 in 1994 (see Figure 2). 
Two main factors contributed to the reduction in the crude birth 
and fertility rates in the anti-natalist countries during recent years. 
The first and most important has been a massive increase in the 
rates of contraceptive use. In Egypt, the rate of contraceptive use 
among married women increased from 23.8% in 1980 to 47.6% in 
1991 (Yehia 1994). In Jordan, the increase was from 22.8% in 1976 
to 26.0% in 1983 (Jordan 1984), and 40.0% in 1990 (Jordan 1992; 
ESCWA 1994). The rate of contraceptive use in Syria also increased 
significantly, from 20% in 1978 (SAR 1982) to almost 40% in 1993 
(Syria and PAPCD 1995). 
The second factor was a significant rise in the mean age at first 
marriage among females, both in the countries operating anti-
natalist policies, as well as in those advocating pro-natalist policies. 
This delay in the mean age at first marriage served to slow down 
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reproduction and thus constituted a major factor in the reduction of 
fertility levels. In Jordan, for example, the mean age of first marriage 
for females increased from 20.1 years in 1961 to 24.5 years in 1992, 
and in Egypt from 20.2 years in 1960 to 22.6 years in 1991 (ESCWA 
1994). 
In the oil-exporting countries, the increase in the average age of 
first marriage was counteracted by the economic incentives of the 
pro-natalist policies in terms of the effect on reproduction within 
the marriage system. Thus, only relatively small reductions were 
made in the fertility rates, which remained very high as compared 
with those in the countries actively operating anti-natalist policies. 
By 1994, the crude birth rate among Saudi nationals was 38 per 
1,000 inhabitants and 44 in Kuwait, while in Egypt and Tunisia, the 
rates were only 29 and 26 (see Figure 2). 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND PROJECTIONS 
Today, rapid population growth appears to constitute the most 
critical socioeconomic problem in the Arab Middle East. Nearly two 
generations of high natural increase rates have created a wide base of 
the age pyramid, and in most countries half of the national popula­
tions are under the age of 18, making them consumers but not 
producers. The wide base of the age pyramid, which also accounts 
for the low crude death rates, will be responsible for further high 
natural increase rates in the future, in spite of the decline in the 
fertility rates, at least in the next two decades. 
In spite of the relative success of the family planning programs in 
the Middle East during the last 15 years and the sharp reduction in 
the crude birth and fertility rates, the population growth rates in all 
of the countries in the region remain high. In Egypt, for example, 
despite the substantial decline in the natural increase rates, the net 
annual population growth at the mid-1990s was about 1.2-1.3 mil­
lion. This increase is almost the same as it was a decade ago, in the 
mid-1980s, when the natural increase rate was 3%, simply because 
the total population has increased by 14 million during that period. 
The situation is common to the rest of the countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa region. 
Rapid population growth is likely to continue throughout the 
region. According to World Bank projections, the Egyptian popula­
tion will continue to increase rapidly, at least in the first half of the 
21st century, and will reach 102.6 million by the year 2050. Likewise, 
the Algerian population at that time will be 58.6 million, and that of 
Syria almost 49 million (World Bank 1995). 
The peculiar nature of the demographic problem, as compared 
with other socioeconomic problems, is that while it is possible to 
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change economic policy within a period of only a few years, experi­
ence tells us that it generally takes at least two generations to alter 
reproductive behavior. Until changes take hold, governments of 
“overpopulated” countries must absorb and support their bulging 
populations with inadequate resources. 
Since this process is irreversible, the governments of these coun­
tries have to plan the development of their economic infrastructure to 
support populations which will at least double in number. Is it pos­
sible for the Egyptian economy to support more than 100 million 
people, or for Jordan to support more than 10 million? The creation 
of a single job in Egypt costs about $5,000 (al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi 
March 12, 1990) and every year more than 400,000 additional people 
are joining the labor market.Therefore, Egypt needs to invest more 
than $2 billion annually just to create additional work opportunities 
without taking into consideration existing unemployment. 
One of the major obstacles to reducing the fertility rates all over 
the Middle East has been a skewed set of economic incentives. Educa­
tion at all levels, as well as health care and basic foodstuffs, are either 
provided entirely free of charge or are highly subsidized. These mea­
sures serve, in effect, as incentives for high fertility. Naturally, how­
ever, it is not advisable to terminate these social policies in these 
countries, thereby threatening the well-being of millions of citizens. 
A key question is why the authorities of the overpopulated coun­
tries delayed the implementation of family planning programs for 
many years after they became aware of the population problem and its 
devastating consequences in their countries. Gamal Abd al-Nasser, for 
example, acknowledged the population problem in Egypt shortly after 
the July 1952 revolution. However, it took 13 years until the first 
Egyptian family planning program began operation. In addition, after 
the June 1967 war, the issue of the population problem was aban­
doned in favor of military buildup. President Mubarak began to 
devote greater resources and attention to the population issue only a 
decade ago. This means that during the better part of twenty years, the 
population problem in Egypt was almost totally neglected. 
Egypt is only one example. Other governments in the region also 
delayed the implementation of family planning programs well after 
they became aware of the issue. In Syria, although overpopulation 
was recognized as problem in the mid-1970s, it took more than a 
decade until the financial benefits to large families were canceled. 
It appears that the combination of two factors is to blame for the 
delay. The first was the sensitivity of family planning in traditional 
Islamic societies and the strong opposition of the Islamic fundamen­
talist movements to any anti-natalist measures. The movements 
claimed that the central reasons for economic hardship were not 
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high natural increase rates but instead misguided leadership of the 
secular regimes. The Islamists argued that the establishment of 
religious regimes, in accordance with the Islamic Shari’a, would 
return the prosperity that they once enjoyed. 
In an attempt to avoid direct confrontation with these move­
ments, most of the regimes in the “overpopulated” countries de­
layed the implementation of family planning measures for as long as 
possible. However, the problem finally reached the point at which 
further denial of its consequences would constitute a greater threat 
to the continued stability of the current regimes, even in the short 
term, than a confrontation with the Islamic fundamentalist move­
ments over the issue. 
The second reason for the delay was the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
particularly in the cases of Egypt and Syria. The longstanding con­
flicts led the regimes of these countries to allocate scarce resources 
to military purposes, and away from socioeconomic problems (such 
as rapid population growth). 
In the case of Syria, after the signing of the peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel in 1979, and until the late 1980s, more than half of 
governmental expenditures went to the military, resulting in a re­
duction of more than 20% in the per capita GDP during the years 
1981-89 (Kanovsky 1995). 
Only the continued reduction of the fertility rates, combined 
with a shift in resources from military purposes to socioeconomic 
development, will bring about an easing of the population pressures 
in the Middle East. Indeed, this will prove to be one of the most 
critical variables in the prospects for Middle East peace. 
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ABSTRACT 
We describe a variety of satellite-derived datasets and their application to understanding changes in the landscape of 
southwest Asia, including regional climatology, natural vegetation, and the expansion and intensification of agricultural 
production. We demonstrate the effectiveness of several remote sensing tools in gauging environmental change in this 
semi-arid region as well as offering insights into the appropriate analysis of remotely sensed datasets. 
INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural and pastoral production in the semi-arid regions of 
southwest Asia has expanded rapidly over recent decades to meet the 
subsistence needs of one of the world’s fastest growing populations 
and the demands of the international economy. This growth is 
constrained by great interannual variation in the amount and timing 
of rainfall, which restricts dependable farming to very limited areas. 
Development, nonetheless, has proceeded undeterred—defying 
climate through feats of hydrological engineering or betting against 
it by cultivating vast areas of agriculturally marginal land. These two 
processes, the intensification and extension of agricultural produc­
tion, have been among the dominant forces shaping the modern 
environments of southwest Asia, but their spatial expression is com­
plex. The many nations of this region differ widely in their climate 
and natural resources as well as in their development priorities, 
available capital, and access to technology. Everywhere, however, 
pressure on limited water, soil, and plant resources has increased, 
often nearing the point of exhaustion or international conflict. 
Growing concern about the natural resource base has led govern­
ments and independent groups across the region to initiate ambitious 
and costly conservation and management programs. Ultimately, the 
success of these efforts depends on the development of methods for 
efficient, quantitative measurement of the distribution, use, and re­
generation of natural resources at a range of spatial scales. 
Multispectral satellite data and techniques of image analysis offer 
a potentially powerful tool for understanding problems in the clima­
tology, environmental history, and natural resource management of 
southwest Asia. Satellite data have been collected over southwest 
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Asia for the past twenty-five years and offer a virtually unexplored 
archive for analyzing regional environmental changes. During the 
next few years, a new generation of earth resource satellites will 
come on line, providing more frequent and more detailed measure­
ments of the earth’s surface than are yet possible. Southwest Asia is 
particularly well suited to satellite observation. There are few trees 
and, during much of the year, few clouds to obscure the land sur­
face; the major vegetation cycles of the region (winter cereal farm­
ing, summer cash cropping, deciduous forest growth) occur out of 
phase, allowing them to be studied easily and independently of one 
another. On the other hand, the bright reflectance of the land sur­
face and the high dust content of the atmosphere can often cause 
difficult technical problems in the detection of change over time and 
in the estimation of surface biophysical parameters. 
Satellite sensors are best described as imaging spectrometers that 
measure the earth’s reflectance or emission of electromagnetic radia­
tion over small areas, or pixels, ranging in size from several meters 
to several kilometers. Most satellite sensors measure pixel reflectance 
or emission in multiple bands of the electromagnetic spectrum, so 
that each pixel is characterized by several different values. These 
values can be treated in one of two ways. First, pixel values or ratios 
among them can be assigned to the three primary colors and used to 
modulate their intensity so that they combine to produce for each 
pixel one color from a palette of millions. The result is a richly de­
tailed, false color representation of the land surface that can reveal 
features, contrasts, and textures not apparent on aerial photographs. 
A second approach treats pixel values as discrete physical quantities 
that can be compared mathematically to each other and to known 
spectral characteristics of plants, soils, rocks, and other surface 
materials (Figure 1). In this way it is possible to produce rapid land-
use and land-cover classifications and to estimate land surface prop­
erties such as vegetation density, temperature, and evapotrans­
piration, among others. 
The most commonly used satellite-derived estimate of vegetation 
density is the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI), which 
takes advantage of the strong reflectance of green vegetation in the 
near-infrared wavelengths and its relatively strong absorption of 
visible wavelengths (Tucker 1979). This index, calculated as the 
difference between infrared and visible reflectance divided by their 
sum, is a dimensionless quantity ranging in value from –1 to 1. 
NDVI = (REF  - REF ) / (REF  + REF )
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Figure 1	 Reflectance spectra for common 
crop, shrub, and soil types in semi­
arid southwest Asia. 
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Numerous studies have demonstrated strong positive correlation 
between NDVI and widely used surface measures of vegetation 
density such as biomass and leaf area index, though the precise 
nature of this relationship for a particular crop and region must be 
determined experimentally. Because it is a ratio of two reflectances, 
NDVI is particularly resistant to varying scene illumination and thus 
provides fairly consistent measurement fields across broken terrain. 
On the other hand, in very dense or multi-layered vegetation cano­
pies, some vegetation may be obscured from direct view and hence 
not measured by the NDVI. In sparsely vegetated areas, bright soils 
tend to dominate the measured pixel reflectances, resulting in low 
signal-to-noise ratios. A number of alternative vegetation indices 
have been developed to minimize these problems, but their judi­
cious use typically requires additional information about soil prop­
erties and other surface characteristics, complicating their appli­
cation over large areas (Huete 1988; Qi et al. 1994). In general, 
NDVI is well suited for exploratory analysis of changing vegetation 
patterns in southwest Asia and is used extensively in the analyses 
that follow. 
At present, multispectral data collected by existing satellite sen­
sors are of two general types (Table 1). The first is coarse to moder­
ate spatial resolution, high temporal frequency reflectance data 
collected within a limited number of spectral bands. The most com­
mon sensor of this type is the Advanced Very High Resolution Radi­
ometer (AVHRR) carried on NOAA’s meteorological satellites, 
which provides daily measurements of global reflectance and ther­
mal emission in five spectral channels with a pixel size of 1 km. 
Another general type of satellite sensor provides high spatial 
resolution data in as many as seven spectral channels every 14–16 
days. Sensors of this type include the widely used Landsat, SPOT, 
and IRS systems, which produce images with pixel sizes as small as 
5-10 meters. New satellite systems are breaking down this di­
chotomy of data types, but successful application of satellite data to 
ecological problems has depended and will continue for some time 
to depend on the integration of different spatial and temporal scales 
of analysis as well as ground-level and satellite data. This paper 
presents ongoing research by the Southwest Asia Project at the Yale 
Center for Earth Observation on the application of satellite data to 
mesoscale climatology, environmental history, and resource 
management in southwest Asia. 
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MESOSCALE CLIMATE, HYDROLOGY, AND 
VEGETATION OF SOUTHWEST ASIA 
One objective of the Southwest Asia Project is to understand the 
relationships among climate, water resources, and the distribution 
of vegetation across southwest Asia. There are two unique aspects of 
our work in this area. First, we carry out geographical analysis on a 
rather small spatial scale (i.e. the mesoscale) using a grid spacing of 
five kilometers. The advantage of mesoscale analysis is that it cap­
tures many of the significant natural patterns and human induced 
features of the landscape, including meteorological phenomena and 
terrain variations. Examples of mesoscale landscape features are 
mountains, coastlines, rivers, cities, and rangeland and agricultural 
patterns. Second, we make use of satellite-derived data extensively to 
complement conventional climate station data. Satellite sensors, 
even in their current early state of technical development, can de­
scribe fine scale spatial patterns of standing water, snow, and vegeta­
tion at reasonably frequent intervals. 
A classic problem in climate and vegetation description is the 
combined spatial and temporal variation of the relevant field 
quantities: temperature, precipitation, snow cover, soil moisture and 
runoff. Putting aside long-term trends and interannual variation, 
one must still capture the seasonal cycles of these quantities. We 
approach the problem of graphical presentation using the technique 
of cluster analysis, known also in the remote sensing field as 
unsupervised classification. This approach groups into a particular 
class all pixels in the image having similar seasonal cycles, 
independent of where they occur geographically. The complete 
spatial and temporal description of a particular field quantity (e.g. 
precipitation) can then be concisely presented in two diagrams: a 
class map showing the geographical distribution of each class and 
signature plots showing the seasonal cycle of the quantity. There is 
of course some lost information and some arbitrariness in such a 
descriptive method. First, one must choose how many different 
classes are to be defined. The more classes one defines, the more infor­
mation is retained, but the more complex the result. Second, a quantita­
tive measure of pixel difference must be defined. It is this difference that 
will be minimized among pixels assigned to the same class. 
The objective of the Southwest Asia Project is to analyze most of 
the relevant climatological, hydrological, and vegetation fields and 
to examine the relationships among them using simple models. In 
this short paper, however, we can only give the briefest description 
of two important fields: precipitation and vegetation cover. 
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PRECIPITATION 
The starting point for our analysis of climatological precipitation 
is a collection of station data available from FAO (FAOCLIM ver­
sion 1.2). This dataset includes monthly values for standard climate 
quantities, averaged over a period from 1940 to 1970, for about 1500 
stations in southwest Asia. The station density is quite variable. It is 
particularly high along the Mediterranean coast but very low in the 
desert and mountainous interior regions. The typical distance be­
tween stations varies from about 10 to 200 km, depending on the 
region. A critical step in our analysis is the interpolation of station 
data to a regular array of grid points with 5 km spacing. This 
interpolation is done using a Gaussian weighting function: 
-r2/R2 
W = e
where r is the distance between station and grid point and R is the 
radius of influence. To account for the variable station density, the 
value of R is adjusted at each grid point so that the sum of the sta­
tion weights remains constant. During the interpolation procedure, 
the temperature values are corrected for altitude using an assumed 
lapse rate of –5oC/km. The resulting monthly gridded fields are then 
subjected to a k-means clustering algorithm to assign each grid 
point to one of ten classes. The members of each class have similar 
seasonal cycles of precipitation. The geographical distribution of the 
precipitation classes is illustrated in Figure 2. The seasonal cycle of 
precipitation for each class is shown in Figure 3. 
Several important aspects of Middle East precipitation are clear 
in this analysis. Throughout the region, precipitation is low or ab­
sent in summer, reaching a maximum in mid-winter, excepting only 
the coastal regions of the Caspian Sea (class #10), where a striking 
autumn rainfall maximum is evident. Several strong spatial gradi­
ents are also clear. The plentiful winter rains along the Mediterra­
nean Coast decline rapidly inland due to orographic lifting and 
descent as well as decreasing water source proximity. From south 
and southwest to north and northeast in the interior, precipitation 
increases due to the decreasing influence of the subtropical high and the 
increasing effect of mid-latitude frontal storms and orographic lifting. 
VEGETATION COVER 
The most appropriate satellite sensor for studying vegetation 
cover and dynamics over large areas is the AVHRR. This instrument 
has been in continuous operation since 1979, and there are several 
ongoing projects to produce consistently processed global images at 
a high temporal frequency (James and Kaluri 1994; Eidenshink 
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Figure 3	 Class signatures from k-means 
classification of monthly 
precipitation 
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1994). Because on a given day a significant part of the land surface is 
obscured from view by clouds, daily AVHRR images are routinely 
lumped into 10-day groups, and a single image is derived for the 
period by choosing the pixel with the highest NDVI. The result is an 
image that is largely (though not completely) cloud-free and is 
suitable for many types of multi-temporal analysis (Holben 1989, 
Myeni et al. 1997). 
To produce a preliminary analysis of vegetation cover in south­
west Asia, we acquired one year (October 1992 – September 1993) of 
1-1 km resolution AVHRR data, geometrically registered, radio-
metrically calibrated, and composited into 10-day periods by the 
USGS EROS data center (Eidenshank and Faundeen 1994). After 
computing NDVI for all pixels in each image, we stacked the images 
so that each pixel is characterized not by one but 36 NDVI values. 
As in the preceding analysis, we then used a k-means clustering 
algorithm to assign each pixel to one of thirteen classes having 
similar seasonal cycles of vegetation cover. The geographical 
distribution of each class is shown in Figure 4 and the characteristic 
seasonal NDVI cycle for each class in Figure 5. 
Table 2	 Description and provisional interpretation of classes from k-means cluster analysis of NDVI from 10 day composite 1 km AVHRR data, 
Figure 4).  Interpretations must be verified by fieldwork. 
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Figure 5 Class signatures from k-means classification of NDVI from 10 day composite 1 km AVHRR data. 
The resulting distribution of vegetation classes is complex. On 
broad scales, it reflects the natural influence of rain and winter 
snowfall. On finer scales, however, it shows the effects of city build­
ing, deforestation, grazing, and rainfed and irrigated agriculture. 
Using characteristic NDVI curves for each class and partial analysis 
of corresponding climatological fields, tentative interpretations of 
each class are presented in Table 2. 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CLASSIFICATION 
The k-means algorithm employed above uses Euclidean distance 
to describe similarity among pixels characterized by measurements 
of a single variable at multiple time points. This approach empha­
sizes the mean of the time series for each pixel and, to a lesser extent, 
each pixel’s value at a given time point but ignores the sequence in 
which these values occur. In other words, the k-means algorithm 
assigns greater significance to the amplitude of the seasonal curve 
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than to its shape. This is clear from the plot of class means from the 
vegetation classification (Figure 5), where several classes having the 
same general shape differ only in their amplitude. 
For some applications, however, it is useful to emphasize the shape 
of the seasonal curve when classifying multitemporal datasets. For 
example, in Mediterranean-type ecosystems there is considerable 
regional and interannual variability in both the timing and the length 
of the growing season, and hence subtle changes in the timing of 
seasonal maxima and minima may be of considerable interest to 
agroclimatologists (Benedetti et al. 1992). Patterns of land use and 
land cover may also be better differentiated by the shape of the annual 
cycle, especially in areas where there are multiple cropping cycles. 
Figure 6	 Rules-based classification of Fourier coefficients 1-6 computed for average monthly NDVI from 10-day 
composite 8 km AVHRR data, 1982-1993. 
Finally, it is important to consider that in moderate to coarse resolu­
tion satellite data vegetation signals are often diluted by mixture 
with seasonally invariant terrain, such as barren or urban land. Thus 
in the case of pixels having the same general type of vegetation but at 
different densities, a k-means classification would separate them by 
density, while a classification based on the shape of the curve would 
correctly recognize the basic ecological similarity among them. 
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One common method for describing the shape of time series data 
is Fourier analysis, a technique that represents complex waveforms as 
the sum of simpler components, usually sine waves. To assess the 
utility of Fourier methods for analysis of vegetation patterns in south­
west Asia, we computed mean monthly NDVI values over the period 
1982-1993 using the 8 km resolution Pathfinder AVHRR dataset 
(James and Kaluri 1994). As in the precipitation analysis presented 
earlier, averaging helps reduce inherent noise and the effects of 
interannual variability on the analysis of seasonal cycles. Following a 
method described by Olsson and Eklundh (1994), we computed the 
first six Fourier coefficients for the 12-month time series for each pixel 
and the proportion of the series variance explained by each compo­
nent and by the sum of all components up to and including the one in 
question. These components provide information about the general 
shape of the curve (number of NDVI peaks), its phase (timing of 
peaks), and amplitude (height of peaks). Using a series of rules and 
threshold values, we then divided pixels into distinct classes based on 
the number, timing, and magnitude of NDVI peaks. The results of this 
classification are presented in Figure 6. 
Like the k-means method, the Fourier approach distinguishes well 
among the major ecological regions of semi-arid southwest Asia: 1) 
the desert and steppe (no peaks), 2) the dry-farmed areas (March-May 
peaks), 3) the irrigated areas (double and triple peaks), and 4) the 
deciduous forests (June-July peaks). To examine the differences be­
tween the two classification techniques more closely, we used the k-
means algorithm to assign the image pixels in the 12-year average 
dataset to 16 classes, the same number recognized in the Fourier 
approach. We then chose a representative sample of individual pixels 
and compared their seasonal NDVI cycles to those of the classes to 
which they were assigned by each method. Figure 7 (left) shows two 
pixels, a and d, which have very similar double-peaked seasonal cycles 
but differ in amplitude. In the Fourier classification, both of these are 
assigned to class 3, while the k-means classification divides them 
between two classes (15 and 10) based on their different annual 
means. Significantly, the Fourier technique recognizes neither pixel b 
nor c as double peaked, though the k-means technique lumps them 
with Classes 15 and 10, respectively, because of general similarity of 
overall mean. The difference between the two techniques in the case of 
single-peaked pixels is more subtle but still significant. Figure 7 (right) 
plots the seasonal cycle of five pixels (e-i) that the k-means algorithm 
divides into two classes (e-f and g-i) based on differences in their 
annual means. The Fourier approach, which is more sensitive to the 
timing of the maximum, groups pixels f, g, and i together on the basis of 
their sharp May peak (Class 13) but classifies pixels e and h separately. 
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Figure 7 Comparison of k-means and Fourier classifications 
In general, we found that the Fourier technique is a useful 
method for classifying pixels according to the shape of their seasonal 
cycle and is therefore an invaluable complement to the more widely 
used k-means method. Unlike the k-means algorithm, however, the 
rules-based approach to classification contains an element of subjec­
tivity, as the analyst must decide a priori what classes are to be dis­
tinguished and what the threshold values should be. While this 
limits the usefulness of the technique for exploratory data analysis, it 
provides a powerful tool for isolating and extracting specific classes 
of interest. 
CHARACTERIZING INTERANNUAL VARIABILITY 
All of the analyses presented so far have used either a single year 
of data or multiple-year averages to represent climate or vegetation 
patterns generally or during a particular period of time. With their 
fast and efficient repeat coverage, satellite sensors also provide im­
portant data for the analysis of land surface change over time. While 
these changes are easy to detect, they often have multiple causes that 
are difficult to infer from satellite data alone. In the analysis of veg­
etation dynamics, climate variation is clearly an important driving 
force, but not all types of vegetation respond uniformly to climate 
change. Some cropping systems in southwest Asia are heavily buff­
ered against climate variation either by irrigation or by careful as­
sessment of risk. In other systems, enforced schedules of crop 
rotation or speculative cultivation in marginal areas can amplify 
minor climate fluctuations considerably (Nguyen 1989). 
One very useful approach to isolating climate effects on vegeta­
tion is the vegetation condition index (VCI), proposed by Kogan 
(1993) for use in drought monitoring. This index is computed for a 
particular time point in a long, cyclical time series by comparing the 
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NDVI value of each image pixel to that pixel’s maximum and mini­
mum value at the same time point in all years spanned by the series. 
The result, typically scaled between 0 and 100%, provides a relative 
measure of vegetation cover within the ecological parameters of each 
vegetation type. In other words, the VCI attempts to normalize 
ecological variability across the image and to emphasize changes due 
to relatively high frequency meteorological fluctuations. 
In Figure 8, we use the 8-km pathfinder AVHRR dataset to com­
pute the VCI across southwest Asia in April for four years character­
ized by markedly different precipitation patterns. In each image, the 
approximate distribution of rainfall during the preceding six months 
Figure 8	 Vegetation condition indices (VCIs) for April of four successive years. Contours show the approximate distribution of total November-
April precipitation for each year. 
(November-April) is represented by 200mm contours derived from 
the Global Precipitation Climatology Project’s Combined Precipita­
tion dataset (Huffman et al. 1997). This analysis highlights both the 
high interannual variability of rainfall and vegetation state across 
southwest Asia and the strong correlation between these two variables. 
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MONITORING THE INTENSIFICATION AND EXPANSION 
OF PRODUCTION 
A steady expansion of cereal cultivation into regions used tradi­
tionally as rangeland has been underway for decades in southwest 
Asia. The principal crop sown in these marginal areas is barley, and 
a graph of annual changes in its harvested area in Iraq and Syria 
shows rapid increase throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Figure 
9). This increase is due in large part to the growing economic im­
portance of barley and barley straw for livestock feed as sheep and 
goat numbers far exceed the carrying capacity of available range­
land. Much of this cultivation has been carried out on very large 
scales, and tractors are often used to plow and sow fields several 
kilometers in extent. If adequate rain falls, crop production can be 
very high, but crop failure is very common during normal or dry 
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Figure 9	 Trends in irrigation and barley cultivation in Syria and Iraq, 1960-1995 (from FAO/ 
FAOstat). 
years. Because deep plowing destroys the natural vegetation com­
munities adapted to local climatic conditions, cultivation in the 
steppe can result in serious erosion hazards and rapid deterioration 
of forage production. Although cultivation of marginal zones is now 
outlawed in many countries, identifying areas where high-risk culti­
vation has occurred and continues to occur can aid in formulating 
conservation strategies and revising policy. 
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To identify areas where high risk agriculture was practiced dur­
ing the 1980s and early 1990s, we have summed March and April 
NDVI maxima computed from the 8-km Pathfinder AVHRR dataset 
for each year between 1982 and 1994. The resulting series of 13 
images shows the approximate density and distribution of green 
vegetation across the study area just before the maturation and 
harvest of winter crops. We then calculated the standard deviation 
of this series for each image pixel and divided the result by the series 
Figure 10	 Marginal agriculture in semi-arid southwest Asia. Standard deviation of March-April 
NDVI divided by mean of March-April NDVI. 
mean (Figure 10). Low values of this ratio indicate stable spring 
NDVI values as expected in core agricultural areas, healthy range­
land, and barren desert. High values, on the other hand, indicate 
areas where spring NDVI fluctuates strongly about a lowered mean 
or where agriculture has been introduced or abandoned during the 
period of observation. The distribution of high values therefore 
provides a useful tool for recognizing areas where vegetation cover 
has changed significantly during the period of observation. 
The three regions highlighted in this analysis are A) the lower 
Jazirah in eastern Syria and Northern Iraq, B) the Hakkari and Van 
provinces of southeastern Turkey, and C) small areas along the 
branches of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers in southern Iraq. Of 
these regions, only the first corresponds to regions where extensive 
dry farming of cereals is practiced. A plot of the full NDVI time 
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Figure 12 Landsat MSS (top) and SIR-C 
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Figure 11 Mean NDVI values as a function of time, northeastern Syria test area. 
series from a roughly 400 km2 area within this zone confirms high 
interannual variation of vegetation cover about a low mean (Figure 
11). In the last two years of the time series, NDVI values rise sharply, 
signaling either unusually high rainfall (which did not occur) or a 
qualitative change in land-use practices. 
Higher resolution satellite data (Figure 12) allow further analysis 
of land use change in this area. A Landsat MSS image acquired June 
1975 (top) shows barley cultivation on an extremely large scale. 
Fallow and plowed fields, which appear pink and green respectively, 
are often several kilometers in length and are arranged haphazardly 
across a broad basin where deep calcic soils have developed in a 
region with otherwise very limited agricultural potential. This pat­
tern is a clear result of the use of mechanized plows to till large areas 
in hopes of abundant winter and spring rains. A second image ac­
quired nearly twenty years later by an imaging radar system on 
board the Space Shuttle (bottom), shows that these broad fields have 
been subdivided into hundreds of smaller parcels. This change, 
which began in 1993, resulted from the discovery and exploitation 
of ground water reserves and represents a transition from extensive 
dry farming to intensive irrigation. 
The rapid growth of irrigation elsewhere in southwest Asia over 
the past two decades (cf Figure 9) can also be investigated through a 
combination of moderate and high resolution satellite data. Because 
much of the irrigation agriculture in the region is practiced in the 
summertime, when dry farming is impossible, it is easy to recognize 
irrigated areas by elevated August-September NDVI. In addition, 
because of higher ground surface temperatures and increased evapo­
(bottom) imagery depicting the ex­
pansion of irrigated farming in the Jebel 
‘Abd-al ‘Aziz region, eastern Syria. 
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Figure 13 Intensification of irrigated agriculture in semi-arid southwest Asia. Standardized difference between mean August-
September AVHRR Channel 5 brightness temperature in 1993-4 and 1981-2 subtracted from standardized 
difference between August-September NDVI in 1993-4 and 1981-2. 
transpiration during the summer, irrigated fields may also be recog­
nized by their comparatively low emission in the thermal infrared 
wavelengths. To map areas where irrigation increased or decreased 
between 1981 and 1994, we computed and standardized the differ­
ence between mean August-September NDVI in 1993-94 and 1981­
82 and between mean brightness temperatures at the two time 
points. A simple difference of these values (NDVI-Temperature) 
assigns high values to pixels where NDVI has increased and tem­
peratures have decreased and low values to areas where NDVI has 
decreased and temperatures increased. 
The spatial distribution of this index is shown in Figure 13. High 
values correspond well to known locations of major irrigation 
projects: A) the Ceyhan valley in southern Turkey, B) the Maskanah 
region of central Syria, C) the Harran plain (GAP project area) of 
south central Turkey, D) the Ceylanpinar-Ras al-‘Ain region on the 
Turkish-Syrian border, E) the upper Tigris valley, and F) the 
Hamrin region of northern Iraq. The analysis also highlights areas 
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Figure 14 NDVI and summer cultivation profiles of the Harran Plain, Southeastern Turkey. 
where summer vegetation has declined significantly such as the 
marshes of southern Iraq (G) and the shores of the Caspian Sea (H). 
As in the preceding analysis, much more can be learned about the 
nature of vegetation changes in specific areas by examining the full 
time series of NDVI values. Figure 14 shows the NDVI profile of a 
1500 km2 region of the Harran plain in southern Turkey (area C, 
Figure 13). Between 1981 and 1987, the characteristic seasonal 
NDVI cycle of the region was characterized by a large late winter-
early spring peak representing dry-farming in the region and by a 
second, considerably smaller peak in July-August indicating limited 
summer cultivation. After 1987, however, the size of the late sum­
mer peak grew rapidly as water from deep wells and later from the 
Attaturk dam was used to irrigate larger areas each year. 
The magnitude and spatial distribution of these changes can be 
seen clearly in a pair of late summer Landsat images of the Harran 
plain in 1984 and 1992 (Figure 15). In this color combination, 
which approximates that of an infrared aerial photograph, vegeta­
tion (mostly cotton) appears bright red due to its strong reflectance 
in the infrared wavelengths. Using unsupervised classification tech­
niques to distinguish cultivated from fallow land, we estimate that 
between these two time points, the extent of summer irrigation on 
the Harran plain increased from 15,000 ha to more than 45,000. 
Similar estimates from images from 1985, 1987, and 1990 provide 
further information about the timing of this growth and generally 
confirm trends apparent in the AVHRR data (Figure 14). 
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Figure 15 Expansion of summer irrigation in the Harran Plain (GAP project area), southeastern Turkey. 
ESTIMATING BIOPHYSICAL PARAMETERS 
256 
As demonstrated in the preceding examples, two key aspects of 
the SWAP methodology are a multi-sensor approach and the use of 192 
satellite data from archives maintained over the past 20-30 years by 
the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA), the 
Digital 
Number 128 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and other national and interna­
64 
tional agencies. Successful integration of data acquired by different 
instruments at different times and under different conditions re­ 0 
quires careful attention to the different sensitivities and calibration 70 
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 
of satellite sensors as well as to the effects of atmospheric aerosols 60 
and gases on the transmission of electromagnetic radiation. 50 
To illustrate the importance of these considerations, we have Reflectance 40 
selected two Landsat TM images of the Palmyra region in Syria, (%) 30 
taken one month apart (August 31 and October 10, 1984). Because 20 
vegetation and land-use changes are minimal in the region during 10 
this time of year, the spectral signatures of corresponding areas on 0 
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 
the two images should be nearly identical. A plot of the average pixel Wavelength (microns) 
values of four different 20 ha test areas present in both images, Urban 30 August Urban 1 October 
Soil 30 August Soil 1 October 
however, shows no clear similarity between the spectra of each test Palm grove 30 August Palm Grove 1 October 
Marl 30 August Marl 1 October 
area on the two different dates and no systematic difference among 
the spectra of the different test areas (Figure 16, top). These results, Figure 16 Comparison of raw (DN) and 
which bode poorly for the use of satellite images to analyze land reflectance spectra for test areas in 
the Palmyra Basin, central Syria.surface changes over time, have two main causes. First, differences 
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in the relative positions of the satellite, the sun, and the earth’s 
surface at each time point can result in significant differences in the 
amount of sunlight illuminating the earth’s surface and the amount 
that is reflected toward the satellite sensor. Second, the intensity of 
solar radiation varies significantly across the visible and near-infra­
red wavelengths and different scaling factors are used to convert 
satellite-measured radiances within each wave band into digital 
numbers for computer image analysis. By applying known calibra­
tion equations for each wave band to recover pixel radiances mea­
sured at the satellite and normalizing these for the viewing angle of 
the sensor, digital numbers can be converted into estimates of sur­
face radiance that are comparable across space and time. By further 
dividing this result by the total amount of incident solar radiation in 
each waveband, radiance spectra can be converted to reflectance, a 
dimensionless quantity that allows the integration and comparison 
of spectra obtained by many different kinds of sensors in orbit, in 
the field, or in the laboratory. Although these operations neatly 
recover coherent and reproducible reflectance spectra from satellite 
data (Figure 16, bottom), full integration of multitemporal and 
multisource spectral data must consider also the more subtle (but 
cumulatively significant) effects of changing atmospheric condi­
tions, degradation of satellite sensors over time, and complex 
changes in the reflectance of different materials under varying illu­
mination and viewing conditions. 
Once reproducible and physically meaningful spectral measure­
ments are obtained from satellites, they can be combined with the 
results of field investigation to develop techniques for estimating 
ground surface properties. The use of multispectral reflectance data 
to estimate physical parameters such as leaf area index, as well as 
related climate and soil conditions is well-established (Wiegand et 
al. 1992; Penuelas et al. 1992; Moran et al. 1996). Considerable 
improvement in the accuracy and spatial scale of these estimates is 
expected with the development and launch of new sensor systems 
that better describe surface reflectance characteristics. These ad­
vances along with improved temporal coverage, will enable the 
routine use of satellite data for agro-ecological characterization, 
precision farming, and agricultural decision support systems. 
Taking full advantage of improvements in satellite sensor design 
depends on accurate characterization of the reflectance properties of 
major crops at different stages of their growth cycles and in different 
soil conditions. Very few studies of these relationships have been 
carried out in southwest Asia, and considerable research remains to 
be done before satellite-derived data can be fully integrated into 
agricultural research and development in the region. For this reason, 
  

     
we have begun a program of field research that uses portable spec­
trometers to acquire high-resolution spectra from crops in different 
settings and stages of growth. Much of this fieldwork is scheduled 
during times of satellite overpass to insure the comparability of in 
situ and satellite data. 
This research, carried out in collaboration with scientists from 
the International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas 
(ICARDA), has focused primarily on the region around Aleppo, 
Syria, where rainfall varies between 300 and 350 mm/year. The first 
season of field research in this region during the late summer and 
early autumn of 1997 focused on major irrigated crops such as 
cotton (Gossypium), potato (Solanum erianthum), soybeans (Glycine 
max), corn (Zea mays), sunflower (Helianthus), and various veg­
etables. At each of 231 different locations, we measured the spectral 
characteristics of crop and soil, and took samples for laboratory 
measurement of wet biomass and leaf areas index. In the analysis of 
these data we have focused on characterizing the relationship be­
tween conventional spectral indices such as NDVI and developing 
new indices which are more closely related the physical characteris­
tics of different crops. In general, we found that NDVI explained 
between 50 and 80% of the observed variability in wet biomass and 
leaf area index for the five crops intensively studied. The closest 
relationship between spectral and biophysical variables was observed 
for cotton and soybean (Figure 17). In most cases, the relationships 
between the variables were non-linear, as other researchers have 
found (e.g. Wiegand et al. 1992). 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have illustrated some modern methods for 
analyzing spatial and temporal patterns of climate and vegetation in 
southwest Asia. These methods combine conventional climate ob­
servations, multispectral satellite data, and computer-intensive 
interpolation and clustering algorithms. When combined with more 
systematic fieldwork, these approaches may ultimately provide the 
level of completeness and accuracy needed for modeling, monitor­
ing and managing the rapidly changing environment of the region. 
As the quality and accessibility of satellite data improve, we should 
expect wider application and rapid improvement of the methods. 
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Ecopeace: A Model Organization for Regional Cooperation in the Middle East 
Gidon Bromberg 
Environmental Movements and Problems in Egypt 
Nicholas Hopkins 
Ecotourism from Petra to Palmyra: New Age Trauma 
Linda Schilcher 
Moderator: Nancy Ruther 
Discussant: Brian Spooner 
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION 
J. A. Allan, Youssef Barkoudah, Brian Spooner 
Moderator: Frank Hole 
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Conference Poster Sessions 
Monitoring Irrigation Development in the Harran Basin, Turkey, 
Using Landsat MSS Imagery 
Jeff Albert and Nick Kouchoukos, Yale University 
Cultural Identity and Communal Politicization in the Resettled 
Nomadic Environment: The Case of the Israeli Negev Bedouin 
Stephen C. Dinero, Philadelphia College 
The Importance of Group Affiliation, Land Use and Ideology in Shaping 
Perceptions of the Extent and Causes of Desertification in the 
Southern West Bank 
Steven Gasteyer, Iowa State University 
Classifying Vegetation in the Semi-Arid Near East Using Fourier Series 
Techniques 
Art Gleason, Yale University 
The Marshlands of Southern Iraq: A Forgotten Environment 
Sayyed Nadeem A. Kazmi, Al-Khoei Foundation 
Origins of Islam: Socio-Political and Socio-Ecological Contexts 
Andrey Korotayev, Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
Developing Sustainable Water Management in the Jordan Valley 
Rudolph Orthofer, Austrian Research Centre 
Transformation of the Environment in the History of Ancient Egypt 
Dmitry B. Proussakov, Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
Syria’s Agricultural Development and Environmental Concerns: 
Conflicts and Solutions 
Gloria Saliba, University of California, Los Angeles 
Remote Sensing Analysis of Irrigation-Associated Land Use Changes in 
Southeastern Turkey: Possible Relation to Increased Incidence of Malaria 
Antoinette Wannebo, Columbia University 
Risk and Transformation of Water Use Governance in the Middle East: 
A Systems Perspective 
Jeroen Warner, University of Groningen 
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Conference Participants 
AMIR A. AFKHAMI Yale University 
ABDUL RAHMAN AL-AWADI Regional 
Organization for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment, Kuwait 
JEFF ALBERT Yale University 
J. A. ALLAN University of London 
ABBAS AMANAT Yale University 
FARHAD ATASH University of Rhode Island 
YOUSSEF BARKOUDAH International Plant 
Genetic Resources Institute 
PETER BEAUMONT University of Wales 
LOIS BECK Washington University 
MENAKHEM BEN-YAMI  Consultant 
MAGNUS BERNHARDSSON Yale University 
HYND BOUHIA Harvard University 
GIDON BROMBERG Ecopeace 
MARTIN BUNTON University of Victoria 
PETER CHRISTENSEN University of Copenhagen 
HEIDI CULLEN Columbia University 
KEITH CRESSMAN FAO-Rome 
AHMAD DALLAL Yale University 
DAVID DEROSA Yale University 
STEVEN DINERO Philadelphia College 
SHARIF S. ELMUSA Institute for Palestine Studies 
PAUL WARD ENGLISH University of Texas, Austin 
IZZAT FEIDI FAO-Rome 
KAREN POLINGER FOSTER Yale University 
STEPHEN GASTEYER Iowa State University 
ART GLEASON University of Maryland 
DANIEL GOLANI Hebrew University 
JOSEPH A. GREENE Harvard University 
NADER HABIBI Yale University 
DANIEL HILLEL University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
FRANK HOLE Yale University 
NICHOLAS HOPKINS American University of Cairo 
A.A. JARADAT	 International Plant Genetic 
Resources Institute 
AMY T. JOHNSON Harvard University 
SAYEED NADEEM A. KAZMI Al-Khoei Foundation 
ANDREAS KELESHIS FAO-Cyprus 
ROGER KENNA Yale University 
ALISTAIR KIRK University of Durham 
JOHN KOLARS University of Michigan 
ANDREY KOROTAYEV Oriental Institute of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences 
NICHOLAS KOUCHOUKOS Yale University 
GERRY LEMCKE Swiss Federal Institute for 
Environmental Science 
RUSANNE LOW University of Minnesota 
MICHAEL MANN University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
BEHROOZ MORVARIDI University of Bradford 
THOMAS NORDBLUM International Center for 
Agricultural Research in Dry Areas, Syria 
BERNARD O’KANE American University of Cairo 
RUDOLF ORTHOFER Austrian Research Center, 
Seibersdorf 
CHRISTOPHER PASTORE University of Pennsylvania 
WALTER PEARSON Western Washington University 
ATTILIO PETRUCCIOLI Islamic Environmental Design 
Research Centre, Italy 
LUKE POWELL Middlebury, Vermont 
DMITRY PROUSSAKOV Oriental Institute of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences 
W. MICHAEL REISMAN Yale Law School 
CYNTHIA ROSENZWEIG Columbia University 
NANCY RUTHER Yale University 
GLORIA SALIBA University of California, Los Angeles 
LINDA SCHILCHER University of Arkansas 
URI SHAMIR Technion, Israel 
RONALD SMITH Yale University 
BRIAN SPOONER University of Pennsylvania 
SUSANNE H. STEINMANN Clark University 
STEVEN STOLL Yale University 
HEIDI A. WALCHER Yale University 
ANTOINETTE WANNEBO Columbia University 
JEROEN WARNER University of Groningen 
HARVEY WEISS Yale University 
DALE WHITTINGTON University of North Carolina 
ONN WINCKLER University of Haifa 
AARON WOLF Oregon State University 
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Council on Middle East Studies
 
YALE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES 
The Council on Middle East Studies at Yale University, chaired by Abbas Amanat, is a member of the 
Yale Center for International and Area Studies. The Council works to coordinate offerings relating to the 
Middle East among various departments of the university and enhances the permanent resources available 
on campus by sponsoring discussions and lectures by visiting scholars as well as conferences and work­
shops. The Council also provides information concerning grants, fellowships, research programs, and 
foreign study opportunities and disseminates information to the Yale community regarding study of the 
Middle East in the vicinity of New Haven, and is involved in the outreach effort carried out by the program 
in International Studies. 
The Council’s recent projects include a year-long seminar on “Millennialism: Motifs and Movements” 
(a Mellon/Sawyer Seminar, 1998), an international conference on Islamic Law (1994) and the 1997 confer­
ence “Transformations of Middle Eastern Natural Environments.” Projects of the Council planned for the 
future include a conference on Arabic and Persian medieval literature, a series of conferences on American-
Middle Eastern relations (economic, political, and cultural) and a study of water management in the 
Middle East. 
More information about the Council can be found on the following website: http://www.yale.edu/ycias/cmes. 
Bulletin Series
 
YALE SCHOOL OF FORESTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 
The Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies Bulletin Series, begun in 1912, issues faculty and 
student monographs, symposia and conference proceedings, and other reports of environmental interest. 
For information about ordering copies of this or other Yale F&ES Bulletin titles listed below, contact: 
Bulletin Series, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 205 Prospect St., New Haven CT 06511, 
USA; e-mail: jane.coppock@yale.edu; or visit our website at: http://www.yale.edu/ forestry/publications. 
Bulletin 102. Resource Use in the Trinational Sangha River Region of Equatorial Africa: Histories, Knowledge 
Forms, and Institutions/Utilisation des Ressources Naturelles dans la Région Trinationale du Fleuve Sangha: 
Histoires, Savoirs et Institutions. Yale University Conference. 1998. 
Bulletin 101. Bridges to Sustainability: Business and Government Working Together for a Better Environment. 
Yale/UNDP Program on Public-Private Partnerships. 1997.
 
Bulletin 100. Restoration of an Urban Salt Marsh: an Interdisciplinary Approach. Yale Center for Coastal and
 
Watershed Systems. 1997.
 
Bulletin 99. The Ecotourism Equation: Measuring the Impacts. International Society of Tropical Foresters
 
Conference at Yale. 1996.
 
Bulletin 98. Local Heritage in the Changing Tropics: Innovative Strategies for Natural Resource Management
 
and Control. International Society of Tropical Foresters Conference at Yale. 1995.
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